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Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation focuses on the study of interreligious violence, civic peace, and 
citizenship in the Christian-Muslim conflict zone of Maluku (the Moluccas) in eastern Indonesia, 
especially in the region of Ambon. Violent conflict between Christians and Muslims broke out in 
the region on january 19, 1999, and continued for four years. Against this backdrop, the 
dissertation investigates factors underlying the interreligious violence as well as those shaping 
post-conflict peace and citizenship. The project examines the role of religious networks, 
organizations, and discourses before, during, and after the mayhem. It also explores the 
dynamics ofMaluku's religious groups, government institutions, and civil society associations in 
responding to violence and reconciliation. 
The research, conducted from February 1, 2010, to March 30, 2011, utilizes 
ethnographic fieldwork, network and associational analysis, as well as historical and 
comparative research on the social formation of religious identities and associations in the 
Maluku region. It also draws on a questionnaire of one hundred former members of militia 
groups, both Christians and Muslims. 
The dissertation shows, first, that relations between Christians and Muslims in Maluku 
were not previously pacific but have been marked by competition and violence since European 
colonial times. Second, in the first phases of the Maluku wars, religious identities and discourses 
xi 
figured prominently in the framing and exacerbation of the strife. Third, synergy between state 
and society actors has been the key to stopping the mass violence and resolving conflict. The 
findings contrast with previous analyses that (1) portray pre-war Maluku as a stable area, (2) 
place singular emphasis on the political economy of the conflict, and (3) neglect the contribution 
of government in the peacemaking process. 
Fourth, while in some parts of Indonesia religious groups eagerly promote the 
application of Islamic Shari' a such as in Aceh or of Christian Law such as in Papua, the question 
of religious law did not figure prominently in Maluku. Fifth, in the aftermath of religious 
violence, ethnic difference, identification with clan, and regionalism are becoming more 
pronounced. If not addressed appropriately, these forces could serve as the sources for renewed 
collective conflict in the years to come. 
xii 
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Glossary and Abbreviations 
ABS Ambonsche Burgerschoo/ (A European school set up in Ambon in the 1850s and 
1860s for the children of Ambonese burgers). 
Adat System of mores or customary law; custom; tradition. 
AM GPM Angkatan Muda Gereja Protestan Maluku (Youth Organization of the Moluccan 
Protestant Church). 
Agas Derived from the name of a small-type of mosquito, it refers to a group of child 
Christian militias. 
Alhilal Ambonese Arab-sponsored Islamic institutions of learning across the Moluccas. 
It has some 200 madrasas (Islamic schools) and one university (Universitas 
Alhilal in Ambon city). 
Alifuru A generic term for the hill tribes in Maluku, especially from Seram Island, 
traditionally having derogatory connotations of someone bad-mannered, 
uncultured and uncivilized; the term is also used locally to indicate that part of 
the population that has adhered to the indigenous cultures, resisting the 
influences of both Islam and Christianity. 
Anak Negeri Lit. "son of negeri" or village (it refers to a sort of "indigenous people"; the term 
is used by AmbonesejMalukans as an "identity marker" of their native status, 
aiming at differentiating themselves from the "migrants"). 
Anak dagang Lit. "son of trade" (the term is used by Ambonese for migrants or outsiders, 
particularly from Sulawesi, who came to Ambon to do business). 
APRMS Angkatan Perang Republik Maluku Selatan (Armed Forces of the Republic of the 
South Moluccas). 
Aroha Derived from "roh" (spirit), the term refers to the spirits of the ancestors and 
the spirit of Prophet Muhammad. In Hatuhaha of Haruku Island, aroha is also 
called "manian" or "perayaangaharu," a celebration of aloes-wood incense 
burning. 
Bahasa tanah Indigenous language(s) of the Ambonese island. 
BaileojBaileu Ambonese traditional village meeting hall; village council house; center of 
community and ad at religion. 
Baku Bae Traditional mechanism of conflict resolution and reconciliation in Ambon and 
central Maluku; restoration after quarrel. 
Batu pamali Ambonese term for a sacred offering stone. 
XV 
BBM Stands for "Buton, Bugis, Makassar" (a reference to three of the major ethnic 
groups from South and Southeast Sulawesi known for their inter-island trading 
and settlement outside their homeland. It also denotes a certain antipathy 
towards these people as having their rights and privileges usurped from those 
with whom they have traded and settled. The term is common not only in 
AmbonjMaluku but also in other parts of eastern Indonesia, including Papua). 
Bappeda Bad an Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning 
Board). 
BPS Bad an Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics). 
Brimob Brigadir Mobil (Mobile Brigade). 
Bupati Head of regency (kabupaten). 
Burger A group of Ambonese or Eurasians known as free citizens (orang bebas or 
merdeka). In return for the services rendered to the Dutch East Indies Company 
(VOC), these groups-and their descendents-were declared to be free 
citizens, namely, free from the compulsory services for the VOC and the 
obligations of the spice monopoly. The Burger settlement in Ambon City is now 
called "Mardika," derived from the Dutch Mardijkers (lit. the "free people"). 
Cakalele Maluku's traditional war dance involving a sword and shield. 
Camat Head of sub-regency or kecamatan. 
Coker Stands for co wok keren ("handsome youths"); it refers to a group of Christian 
gangs led by Berty Lou patty (based in Kudamati of Ambon city). 
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Indonesian Legislative Assembly). 
DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Indonesian parliament at provincial and 
regional level). 
Fam A collection of a number of clan groups (ranging from 15 to 25) organized on 
the patrilineal-patrilocal principle. 
FKM Front Kedau/atan Maluku (Moluccan Sovereignty Front). 
GPM Gereja Protestan Maluku (Moluccan Protestant Church). 
lAIN Institute Agama Islam Negeri (the State Institute of Islamic Studies). 
lCMl Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals 
Association). 
lndische Kerk State Church of the Indies. 
xvi 
Inlander 
Kabong 
Kabupaten 
Kampung 
burger 
Kapata 
Kapitang 
Kapolres 
Kepala soa 
Kecamatan 
Kewang 
Kodim 
KNIL 
Kompeni 
Kopassus 
KOSTRAD 
Kudaputih 
Landraad 
Langgar 
Laskar jihad 
Linggis 
Midras 
Marin yo 
Dutch term for native. 
Ambonese term for garden. 
Administrative district or regency. 
Burger village. 
Traditional greeting formulas and shorthand histories consisting of, generally, 
old songs in which episodes of the past are told; Ambonese traditional sung 
verse. 
Ambonese term for adat war leader (i.e. "captain"). 
Kepala Kepolisian Resort (district police chief] .. 
Head of soa (i.e. a collection of kin-groups). 
Administrative sub-regency. 
Ambonese term for head of land/sea affairs. 
Koman do Distrik Militer (military district command). 
Koninklijk Neder/andsch-Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army). 
Indonesian/Malay term for the Dutch (East Indies Company). 
Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Forces Command). 
Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command). 
A faction of Christian fighters in Ambon led by Agus Wattimena. 
Dutch term for Land Court. 
Prayer house. 
java-based Islamic paramilitary group (founded in early 2000) led by ja'far 
Umar Thalib responsible for the Maluku wars (now the group is inactive). 
A group of Muslim child fighters during the Maluku conflict. 
Ambonese term for the Malay madrasah or Islamic institution of learning. 
Ambonese term for a "soa messenger" (an adat official who broadcasts 
information and announcements from the raja to people in negeri j village). 
xvii 
Matarumah 
MUI 
Muspida 
Negeri 
Negeri lama 
NlCA 
Nunusaku 
Nusa Ina 
Oom 
Orangkaya 
Panglima 
Pancasila 
Pasukan jihad 
Pastor 
Patasiwa/ 
Patalima 
PBB 
Exogamous patrilineal clan (household, patrilineage). 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulemas Council). 
Musyawarah Pimp in an Daerah (regional leadership consultation). 
Ambonese term for village or, more precisely, "adat village" (in 
Indonesian/Malay language the term equals "negara" meaning "state"). 
Ambonese term for "old village," i.e. the original settlements. 
Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. 
The name of the legendary mountain in Seram (the largest island in Maluku) 
and the source of the three rivers (the Eti, the Tala, and the Sapalewa). It is 
traditionally regarded as the beginning and the end, namely the source and the 
destiny of life. 
Ambonese term for "mother land" or Island of Seram. 
A term of address for an older man in Ambon. It originally meant "older 
Ambonese soldier." 
Lit. "wealthy man"; an Ambonese title for a headman in the hierarchy 
established under the Dutch; it is not really a "rich person" as in standard 
Indonesian/Malay, but simply a title granted by the Dutch in the village level 
like raja or patih (at present, such a title no longer exists in Ambon). 
Commander, military or paramilitary (e.g. panglima perang =commander of 
war). 
Indonesian national ideology consisting of five basic principles (panca = five, 
sila =foundation), namely the belief of one God, humanity that is just and 
civilized, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the wisdom of 
representative deliberation, and social justice for all Indonesians. 
Ambonese/Moluccan (including North Moluccan) Islamic militia groups during 
the Maluku wars. 
Priest (for Catholics). 
Lit. "division of nine" (patasiwa), "division offive" (patalima); an alliance 
system on Seram Island dividing the island into two parts corresponding 
roughly to west and east Seram, respectively; found in various forms 
throughout Central and Southeast Maluku. 
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party-" conservative Islamic political 
party"). 
xviii 
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian democratic party-struggle, 
breakaway from Partai Demokrasi Indonesia in late New Order]. 
Pela Traditional inter-village (sometimes inter-clan) relationship. A common term 
in Ambon, pel a refers to traditional ceremonial bonds of friendship and mutual 
obligation established between two or more villages often encompassing both 
Christian and Muslim villages in a single alliance. It is conceived of as an 
enduring and inviolable brotherhood, an alliance that has to be renewed 
regularly through important ceremonies and solemn oaths. 
Pemuda Youth 
Pemekaran Lit. "blossoming"; subdivision of an administrative region such as a province or 
district into two or more smaller ones. 
Pendeta Reverend or pastor (for Protestant). 
Perda Peraturan Daerah (regional regulation). 
Pesantren Islamic boarding school. 
PKS Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera Qustice and Welfare Party, a post-New Order 
Islamic political party). 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, banned in 1965) 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party-Muslim party 
formed by fusion during New Order). 
Putra daerah Lit. "son of the region" (local-born candidates for public office). 
Raja Ambonese term for a village head (Indonesian term for a king); traditional 
village leader in the Ambon area, highest ranked indigenous headman under 
the Dutch system. 
Reformasi Reformation. 
RMS Republik Maluku Selatan (the Republic of the South Moluccas, Ambon-based 
secessionist movement in 1950]. 
Salam-Sarane Ambonese traditional terms for Islam and Christianity. 
Saniri Traditional village council in the Ambon area. 
Satgas Satuan Tug as (task force for security). 
Sekwilda Sekretaris Wilayah Daerah (regional secretary). 
Sinode Synod. 
xix 
Soa Kin-group consisting of a number ofmata rumah; a subdivision of the village 
consisting of a collection of families led by "kepala sod' (head of soa). 
STOVIL School tot Op/eiding van Inlandsleeranen (a religious school for the natives 
established by the Dutch). 
Tenggara Lit. "Southeast." In the Maluku context, the term means "people from Southeast 
Maluku" or the Southerners. 
TN! Ten tara Naslonallndonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces, formerly ABRI = 
Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia-Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia). 
Tete-nene Ambonese term for ancestors (of Ambonese people). 
moyang 
Tete Manis Lit. "Sweet Grandfather"; the everyday term for referring to God parallels the 
Tete Lanlte used in the indigenous religions in Maluku. 
Tuagama Ambonese term for a church caretaker. 
UKJM Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku (the Christian University oflndonesia in 
Maluku) based in Ambon city. 
Uli A traditional village federation found on the Ambon-Lease Islands (e.g. Uli 
Hatuhaha in Haruku Island of Central Maluku). 
Unpatti Universitas Pattimura in Ambon (the only state university in Maluku). 
Upu Lanite Lit. "Lord of Heaven" meaning the deity who descended from the sky to mate 
with the goddess Tapele ("Earth") creating all life prior to withdrawing into the 
sky again. 
Volksraad Peoples' Council. 
VOC Verenlgde Oostindeische Compangnie (Dutch East Indies Company). 
Walikota Mayor. 
Wijkmeester Head ofkampung burger or burgerkampoeng. 
Yon Gab Batalion Gabungan (joint battalion). 
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Part One 
Introduction and Theoretical Framework 
This section consists of two chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 1) outlines the 
dissertation's focus, methodology, general contribution, and structure. The second chapter 
(Chapter 2) explains the dissertation's theoretical framework. It assesses literature on the 
Maluku conflict, anthropological debate of conflict and integration, and the theories and 
approaches used in the dissertation as a whole. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
2 
On May 21, 1998, Indonesia witnessed a dramatic and historic event: the fall of Suharto-
led New Order dictatorial regime that had been in power for over 32 years. The long-ruling 
Suharto (1966-1998) was toppled by an alliance of secular Muslims and non-Muslims, middle 
class societies, democracy activists, students, and some political elites, following the economic 
crises that hit this world's largest Muslim country beginning in late 1997 (cf. Hefner 2000).ln 
the beginning, the process ofpost-Suharto transition went peacefully. Unlike other 
undemocratic countries which commonly turned to deadly violence after a revolution has taken 
place, Indonesia's political transformation, at least at first, remained relatively peaceful. The 
country thus had been widely featured as a Muslim nation which was successful in handling the 
political shift from an authoritarian military regime to a democratic civilian government. 
This nice picture of peaceful and nonviolent "transition toward democracy," however, 
was soon shattered by widespread outbursts of deadly sectarian conflicts and vicious ethno-
religious communal violence in the months following Suharto's overthrow. These events raised 
suspicions that Suharto and his followers were behind the violence. The violent conflicts 
occurred not only in java's main towns and places but also in "outer Indonesia," including in the 
districts of Sambas, Sam pit, Paso, Bima, Ambon, Halmahera, Ternate, and Tobelo. The violence 
resulted in the displacement of some 1.5 million refugees, the deliberate destruction of urban 
and sub-urban areas, thousands of casualties, and a plague of criminality and public lynching ( cf. 
van Klinken 2007; Nordholt and van Klinken, eds. 2007; Pannell, ed. 2003; Headman, ed. 2008; 
Hefner 2005a). 
Of all the conflicts to erupt in Indonesia after 1998, the religious violence in Ambon, one 
of the country's largest urban centers, was the most appalling (van Klinken 2007: 88) in terms of 
3 
the scale of the death and destruction (cf. HRW 1999; ICG 2000a, 2000b). It was also among the 
most complex in term of actors involved in the conflict, phases of violence, and motives behind 
the tragedy (cf. Bohm 2002, 2005). Apart from the 1975 and 1999 savage military onslaughts in 
East Timor (now Timor-Leste), the violence in Ambon (and Maluku) from 1999 to 2004 was the 
most shocking violence seen in the Indonesian history since the anti-communist pogroms of 
1965/1966. 
The violent conflicts between Christians and Muslims from various ethnic groups on 
Ambon and the provinces ofMaluku and North Maluku began on january 19,1999 (cf. ICG 
2000a, 2000b ). These conflicts turned into deadly large-scale communal violence once java-
based armed jihadist Islamic paramilitary groups, especially the Laskar jihad ("holy war" 
militias), with the support of some elite members of military and police, sent several thousand 
fighters to Ambon, the provincial capital of Maluku, in the middle of 2000 (ICG 2001; Noorhaidi 
2002, 2005). As a result of this escalating violence, the previously relatively peaceful Maluku 
became the site of devastating interreligious conflicts. 
Indeed notwithstanding the Maluku's history of separatist resistance to jakarta and 
Indonesian nation-state since the proclamation of the Republic of South Moluccas (Republik 
Maluku Se/atan or RMS) in 1950, Maluku had a reputation during the New Order for enjoying 
relatively harmonious relations between Protestant, Muslim, and Catholic communities. Most 
experts and scholars oflndonesian society thus were baffled when a minor traffic incident in 
january 1999, between two young men of different religion from the regions of Batumerah and 
Mardika (both in Ambon city), triggered a string of violent conflicts between Christians and 
Muslims, spilling over from Ambon city to the corners of the Moluccan archipelago (see the 
detailed description of the Maluku mayhem in Chapter 5). 
The post-Suharto communal riots differ from previous forms that had broken out across 
the country in their nature, forms, patterns, and causes. Unlike the deadly violent conflicts in 
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Aceh and Papua, for instance, which are deeply-rooted in the prolonged issues of regionalism, 
sociopolitical injustice, economic discrimination, state-sponsored exploitation, and jakarta-
controlled development, the sequence of mass violence that emerged in post-New Order 
Indonesia is a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained simply under the rubric of "ethnic 
conflict," "religious violence," or "Islamist terrorism." In addition, the post-Suharto social chaos 
has considerable temporal specificity, shifting from one sort of violence to another in terms of 
its modalities. In addition, unlike violence in Aceh or Papua which is far away from ethno-
religious issues, the violence that took place in the final years and post-New Order era was 
marked by an ethno-religious nature ( cf. Side! 2006; Bertrand 2004; Wilson 2008). 
In his study of ethno-nationalist conflicts and collective violence in South Asia, the 
Harvard anthropologist Stanley Tambiah (1991, 1996) has observed that if scattered incidents 
oflocal brawls are to become full-blown communal wars, the tensions and resentments of 
everyday life must be removed from their place of origin and generalized into encompassing 
narratives of ethnic victimization and enmity. Tambiah refers to this process as "focalization" 
and "transvaluation." Tambiah (1996: 81) says, "Focalization progressively denudes local 
incidents and disputes of their contextual particulars, and transvaluation distorts, abstracts, and 
aggregates those incidents into larger collective issues of national or ethnic interest." 
It is precisely this process that gave the conflict in Ambon and Maluku such an 
incendiary quality after 1999. What had begun as local grievances and a patchwork of alliances 
was gradually abstracted and focalized into a narrative of a religious clash by "the active 
presence of agents who have the discursive resources and social authority to disseminate a 
meta-narrative of communal peril and riposte" (Hefner 2005: 283). 
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Focus of the Dissertation 
Against this backdrop, the dissertation aims to explore two general issues. First, it 
examines the interreligious violence between Muslims and Christians in Maluku (the 
Moluccas)', particularly in the region of Ambon. The term "Muslims" refers to mainly Ambonese 
or Moluccan Muslims coming from across the province's islands such as Ambon, Lease, Seram, 
Buru, and Banda, as well as some groups of Mus lim migrants, particularly Butonese, Bugis-
Makassarese, and Javanese. The term "Christians" refers mostly to Protestants linked to the 
Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku), the biggest Christian congregation in the 
Moluccas, except on the regions of Southeast Maluku, where Catholics hold the majority. In the 
latter region, particularly in Kei, Tual, and Tanimbar, the violence occurred between Muslims 
and Catholics. 
The second issue it will examine is the efforts of local Christians and Muslims to resolve 
conflict and prevent renewed violence. More specifically, it focuses on the role of Maluku's and 
Ambon's local governments, religious leaders, and "civil" society in the process of Christian-
Muslim peacebuilding and reconciliation. This thesis, then, is an ethnographic account of social 
change throughout and after collective violence on the northeastern islands of Ambon and 
Maluku. The underlying argument of this dissertation is that it is insufficient to study only 
conflict and violence; integration and cooperation are also significant social phenomena that 
require documentation, analysis, interpretation, and explanation. In addition, I assert that not 
only should we be concerned with reducing violence, but that collaboration needs to be further 
developed. 
I wondered, while writing this dissertation, why do we find so many detailed studies 
about violence and war and so few about reconciliation and human peace? Why are so many 
'In this dissertation, the Indonesian Maluku is used interchangeably with the English 
Moluccas, and the word "Moluccan" is applied interchangeably with that of "Malukan" to depict its 
habitants or as an objective. 
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anthropologists attracted to the study of human conflict, aggression, and violence, either 
individual or collective, while conciliation, both interpersonal and intergroup, receives relatively 
short shrift? In this light, my dissertation can be viewed as an academic endeavor to reassess 
religious elements that can be used, on one hand, as a source for reducing, eliminating, and 
transforming conflict, and on the other hand, as a resource for fostering integration, democratic 
civility, and religious pluralism. 
This dissertation, in particular, investigates factors underlying the interreligious 
communal violence that erupted in Maluku from 1999 to 2004, as well as those hindering the 
post-conflict resolution and peacemaking. It therefore explores not only the question of why and 
how the deadly Christian-Muslim fighting occurred in a region which had formerly been seen as 
a stable area and a "peaceful society," but also how these differing and competing religious 
groups portray the violent past, engage the current uneasy peace, and provide models of, and 
for, future coexistence. 
Giving these issues on the central focus of analysis, it means that this dissertation tries 
to go beyond the "standard question" posed by scholars oflndonesia or Maluku, that is: "why did 
Maluku's Christians and Muslims become involved in such communal violence?" The term 
"communal violence" refers to those cases in which ordinary people or civil populations steadily 
fight each other over a certain period oftime ( cf. Brass 1997; Adam 2009). Addressing the query 
of "why Maluku fell into such massive conflict" is unquestionably significant. Such a question can 
provide political, cultural, and sociological insight into the forces that underlay the mayhem. 
Such a question, however, is not enough to comprehend the dynamics, complexity, and 
varieties of collective violence. Other specific questions are thus needed to complement the 
initial query. Instead of simply asking "why conflict erupts," this dissertation tries to elaborate, 
for instance, "why some conflicts in some places last longer than others," "what motivates 
ordinary people to continue fighting that could jeopardize their lives," or "why some people 
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eagerly engage in the warfare while others refuse it or even support peace project." Such 
questions are intended to address a change that might take place on the ground in the wartime 
and its aftermath. Addressing these queries furthermore is needed since the Maluku conflict was 
not a homogenous incident but rather a "heterogeneous riot" that erupted in a number of stages 
involving various actors, motives, and interests. 
This dissertation, moreover, examines the role of religious networks, organizations, 
discourses, and practices before, during, and after the collective conflict. It examines if and when 
these social and cultural resources contributed to the unrest, and how they may have helped or 
will have to create a public and pluralist culture capable of bridging ethno-religious divides. The 
thesis investigates whether Maluku's religiously-based organizations and networks became one 
among the contributing structural or ideological influences on actors engaged in the violence. It 
tries to look at whether religious identity played a central role during the conflict or only 
provided symbolism and ideological conviction for their campaign to achieve more worldly 
goals. 
The Maluku conflict thus provides a striking example of the ambiguous role of religion-
or to borrow the term from R. Scott Appleby (2000}, the "ambivalence of the sacred"-in social 
life. While most scholars of the Maluku conflict tend to neglect the important role of religion in 
the violence, I take this issue as a focus of analysis, arguing that, while it was by no means an 
exclusive influence, religion did matter in the warfare and post-conflict settings, whether in 
preserving and aggravating the discord or supporting and improving peace and reconciliation. 
In the context of the Maluku conflict, including the province of North Maluku, it is almost 
impossible to undertake research on the subject without examining the complex role of religion 
since it greatly contributed to the communal riots (cf. Adeney-Risakotta 2005; Wilson 2008; 
Sidel2006}. However, it is also too simple to reduce the complexity of the conflict to just a 
matter of religion without investigating the political economy of being Christians and Muslims in 
the Maluku social field. This study thus tries to combine religious identities and local political 
practices in analyzing the Maluku conflict (see more in Chapters 5-7 on the dynamics and 
complexity of the Maluku violence). 
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Though the dissertation focuses on the social and cultural supports for and against the 
establishment of a post-conflict peace and the framework for multi-religious citizenship, the 
project also examines the continuing challenge exclusivist religious interpretations and 
practices pose for post-conflict processes. This is also a significant point but has ironically been 
ignored by scholars of the Maluku conflict. Maluku's recent religious militancy and exclusivism 
are part of the legacy of the region's civil uprising that challenge the ongoing attempts to 
establish Christian-Muslim peace, reconciliation, and citizenship in the region. Former members 
of militias, Christian fighters, or jihadist groups all have become a hindrance for the region's 
peaceful conflict resolution processes. Considering the importance of this issue, this thesis also 
aims at exploring the dynamics of Maluku's religious groups and civil society associations in 
responding to violence and the post-conflict truce, as well as examining the implications of 
religious networks, associations, and discourses for the peace and for local understandings and 
practices of national citizenship. 
Based on the depiction sketched above, the dissertation thus provides an alternative 
framework for understanding religion, "civil" society, and political practices and their role in 
violence and post-war situations by focusing on the role of religious networks, civil associations, 
and normative discourses; by expanding the focus of conflict/peace studies to the broader level 
involving state-society agency; by moving beyond anthropological studies that have paid great 
attention to violence while neglecting post-war peacemaking and reconciliation; and finally by 
combining little-examined historical archival material with knowledge from the field to 
contribute to the emerging literature on communal violence, conflict resolution/ reconciliation/ 
civic peace, and citizenship. 
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Ambon and Maluku: Settings 
There are several reasons of why I focus on Ambon and not Maluku as a whole. Ambon 
is the name for both the provincial capital of Maluku and an island. These reasons are, first, 
besides being the provincial capital of Maluku, Ambon is the hub of Maluku and the turmoil 
started from this town prior to escalating to the surrounding region. Once the capital of the 
Dutch East Indiesz (VOC), Ambon is also the most populous region in Maluku, within which 
multi-religious and ethnic groups have lived. 
As a "city of migrants," as the Dutch historian GerritKnaap (1991: 105-28) has called it, 
Ambon had been inhabited by people from diverse ethnicities and religions since colonial times 
(cf. Leirissa 1985, 2000). As the home of multi-religious and ethnic groups, Ambon has 
undeniably been an arena of competition, conflict, and power struggle between Christians and 
Muslims (or even between Muslims and Muslims as well as Christians and Christians from 
different denominations, regions, clans, and ethnic backgrounds), Ambonese and non-
Ambonese, as well as settlers and migrants. 
The second reason why I focus on Ambon, both Ambon Island and Ambon city, is that 
the region was most severely affected by the mass violence in the Maluku province (cf. van 
Klinken 2007). The third reason, equally important this region is today highly segregated in 
terms of religion, region, and culture. Everyone coming to this area will immediately recognize 
the diversity of its inhabitants, but they have been divided along religious lines: negeri sal am 
(the "Muslim village") and negeri sarane or serani (the "Christian village"). 
Such divisions actually already existed in the Dutch colonial era (cf. Bartels 1977a; see 
Chapter 3), but the Ambon conflict made the separation worse (cf. Pattikayhatu 2008a). In post-
2 The Australian historian of Ambon Richard Chauvel (1990) has noted that the city of 
Ambon (Amboina] became one of the most significant cities during the authority of the VOC 
(Vereenigde Oost·Indische Compagnie or the Dutch East Indies Company]. It was the administrative 
center and major seaports ofMoiuccan islands, and became the VOC's headquarter prior to Batavia 
(now jakarta] in java. 
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conflict Ambon, people chose to live in an area inhabited by those having the same faith as them. 
Although living in the same village or town, they grouped together with their religious brethren 
in a separate bloc. As a region with a strong "segregated plurality," it is understandable why 
Ambon's social actors have found it difficult to establish sustainable peace and post-conflict 
integration (cf. Pariela 2008; Soumokil2011). 
The municipality of Ambon covers about 40 percent of Ambon lsland's territory. Ambon 
city refers to the commercial and administrative center of the municipality of Ambon and is 
situated on the southern side of Ambon Bay. The remaining 60 percent of Ambon Island is part 
of the kabupaten (regency) of Central Maluku. Furthermore, Ambon city's population in 1990 
was 275,888. After the mass conflict, with huge numbers fleeing or displaced to other areas, the 
population shrunk to 191,561. In the 2006 census, the city of Ambon consists of 258,331 people, 
of whom there are 120,489 Muslims (46.5%), 122,407 Protestants (47.2%), and 15,175 
Catholics (4.6%) (BPS 2007). As of 2010, it had reached 330,355 (BPS 2010), all packed into a 
tiny land area. 
My focus on the region of Ambon is also due to the fact that Maluku is a vast archipelagic 
province and thus it is an unfeasible task to conduct a fieldwork across all islands. However, it 
should be noted, during fourteen months of my research and fieldwork (2010-2011) I travelled 
to nearby islands affected by the region's violence including Seram, Buru, Haruku, and Saparua. 
In the present work, I highlight some findings that result from my visits to these islands. 
Located in eastern Indonesia, Maluku is a group of 1,208 islands which colonial trade 
since the beginning ofthe sixteenth century made famous as the "Spice Islands" for their rich 
supply of nutmeg and cloves (cf. Andaya 1993a; Amal2010a, 2010b; Alwi 2010). It is thus no 
exaggeration to say that Maluku had once been the heart of the Dutch East Indies' spice trade (cf. 
La pian, ed.1982; Leirissa, at. al. 1982). The islands in Maluku cover about 850,000 square 
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kilometers (about 87 percent of which is sea) to the east of Borneo and to the west of Papua, 
running north ofTimor-Leste through to the border with the southern Philippines. 
Until the Moluccan archipelago was divided into two provinces (Maluku and North 
Maluku) in September 1999 under the presidency of B.). Habibie, it had been Indonesia's most 
extensive single province. Ambon city (located on the island of Ambon, also known Amboina), 
the capital of the old undivided province of Maluku, remained the capital in the new Maluku 
province, with Ternate as the provincial capital of the more remote North Maluku. At the time of 
the division into two provinces, the archipelago's population of just over two million, about 
830,000 of whom were in North Maluku, amounted to less than one percent of the Indonesia's 
total population (cf. Hill and Sen 2005; Leirissa, at. a!. 2004). Maluku, moreover, is the home for 
Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics who had once been living in relatively peaceful coexistence. 
The population in Maluku province, estimated in 2000 census as 1.15 million (see Table 1), is 
split almost evenly between Muslims ( 49.1 o/o) and Christians (50%), most of whom are 
Protestant. 
Table 1 
Population of the Maluku Province by Religion, 2000 
Province Urban o/o Rural o/o Total o/o 
Muslim 124,918 43,1 439,117 51.1 564,035 49.1 
Catholic 19,325 6.7 69,252 8.1 88,577 7.7 
Protestant 145,055 50.0 343,576 40.0 488,631 42.5 
Other 661 0.2 7,995 0.9 8,656 0.8 
Total 289,959 100.0 859,940 100.0 1,149,899 100.0 
Source: calculated from Badan PusatStatistik 2001, Population of Indonesia: Results of the 2000 
Population Census, series 12.2. 
Christians are slightly more concentrated in the urban areas, where they represent 
56.7% of the population; Muslims form a slight majority in the rural areas. Catholics have been 
the dominant religious group in Southeast Maluku, especially the islands of Kei and Tanimbar. In 
the 2006 census, the province ofMaluku consists of 1,322,908 people of whom there are 
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798,292 Muslims (60.3%), 425,490 Protestants (32.1 %) and 94,198 Catholics (7.1 %), the rest 
are small minority religions such as Buddhism (BPS 2007). Furthermore, the migrant population 
in the region, composing respectively 9.1% of the total populace, comes mostly from Southeast 
Sulawesi (Butonese and Kendarese), South Sulawesi (Buginese and Makasarese), and java. The 
level of socio-economic imbalance between religious and migrant groups prior to the conflict is 
demonstrated in Table 2, which shows the proportion of the population employed in high-
ranking job (i.e. government officials, professionals, and technicians) in Maluku province in 
1990. These intergroup horizontal inequalities are an important potential cause of conflict, but 
the relationship is not straightforward. High inequalities can persist for many years without 
sparking mass violence. 
Table 2 
Proportion of population in Maluku employed in high-ranking job by religion and 
migrant status, 1990 
Religion Non-Migrant Migrant Combined 
Islam 2.5% 7.4% 3.1% 
Catholic 4.2% 16.7% 4.4% 
Protestant 7.4% 12.7% 7.6% 
All religions 4.4% 8.8% 4.8% 
Source: calculated from sample of Census 1990 (cited in Brown 2004: 26). 
Methodology 
This dissertation was the outcome of fourteen months of research and fieldwork from 
February 1, 2010, to March 30, 2011, in Ambon and the surrounding regions, particularly the 
islands of Buru, Seram, Haruku, and Saparua for ethnographic fieldwork, as well as in jakarta 
and Salatiga (Central java) for gathering relevant historical and archival literature. During my 
field research, I employed three main methodologies: (1) ethnographic fieldwork; (2) network 
and associational analysis; and (3) historical and comparative research on the social formation 
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of religious identities and associations in the Maluku region. The dissertation also draws on a 
questionnaire of one hundred former members of militia groups, both Christians and Muslims. 
The ethnographic fieldwork relied on two key research methods, namely participant 
observation and interviews. The communities in which I carried out ethnographic fieldwork 
were Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims. The multiple origins as well as ethnic and professional 
backgrounds of these religious groups who inhabited the region were taken into consideration. 
In this regard, I engaged and interacted with both natives of Ambon and migrants from various 
ethnicities, especially Butonese, Buginese, and Makassarese as the major migrant groups in 
Ambon. Among these ethnic groups, Ambonese have certainly been dominant since the Dutch 
made the town their center of power in the early 17th century. More specifically, I took part in 
the events and practices such as ritual festivals, religious ceremonies, public sermons, group 
gatherings, interfaith dialogue meetings, public performances, religious educations, and other 
forms of routine activities held by the region's religious, "civil" organizations affiliated with 
Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims.' 
The second method I applied during the ethnographic fieldwork was interviews. I 
employed various types of interviewing methods depending upon the informants, including 
informal interviewing, unstructured, and in-depth or semi-structured interviewing (cf. Bernard 
2006: 210-12]. The use of a variety of types of interviewing was needed since my informants 
varied ranging from ordinary townspeople and ex-militia members to high-level bureaucrats 
3 These organizations and networks included Gereja Protestant Maluku (the largest 
Protestant organization in the Moluccas], Keuskupan Diosis Amboina (Maluku's largest Catholic 
organization], Maluku branch oflndonesian Ulama Council (MUI], Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah (Indonesia's first and second largest Muslim social welfare organizations regarded 
as politically moderate], Lembaga An tar !man Maluku (the region's interreligious organization], Tim 
20 Wayame, Yayasan Hualopu, and jaringan Baileo Maluku (the province's respected civic 
associations devoted to the empowerment of society], Dewan Latupati Maluku (a group consisted of 
adat/community leaders], various Islamic groups such as Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam Maluku, 
Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala, Badan Koordinasi Pemuda dan Remaja Masjid Maluku, Yayasan al-
Khairat and Pengurus Besar Persaudaraan Muslim Nus a Ina. Equally important was Gerakan 
Perempuan Peduli (Concerned Woman's Movement], an interreligious female group that contributed 
to the peace processes. 
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and elite members of a community. In general, I conducted this particular kind of interview with 
members of both Christian and Muslim communities of Ambon's major ethno-linguistic groups. 
Select informants included those who supported and refused the Malina II peace accord in 
particular and the ideas of post-conflict Christian-Muslim reconciliation in general. 
Those interviewed for this research also consisted of state-society representatives. 
Representation of state-society groups in undertaking the interviews was needed since the 
creation of post-conflict culture of citizenship requires the collaboration of the two. In short, the 
informants represented ordinary villagers, city dwellers, academicians, politicians, business 
communities, ex-militia members and leaders, military and police personnel, government 
officials, community and religious leaders, and members and activists of "civil" organizations. 
The field interviews with the representation of these wide-ranging communities aimed to obtain 
insight into the perspectives of those involved in the violence and post-conflict activities. All 
interviews were conducted in my native language, Bahasa Indonesia, and Ambonese Malay. 
I also utilized the informal interviewing technique with those having plenty of time and 
occasions to talk and discuss particular issues dealing with conflict and peace in the post-Malino 
II peace deal. The communities in which I carried out this sort of interviewing method were 
selected from the following groups: (1) Christian and Muslim villagers and townspeople from 
various ethno-linguistic backgrounds and professions that inhabited Ambon; (2) the 
participants of the Malina II peace accord; (3) civil society leaders who were involved in the 
peace processes such as members of Tim 20 Wayame; (4) moderate religious groups; (5) 
women groups such as members ofGerakan Perempuan Peduli or the Concerned Women's 
Movement); (6) Christian and Muslim conservatives that refuse the ideas of interreligious 
reconciliation; and (7) ex-militias members.4 
4 With these ex-( religious) militias1 I interviewed about the motives and interests of their 
involvement during the violence, and their hopes, if any, for the post-conflict reconciliation. 
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In addition to the informal interviewing technique, I used an in-depth, semi-structured 
interviewing method, a technique of interviews based on the use of "interview guide" usually in 
the form of written list of questions and topics that need to be covered in a particular order 
(Bernard 2006: 212). I applied this sort of interviewing method to the following groups: (1) 
high-level bureaucrats and political elites', (2) respected religious and community leaders', and 
(3) ex-commanders of Christian and Muslim paramilitary groups that rejected the Malina II 
peace deal and attempts of reconciliation? I then "triangulated" the data obtained from these 
multiple sources in order to obtain varied, different accounts of the same event and subject 
(violence, conflict, peace, and citizenship) from opposing sides and to attain more nuanced, 
comprehensive, and balanced data and understandings on the Maluku carnage and post-conflict 
situations, particularly with regard to attempts of building peace and a culture of citizenship. 
Conducting interviews with these ex-(religious] militias was significant to gain particular insight or 
perspectives on the subjects of, but not limited to, the nature of conflict, the roots of the violence, 
prospects for peacemaking, and the possible creation of a citizenship culture and civility in post-
conflict Maluku. I addressed the same subjects to the above specified non-( ex) militia and 
conservative groups} in addition to interviewing their activities during the time of the violence and 
post-conflict situations, including their expectations for the rebuilding Maluku. 
5 With these political elite groups and bureaucrats, I interviewed on the subjects of the state 
efforts in building peace and public culture of citizenship and pluralism after the Malina II. Issues of 
the nature of conflict and the root causes of the violence were also addressed to gain elite 
perspectives on the subject 
6 They were, among others, Rev. john Ruhulessin [a current chairman of the Moluccan 
Protestant Church Synod, the largest Christian congregation in the Moluccas]; Rev. Sammy Titaley 
and Rev.l.j.W. Hendricks [former chairmen of the GPM synod during the time of conflicts); Bishop 
Mandagi, Father Agus Ulahay [respected Catholic leaders]; Rev. john Sahalessy, Rev. jacky 
Manuputty, and many others. For the Muslim leaders, they included, among others, Hasbullah 
Toisuta, Abidin Wakano, Idrus Tatuhey, Lutfi Shanaky, Thamrin Ely, Hadi Basalamah, Idrus Tukan, 
and Nasir Rahawarin. With these respected elite members of Ambonese or Moluccan religious 
groups, I interviewed on the subjects of the root causes of the violence and the religious resources 
(associations1 networks, and discourses) that support of1 and opposition to conflict as well as peace, 
civic pluralism1 citizenship1 and democratic civility. 
7 These particular groups included Rustam Kastor (advisor and ideologue of the Laskar 
jihad], Umar Ali Attamimy (one of the Muslim "field commander"], and Sammy Walairuny [former 
Executive Secretary for the FKM/Moluccan Sovereignty Front, one of the Christian factions active in 
the violence). For these particular persons, I strictly focused on the questions of the root causes of 
conflict, why they rejected the Mali no II and efforts of reconciliation in the region, and what they 
expected for the rebuilding of post-war Maluku. By addressing such questions to these particular 
groupS1 I could gain particular insights about the nature of conflict and violence1 as well as issues of 
post-truce Maluku so that the findings can be used for strengthening peace processes. 
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During my fieldwork I was also fortunate to have many close friends and colleagues in 
Ambon and Maluku. They fully supported and kindly helped me obtain access to sites, 
documents, and individuals and local informants, both Muslims and Christians, pertinent to the 
fieldwork. As a result, I was able to interview a large number of Moluccan political, community, 
and religious leaders, some of whom were Governor of Maluku Karel Albert Ralahalu, Mayor of 
Ambon jopi Papilaja (now retired), Vice Mayor Olivia Latuconsina (now retired), Rev. Dr. john 
Ruhulessin (chairman of Moluccan Protestant Church Synod), Thamrin Ely (Muslim coordinator 
for the Malina II Peace Agreement), Idrus Tukan (chairman for Maluku's Indonesian Ulama 
Council), Bishop Mandagi (Diocese of Amboina), KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke (a respected Muslim 
religious leader), Rustam Kastor (a retired general and former consultant of the Laskar jihad), 
Hadi Basalamah (Ambon's Arab leader), l.j.W. Hendriks, Nasir Rahawarin, and many others. 
In addition to participant observation and interviews described above, I used network 
and associational analysis. In multiethnic societies, the political scientistAshutosh Varshney 
who conducted research on ethnic conflict and civic life among India's Hindus and Muslims has 
argued, "institutional frameworks tend to produce very different political strategies," some of 
which privilege ethnic cooperation and accommodation while others favor ethnic polarization. 
In this context, "institutional frameworks can, thus, be liked to communal conflict or peace" 
(Varshney 2002: 12). 
In this regard, accordingly, it is significant to analyze structures and frameworks of 
Moluccan/Ambonese religious institutions and networks whether they support or oppose 
conflict and segmentation or peace and collaboration. It is also important to analyze the 
"mechanisms" that link religious-based civic networks/institutions and interreligious 
conflict/peace. This method, moreover, was to examine the existence of what Paul Brass (1997) 
calls an "institutionalized riot system" [Brass 1997) and "institutionalized peace system" 
(Varshney 2003). In its implementation, I looked at rural and urban-based religious networks 
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and institutions to examine the similarity and difference of the institutions with regard to their 
role in and attitudes toward violence, as well as the subsequent truce. 
Since part of this research deals with the history, trajectory, and dynamics of Christian-
Muslim relations prior, during, and after the mayhem, the project also employed a method of 
historical and textual analysis. The historical and literature review were carried out by 
examining materials at, among others, the National Archive Museum, the National Library 
(located in jakarta), the Rum phi us Library (Ambon), and the Universitas Pattimura, the largest 
university in Maluku (located in Ambon). At these institutes and libraries, l investigated the 
various views of socio-historical roots of the violence and the development of post-conflict 
Maluku. I completed this archival and historical research by exploring relevant documentation 
and media, especially newspapers, magazines, and the internet." 
At first I had difficulty getting access to the Christian and Muslim radical-conservatives, 
as well as to former members of the "religious" militias, especially those members who refused 
the ideas of interreligious reconciliation. A special word of thanks goes to my excellent friend 
and "assistant" Rev. Elifas Maspaitella, whose connection to wide-ranging local informants made 
it possible to gain access to the Christian conservatives, ex-militias and field commanders. 
As for the Muslim conservative groups and ex-militia members, including ex-members 
of the Laskar jihad, I was finally able to approach some of them after regularly participating in 
their religious sermons and ritual practices, and having conversation with some elite members 
of the groups. I utilized my "Muslim identity" and knowledge of Arabic and Islam to approach 
and interact with them. Additionally, I was helped by my Muslim research assistant who was ex-
a Besides national print media like Kompas, Republika, Gatra, and Tempo, I collected and 
examined accounts on the violence in Maluku's local newspapers, including Suara MalukuJ Siwalima 
(affiliated with Christians) and Ambon Express [affiliated with Muslims], especially those from 1999 
when the violence started to figure out the distribution of the violence and the dynamics oflocal 
responses towards conflict and peace issues. Also important were the documents and publications of 
Muslim jihadists responsible for the Maluku wars. 
member of the Laskar Jihad in distributing a questionnaire survey for ex-Muslim militias. The 
Ambonese Muslim leader KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke also helped me gain access to some ex-
(Muslim) field commanders. However, unfortunately, some elite members of Muslim 
conservative groups responsible for the wars refused to be interviewed for reasons that I was 
unable to determine. 
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Finally, the ethnography of violence should not only be concerned with building 
scrupulous theories about violence and conflict but should also be engaged in critical reflection 
on the methodological problems of conducting research under violent conflict. This is vital to 
point out because an ethnographer of violence will face, what Jaap Timmer (2002: 3) called, 
"risks of seduction" in high-conflict settings since the informants, both victims and perpetrators 
of violence, have a personal and political stake in making the ethnographer adopt their 
interpretations of the cause and dynamic of the conflict. I felt that both Muslims and Christians 
tended to make an argument and interpretation to justify their violent actions and blame the 
others as the initiators and perpetrators of the conflict. It was hard to find an informant that 
"honestly'' admitted their faults in the past conflict. 
Questionnaire Survey 
In addition to three methods described above, I administered a questionnaire to one 
hundred former members oflocal militia groups (SO ex-Christian fighters and SO ex-Muslim 
jihadists, including Ambonese members of the Laskar Jihad). The sites for the survey were 
Kudamati, Rumahtiga, Kariu, and Aboru, all of which are the stronghold of Christians, for 
Christian respondents. Whereas Rumahtiga and Kariu (in Haruku) were completely damaged by 
the Muslim jihadists, Kudamati and Aboru were safe. Rumahtiga was destroyed by the Laskar 
Jihad campaigns, while Kariu was devastated by its Muslim neighbors, the Pelauw Muslims. 
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Kudamati, located on the uphill of Ambon city, was the base of the main Christian 
fighters groups such as the Coker, Kudaputih, and Front Kedaulatan Maluku (Moluccan 
Sovereignty Front), while Aboru, on the tip of Haruku Island in central Makuku, is renowned as 
the headquarter of the old RMS separatist movement sympathizers. This area is difficult to reach 
since it is located behind a mount and thick forest. One needs to take a boat and ojek, a 
motorcycle used for public transportation, to arrive at this place. Accompanied by a local GPM 
pastor, I landed in this region and stayed there for a few days to undertake fieldwork, conduct 
interviews, and distribute the quiz. Over the course of the Maluku wars, both Aboru and 
Kudamati became among the frightening Christian centers. 
Locations for the Muslim respondents were mainly Batumerah (85%) in Ambon city and 
Negeri Lima (15%) in jazirah Leihitu. Batumerah, whose population today reaches more than 
45,000 people, is the oldest and the only Muslim negeri in Ambon (cf. Leirissa, at. al. 2004; 
Leirissa 2000, 1995). It is in this crowded area of Ambon town that the incident of january 19, 
1999, took place. Established by the Dutch, Batumerah nowadays is inhabited by Muslims from 
multiethnic backgrounds, both settlers and migrants. During the sectarian conflicts, the Laskar 
jihad used this settlement as its main base, particularly in the area of Kebun Cengkih, located on 
the highland ofBatumerah. Since the Laskar Jihad was disbanded in October 2002, many of its 
followers chose to stay in this area. Some of them established their own sub-village in Gunung 
Malintang. Negeri Lima, furthermore, is located in the rural area on the upland ofLeihitu 
Peninsula. It was in this area where Hitu, one of the oldest Islamic kingdoms in central Maluku, 
was located. Over the course of the communal strife, Muslim jihadists from this peninsula, 
infuriated by the deliberate destruction of the Al-Fatah Mosque, came down to Ambon city and 
attacked Christian centers (see Chapter 6). 
Ethnically, the survey respondents are Ambonese and Moluccan. The survey 
respondents' age ranges between twenty and fifty years old, while their educational 
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backgrounds mostly graduated from an elementary school [Sekolah Dasar). Profession of most 
respondents is wiraswasta, a term commonly refer to those who run a small private enterprise, 
with the average monthly income of the respondents below !DR 1,000,000 [about USD100) 
before and after the conflict. I will present the survey results throughout the dissertation, 
particularly in Chapters 6, 7, and 12. Questions of the questionnaire survey are categorized into 
three main parts. First deals with respondents' educational, religious, political, and social 
backgrounds. Second relates to respondents' motivations in the involvement of previous wars 
and their perceptions toward the Maluku carnage. And the third category is respondents' 
responses toward the future of Christian-Muslim relations in Maluku. 
This survey was truly helpful in understanding [1) the social backgrounds of the ex-
militias, [2) their motives involved in the war, [3) their recent views toward the earlier violence, 
[4) their current perceptions of the opposing religious groups, and [5) the prospects for future 
peace in Ambon. I used former members oflocal Christian fighters and Muslim jihadists as my 
assistants to distribute the survey and analyze it. Prior to distributing the questionnaire, I 
explained the purpose of the quiz to my assistants. In addition to the survey, interviews, and 
ethnography, I also had occasion to have conversations with former combatants who were 
willing to talk about their "dark past." Although survey responses on the Maluku conflict and 
peace vary, religious factors in motivating their involvement in the conflict are common in both 
groups. The two parties also considered the Maluku conflict as a holy war [Chapters 6 and 7). 
Contribution 
This dissertation will contribute to, first, the growing anthropological study of violence, 
conflict resolution, and peacemaking in multi-religious and divided societies. Anthropologists 
have traditionally studied the ethnography of conflict andjor integration in tribal, small-scale 
societies [e.g. Howell and Willis, eds.1989; Kemp and Fry, eds. 2004; Gluckman 1955a, 1955b; 
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Turner 1975; Sponsel and Gregor, eds. 1994, see more in Chapter 2), and not in plural and 
complex nations (cf. Nordstrom and Robben, eds.1995; Malkki 1995; Wolf and Yang, eds. 1998; 
Theidon 2006, 2007; Mahmood 1996). Anthropological contributions to the study of post-war 
integration and peace building also remain less substantial, notwithstanding the fact that 
anthropologists have made impressive contributions to the study of warfare and violence (cf. 
Schmidt and Schroder, eds. 2001). 
Second, by analyzing the role of Maluku's Christian and Muslim groups in both discord 
and concord, this project will also contribute to the newly emerging anthropology of Christianity 
and Christian politics, as well as of Islam and Muslim politics. It is important to acknowledge 
that Islam and Muslim societies have attracted a number of anthropologists (e.g. Geertz 1968; 
Eickelman 1981; Gilsenan 1982; Gellner 1981; Norton 1987; Bowen 1993; Hefner 2000; Varisco 
2005; Marranci 2008). More specifically, Muslim politics have also been the subject of a number 
of anthropological studies (e.g. Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Hefner, ed. 2005). While Islam, 
Muslim societies and politics have captured the attention a number of anthropologists, 
Christianity, Christian communities and politics have been on the periphery of anthropological 
study (e.g. Hann and Goltz, eds. 2010; Cannell, ed. 2006) at least until the early 1990s.' In an 
introductory chapter of her edited volume on the anthropology of Christianity, Fan ella Canell 
(2006), said that anthropology has been less successful in considering Christianity as an 
ethnographic object than it has in considering other religions in part because Christian 
community has commonly been wrongly clustered as a "homogenous theological group," while 
anthropology defined itself as a rational, empirically based enterprise quite different from 
theology. 
'Since the 1990s, Christianity has become one of the fastest growing subfields in the 
anthropology of religion. 
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Third, inasmuch as civil groupings are central to its analysis, this dissertation will 
contribute to the emerging anthropological study of everyday social groupings alternative to the 
usual, established concepts of" civil" society and of citizenship developed in the Western 
scholarships. As the anthropologist Chris Hann (in Hann and Dunn, eds. 1996) has noted, 
contribution from anthropologists on the field of everyday forms of civil groupings has been 
few, despite the fact that the Western notions of civil society have undergone a critical 
reformulation. Recent research has indicated that, contrary to classical theories, structurally 
11 Civic" associations are not by any means always "civiY' in terms of their animating discourses or 
public practices (cf. Hefner 1998, 2001; Weller 1999; Norton 1995 /1996). This study will thus 
contribute to the anthropological study of civic associations and public culture from the 
perspective of "post-classical" civil theory. 
Fourth, the dissertation aims to contribute to the anthropology of elite society, 
especially that of the government or state institutions. Traditional political and military science 
have generally situated studies of warfare and uprising primarily in political institutions and the 
actions of elites. This may be where political violence is conceived, but it is not where it is 
carried out. As anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom (1998: 103-121) has rightly pointed out 
"political institutions and elites operate in war and in peace; their existence does not mark the 
inception of violence." As I will explain in Chapter 11, elite members of Indonesian and Moluccan 
governments and state institutions have contributed to the ongoing processes of the 
establishment of Christian-Muslim reconciliation and civic peace, albeit some anti-pluralist 
factions in the same government have tried to shrink and destroy their attempts by forging 
alliances with radical civilian groups. Robert Hefner (1998, 2001, 2005) characterizes the 
former as the 11civil stateu while the latter as '~uncivil state." 
Fifth, this dissertation, in particular, will contribute to the Indonesian/Southeast Asian 
studies. It is important to emphasize that Ambonese Christian and Muslim societies have 
23 
received relatively short shrift among anthropologists of Indonesia, particularly those having to 
do with the Christian and Muslim cultures and politics. It is also imperative to note that most 
social scientists, anthropologists, and scholars of Indonesian society and politics, have given 
much attention to research and writings on the country's conflict and violence. Glen Smith and 
Helene Bouvier-Smith (2003) published a working bibliography on conflict and violence with 
special reference to Indonesia, consisting of a long list of studies on violence-related issues both 
by Indonesians and foreigners. Only a few social scientists and anthropologists have undertaken 
research on post-conflict reconciliation and peacemaking in AmbonjMaluku and Indonesia in 
general or on social change in post-war settings (e.g. Brauchler, ed. 2009; Pariela 2008). This 
dissertation, by focusing on both conflict and peace in Maluku, will fill a gap on the existing 
scholarships on Indonesia and Maluku. 
Structure ofthe Dissertation 
This dissertation will be divided into five main sections, as follows: 
Part one consists of two chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 1) or "introduction" 
provides a general description of the dissertation, the focus of the study, the theoretical 
contribution of the dissertation, and methodology used during research. Chapter 1 also briefly 
outlines acts of a new form of communal violence in post-Suharto Indonesia, including the 
Maluku conflict, to provide a "sociological context" of the topic discussed in this dissertation. 
The second chapter (Chapter2) explains the theoretical foundation of the dissertation. It 
describes multiple theoretical frameworks employed in this thesis. The application of multiple 
theories and approaches to this study is needed since conflict and peace are the complex 
phenomena of human actions that cannot be explained through single theory and approach. 
Part two, consisting of two chapters (Chapter 3 and 4), provides the historical 
background to the Maluku conflict. The chapters sketch the dynamics of Christian-Muslim 
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relations in Ambon and Maluku before the eruption of the wars in 1999 from European 
colonialism to the New Order. The chapters highlight the often violent history between the two 
competing religious groups in the area since colonial times, especially during the Dutch period. 
This Christian-Muslim conflict reached its peak during the New Order [1966-1998) due to the 
regime's discriminatory policies and political intervention towards public affairs and local 
traditions of Moluccan societies. 
Part three, comprising three chapters [Chapters 5, 6, and 7), discusses the dynamics and 
density of the Maluku interreligious conflict. The section in particular underscores the central 
role played by ritual and religion in initiating and radicalizing the Christian-Muslim violence. As 
well, it depicts Maluku's social actors and religious radicals, both Christians and Muslims, over 
the course of the communal conflict. 
Part four, consisting offour chapters [Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11) discusses peace building 
and reconciliation efforts before and after the signing the Malina II peace pact. The Chapters 
particularly emphasize the significant contribution of the Indonesian government [both central 
and provincial/regional), religious leaders, and civil society agencies, including interreligious 
women group in the ongoing processes ofMaluku's Christian-Muslim reintegration. The section 
also describes Maluku's traditional institutions of brotherhood and indigenous practices of 
dispute resolution. 
Part five comprises two chapters. The first chapter [Chapter 12) assesses the 
contemporary situation in post-conflict Maluku, highlighting the region's segregated pluralism, 
religious militancy, and citizenship discourse. It also discusses the competing ideas between 
religion and regionalism and how this effects to the debate of citizenship and civic peace. The 
chapter aims at providing a picture whether processes of peace building, conflict resolution, and 
reconciliation after the signing of the Malina II peace pact have developed significantly or not. 
The second and last chapter [Chapter 13) is the conclusion of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
Conflict, Violence, and Peacebuilding: 
A Theoretical Framework 
This chapter is intended to explain the theoretical background to and framework for the 
dissertation. Since the dissertation's main focus is to examine the complex phenomena of human 
violence and peace, as well as the ambiguity ofreligion10 and Maluku's social actors, both elites 
and masses, in the conflict settings, this thesis will apply multiple theories and approaches to 
these issues. 
The chapter argues that in the study of collective conflict and integration, it is 
imperative to examine comprehensively issues of, first, structures and human agency, either 
individuals or social groupings; second, social history and politics of the society; third, elite 
leaderships and mass-level factors in causing violence and peace; and fourth, the interests and 
motives of those involved in the violence and peace process-whether motivated by 
instrumental and rational calculation, emotional/psychological influences, or religious/identity 
factors. Only by recognizing the importance and interplay of agency and these structures, as 
well as the plurality of histories, motives, identities, and interests, can one answer several 
central questions in the study of social conflict and integration. 
The analysis presented throughout this dissertation is based on the need to recognize 
three significant points: first is the complex interaction of structural, historical, and cultural 
influences and human agency, both individuals and collectivities. This is to say that the analysis 
10 The word "religion" used in this study refers not only to religious doctrines, teachings, and 
symbols, but also religious agents [actors, adherents, communities, and organizations) who produce 
and reproduce religious knowledge and cultures. This is to say that religion is not simply about belief, 
doctrine, norm, or even ideology. It is also about social capital which is social netvvorks created by 
religious actors. Although basic religious teachings might be homogenous, their implementation 
varies from place to place. Religius adherents are also heterogeneous since they have been influenced 
by numerous factors including local politics, traditions1 cultures, history, and knowledge. Religion is 
thus not fixed but it is prone to shift depending on the situations and its actors. 
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of this dissertation illustrates the danger in putting too much weight on the presence of 
objective conditions for conflict without allowing for the importance of subjective 
understandings of human agency, and vice versa. The second point concerns the dynamism, 
change, and variation in conflict situations. The Maluku conflict involved various stages in 
different times and places (see Chapter 5) so that dynamism and variation should be taken into 
consideration. And the third point is the recognition of the variety of interests and motives of 
actors engaged in conflict. A detailed account of a single case oflarge-scale violent conflict, as 
Chris Wilson (2008: 15) has noticed, requires an inclusive approach-"one that recognizes the 
mutually influential role of elite agency and socio-political conditions, and of instrumentalism, 
emotion, and identity, and that pays close attention to changes over time and to local details." 
In the light of this "total approach," the chapter discusses various theories put forward 
by a number of social scientists and anthropologists such as Fredrik Barth (on change and 
fluidity of ethnic boundaries), Pierre Bourdieu (on symbolic violence and symbolic resources), F. 
Bailey (on manipulative strategies and pragmatic choices), Peter Berger (on desecularization of 
the world), Robert Hefner (on the concepts of religion, state-society synergy, dialectics of 
structure and human agency, as well as social history and human cultures.), R. Scott Appleby (on 
the concept of religious ambivalence), Stuart Kaufman (on mass-elite relations in conflict 
settings), Dale Eickelman (on Muslim politics and the plural sources of religious authority), Paul 
Brass (on institutionalized systems of riots), Robert Weller and Richard Norton (on 
associationallife and state-society relations), to name but a few (see more in the following 
sections). These theories and approaches are all useful for the analysis of this dissertation. 
I will begin this theoretical chapter with a literature review on some important works 
with regard to the Maluku communal violence, followed by my assessment, highlighting 
strengths and weaknesses of the previous literature, and then I will present my dissertation's 
focus that will fill the gaps of the earlier studies on the Maluku chaos. The assessment of the 
27 
literature on the Maluku conflict is also vital to show, first, how the debate of the links between 
religion, either normative discourses or social capital, was left out from the much literature. The 
second point is to illustrate the absence of the discussion ofMaluku's post-conflict peacemaking 
and reconciliation from the previous works [e.g. Brauchler, ed. 2009). After presenting a 
literature review on the Maluku conflict, l will outline anthropological literature on violence and 
peace in order to situate my theoretical framework within the broader debate of anthropology 
of conflict and integration, followed by the discussion of the dissertation's approach and 
framework to position my project's theoretical ground. 
Studies of the Maluku Conflict: An Assessment 
Most previous works on the Maluku carnage have primarily focused on the socio-
historical roots of the violence, highlighting how and why previously relatively peaceful 
religious communities can descend into a large-scale violent conflict. Scholars' opinions differ 
with regard to the root causes of the Maluku communal conflict, and how local small-scale 
fighting can turn into large-scale warfare. To be sure, there have been a number of sizeable 
works on the Maluku conflict authored by both Western and Indonesian scholars. Due to 
limitations, however, I will only briefly assess the works ofjacques Bertrand [2002, 2004), 
Gerry van Klinken [2001, 2007), Noorhaidi [2005), john Side! [2006), jeroenAdam [2009), and 
most recently Muhammad Najib Azca [2011). The choice is based on the depth and quality of 
these studies. As well, analyses and theoretical frameworks the authors used in these works 
represent the broad perspective of conflict studies. 
Let me begin with jacques Bertrand's work.ln his comparative study on ethnic conflict, 
the Canadian political scientist jacques Bertrand has examined the social roots and context of 
ethnic conflict in various places in Indonesia, including Maluku, through what he terms the 
"historical institutionalism approach" by tracing the violence back to the "institutional context 
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that defines and shapes ethnic identities, the official recognition of the groups, their 
representation in state institutions, and their access to resources" (Bertrand 2004: 4). Bertrand 
furthermore analyzes the conditions that increase the potential for these violent conflicts to 
erupt by highlighting three major factors leading to such religious wars. 
These factors are, first, uncertainty over a secular definition of the nation that leaves 
open the query of an Islamic state. Since the mid-1980s and the 1990s, Bertrand argues, Suharto 
had shifted his political policy to support Islamic groups ( cf. Hefner 2000). Seen as a departure 
from the preceding marginalization of Muslim communities under Suharto's New Order regime, 
it was broadly interpreted as a major policy change. That political shift led to sharp tensions and 
conflicts between Christian and Muslim communities due to the ambiguity and uncertainty it 
created about the future role of Islam in the polity. In the Maluku context, Bertrand has argued, 
the late Suharto policies disturbed the balance between Christians and Muslims, which led to a 
decline of the "traditional" Christian domination over bureaucratic seats and associated 
patronage and privileged Muslims to gain new positions and resources. 
The second factor Bertrand highlights is patrimonial features of the authoritarian 
regime. Bertrand said that these characteristics often reinforce religious and ethnic networks, 
thereby intensifying group competition and creating vulnerabilities in the face of institutional 
change. In Maluku, Bertrand continued to argue, such rivalry enhanced divisions between 
Christian and Muslim groups, particularly since Muslims had been marginalized and 
disadvantaged for a quite long time beginning in the Dutch colonial era (cf. Chauvel1990, 1980). 
In combination with the uncertainty surrounding the future role of Islam, Bertrand has argued, 
tensions grew to unprecedented levels as Christians saw their interests potentially threatened 
and Muslims viewed possibilities of redressing past imbalances and injustices. 
The third factor is a rapid democratic transition since the downfall of Suharto in May, 
1998, after more than thirty years of authoritarian rule. When the Suharto regime collapsed and 
the new President Habibie began to launch a political reform over state institutions and the 
electoral mechanism, Bertrand (2004: 114-5) suggests that it made Muslims anxious over the 
likelihood oflosing their recent gains while Christians were anxious over the likelihood of 
further loses. Bertrand moreover contends that the "critical juncture" of Indonesia's rapid 
political change, fuels ethnic instability when joined with the two previous factors. As a result, 
Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Maluku in general feared losing their relative positions 
and access to political-economic resources. Muslims were concerned that Christians might 
reassert their regional dominance, while Christians feared an erosion of their status in a state 
more strongly inclined to favor its large Muslim majority (Bertrand 2004: 114-34; 2002: 62). 
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Although Bertrand's framework has been quite successful in understanding and 
analyzing the institutional context and period in which ethnic conflicts are likely to erupt, his 
macro-structural and historical approach hindered him from answering some key questions, 
such as why a particular kind of violence occurs and how it escalates to the scale that occurred. 
Filling in some gaps left by Bertrand, the Dutch scholar of Indonesian politics and society Gerry 
van Klinken (2007) arrived with a comparable project ofpost-Suharto communal conflicts to 
help explain why and how such mass violence broke out during Indonesia's political transition 
period. Gerry van Klinken (2007) in particular criticizes Bertrand's historical institutionalism 
approach which, according to him, takes seriously the ability of political institutions to 
determine human behavior. The weakness of this approach, van Klinken has noted, is that 
historical institutionalism is not well equipped to understand what causes "critical juncture" (cf. 
Hall & Taylor 1998), nor what happens when institutions fail. 
Unlike Bertrand, who focuses on an analysis of historical features of political patterns 
and policies of the New Order as a major role in creating violent conflicts, van Klinken (2001, 
2007) gives more attention to "local dynamics" as a main factor of the communal violence. Van 
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Klink en emphasizes the role of "local actors," either in provincial or regionallevelsn, competing 
over scarce resources as a driving force for such religious violence, driven by" critical junctures" 
of a political transition. National issues such as socio-economic and political crises as well as 
religious, ethnic, and cultural identities, only played, if any, as less-significant and secondary 
elements of this "by designed" communal violence. In addition, van Klinken provides a detailed 
historical ground by stressing the focal role of the "short-term frame" rather than the "long-term 
frameworks" despite acknowledging the contribution and the indirect impact of the long-term 
historical processes toward a number of communal violent acts in Indonesia, including those of 
Ambon and Maluku. 
The long-term explanations, van Klinken has argued, have a fatal weakness: the lack of 
the historical perspective to be able to answer the question why such communal violence 
happened in the aftermath of the downfall of Suharto and the New Order. Based upon this 
weakness of the long-term explanations, van Klinken turns into short-term models by proposing 
"contentious politics approach" to elucidate that the reason things occur when they do is 
opportunity. The dramatic democratic movements of1998 that demanded political change in 
general and Suharto's resignation in particular clearly took advantage of the political 
opportunities offered by the multiple crises, but so did "those who organized the episodes of 
communal violence" (van Klinken 2007: 11). The basic premise of this approach is that "weak 
states" have an open political opportunity structure: they provide easy access to the political 
system for protest and establishment group alike but at the same time their capacity to act is 
limited. In this sense, Indonesia did have an open political opportunity structure during the 
times of political transitions. 
11 Van Klinken's conclusion that the Moluccan wars were only "local phenomena" is only 
"half true" because these religious disturbances were clearly trans-local phenomena involving a large 
number of various actors from different professions (Hefner 2005a: 273-301). 
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Among the significant short-term explanations that made change a possibility in 1998 as 
noted by van Klink en were: (1) the inability of the state's security apparatus to handle mass 
protests, (2) the split of the national elites following the sudden resignation of Suharto, (3) the 
occurrence of an enormous number of educated but frustrated candidates to elite positions who 
no longer trusted to the authority of their political elites, and ( 4) people suffering due to krisis 
moneter (monetary crisis) and economic bankruptcy and who were ready to be mobilized by 
interested individuals or groups (van Klinken 2007: 23). However it is crucial to note that 
economic deprivation by itself did not directly lead to collective violence. It is proved by some of 
the poorest areas of Indonesia, such as East and West Nusa Tenggara, where serious communal 
violence did not occur after 1998. In addition, this critical juncture of political transitions and 
economic crises by itself did not lead to massive violence unless there are "invisible hands" 
driving such collective riots. 
In other words, nothing grows to such a large-scale communal violence without 
organization and conflict management, as well as fighting organizers, conflict managers, and 
violent brokers. These violence organizers or rioting brokers could be local government officials, 
security forces, business communities, and any interested groups or individuals functioned as an 
intermediate class that bridge between local elites and ordinary masses. The crucial issue for 
these brokers, as van Klinken has pointed out, was control or competition over the scarce local 
resources, either political or economic, of the state. 
This open political opportunity was mainly because jakarta had lost political control 
over regional/local provinces/districts following political uncertainty and transitions. This is 
exactly what happened in the five areas oflndonesia, such as Sambas, Sam pit, Poso,Ambon, and 
North Maluku, where the large-scale violent acts took place as van Klinken points out. In other 
words, local socio-political structure conditions, unique characteristics of these places such as 
rapid urbanization, high dependence of the state sector, the speed of deagrarianization-non 
agricultural population, and agency all together played significant contributions in escalating 
violent conflicts in the regions. 
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While van Klinken's stress on the central role played by local elites in the course of the 
Maluku conflict is welcome and seems closer to revealing the complexity of the true situation, 
rather than those who tended to blame national actors-either civilian or military elites in 
jakarta-as orchestrating the violence, his over-emphasis on the political aspects of the conflict 
and the rationality of the (elite) actors was problematic (cf. Azca 2011). In the context of the 
Maluku conflict, local actors engaged in the warfare were not merely driven by political-
economy, and the conflict itself is not simply political in nature (see Chapters 6-7). In addition, 
van Klinken missed the discussion of the experiences or voices of what Edward Aspinall (2008: 
570) has termed "foot soldiers" in mass violence, namely ordinary masses that fought in the 
wars. Following Edward Aspinall, I also maintain that it is imperative to take seriously ordinary 
perpetrators' ideologies, motivations, and experiences since "they are the connective tissue that 
links general theories about violence to the lived experience of particular violent episodes" 
(Aspinall2008: 571). 
The political scientist john Side! (2006), informed by post-structuralist scholarship, 
developed an explanatory framework that links the changing forms of religious violence (from 
riots that broke out in several places in java to jihad that erupted in Maluku) to identity 
uncertainty against the backdrop of changing political and economic structures at the national 
level. For Side!, the changing place of Islam in the country's politics and power structures in the 
final years of, and after the downfall of, Suharto produced changing uncertainties and 
ambiguities about Islamic identity and authority and, thus, changing forms of violence. 
Although Sidel's analytical framework on the link between the changing faces of 
religious violence to identity uncertainty looks fascinating, his task was undermined by his 
failure to substantiate his bold thesis with strong empirical evidence. In applying the 
framework, unfortunately, Side! relies mostly on secondary sources and from-a-distance 
observation, especially from the narratives and descriptions of the context oflocal violence. 
Such shortcomings frequently lead to vagueness in making and drawing big narratives at the 
national level which are certainly open for further examination. 
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Besides highlighting the shifting political structures at the national level in the aftermath 
of Suharto's collapse, john Side! also traces the historical roots of the Maluku conflict back to the 
New Order and colonial era. Side!, in particular, underlines the role of distinctive and 
discriminative patterns of class formation during the New Order that crystallized since the 
Dutch colonial era, one within which religious institutions and authority figured both 
prominently and problematically. This segregated pattern, Side! (2006: 18-43) has argued, left a 
legacy of instability, tension, fear, insecurity, anxiety, and dynamism in class relations in post-
independence Indonesia which later drove Indonesians, including the Ambonese, to violent 
religious conflicts. 
Despite his study that highlights political, institutional, and intellectual tradition as the 
root causes of the violence deserves credit, it is significant to underscore that Sidel's analysis 
and description are biased. It is true and unquestionable that some Muslim groups and 
individuals became the actors, protagonists, and masterminds of such violence but so did the 
Christians. However, Side! tends to neglect and ignore the pivotal role of Ambon's Christian 
gangs and fanatics such as Coker, Kudaputih, Agas, and local groups so-called the "grassroots" in 
generating and escalating the violence (see Chapter 7]. Side!, thus, does not "cover both sides" of 
the facts of the religious violence. In addition, more significantly, he does not mention the local 
dynamics and variation of Indonesian Muslim societies in responding to the violence. He not 
once mentions pro-democracy and pluralist Muslims. Side! missed the point that there were 
substantial numbers of moderate Muslims in state and society levels that opposed the mass 
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violence and terrorism and worked hand-in-hand with non-Muslims to preventthe conflict (see 
Chapters 9, 10, and 11). 
There is a strong tendency in Sidel's analysis to present Muslims as the perpetrators and 
Christians as the victims of the religious violence as he points out: "non-Muslims appear to have 
borne the brunt of the violence" (Side! 2006: 165). ln fact, both Christians and Muslims became 
the perpetrators and the victims alike. Worse yet, he implies that the violence escalated because, 
as Muslims were blocked in their aspiration for governmental in power, they escalated their 
attacks. In brief, Sidel's work is a very damning portrait of Indonesian Muslims. Thus, instead of 
criticizing the dominant strands of the "religious violence industry" promoted by terrorism 
experts as the author promises, he even is trapped within the discourse of this religious violence 
enterprise. Sidel's work thus is as a sort of an essentialized and ultimately simplistic model of 
Islam and Muslim politics that need for further serious examination. 
Recent work on the Maluku conflict such as that ofjeroen Adam (2009, 2010) focuses on 
the role played by ordinary masses of Ambon during the communal conflict. Unlike some 
scholars of the Maluku conflict who tended to analyze the socio-historical roots of the eruption 
of the mass violence, Adam's study is an attempt to understand social change throughout and 
following a communal violence in Ambon Island through the lens of forced migration. He was in 
particular intrigued by the question of why Ambon's ordinary folks (cf. Brass 1997) who had 
little chance of accessing the state bureaucracy became engaged in the protracted violence 
(Adam 2009: 70). Adam, then, came up with the conclusion that ordinary people, who were 
"much more proactive" (ibid: 88), had specific, private interests and goals in becoming involved 
in communal violence, namely to get Ambon's very limited resource: land! 
Ambon's people, Adam asserts, tended to view violence as a rare opportunity to access 
the land. As a result, displacement (or in Adam's term, "forced migration") is not only the impact 
of the collective violence but also part of local people's strategy to occupy the soil and territory. 
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Adam's conclusion is sharply in contrast with my findings, in which Ambonese Christians and 
Muslims, who had involved in the wars, did not really care about the land access and other 
profane things. They, particularly ordinary Christians and Muslims, involved in the wars mainly 
to defend-not to get/access land, bureaucracy, or marketplace as Adam's claims, what they saw 
as "sacred areas," namely religion and territory (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
Other studies on the Maluku conflict such as those ofNoorhaidi (2005] and Azca (2011] 
put emphasis on the central role of external Muslim jihadists in intensifying the communal 
violence. While Noorhaidi focuses on the Laskar jihad (a java-based lslamist paramilitary 
group], Azca underlines non-local jihad actors (mainly based in java] outside the Laskar jihad 
such as the Laskar Mujahidin, Hizbullah, and jama'ah Islamiah. Noorhaidi (2002, 2005] in 
particular examines the formation and development of the Laskar jihad that successfully 
mobilized thousands of non-local jihadists to the conflict area, especially to Ambon and other 
southern region of Maluku.l' Noorhaidi claims that the Laskar jihad emerged as an 
unequivocally militant Islamic group whose members were willing to martyr themselves for 
God. Due to its pioneering calls for jihad in Maluku, it became the most prominent face of Islamic 
militancy in post-New Order Indonesia (Noorhaidi 2005: 15-6]. 
Following the social movement theory framework, N oorhaidi focused his analysis on the 
rise of the Laskar jihad and how it mobilized its followers to participate in the jihad-activism in 
Maluku. Noorhaidi (2005: 17 -8], furthermore, applied the political process theory of social 
movement theory using a rational choice paradigm to explain how the Laskar jihad emerged by 
mobilizing its resources and structures as well as by using its strategic frames to recruit people 
against a backdrop of political turmoil which provided the political opportunity structure. 
Although Noorhaidi's study has contributed to our understanding of the peculiar phenomenon 
12 In North Maluku, as discussed by Wilson (2009], local Muslim jihadists became the only 
and prime actors of the conflict in the region. During the conflict, they even refused the coming of the 
Laskar jihad. 
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of the Salafi movement which emerged during Indonesia's rapid political change, its rational 
choice approach seems to neglect the varied motives, narratives, and objectives of the ordinary 
and low rank activists of the Laskar jihad (cf. Azca 2011). 
Several former members of the Laskar jihad who resided in Ambon whom I interviewed 
admitted that many ordinary Muslims joined the Laskar jihad in order to work on the kebun 
cengkih ("clove plantation") owned by Muhammad Amin Rais, one of the strongest supporters of 
the Laskar jihad's campaign and former chairman of Indonesia's Islamic organization 
Muhammadiyah, in Ambon, and not going to war against Ambonese Christians. Indeed, the 
Laskar jihad used the kebun cengkih as its headquarters over the course of the Maluku conflict. 
But kebun cengkih here is the name of a hamlet on the uphill Negeri Batumerah in Ambon city, 
and not Amin Rais' clove farm. Accordingly, some of the Laskar jihad members felt that they had 
been deceived by the Laskar jihad elites who had recruited them. 
Muhammad Najib Azca's recent study (2011), in some way, continues Noorhaidi's work 
on non-local Muslim jihadists. Driven by the puzzles oftoday's ex-Muslim jihadists, Azca carried 
out a research on the short-lived jihad movement by focusing on their post-jihad activism: "on 
their current situation and networks, their ideology and identity, and their activities and life 
trajectory" (Azca 2011: 61). Azca claims that lack of scholars' attention on the post-jihad 
movement situation has caused little understanding of the impact of jihad activism on individual 
activists and groups as well as the recent dynamics and transformation of Islamic activism in the 
post-jihad period. 
However, unlike Noorhaidi, who focuses solely on the Laskar jihad, Azca goes further by 
expanding the number of units analyzed in his research, not just the Laskar jihad but also the 
Laskar Mujahidin and other non-local jihadist networks that contributed to the religious wars in 
Ambon, Maluku, and Paso. As well, unlike Noorhaidi employing "political process theory" of 
social movement, Azca (2011: 51) emphasizes the critical role of emotion and passion in social 
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movement, referring jihad movement as "passionate politics." Although Azca's study 
significantly complements Noorhaidi's work on non-local jihadists, his analysis, however, tends 
to highlight the role of the Muslim outsiders during the conflict, while saying little about local 
partisans to the violence. Both Azca and Noorhaidi miss the discussion oflocal Muslim jihadists 
and their contribution to the wars. 
The above existing scholarships on the Maluku and Ambon unrest can be summarized as 
follows. First is that most previous studies clearly only deal with the roots and nature of the 
Maluku communal violence, and not peace building and reconciliation processes in the region. 
Most scholars of the Maluku conflict have focused primarily on the socio-historical roots of the 
violence, highlighting how and why long peaceful religious groups descended into a cycle of 
large-scale and brutal conflict, and not, for instance, how Maluku's Christians-Muslims resolve 
their communal violence. Previous studies of the Maluku conflict, moreover, sought the causes 
of the violence by emphasizing national factors such as the fragile conditions after the downfall 
ofSuharto in 1998 and the legacy of the New Order's authoritarianism, discrimination, and 
imbalanced development. By contrast, this dissertation gives more weight to Maluku's historical, 
political, and religious processes that provide conditions and rationale for the eruption of the 
mass conflict. 
The second point is that the previous studies put little attention to the discussion of the 
ambivalence of religion. Authors like jacques Bertrand, Gerry van Klinken, and Patricia Spyer, 
for instance, paid little attention to the role of religious identities in the spread ofthe riots, nor 
in the post-conflict peace building processes. Van Klinken even devalues the role of religious 
identities in the shape of violent acts despite the fact that religious elements did contribute to 
acts of terrorism, vandalism, and violence during the Maluku and Ambon wars. Much of the 
existing literature on the Maluku conflict also focuses primarily on the role of political elites, but 
it does not assess the role oflocal social and religious networks in facilitating or constraining 
elite strategies. In recent cases of Indonesia's interreligious violence such as those of Central 
Sulawesi, Ambon, North Maluku, and Halmahera, religiously-generated resources have indeed 
played complicated roles in the violence and post-conflict pacification (see Chapters 6-12). 
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From an anthropological perspective, it is interesting for further investigation to 
examine how the religious groups and organizations mobilize religious resources to support 
their violent acts and terrorism which are missing in the existing scholarships of the Maluku 
wars. Interestingly, even though all of the previous studies discussed above have greatly 
contributed to our understanding of the Maluku violence, none has examined the potential role 
oflocal religious networks, associations, and normative discourses in rebuilding social relations 
across and within Maluku's divide society in the aftermath of the violence. Indeed, although 
Schulze (2002), Spyer (2002), and Side! (2006) correctly highlight the role of religious 
influences in contributing to sectarian conflict, they have not examined the role of religious 
networks and cultures in the post-conflict truce and peacemaking, in whatever social form these 
are emerging. 
Third, the previous studies did not discuss the complex role of civil associations in both 
intensifying the conflict and supporting the peace process. It is central to acknowledge that 
before and after the communal violence in Ambon, there existed (some) civil associations and 
religious groupings, both Christian and Muslim, that promoted the ideas of peace, reconciliation, 
a culture of citizenship and civic pluralism. Instances of these civil societies included Gerakan 
Perempuan Peduli (Concerned Women's Movement), Gerakan Baku Bae (Baku Bae Movement), 
and Tim 20 Wayame (the Wayame Team of20) (see Chapter 10). Moreover, there are also 
(some) uncivil societies or uncivil groupings in Ambonese society, whether linked to Islam or 
Christianity, which give rise to ethno-religious tensions and sectarian divides inconsistent with a 
culture and practice of multicultural and multi-religious citizenship. Examples of these "uncivil" 
societies included Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala, Satgas Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar, Front 
Pembela Islam Ma/uku, Pasukan]ihad, Kudaputih, and the Coker (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
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This is to say that social groupings located in civil society are capable of pursuing 
sectarian and even violent self-interests, not just civil ones (cf. Hefner 2001, 2005b). The Maluku 
case suggests that, as Robert Weller (1999: 15) has rightly pointed out, "not every voluntary 
organization between family and state is civil'' because associations or social groupings in a civil 
society "may compete and disagree with each other or with the state" and that might serve as a 
source of violence and enmity. From anthropological point of view, it is interesting to look at the 
division of these civilian groupings and how non-state associations classically known as civil 
society can fall apart into uncivil orientations. 
Fourth, the previous studies paid little interest to the role of local ordinary folks such as 
Arnbonese Muslim jihadists and Christian fighters as the main actors of the Maluku conflict. 
Most existing scholarships put emphasis on the role of government and civilian-military elites in 
both jakarta and Ambon in initiating and orchestrating the fighting. lnfluenced by structuralist 
frameworks in the study of social conflict, the agency of the masses has largely been 
underestimated in the existing studies of the Maluku strife. These masses are commonly 
portrayed as "languid actors" simply following "greedy elites," just as puppets in a Javanese 
shadow play following the puppeteers' intentions. 
1 argue that it is not enough to only see elite interests and motives in explaining a 
collective conflict, an equal amount attention has to be paid to reasons behind why ordinary 
people with little opportunity to access the state bureaucracy and politics decide to engage in a 
mass violence that risk their lives. Studying ordinary masses in the mass riots is significant in 
order to understand the ongoing logics and dynamics of a protracted communal violence. Adam 
(2009) and Azca (2011) have indeed scrutinized the role of these ordinary folks (while Adam 
focuses on Ambonese people, Azca emphasizes non-local Muslim jihadists) during the conflict 
but they fail to notice the varied motives and interests of those masses involved in the wars. 
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Fifth, the previous works of the Maluku carnage tend to demonize and blame the 
government as the masterminds of the conflict. Since early 1990s, after the collapse of 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, analysts tended to overemphasize (1) the great 
success of civil society in toppling dictatorial regimes and "making democracy work" (cf. Putnam 
1994), and (2) the failure of state institutions in bringing society into, in Robert Hefner's 
(200Sb) term, "democratic and pluralist habits of the heart." They, furthermore, tend to 
undervalue the role of government and state institutions in post-conflict peace processes since 
they are part of the problem and not part of the solution of the conflict. 
Portraying state institutions as an all-powerful and evil monolith standing over an 
always innocent society, in the context ofMaluku and post-New Order Indonesia, is no longer 
the case; consequently, one should not blame the state as the only legitimate agent of violence. 
In the aftermath of the outbursts of ethno-religious violence in places like Indonesia (Maluku 
included), one will understand that civil society and social capital alone are not sufficient to 
"make democracy work." ln the Ambon settings, moreover, the signing of the Malina II Peace 
Pact and the end of the religious wars could not be achieved without the intervention of 
Indonesian government (central and regional) and (some) elite members of society (see Chapter 
11). 
Sixth, the previous works did not assess Maluku's post wars' development. Clearly, 
most studies of the Maluku conflict, with few exceptions (e.g. Adam 2009), only deal with the 
violent past and not post-communal violence situations in Ambon and Maluku. Examining post-
war Maluku is required in order to understand issues potential for renewed conflicts as well as 
continuing peace in the region (see Chapter 12). 
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Anthropology of Violence and Peace building: A Review 
Although the debate of human conflict and peace had long been discussed since the 
early formation of social sciences, the conversation over communal conflict, reconciliation, and 
peace building with special notice to the complex and ambiguous role played by religious actors 
and normative discourses in plural, multi-ethnic societies is rather recent. Religion regains its 
central analysis among social scientists and political observers in particular since the 
appearance of what so-called "public religion" and "religious resurgence." I shall return to this 
discussion later. But, before that, I will briefly review some findings or postulations of 
anthropologists, in order to understand (1) the nature and angle of their discussions and (2) the 
dynamics of the debate as well as the weaknesses of their theories with regard to human conflict 
and integration. Even though this study is not directly built on the basis of their theories and 
results, their notions are undoubtedly helpful. 
One of the early significant anthropological studies on human conflict and/or peace is 
African Political Systems, a collection of essays of early British structural-functionalists. Having 
been considered as the foundation of modern political anthropology (cf. Vincent, ed. 2005), the 
book discusses issues of conflict and violence and the way African tribal societies resolved their 
conflicts and maintained social balance and stability. For the early British structural-
functionalists, social stability was postulated, so that the major problem was to show how the 
various conflicts and interest groups upheld a balance of forces that resulted in a stable, ongoing 
social structure. The integrating power of religion and symbols were also noted, especially the 
role of ritual in confirming and consolidating group values ( cf. Lewellen 1992: 13; Evans-
Pritchard 1956). Thus, for the early functionalists, as janet Bujra (1973: 43) has noted, the 
assumption was that social unity was a normal state of affairs, whereas conflict was a 
problematic situation which could not easily be incorporated into their theoretical framework. 
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In brief, the classical anthropological scholarship gives much more weight to integrative 
elements, and not conflict ones, of human cultures, societies, and religion. 
Such a functionalist approach of an integrative aspect of human cultures and societies 
was criticized by subsequent generations of anthropologists. Clifford Geertz (1973), for instance, 
said that such a static school fails to address social change and the whole picture of social facts 
of ritual and beliefs. Besides Clifford Geertz, other strongest critics of structural-functionalism 
among modern anthropologists are F. Bailey (1960, 1969) and Fredrik Barth (1959, 1966, 
1969). The political anthropologist F. Bailey once proclaimed, "Structure may go to the wall but 
people survive." From political anthropological perspective in particular, this statement of 
Bailey could be the rallying cry. It marked the end of structure/culture-based approach and the 
beginning of actor-based method within anthropology. 
Since the mid and late 1950s, the process approach,B which focused on, and was much 
more interested in, (1) process (for a political anthropologist it refers to public process) and (2) 
the consciously held goals of the group, became among the most influential approaches in 
anthropology. Political anthropologists focusing on process approaches then emphasized the 
study of competition for power and the way that group goals are implemented by those 
possessing power (cf. Turner 1957; Leach 1954). Since they focused on "process" rather than 
pattern or "template" of human culture, the locus of their research interest shifted from 
13 Two quite different streams of inquiry within the process theorists emerged. First, those 
who broadened the scope of the study from relatively uniform, small scale, tribes to include complex 
societies (e.g. Leach 1986); and second, those who shifted their focus from the broad structural view 
of whole systems (one of the markers of structural-functionalist school] to the actions of individuals 
or small groups operating within the systems which later was to be called "action theory" whose 
primary focus was individuals and their manipulative strategies to gain and maintain power ( cf. 
Lewellen 1992; Bailey 2001; Barth 2000). Originated from the German sociologist Max Weber and 
later applied to political anthropology by Abner Cohen, the action theory, whose central concepts 
include goal orientation, manipulative strategies, maneuvering and decision making, thus, mainly 
focuses on the micro-level analysis and the microcosmic settings in examining social phenomena1 
including group conflict 
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equilibrium or synchronism that marked the legacy of school of structural-functionalism to the 
study of change. 
It is thus obvious that since the late 1950s and early 1960s, anthropology had 
undergone a significant transition. The first transition was from the study of equilibrium, social 
balance, or synchronism within human societies (the legacy of structural-functionalism) to the 
study of change, competition, struggle, conflict, social imbalance, and manipulation. The second 
change was the shift from structure or culture-based approach (a broad structural view of whole 
systems and their impact on societies) to agency-based method (actions of either individuals or 
small groups along with their manipulative strategies to gain, regain, or retain power). And the 
third transition was changing from pattern method (a static view of cultures) to process 
approach (a more dynamic understanding of human cultures). Based on the depiction sketched 
above, it is not surprising to look at why since then there has been growing anthropological 
literature on aggression, violence, terror, war, and resistance, and left out the study of 
harmonious, peaceful aspects of human societies. 
By the 1960s, competing perspectives (i.e. a view that emphasizes competitive, 
aggressive and violent dimensions of a presumed human nature) arouse more strongly, 
exemplified in major popular books such as Robert Ardrey's Territorial Imperative (1966) and 
Konrad Lorenz's On Aggression (1966). Anthropologists have indeed established considerable 
literature on the lived realities of human violence, and the ethnographic study ofterror and 
resistance has become something of a subfield ofits own (e.g. Schmidt and Schroder, eds. 2001; 
Nordstrom and Martin 1992; Warren 1993; Tambiah 1991, 1996; Appadurai 2006; McKenna 
1998; Nordstrom and Robben, eds. 1995; Mahmood 1996). The increasing involvement of 
anthropologists in the study of aggression, moreover, has produced deeply challenging 
ethnographies of violence that complement non-anthropological studies of violent conflict; these 
have greatly contributed to our understanding of the human experience of conflict. 
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Unfortunately, however, recent anthropological literature has paid little notice on post-
conflict peace and reconciliation in war-ravaged, multi-ethnic societies (cf. Wolf and Yang, eds. 
1996; Nordstrom and Robben, eds.1995; Avruch 1998; Theidon 2006, 2007). For some 
anthropologists focusing on the human experience of violence and warfare, conflict and 
aggression are considered to be the norm of human societies while social balance, unity, and 
peace are regarded as unreal ( cf. Bujra 1973). Heated by the growing literature on conflict and 
violence, either in anthropology or other disciplines, a handful of anthropologists have studied 
relatively nonviolent, peaceful small-scale tribal societies such as the Semai, the Kalahari San, 
the Zapotec Indians of Mexico, the Yam is of Taiwan, and the Punan of Borneo ( cf. Sponsel and 
Gregor, eds. 1994; Kemp and Fry, eds. 2004; Fry 2007). Moreover, the contributors of The 
Anthropology of Peace and Nonviolence argued that all simple but relatively non-violent societies 
they have examined have special ways of establishing and preserving peaceful relationships 
including what Sponsel and Gregor (1994: xvii) have termed, "sociative, restorative, and 
seperative peace" that bring individual and groups together in mutually rewarding relationships 
of cooperation and reciprocity. For these anthropologists, peaceful coexistence in small but 
plural societies has important preconditions. Civic coexistence involves more than the absence 
of violence and warfare; it requires of what Robert Hefner (1998, 2001) calls a culture and 
organization capable of scaling up interaction and cooperation across socio-cultural divides. 
The dissertation, as stated earlier, is not solely devoted to the study of violence or of 
peace. Instead, it will simultaneously examine the social phenomena and actions of collective 
violence and inter-group cooperation. The political anthropologist Ted Lewellen (1992: 17) has 
reminded us, "That conflict and accord, unity and disunity, might be two sides of the same coin, 
as Gluckman emphasized, was temporarily forgotten." In fact, every society seemed to 
ambiguously exhibit both peaceful and violent behavior. Studies in anthropology show this 
trend. Looking at ethno-religious violence in today's conflict-ridden societies such as Sri Lanka 
(Tambiah 1991, 1996), India (Brass 1997; van deer Veer 1994), the Philippines (McKenna 
1998), Lebanon (Norton 2009), Punjab (Mahmood 1997), or Maluku (e.g. Wilson 2008), 
religiously-marked institutions, discourses, and practices had also played parts in ambiguous 
ways. 
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Accordingly it is important not to exaggerate or underestimate the role of religious 
actors and associations in the time of conflict since they vary in responding to the conflict 
situation. This is to say that religiously-based groupings and "civil" associations-as the Maluku 
case has proved it-can simultaneously serve as a source of conflict (and violence) and a 
resource of peace and social stability. The political scientist Ashutosh Varshney who undertook 
research on the Hindu-Muslim conflict and civic life in India also came up with more or less the 
same conclusion: besides "institutionalized riot systems" ( cf. Brass 1997), he points out the 
existence of "institutionalized peace systems" among India's Hindu and Muslim societies. 
Varshney, moreover, states that in multiethnic societies, institutional frameworks tend to 
produce very different political strategies. Some of these systems, Varshney has argued, 
"privilege ethnic accommodation, others favor ethnic polarization. Institutional frameworks can, 
thus, be linked to communal conflict and peace" (Varshney 2002: 12). 
It is imperative to notice that the debate over the complex and ambivalent role of 
religion in the conflict settings is relatively recent, especially since religion greatly contributed 
to the public affairs. The phenomena of so-called "resurgent religion" and "public religion," then, 
have marked the emergence of, in Peter Berger's (1999) term, the "desecularization of the 
world." Indeed, the lateness of the debate among social scientists over the role of religion, 
particularly in post-war settings and reconciliation is mainly due to, among other reasons, the 
influence of secularization theories that forecasted not only the privatization of religion but also 
its decline and marginalization as the logical consequence of the expansion of modernity that 
institutionally demarcated the religious and secular spheres. 
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The core values of Western societies, including freedom of speech and freedom of 
religion, were elaborated in outraged response to inquisitions, crusades, pogroms, and wars 
conducted in the name of God. By the supporters of secularization theories, religion was 
portrayed as the "burning motivation, the one that inspired fanatical devotion and the most 
vicious hatred" in the wars that plagued Europe from the 1560s to the 1650s. As a result, despite 
the fact that billions of people structure their daily routines around the spiritual practices 
enjoined by a religious tradition, they tend to "overlook or underestimate the complex, multiple 
roles and functions of religion in societies populated by believers who reserve final obedience to 
a sovereign deity or by adherents of a spiritual order" (e.g. Buddhist sanghaJ (Appleby 2000: 2-
3). 
Another objection to those who would increase the role of religion in post-conflict 
peace building and reconciliation (and in other public affairs) is the persistence of religiously 
motivated conflict, intolerance, and anti-pluralist movements among some social groupings 
operating apart from (and sometimes in rebellion against) the state and government. In short, 
relocating religion's public expressions to the nongovernmental domain of civil society did not 
remove the problem of religious violence, albeit such violence has been more ubiquitous in 
societies lacking strong civic institutions and social tradition of pluralisme and tolerance. In 
recent decades, violent conflicts and extremism in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, Sudan, Darfur, 
Iran, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia (Maluku and Poso included), to 
name but a few, has been cloaked, in whole or in part, in religious garb! 
Indeed, the dreadful record of religiously inspired violence and radicalism makes a more 
complicated picture of religious agency. On one hand, religion did contribute to the initiation 
and escalation of the strife. On the other hand, it played a great role in nonviolent movements 
and peace building processes in societies undergoing social discords. While some religious 
leaders utilize and exploit religious teachings and normative discourses to support their violent 
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acts and radicalism (see Chapters 6-7), others use religion to sustain their nonviolent, peaceful, 
and pluralist movements (see Chapters 9-10). 
Historian Scott Appleby classifies religion used for supporting violence as a "weak 
religion," in contrast to a "strong religion" which promotes conciliation, pluralism, and other 
human's universal values. Religion becomes "weak," Appleby has argued, where it as an 
independent cultural and social presence has been weakened by oppression, a history of 
subordination to hostility, or by losing the struggle with the forces of modernization. When 
religion becomes "weak," it is easy to use it as a vehicle of conflict and violence (Appleby 2000: 
77 -78). In Maluku, the weakening processes of Christianity and Islam by political power began 
since the time oflslamic sultanates (i.e. Tid ore, Ternate, Bacan, and jailolo) in the northern part 
ofMaluku) and European and japanese colonialism until the New Order dictatorial regime (see 
Chapters 3-4). 
As the outcome of inconsistencies and incoherence within secularization theory itself 
and as a result of the emergence of "resurgent religion" and "public religion," the classical 
variant of secularization theory has been subjected to extensive criticism. The sociologist Peter 
Berger once called those who believe in the secularization thesis as a "big mistake," albeit he 
previously supported the theory. Indeed in some societies, dress, eating habits, gender relations, 
conflict resolution, and peace building-all unfold beneath a so-called a "sacred canopy." Around 
much of the world, politics and civil society are also suffused with religion. The Maluku case also 
proved the significance of religion in a public domain. Both the collective conflict and 
peace building processes took place on the ground were concealed in religious dress. Hence, "if 
the core of the secularization thesis remains intact," R Scott Appleby (2000: 4) has remarked, 
"its corollaries require revision." This dissertation in some part is an effort to criticize the 
mainstream variant of secularization theory and demonstrate the continuing vitality of religious 
institutions and passions in the modern world. 
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Conflict, Integration, and Total Approach 
The above theoretical explanation apparently shows the dynamics over the debate of 
human conflict and integration issues involving cultural and religious resources within socio-
anthropological discourse. Like the above anthropologists examining social structure and 
aspects of human culture in an attempt to analyze potentialities of conflict and integration 
within human societies, I also try to examine Maluku's cultural resources and its linkage to the 
region's disarray and stability. However, unlike Durkheimian and functionalist schools that only 
explore positive dimensions of human culture and religion or Hobbesians who tended to look at 
negative sides of human societies, this dissertation scrutinizes local political and religious 
resources potential for both the eruption of a social chaos and the creation of a social cohesion. 
In addition, unlike Clifford Geertz who believes in the exclusiveness and separation 
between culture and social structure, I maintain that examining human culture cannot be 
broken up from social system and structure as well as agents as an actor of human actions. 
Cultures are "socially distributed knowledge and habits," to borrow Robert Hefner's (1989) 
term, attached within human actions, social systems, and structures. Since culture is created, 
produced, and reproduced by individuals or groups as a cultural carrier that shapes social 
organizations and actions, its existence cannot be separated from those human institutions and 
individual/social actions. Accordingly, it is misleading looking at culture as an exclusive entity 
apart from human actions, social institutions, and structures of societies. 
The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (then Anthony Giddens through his 
"structuration theory") has pioneered the integration of structure and action that followed the 
successive crises first of Parson's own functionalism and then of a Marxian that had split into 
structuralist and voluntarist camps. In his Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu thoughtfully 
analyzes the interplay between cultural and social structure and social action. He pointed out 
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that structure is dependent upon action, and vice versa. In developing this insight, Bourdieu 
provided an opening for studying how changing material conditions could change the way 
cultural processes played out in the sphere of individual actions. These individual actions are 
recuperated into the reproduction of structure. Drawing from his early work in Algeria, 
Bourdieu sought to show how structures were shaped and reproduced through the very actions 
by which individuals sought to achieve their personal ends. In encouraging the attempt to see 
both actors (and therefore actions) and institutions as shaped and produced by cultural schema, 
this approach also opens up the possibility of analysis of the way in which those schemas are 
shaped in social struggle. This is the ground for a reproduction theory as well as the larger task 
to which Bourdieu's account of"symbolic violence" speaks (Bourdieu 1977, 2007; cf. Calhoun 
1996). 
For Bourdieu, acts of violence can be driven by competition over "symbolic resources" 
(then become the roots of "symbolic violence") among individuals or social groups. He contends 
that the struggle for social recognition is a fundamental dimension of all social life. In that 
struggle, cultural resources, processes, and institutions hold individuals and groups in 
competitive and self-perpetuating hierarchies of domination. He advances the bold claim that all 
cultural symbols and practices (religious practices included) are embodied in interests-not 
only "material interests" in the sense ofWeberian but "symbolic interests" as well-and function 
to increase social differences and divisions (cf. Swartz 1996: 72), then by no means a source of 
conflict. 
Bourdieu's explanation above is useful for my study. In the light ofBourdieu's 
theoretical framework, moreover, it is fruitful for my dissertation to look at how these social 
struggles and competitions among individuals/groups are refracted through symbolic 
classifications, how cultural and religious practices place individuals and groups in Maluku and 
Ambon into competitive class and status hierarchies, how relatively autonomous fields of 
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conflict link individuals and groups, both Muslims and Christians, in struggle over valued, scarce 
resources, how local actors both in state and society struggle and pursue strategies to achieve 
their interests within such fields, and how in doing so actors unwittingly reproduce the social 
stratification order. All these things are to show that culture is not devoid of political content but 
rather is an expression of it. 
Moreover, systems/structures will shape individuals who produce systems j structures 
(and cultures] or, in Bourdieu's term, "practices" in a uniform way. Bourdieu (2007: 163] wrote, 
"The social calendar tends to secure integration by compounding the synchronization of 
identical practices with the orchestration of different but structurally homologous practices" 
(italics are Bourdieu's]. Up to this point, he missed the fact that socialization includes interaction 
and not only internalization. Moreover, Bourdieu's approach missed the fact that each individual 
will respond social systems/structures differently; consequently, each will produce different, 
various cultures. It is interesting to look at, for instance, why Ambon's Muslim and Christian 
leaders during the conflict split into two camps: "radical extremists" and "nonviolent militants" 
( cf. Appleby 2000] despite the fact that they utilized both religious resources and traditions. 
Pierre Bourdieu's approach, moreover, is similar in at least several respects to that of 
Fredrik Barth or F. Bailey. They both pay attention to actions and practices of individuals. Barth 
(1993: 97] states, "I need to focus on the situations and practices that emerge in interaction 
between people and on the precipitate of interpreted experience of those results." Barth 
considers people's practices the "place" of cultural production. Bart and Bailey were also 
concerned about the analysis of manipulative strategies, pragmatic choices, and decision making 
of individuals as social actors in pursuing interests. In brief, they focused on micro-level process 
of socialization and change. Barth emphasizes actors as the unit of analysis. Bourdieu also 
focuses on actors but explains their dispositions and habitus and interests in relation to the 
production and reproduction of the social order as a whole (a social order that is seen as class 
stratified). 
51 
Unlike Bourdieu, however, Barth's transactional approach (and Bailey's) was elaborated 
in opposition to the dominant, essentially Durkheimian (and Parsonian) view of the world as 
ordered by rules or norms. Bourdieu and practice theorists, generally, by contrast, share a view 
that the system does in fact have a very powerful, even determining effect upon human actions 
and the shapes of events. Bourdieu's interest in the study of action and practice is thus not a 
matter of denying or minimizing this point, but rather, expresses an urgent need to understand 
where the system comes from, how it is produced and reproduced, and how it may have 
changed in the past or be changed in the future (Ortner 1984: 145-6). Furthermore, unlike 
Bourdieu who tended to believe in the homologous practices that resulted from the subjective 
principles Barth, by contrast, viewed the plurality of practices as a result of complex empirical 
processes of diverse individuals, "not simply productive ofisomorphy and harmony" (Barth 
1993: 97). 
While Barth mainly focused on actor-based approach with special attention to 
individual actors and left no room for social structures (and systems or cultures), I am 
concerned with both human agency (not only individuals but also social groupings) and macro-
social structures, including social organizations and political institutions such as governments, 
political parties, and civil organizations. I argue that social organizations and political structures 
whether in micro-or macro-levels, including state institutions, have played a crucial role in the 
shape of individual behaviors and social actions. The anthropologist Augustus Richard Norton 
also pays attention to the interplay between human agency (again not only individual actors but 
also social-political groups, international agencies) and social-political institutions (including 
state, CSOs, and NGOs) as the producers of social change-"the state has key role to play," says 
Norton (1995: 13). In his study of civil institutions and the state, Robert Weller (2005: 1-19) has 
also noticed the central role played by both state institutions and civil organizations in the 
political change in Asia, including China. They represent the camp of macro-level analysis of 
social change and socialjcultural production. 
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Furthermore, although I differ from Barth (and Bailey) in looking at human phenomena, 
Barth's analyses of individuals' "manipulative strategies" and "pragmatic choices" in pursuing 
interests are nevertheless useful to examine multiple actors involved in the Maluku conflict and 
peace. Other Fredrik Barth's theories that are useful for my study are those of social change and 
the fluidity of ethnic boundaries. Unlike traditional anthropological description in terms of 
pattern and customs that does not adequately portray change, Fredrik Barth maintains that all 
social systems and customs are prone to change. Barth states, "To understand social change, 
what we need to do as social anthropologists is to describe all of society in such terms that we 
see how it persists, maintains itself, and changes through time" (Barth 1967: 661). 
Looking at the Maluku case, it is obvious that custom and religion have changed, but the 
change is not only the product of actions and interactions of individuals but also those of social 
groups and institutions such as the powerful Maluku's Protestant congregation, the GPM Synod. 
Fredrik Barth, furthermore, maintains that cultural boundaries are fluid, not fixed, so that 
people can shift their identity overtime through personal interaction. For Barth, actors' 
interaction can shift their ethnic identity (Barth 1981). Borrowing Barth's theoretical 
framework. some religious actors as well as community and political leaders in Ambon have 
gradually changed their perceptions with regard to the conflict and opposing religious groups 
after having intensive communications, internalization processes, and considerable interactions 
between the conflicting parties (see Chapters 9-10). 
Moreover, recalling Robert Hefner's (1989, 1990) theoretical approach, I also pay 
attention to the significant role of social history in shaping social and cultural change (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). Besides highlighting the individuals and collectivities, Hefner (1989: 269-70) 
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is concerned about "the conditions that socialize actors" (i.e. history and society) and therefore 
"shape the institutions they bring to bear on received cultural forms." For Hefner (1989: 21), 
religious faith "always has a longer history and wider socialization," and the power of ritual 
symbolism depends on "its ability to tap this experience and focus its compelling quality." 
In addition to the explanation of the contribution of social organizations, structures, and 
systems, Hefner has also noticed the significance of social actors in the analyses of social change 
and cultural production. Citing Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Hefner (1989: 19-20) 
states, "socialization is never completely successful...hence different actors bring different 
attitudes, feelings, and knowledge to the same social dramas." Hefner's comment here is critical 
of both Pierre Bourdieu and Clifford Geertz in part because, for Bourdieu, individuals tend to 
produce a homogenous culture since they internalize the same systems or structures. Here, 
Bourdieu did not anticipate the fact that individuals will internalize and socialize cultures and 
social systems in different, diverse ways. Geertz (1973) also said that to understand religion one 
needs to look at "symbols" (ritual practices or performances). He did not realize that each 
individual may express or may have distinct purposes of practicing religious rituals-then 
produce different meanings. 
Robert Hefner (1989: 20) continued to argue that in order to understand the 
importance of a tradition (and human culture in general), "there is no detour around society or 
history" -"differences of social position, biography, ·and cognition all effect people's experience." 
In his study of the political economy of mountain java, Hefner, in addition to questions of 
experience and meaning, has also emphasized what he calls "circumstantial processes" such as 
population growth, ecological decline, and long-term economic developments-"the patterned 
complexity of which often escapes actors' awareness" (Hefner 1990: xvi]. 
Here, Hefner has tended to apply a "total approach" in studying the phenomena of 
human societies and cultures that, again, differs from both Barth and Bourdieu. Moreover, like 
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Bourdieu, Hefner is also concerned about how to bridge the gap between objectivism and 
subjectivism. Unlike Bourdieu, however, Hefner focuses on the approach he calls "sociogenetic," 
which is to say it studies "the forms of meanings of a people's way of life and the circumstances 
involved in their sustenance and change." Hefner (1990: xii-xiii) maintains that "only through 
such dialectical tacking between activity and constraint can we hope to escape from the ritual 
either for choice between objectivism and subjectivism that continue to plague modern social 
inquiry." 
The dissertation also employs a total approach. I maintain that in order to thoroughly 
examine the complex phenomena of human "social drama" of the Maluku wars, one need to 
apply multiple theories and frameworks. It presents not only the more recent socio-political 
facts and discriminatory policies of the New Order (i.e. "short-term framework") that lead to the 
Maluku conflict but also the social history and politics of colonialism from the Portuguese and 
the Dutch to japanese (i.e. "long-term explanation") that contributed to the religious-based 
division of Ambonese societies. As Peter van der Veer (1994) has suggested on the impact of 
British colonialism on Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in India, I also trace the roots of the Maluku 
religious violence (and Indonesia's post-Suharto communal violence in general) back to the 
colonial era, particularly the Dutch, since they played a significant role in the creation of 
Christian-Muslim separation, regionally and culturally, in Ambon and Maluku that later became 
a fertile ground for the communal conflict (see Chapter 3). 
This dissertation, furthermore, not only analyzes the role of elite agency whether 
national or local elites as van Klinken (2007) studied but also Ambon's and Maluku's local 
masses (cf. Adam 2009) in initiating and intensifying violent conflicts. A central debate in 
conflict study usually concerns the relative importance of elite instigation versus mass-level 
phenomena in the onset and trajectory of collective violence. Some analysts look for some 
powerful and charismatic individuals such as religious clerics seeking to gain and retain political 
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power, economic advantage, or religious authority as the main actors of collective conflicts. As 
well, elite-based theories of violent conflicts have strong intellectual foundation in the Resource 
Mobilization and Social Movements literature (cf. Tarrow 1998). Social Movements theorists (cf. 
Nash 2005) claim that because discontent and grievance are almost always present in society, 
they cannot adequately explain mobilization without the intervention of influential elite 
members of society. Elites are, thus, considered to be the main cause of violence with little 
explanatory weight resting with the conditions prevalent prior to violent conflict. 
Some analysts of conflict, furthermore, eschew the focus on the behavior ofleaders to 
show the importance of mass-driven conflicts. One of the prominent general explanations of 
conflict based on the presence of mass-level phenomena is the concept of Relative Deprivation, 
associated most closely with Ted Gurr's Why Men Rebel. This concept asserts that aggression 
results from frustration of the masses. The greater the intensity of deprivation, the theory says, 
the greater the violence (Gurr 1970). ln his classic texts of conflict study, Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict and The Deadly Ethnic Riot, Donald Horowitz takes a more synthetic approach to the role 
of elites and mass-level phenomena, but still very much emphasize the significance of the latter 
(Horowitz 1985, 2001). 
This dissertation, however, will simultaneously analyze elite/mass agency in the Maluku 
conflict settings. ln explaining the Maluku conflict, I will treat the elites and masses on equal 
manner, considering both as the crucial actors during the bloodshed that must be examined 
carefully. A number of studies on violent conflicts (cf. Kaufmann 1996) indicate that different 
cases of communal violence can be characterized as either elite-led or mass-led. Stuart Kaufman 
(1996: 157) concludes that mass-led conflicts results when mass hostility and fear triggers 
spontaneous outbreaks of violence. Dale Eickelman (1996) also points out that "religious elites" 
such as traditionally educated scholars (ulama) are not the sole source of authority in the 
Muslim politics. Much as Eickelman points out in his approach, in the Maluku context, in 
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addition to religious leaders and the elites of society, the "commoners" or "ordinary" adherents 
of Christianity and Islam such as teachers, church officials, mothers, petty traders, youths, or 
motorcycle drivers (tukang ojek) are all the protagonists of Maluku's political drama, not merely 
because they share normative codes but because they invoke the symbols of those codes to 
reconfigure the boundaries of civic debate and public life (cf. Eickelman 1996). 
Underlying much of the literature on the role of elite instigation and mass-level 
conditions in causing violence depicted in preceding paragraphs is an assumption that elites are 
removed from the irrational influences operating at the societal level. For elites, organizing 
violence is for political and economic reasons (or anything related to "material world"), not due 
to rage, injustice, or prejudice. However, mass-level conflicts stem from less rational sources 
such as frustration, hostility, and fear (cf. Wilson 2008: 18). This point is helpful in examining 
the Maluku unrest, because the conflict involved both elite members of society and ordinary 
people. Did they have different reasons, motives, and interests in their involvement in the 
warfare or share a hope for the same thing: "material ends? 
Other theoretical frameworks need to be taken into consideration when analyzing how 
human conflict is related to factors that motivate those engaged in violent conflicts, whether 
rational calculation of interests (utility maximization or instrumentalism) or emotional j 
identity-related factors. Proponents of rational choice sometimes recognize the role of emotion 
in conflict, and those espousing effective explanations allow a degree of instrumentalism in the 
violence. Yet most analysts give causal precedence to one or another form of motivation. The 
Rational Choice Theory, for instance, points out the rationality of those involved in the violence, 
suggesting that political, economic, or other ("worldly") interests are concealed by the rhetoric 
of grievance and identity. While recognizing the role of ethnic/tribal solidarity, religion, and 
emotion, theorists of Rational Choice concluded that these phenomena are ultimately the 
product of material competition. Susan Olzak (1992) asserts that competition increases when 
different groups come into contact in an environment of declining material resources. 
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Contrary to Rational Choice Theory, which emphasizes "rational utility maximization," 
some analysts have indicated emotional and psychological influences on people involved in the 
conflict. Chaim Kaufman (2005) claims that Rational Choice faces a problem explaining ethnic 
conflict because it does not recognize the power of communal attachments. Furthermore, Roger 
Petersen (2002) has identified four emotions which commonly lead to violence, namely fear, 
hatred, resentment, and rage, each emerging in different situations and motivating attacks on 
different groups. Some analysts, moreover, have claimed that questions of identity play the pre-
eminent role in eliciting the emotional responses necessary for violence. In this view, members 
are driven to conflict by threats or insults to their ethnic group's identity and will put 
themselves at risk in order to benefit the wider community. Stuart Kaufmann (2006) has also 
notified the "myth symbol complex" of a group's identity as the source of conflict. He states, "A 
group mythology that justifies hostility is a precondition for violent ethnic conflict" and "ethnic 
appeals are successful in producing extreme violence only if the group also fears that its 
existence is threatened" (Kaufman (2006: 52-3). 
It is thus obvious that in the study of conflict, scholars vary in identifying the causes, 
roots and agencies of conflict: some put emphasis on the "greed theory" while others give 
emphasis to "grievance"; some focus on "rational choice" while others call attention to 
"emotions" and "psychological influences." Still, some emphasize the role of elites while others 
underline masses as the "primary movers" of violence (cf. Wilson 2008). Literature on the 
Maluku conflict, as discussed earlier, tends to give more weight to political economy and the role 
of elite (civilian and military] and central government in driving the conflict. The role and 
influences of ordinary people, religion, identity, and other "unworldly aspects" are left out from 
the literature. 
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Explaining conflict by reference to either rational interest or emotional outburst alone is 
problematic. Conflicts often involve a striking complexity of issues. Communal conflict is 
basically the outcome of group interaction and therefore two opposing parties, or even each 
individual, will almost certainly be driven by different motives and interests. Individuals 
approach a conflict situation with mutually reinforcing rational and irrational motives. Case 
studies invariably demonstrate that actors-both elites and masses-in a conflict setting 
simultaneously face a range of economic, political, emotional, psychological, religious and 
identity-related factors upon decision making. These influences do not exist independently of 
each other but constantly reiterate or intensify the importance of one other. The Maluku case 
also shows that these rational and irrational factors mutually reinforce in motivating Ambonese 
and non-Ambonese Christians and Muslims in their involvement in the communal conflict. 
As Chris Wilson (2008: 20) has correctly underlined, anyone who has approached the 
inductive analysis of a single case of conflict will attest that theories based too strongly on the 
role of either structures or autonomous actors fail to capture the complexity of a large-scale 
violence. Both conditions and human agency play some role in leading to violence conflict. While 
influenced by surrounding context, it is the motives and actions of individuals and groups that 
translate that situation into violent conflict. Perhaps more importantly, neglecting human 
agency in the tragedy of violent conflict removes accountability from the actors most 
responsible. Human agency is necessary to translate structures into conflict. Accordingly, in the 
study of communal conflict, it is important to examine simultaneously the role of structures and 
human agency. 
This dissertation therefore proceeds with the assumption that conflict and peace must 
be understood as the result of human agency, which shapes and in turn is influenced by a range 
of mutually exacerbating political, economic, emotional, religious, and identity-related factors. 
Rather than disaggregating and studying separately the rational and irrational aspects of 
--:-:, 
conflict, as well as the role of structures, elite agency or ordinary people, I argue that a full 
explanation of a human conflict and peace will be found in tbe interaction of these elements. 
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Part Two 
Pre-Conflict Maluku: 
History, Rivalry, and Hostility 
"When the mass violence erupted in Ambon in 1999, there were flyers written by the Moluccan 
Ulama Council (MUl Maluku) about the Muslim revenge toward Christians regarding killings 
committed by the Christian inhabitants of Leitimor, particularly the village of Pass a, toward Hitu 
Muslims some 300 years ago, on September 9, 1699, more precisely. During that time, the story goes, 
Christians walked on hundreds of the Muslim bodies. This event marked the confiscation of Hitu 
Muslims from their land. The same thing happened when Muslim fighters attacked Christian villages 
of Hative-Tawiri. They also legitimized their attacks by "historical claims" that the land once, some 
hundreds of years ago, belonged to them. Such historical legitimacy of land ownership was also used 
by some Muslim rioters when they occupied Christian areas ofKelang, Boano, Manipa, and west 
Seram resulted in the removal of Christian populations. No one can deny that the past works very 
well influencing to day's (Ambonese] Muslims to commit violence and aggression against Christian 
community." 
Thamrin Ely, Ambonese moderate Muslim leader and participant of Malina II peace pact 
Introduction 
Contrary to some studies and opinions that underemphasized the role of history over 
the course of the Maluku collective conflict (e.g. van Klinken 2001, 2007), Thamrin Ely's 
statement cited above indicates that, first, the historical past has mattered over the course of the 
violence. Both Christians and Muslims utilized local history, popular narratives, and memories 
of violence and hostility to legitimize their violent acts. Second, part of Maluku's social history 
was colored by rivalry, conflict, and warfare between Christian and Muslim groups. 
This point of view contrasts with most analyses that tend to see the historical past of 
pre-conflict Ambon and Maluku as marked by the peaceful coexistence and interreligious 
tolerance between Christians and Muslims (cf. Bertrand 2002; Brauchler 2003; Cappel, ed. 
2006; Pariela 2008).1ndeed, most scholars have presented a view of Ambon [and Maluku), 
before the bloody conflict erupted, as, more or less, an "earthly paradise" filled with abundant 
natural resources, particularly cloves and nutmeg, so that the archipelago has been called the 
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"Spice Islands," or the "sweet island" whose deeply religious people lived in harmony with 
nature and with one another (cf. Deane 1979). Ambon city's motto: Ambon Manise (the "sweet 
and charming Ambon") also indicates such a nice portrayal. This romanticist view, however, not 
only keeps conflict and violence out of Ambon's history but it also leaves history out of the 
picture. 
This section is intended to provide the historical background to the eruption of the 
Maluku conflict in 1999. It sketches the encounter of Christianity and Islam, as well as the 
dynamics of Christian-Muslim relations from the colonial period to the New Order era. These 
years were actually filled with incidents of interreligious violence, competition over local scarce 
resources, and struggle for defending their religious continuity and identity. Moreover, this 
section highlights discriminatory policies and politics of the colonizers (from the Portuguese to 
japanese) and post-independence regimes that caused unequal relations and jealousy which 
might provide a fertile ground for the communal violence of 1999-2004 to thrive. 
In this regard, this section is intended to examine various aspects ofMaluku's historical 
development, aiming at illustrating the diversity, complexity, and dynamics of Muslim and 
Christian groups whose historical experience has significantly differed from one another. In 
particular, this section describes (1) the historical process of religious polarization, purification, 
and proselytization (both Christianization and Islamization) that led to the destruction of 
Maluku's ethnic unity and stability, as well as (2) the genesis of Christian-Muslim division that 
later radicalized interreligious relations and sharpened intergroup tensions. 
In addition, this section depicts the historical settings, social roots, and religious 
discourses that transformed Ambon's and Maluku's religious communities from common 
adherents of religion to zealous followers of Islam and Christianity whose identification with 
their faith could provide a raison d'i!tre for the 1999 communal violence to flourish. The section, 
then, aims at examining political practices of colonialism and post-colonialism and their links to 
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the religious division, radicalization, and fanaticism in the Moluccas. For that reason, I argue that 
the 1999 bloody unrest was not an incident without historical precedent. Rather it was deeply 
rooted in the social history of Maluku: the history of conflict, competition, and antagonism.14 As 
the Australian historian Richard Chauvel (2007: 110) has rightly noted, the unprecedented 
inter-group conflict that engulfed Ambon from 1999 to 2004 was the product of processes of 
social and political change dating back to colonial times, added with the collapse of traditional 
means of conflict management that had been built up over four centuries. 
I, moreover, argue that the legacy of inter-village alliance (pel a or gandong), the 
traditional system of Christian-Muslim unity (sa/am-sarane), and the local mechanisms of 
conflict resolution (baku bae) in Maluku, Ambon and central Maluku respectively (see Chapter 
8), appeared as an indigenous means of settling disputes and hostilities which were widespread 
and commonplace in the region. Seeing from another perspective, these traditional ways of 
intergroup reconciliation and unity also indicate that the violence had been part of everyday life 
of Moluccan and Ambonese societies before, during, and after the colonial period. 
The idea of putting violence into a social and historical context has been the concern of 
a number of anthropologists writing about headhunting in Southeast Asia (cf. George 1996; 
Rosaldo 1980). These accounts point to the interweaving of historical events and social 
practices, and the many effects of this entanglement. They, furthermore, investigate how local 
histories of clash and hostility compete with other discursive forms and thus represent what 
Kenneth George (1996) calls, "contested cultural resources." What is clear from these studies is 
that, as Sandra Pannell (2003: 11) underlines, violence has a "more endemic social purpose and 
constitutive cultural meaning." Another anthropologist pointing out the significance oflocal 
14 Compare this argument with that of M.C. Ricklefs in his study regarding the 1965/6 anti-
communist movement in java. Ricklefs [2007) argues that this tragic incident was strongly rooted 
within java's history of polarized society and enmity that emerged in the stage ofjavanese politics 
since the mid-twentieth century. 
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history and folk narratives for the production and reproduction of violence is Liisa Malkki 
(1995) who wrote a book based on the experiences of the Hutu refugees who fled the 1972 
"selective genocide" in Burundi. Through her examination of narrative accounts of extreme 
violence, Malkki highlights how identities, histories, and even nation-ness are produced through 
violence and the experience of exile. 
The production (and reproduction) of the Maluku strife, as Thamrin Ely has pointed out 
in the opening paragraph, also cannot be separated from local history and popular narratives of 
antagonism, sorrow, pride, and heroism among Muslims and Christians, both settlers and 
migrants, in Ambon and Maluku. A Seramese Muslim (ex) jihadist told me that the reason for his 
involvement with the jihadist groups in 1999 against Christians was driven by retaliation going 
back to years ago when Christians of Aboru in the island of Haruku in central Maluku swept out 
his village and killed his family. In contrast, the Christian fighters of Aboru legitimized their 
violent acts against Muslims during the Maluku conflict by pointing out a historical precedent 
where their forefathers, under the leadership of Kapitan Tua Saya, greatly succeeded in 
defeating their Muslim rivals of Amaika kingdom in Haruku some four hundred years ago15 ( cf. 
Allen 1992). 
This section is divided into two chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 3) describes 
Maluku's Christian-Muslim relations during the colonial periods from the Portuguese to the 
japanese, and the second chapter (Chapter 4) depicts the dynamics of Christian-Muslim 
relations in post-independence Indonesia, particularly during the Old Order and the New Order, 
before the eruption of the interreligious violence in 1999. 
15 Interview with Rev. john Peea and Rev. Wen Lesbassa, pastors of GPM (the Moluccan 
Protestant Church) working in Aboru, February 10, 2011. On the history of Aboru see Pattikayhatu 
(2008b). 
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Chapter 3 
Christian-Muslim Relations, Violence, and Colonial Presence 
Notwithstanding intermittent intergroup cooperation and Christian-Muslim alliances 
( cf. Bartels 1977a; Cooley 1961-see Chapter 8), it is certainly difficultto overlook the often 
violent history of Maluku. The historical records suggest that rivalry and hostility between local 
groups (clan, ethnic, or religious-based) was pervasive (cf. Bouman, et. al. 1960; Polman 1983; 
Pannell, ed. 2003; Steenbrink 1993; Wattimanela 2003). The Portuguese traveler Tome Pires 
wrote in the early 16th century: 
"Mohammedanism (i.e. Islam) in the Molucca islands [Maluku] began fifty years ago. 
The kings of the islands are Mohammedans, but not very deeply involved in the sect 
Many are Mohammedans without being circumcised, and they are not many 
Mohammedans. The heathen are three parts and more out of four. The people of 
these islands are dark-skinned; they have sleek hair. They are at war with one 
another most of the time" (Pires 1944, 1: 213). 
Apart from his insensitive comment on local Muslims and the "natives," Pires' 
assessment shows that violence had deep and prolonged roots in the history of Maluku.16 Inter-
village warfare, besides inter-village unity, was indeed a persistent fact oflife throughout the 
islands of Maluku. Maluku's widespread traditional practice of the cakalele or "war dance" 
reflects how war had become a common feature of the archipelago.17 Widely understood by its 
contemporary male performers not just as a "dance" but as historically concerned with actual 
preparation for violent conflict, the caka/e/e represents past warfare linking to magical/ritual 
preparations for war involving notions of territory and social order (Winn 2003: 53-4). 
16 A report of D.H. Kolff (1840) who voyaged around the southern reaches of Maluku in the 
years 1825 and 1826 also indicates the prevalence of conflicts, violent acts and civil unrests in the 
archipelago. 
17 The cakalele is an expression well-known within Maluku. Its major features are machete 
or sword [parang) of some form and an hourglass-shaped waisted shield (sa/awakung), usually 
fashioned from wood. See more in Winn (2003: 49-71; Bartels 1977a; Cooley 1961). 
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Although anthropologist Dieter Bartels (1977a: 252) links the old war dance cakalele to the 
renewing of Ambon's pela alliance, the pela oath, interestingly, involved immersing various 
weapons of war into a shared drink and by the beginning of the 20th century the usual spears, 
lances, and machetes (parang) were joined by guns, bullets and gunpowder (cf. Cooley 1961: 
72). 
Indeed, history notes that rivalry and conflict between the sultanates ofTernate and 
Tid ore (as well as other kingdoms such as Bacan and jailolo) in the northern part ofMaluku, 
between arranged groups on the island of Seram, and between the ulilima (a confederation 
made up offive clans) and the u/isiwa (an alliance of nine clans) on Ambon Island, pervade the 
whole area. It is commonly believed that Ambon was initially populated by so-called Alifuru, a 
name which actually means "wild people who live in the mountain forests" of Seram Island 
called Nunusaku, whom the Ambonese people consider to be their ancestors ( cf. Abdurrachman, 
et. a!. 2003). 
Far before the European colonial presence in the sixteenth century's, in the coastal 
areas of the Moluccan islands, particularly in the trading centers, people from different regions 
of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, including java, are said to have settled and formed clans 
which later, around the end of the 15th century, organized themselves in so-called u/i (league) of 
different degrees. These u/i formed groups of five or nine sub-groups each comprising a certain 
number of villages originating from common ancestors. The members (called a man or hen a), 
formed a clan which consisted of several rumatau or families. The ulilima formed a group of five 
and was opposed to the ulisiwa (a group of nine). The ulilima settled mostly on the region of 
Leihitu (knownjazirah Leihitu) on the northern part of the Ambon island and embraced Islam 
"The history of Ambon since the arrival of the Portuguese in 1512 is well documented by 
several Portuguese sources, by the local Hikayat Tanah Hitu written by local historian Rijali and 
preserved in Malay and Dutch, and also by short remarks in Rumphius' Ambonsche Historie 
(composed in 1679 on Ambon]. 
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from the early 16th century, whereas the ulisiwa kept to their old traditions and lived mostly on 
the peninsula of Leitimor (known]azirah Leitimor), where Ambon city is now located ( cf. Cooley 
1961, 1966; Effendi 1987)). 
It is unclear whether it is dualism that creates opposition, as Ambonese cosmology has 
confirmed, or the antagonism of society actually that produces dualism. However, interestingly, 
the villages of the one would make political and cultural choices that were opposed to the 
choices of nearby villages of the other. It is also apparent from 16th- and 17th-century sources 
that the two confederations found on Ambon, Seram, and the surrounding islands" regarded 
each other as opponents (cf. Polman 1983) or "traditional enemies" as Barbara Grimes (1993: 
17) calls it. If one uli became Muslim (such as the inhabitants of Leihitu) the other was inclined 
to choose Christianity, whether Roman Catholicism or Calvinist Protestantism-(i.e. the people 
of Leitimor). 
Friendship with the Portuguese or the Dutch on the part of one group created 
opposition to the foreigners in the other group. When the villages of the north coast ofHitu that 
belonged to Ulilima and had embraced Islam looked for support from the Javanese or Ternatans, 
the villages of the south of Hitu that belonged to Ulisiwa sought an alliance with the Portuguese 
(and later with the Dutch) (Grimes 1993: 18-9). This salient territorial and political opposition 
between Ulilima and Ulisiwa constituted part of a comprehensive system of Maluku's socio-
cosmic dualism (cf. Maspaitella 2001). This social structure should be kept in mind when 
discussing modern Ambonese culture and politics. 
The opposites, moreover, always have to be brought into a unity by a man-a 
charismatic person or adatleader-the center of the universe. These dualism and rivalry, as 
19 Van Fraas sen (1983: 5) notes that such dualism-two mutually opposed groupings-also 
exist in the villages of Banda, Kei, Aru, Seram, Buru and adjoining islands in the Moluccas at the 
beginning of the 16th-century. In Seram there are patasiwa (League of Nine) and patalima (League of 
Five), while in Kei Islands there are ursiw (similar to patasiwa and ulisiwa) and lurlim (equal to 
patalima or ulilima) (Effendi 1987: 35) 
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well as war and antagonism, Adolf Henken (2002: 24) argues, were regarded as "necessary to 
create stability and coherence and keep things going" (cf. Gluckman 1955a, 1955b). Considering 
central Moluccas as a region with no ethnic, political, racial, and religious unity, Adolf Henken 
(loc.cit), furthermore, states that inter-group union and harmony was a "legend, created and 
upheld by myths about the origin of the family of its four or five always quarreling members." 
Henken's statement above could be an exaggeration since Ambon and Maluku also has 
institutionalized traditional systems of reconciliation and inter-group unity (cf. Bartels 1977a; 
Takaria 2001; Huwae 1995; Iwamony 2010), but it indicates the common practices of conflict 
and enmity among Ambonese and Moluccan society in pre and post-colonial times." Later, the 
advent of imported world religions of !slam and Christianity, both Roman Catholicism and 
Calvinist Protestantism, brought by foreign traders, teachers, missionaries, and European 
colonizers added to, and deepened, the rivalry, enmity, and fighting, endemic in the whole 
archipelago. Throughout the Moluccan islands from the northern part to the southern regions, 
the introduction of these new world religions and the subsequent banning of headhunting by the 
20 This Maluku's feud could be instigated by disputes pertaining to rights over land (i.e. hak 
ulayat) and other valued properties (e.g. perahu-small boats), or by clashes regarding thefts, 
economic competition, adultery, murder, insults, disobedience [towards adatrule), or revenge and 
counter-revenge. While inter-village fighting and headhunting were linked to various secular 
disputes and rivalries, both activities were also integral features of indigenous religious practices. 
Slaves, one of the largest and mostlucrative items of exchange before and during the colonial era, 
were another source ofMaluku's inter-village conflicts. Slaves, together with cloves, cloth and iron, 
were one of the principal trade items in local and more regionally-based exchange networks. The 
slave trade in the east, which also involved the Bugis and the Chinese besides local inhabitants, was 
an old phenomenon, consisting mainly of those seized in raids on enemy villages being made to labor 
in the victor's own village, with some being sold to foreign traders. Much of the raiding was related to 
feuds, enmities, and religious demands. It was never regarded as a purely economic endeavor. The 
scale of slaving activities, increased dramatically in the 17th century aiming at satisfying Dutch and 
Spanish demands for labor in their cities, as well as in the plantations which the Dutch had 
previously established in Banda, Ambon, West java, and the Cape Colony. The demand for slaves from 
the east, notably Maluku and Papua, became stronger with the decision of the VOC in 1689 to forbid 
the use of slaves from Butung, the Malay areas, Makassar, Bali, and java because of their bad record 
of violence against their masters [Andaya 1991: 83-8). There is strong evidence to suggest that the 
demand for slaves created by the Dutch exacerbated the incidence of Maluku's inter-village warfare 
and local protests [ cf. Andaya 1993a). The regional slave trade, added with inter-village hostilities 
and local headhunting raids, was evoked by the Dutch as the justification for their own forms of 
violence. 
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European missionaries created a new kind of "ritual enmity" and were received by popular 
resistance among the natives. 
The Portuguese: Colonialism and Proselytization 
The violent history ofMaluku, in some part, is intertwined with the mercantile and 
colonizing endeavors of the colonizers: Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, and japan over a 
period spanning more than four hundred turbulent years ( cf. La pian, ed. 1982; Leirissa, et. al. 
1982; Abdurrachman 2008). lt is significant to note that Maluku, unlike other areas of the 
Malay-Indonesian archipelago, had the longest experience of colonialism that has shaped the 
region's society, culture, and politics. The period of colonialism from 16th to 20th centuries is 
marked by violent conflicts between the colonizers such as Spaniards versus Portuguese, 
Portuguese versus Dutch, Dutch versus British, and Dutch versus japanese as they attempted to 
seize and maintain control over both people and resources.21 
This era is also typified by numerous and widespread acts of violence perpetrated by 
the colonizers against the local population ofMaluku, notably Muslim communities, sometimes 
as a result of the rivalry that existed between the Europeans.22 The efforts of the colonizers to 
assert control over Maluku often met with considerable resistance from the local population23 
'' In order to protect the spice monopoly, the Dutch, for instance, proceeded to destroy the 
nutmeg trees which occurred naturally on Maluku's other islands, particularly the islands of Kei, 
Darner, Moa, Teun, Nila and Serua.ln the process, they deprived the inhabitants of these islands of an 
important economic resource in local trade networks. 
22 Perhaps, the most infamous of these events took place on the Banda Islands in 1621. In a 
military campaign aimed at ejecting the English and securing the islands once and for all, the Dutch, 
under the command of jan Pieterszoon Co en, killed or deported as slaves of some 15,000 indigenous 
inhabitants (cf. Andaya 1993a). 
''Opposition to Europeans often took the form of occasional coalitions between a number of 
affected groups and villages, albeit a long tradition of inter-Ambonese warfare, as the Dutch historian 
Gerrit Knaap (1992: 24) points out with respect to central Maluku, had created too much mutual 
distrust to form lasting unions among Ambonese people. Armed resistance is just one of a number of 
strategies employed by local people dealing with European presence. The Europeans, however, also 
represented powerful allies who could be utilized by rival indigenous (Muslim) rulers in their 
attempts to secure greater control over people1 land1 and natural resources. Throughout the 
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(Grimes 1993; Keuning 1988). In the early 1570s, for instance, the Muslim ruler ofTernate 
Babullah succeeded in expelling the Portuguese, together with native Christians, so that by 
1573, the historian Leonard Andaya (1993: 132) has stated, "the jesuits acknowledged that 
almost their entire mission in North Maluku and Ambon had been destroyed." 
Andaya's observation cited above might be right. From the beginning, the economic 
competition between the Portuguese and the mainly Muslim merchants of different nations was 
colored on both sides by religious sentiments. At that time, the Iberian Peninsula had just 
liberated itself from centuries of Arab occupation. The mainly Gujarati and Persian merchants 
had just succeeded in creating a wide network of trading posts entirely controlled by Muslims: 
Malacca in 1414, Giri of East java in the middle of the 15th century, and Ternate of the Moluccas 
in the late 1460s (Reid 1990, 2004). It is hence understandable that both the Portuguese and 
Muslims regarded each other not only as rivals in the markets or on the sea routes, but also in 
religious expansion, in part because religious loyalties were used and entangled with economic 
interests.24 
The harsh and violent encounters between Islam and Christianity, particularly Muslims 
and the Portuguese, were clearly motivated not only by political and economic interests but also 
religious passion. Vlekke (1959: 91) notes that the Europeans, particularly Spaniards and 
Portuguese, had both economic and religious motives to monopolize the spice trade since this 
sixteenth century, the Mus lim rulers of Ternate and Tid ore in northern part of Maluku capitalized on 
the rivalry between the Spanish and the Portuguese and later in the seventeenth century, between 
the Spanish and the Dutch, to play out the traditional dualism that existed between these two 
powerful Islamic kingdoms. When the Portuguese arrived in the Moluccas, a clash of commercial and 
of religious interests was nearly inevitable. Not all local rulers chose Islam to strengthen their grip on 
the people or in order to resist the Portuguese. But those who did, after some hesitation, used 
religious motives to consolidate their power, as did the Portuguese among their allies. 
24 It should be noted, however, during the colonial period, religious motives often remained 
secondary to power and profit in trade on both sides. In the Moluccas, for instance, the Portuguese 
who arrived from the West in 1512 and the Spaniards who entered from the East in 1521 had 
involved in fierce rivalry and fighting, as did two neighboring Sultanates ofTidore and Ternate. The 
sultans of these two Islamic kingdoms of North Maluku (as well, the kingdoms of Bacan and jailolo) 
always fought each other, and both looked to Portugal, Spain, later Holland, as an ally. 
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trade became the source of wealth of the Islamic sultanate of Ottoman and the Spice Islands (the 
Moluccas] at the time had become legendary as the source of Oriental prosperity. 
For Portuguese, religion mattered for their expansion outside the European world. As 
van Fraassen (1983: 9-10] has reminded us, one of the important aspects of the Portuguese 
activities in connection with the foundation of a colonial realm was the propagation of the 
Christian faith. To fight the Muslims all over the world was a sacred duty with the Portuguese, 
while the conversion of the heathen was an important motivation for their battle against the 
Muslims. In the Ambonese islands this Portuguese missionary zeal had lasting consequences, the 
villages Christianized by the Portuguese remaining Christian under later Dutch rule.25 This is 
among the reasons why B.j.O. Schrieke suggested that the Portuguese expansion in the Malay-
Indonesian archipelago must be viewed as a sequel to the Crusades in Europe and in the Middle 
East. The driving forces setting the expansion of the Portuguese in motion, Schrieke has argued, 
was the desire for adventure and the ambition for nobility, combined with religious zeal. 
Schrieke states, "Religious zeal, nourished in the tradition of the Crusades and the remembrance 
of the bitter struggle with the Moors in the Iberian Peninsula, certainly continued to be an 
essential motivation ... The religious element remained a factor of significance in Spanish politics 
in later times as well. For the inhabitants of the [Iberian] peninsula, a Mohammedan [Muslim] 
was a Moor, an object of abhorrence" (Schrieke 1955,1: 37-8]. 
History records that following the expulsion of the Moors (Muslims] from the Iberian 
peninsula, the Portuguese, after having gained a grip in Ceuta on the north coast of Muslim 
Africa, proceeded to make further conquest along the west coast and finally rounded the Cape of 
Good Hope on their way to India and the Malay-Indonesian archipelago. The Portuguese 
intensified their zeal to destroy the Muslim trade and pursuing their passion for a trade 
25 An increasing volume of publications relating to 16th-century ecclesiastical and missionary 
history in the Moluccas has appeared in the 20th century. See more in Polman (1983). 
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monopoly by venturing farthest east to the Straits of Malacca (now part of Malaysia) and to the 
Moluccas (Azra 2008: 12-3). 
The Portuguese were able to defeat Malacca in 1511. A year later they landed in the 
northern areas of the Moluccas, a name ultimately derived from the Arab traders' term for the 
region,jazirat a/-Muluk-the "land of many kings." In 1525 they arrived in Hitu of Ambon Island, 
and stayed there for several years.26 But the Portuguese soon moved to the south side of the 
peninsula in Ambon Bay (TelukAmbon) near the villages ofTawiri and Hative where there was a 
more protected anchoring place. The move was motivated by religious conflict between the 
Catholic Portuguese and the Muslim leaders ofHitu (cf. Keuning 1988; Abdurrachman 2008; 
Leirissa, et. a!. 2004). By having the Portuguese move to Tawiri and Hative, the Muslim Hituese 
had sent them to live with other "infidels." 
This information indicates that when the Portuguese landed in the area, Ambon was 
already partially Muslim. At the time the Portuguese arrived there was a Muslim community 
established at the trading center ofHitu27, on the northern peninsula of the island of Ambon, of 
the Hatuhaha on the northern half of the island of Haruku ( cf. Chauvel1980), and of Hoamoal in 
the western peninsula of Seram. At the time, Ambon Island constituted part of a regional 
network extending throughout Southeast Asia, linking the Middle East and India to China. 
Besides Hoamoal of Seram Island, Ambon had become an important trading center, especially 
"Following Vasco de Gama's discovered route around Africa, the Portuguese conquistador, 
Alfonso de Albuquerque, sailed to India, took control of Goa, and then sailed on to take control of the 
strategic port ofMalaka in 1511. Before the year was out, he sent three ships on to the Spice Islands, 
guided by a Malay skipper. One ship was lost, one reached Banda and returned to Malaka with a load 
of nutmeg, and the thlrd1 commanded by Francisco Serrao, was shipwrecked on some small islands in 
the Banda sea. The survivors were assisted by natives who took them to Hitu, a Muslim village on the 
northern peninsula of Ambon Island. 
2
' At first, cordial relations were established between the Portuguese and the Hituese, but it 
was not long before the Portuguese were forced to move to the Leitimor peninsula, where they built 
a fort on the site of what is now known as Ambon city (Kota Ambon). From their foothold on Leitimor 
the Portuguese promoted the expansion of clove cultivation there and on the Lease islands. For the 
reminder of the century there was an unstable balance of power between the Muslim Hituese and the 
Portuguese. 
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the region of Hitu, in pre-colonial time and afterwards. Initially a small trading entrepot on the 
north coast of Ambon Island, Hitu had emerged as a center of clove production, and as such had 
attracted Muslim traders from java, India, Arab, and Malay, as well as Europeans. Anthony Reid 
(2005: 79-80) said that the main motive behind the Portuguese expansion to Maluku was the 
discovery of cloves and nutmeg, besides religious mission and seeking new converts. Because of 
their involvement in the complex set of antagonism and alliances, the Portuguese failed in 
controlling the clove trade in Maluku, which was occupied by Muslim traders who settled in the 
area long before the coming of the Portuguese. 
The description above suggests that Islam preceded Christianity to the Ambonese 
islands. It had reached and penetrated the eastern archipelago, Maluku respectively, some fifty 
or eighty years before the coming of the Portuguese in 1512 and Spaniards who had come to the 
archipelago after the death of Magellan (1521). The Dutch historian De Graafassessed that Islam 
reached the Moluccan Islands in the latter half of the 15th century, albeit traces of Muslim 
influence were already present a century before that period (Meilink-Roelofsz 1962; de Graaf 
1970). Perhaps, the Islamization process of Ambon was by means of commercial ties and 
networks of Hitu. For its part, the Hikayat Tanah Hitu, composed by the local imam of Hitu, Rijali, 
in the 17th century, records that one of the leaders ofHitu, Patih Putih, travelled to Tuban of East 
java, one of the trading ports on java's north coast, to study Islam c. 1510 (Chauvel2007: 109) 
and there forged an alliance with the Sultanate ofTernate28 (Chauvel1980: 43). 
As a result of the increasing trade and the connected shared interests, Hitu's and 
Hoamoal's political and cultural contacts with java became more intensive. This involved among 
other things that Islam gained a deeper hold ofHitu and Hoamoal (cf. Allen 1992). As the 
significance of the Ambonese islands grew, it became important for the Portuguese to extend 
28 Adolf Heuken (2008) notes that Pati Tub an (or Patih Putih), a headman from Hitu, around 
1510, met in Giri with the ruler ofTernate, Tidore Vogue, who had changed his name into "Islamic" 
Zainul Abidin (about 1470) and was married to a Javanese Muslim woman. 
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their influence there, to oppose Asian trade in the area, to counter Javanese influence and to get 
hold of the cloves. Means towards this end included the establishment of alliance relations with 
villages belonging for the greater part to Ulisiwa ("League of Nine"), the propagation of 
Christianity, the involvement of warfare against Hitu and Hoamoal, and the construction of a 
permanent Portuguese settlement (cf. van Fraassen 1983). Since at first the Portuguese had 
difficulties in developing and convincing local inhabitants into Christianity, they were convinced 
that Ambon could not be converted without force of arms Qacobs 1980: 354-6). As a result, the 
Portuguese, with their Ambonese allies, took the Muslim village of Mamala and destroyed Hitu. 
There are varied opinions as to just who brought Islam to the region. Some argue the 
Persian, Arab, or Gujarati traders who resided coastal areas of Maluku long before the advent of 
the Portuguese, while others point the Malaccan sufis and teachers who introduced Islam to the 
Moluccas in the 15th century. Another study highlights the role of Javanese elite members of 
recently Islamized harbor princedoms, especially Giri-Gresik and Tuban, as well as the sultanate 
of Cirebon in West java.29 Adolf Heuken (2008: 32) states that Islam came to Hitu (Ambon) from 
Giri (Gresik of East java) and from the north via Ternate and Wai Putih. With Giri, which was the 
residence of Sunan Giri, one of the first preachers oflslam in java, Ternate and Hitu kepttrade 
and religious connections alive until the 17th century. 
Whoever brought Islam to Maluku, what is clear is that it was the members of the 
merchant-class and local elites of the sultanates who one by one switched from indigenous 
religion3o to Islam. Islam spread slowly, however, and for a long time did not change society, but 
increased the status of the rulers and their courts. By the middle of the 15th century, Islam was 
accepted by the kolano or king ofTernate and some coastal villages of Hitu in Ambon Island. 
29 Interview with Abidin Wakano, Ambon, june 9, 2010. 
3D Maluku's indigenous religion, Adolf Heuken (2002: 24-5) writes, was an ethnic-religion, a 
sort of animism without a center and no codified creed, and with very different local beliefs. The 
person not only worshiped the sun, the moon, the stars, the sky, and the earth, but also objects as 
presented in their ghost huts (ureu) and pamalis ("sacred stones"). 
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Only by the 16th century, as the historian of Southeast Asia Anthony Reid (1993) points out, 
large numbers of people, both rural and urban, were converting to Islam, and identifying 
themselves as part of global Islamic community (ummah). 
In the Ambonese islands, Islam was mainly based in a mini-kingdom ofHitu and other 
small villages ofLeihitu peninsula, while the large number of Christians (Catholics) in the 
sixteenth century lived on the Ambonese peninsula of Lei timor and on the small Lease islands of 
Haruku, Saparua, and Nusalaut. It is unclear when the first indigenous Christian community was 
established. However, when the great apostle Francis Xavier landed at Hative on the western 
shore of the Bay of Ambon on 14 February 1546, he was welcomed by local Ambonese 
Christians from a few villages, who had previously been baptized by the Portuguese.31 Upon his 
visit, Francis Xavier, the co-founder of the Society of jesus, had decided that jesuits needed to be 
sent permanently to Maluku. The result was that by the middle of the 16th century 
Ambon/Maluku witnessed the arrival of jesuit priests. 
How and why had these people become Christians? Francois Valentijn (1666-1727), a 
preacher who twice entered the service of the VOC and the most prolific and most frequently 
read author on Ambon and surrounding islands, reports that the heathen people of Leitimor had 
sent emissaries to Malacca (and Goa of Sulawesi) to ask the Portuguese to help them against 
their foes of Muslim Hituese. These messengers came into contact with Catholicism and made 
the village leaders of Hative ask for protection and baptism. The Portuguese responded to their 
wishes and from that period on became involved in insular politics and old rivalries in Ambon. 
The villagers ofHative (and Tawiri) may have regarded baptism more as a sign of alliance with 
the Portuguese than as a sacrament based on faith. Later, to complete the implementation of 
31 It is reported that as early as 1538 the first three villages of Ambon embraced Christianity, 
and when Francis Xavier visited Ambon in 1546 he encountered seven village communities/ six of 
which were located in jazirah Lei timor, professing Christianity. Only in the second half of the 16th 
century was Christianity accepted in some of the villages of Lease Islands. 
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Portugal's policy offeitoriaJortaleza e igreja (trading, military domination, and the gospel, often 
pictured as glory, gold, and gospel, in whatever order was opportune), Hative and Tawiri had 
become the centers of the Catholic mission and a new church was built in there [Abdurrachman 
2008: 4-5; cf. Grimes 1993). 
In the 1530s, Hitu, assisted by Javanese and Ternatans who built up powerful fleets of 
kora-kora (war canoes), began to make war raids, burning and destroying Ambon's Christian 
villages. To seek protection from the attacks, a leader from Hative, later baptized to be a Catholic 
by the name of Don Manuel, went to the Portuguese administrative center at Goa (Sulawesi) 
requesting Portuguese protection against the raids of Muslim Hituese. In agreeing, the 
Portuguese took a new role as protectorate of the villages in central Maluku. By 1538, a 
Portuguese fleet was sent to Ambon, dispersing the Hitu war fleets (Grimes 1993: 18-9; 
Abdurrachman, et.al. 1973). 
Later, in 1564 the Muslim Hituese with the help of Javanese and with protection from 
Sultan Hairun ofTernate regained control over the whole area of Ambon. When Muslim leaders 
of Hitu requested support from Jepara Oava) to drive the Portuguese out of Maluku, the 
Portuguese were forced to rely solely on the ulisiwa villages in Ambon Bay. The situation on 
Ambon thus became delineated quite strongly in terms of a faction of ulilima-Muslim-Javanese 
centered on Hitu versus an ulisiwa-Christian-Portuguese faction centered mostly at Hative and 
Tawiri. Hence, over the course of the 15th and 16th centuries, the polarization between global 
religions and the rise of religious boundaries, especially between Islam and Christianity, was 
already apparent. The increasingly sharper polarization between the two religions basically 
resulted from the race to win new converts (cf. Aritonang and Steenbrink, eds. 2008). 
There is no doubt that religious factor was evident in the contest for the eastern 
archipelago between the Portuguese/Spaniards and local Muslims of Maluku, although 
Schrieke's assessment of the "crusading motive" on the part of the Portuguese must not be 
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overemphasized. The coming of the Portuguese and Spaniards, as the historian Azyumardi Azra 
(2008) rightly points out, had indeed intensified the religious race between Muslims and 
Christians. Historian of Southeast Asia, Anthony Reid (1993) maintains that in eastern Indonesia 
as a whole Muslims and Christians were almost on a par in the mid-16th century. The unstable 
modus vivendi between the Portuguese and the sultanate ofTernate in the clove trade allowed 
Christian and Muslim missionaries to make some headway among the still largely "animist 
people" of the Moluccas. The success of Sultan Baabullah ofTernate in expelling the Portuguese 
undoubtedly provided momentum for the further Islamization in the Moluccas as a whole. The 
sultan, for instance, compelled most of the Christian supporters of the Portuguese throughout 
the Moluccas to accept Islam as a sign ofloyalty. 
Sultan Baabullah had already been an effective propagandist for Islam during his 
father's time. Baabullah's father, Sultan Hairun, according to oral sources from the early 17th 
century, was a strong defender oflslamic faith and tried hard to restrict the Christians and their 
priests, albeit he regarded as a loyal vassal of the king of Portugal. ln 1570, he was treacherously 
murdered by a Portuguese force, and this event marked the beginning of the rapid downfall of 
the Portuguese power and fortune in Maluku. Hairun's son and successor Baabullah vowed to 
revenge his father by throwing all Portuguese and native Catholics out of the Moluccas. During 
the campaign, Baabullah was supported by most Muslim leaders when he gathered support from 
all neighboring islands to weaken the Portuguese and to kill or (re) convert all Christians. As a 
result, in 1573, almost the entire jesuit mission was in shambles, and by 1575, the Portuguese 
were forced to leave for Ambon or Malacca. After Baabullah's victory, he was able to spread 
Islamic faith through much of the Ambon area, to Buton of Southeast Sulawesi, and even to 
southern Mindanao (cf. Amal2010a, 2010b).Anthony Reid (1993: 147-8) points out that the 
Portuguese and Spaniards believed that the "crusading sultan" (Portuguese and Spaniards' call 
for Sultan Baabullah) introduced "a great number of Arabian and Persian false prophets into the 
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Moluccas, and sent envoys and missionaries to Brunei, Mindanao, java, and Aceh to encourage 
the holy war." 
As a result of these developments, during Baabullah's reign [1570-1583), and until the 
entrance of the Dutch in 1600s, in spite of complicated religious loyalties, there was a growing 
sense thatthe acceptance of Islam was an essential part ofloyalty to the ruler ofTernate. The 
hope of the Portuguese and the Spaniards for massive conversion to Christianity in Maluku did 
not materialize, however. As de Graaf pointed out, this proved an idle hope. Only very few 
natives were baptized during the 16th century. Even the great apostle of Asia, Francis Xavier, 
who was in the Moluccas in 1546-7, was unable to loosen the hold of Islam there. This failure 
had a lot to do with the erosion of the Portuguese image that had already suffered from the way 
in which many Portuguese behaved themselves towards native Muslims [cf. van Fraassen 1983), 
and from the corrupt administration of various Portuguese official representatives in the 
archipelago. In brief, the Portuguese period was an era during which polarization and religious 
boundaries were clearly drawn. Only by the mid-17th century was this sharp distinction between 
Islam and non-Islam fading, though it has reemerged again in the mid-18th century. 
The Dutch and Pro-Ambonese Christian Policies 
After the defeat of the Portuguese by the new comer of colonialism, the Dutch, the major 
conflicts in the Moluccas were no longer between the "crusading" Catholics and Muslims, but 
between the Dutch-supported Protestants and local Muslims. In the first contract of the VOC 
[Vereenigde Oost-lndische Compagnie-United East Indies Company) actually no article on 
religion was included.'' It was in 1623 that the religious duties of the VOC were formulated for 
the first time, supervised by the Netherlands' highest authority-the Staten-Generaal. Some 
32 The first contract was based on a short stay overseas1 just sufficient to buy enough 
commodities. The VOC had started as a trading company but in its first two decades it developed into 
a colonizing institution as well. 
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argue that religion was simply forgotten in 1602 when the VOC began to expand their trading 
activities in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, others stress the changing conditions in the 
1620s (cf. Aritonang and Steenbrink, eds. 2008). 
The victory of the Orthodox wing of the Reformed Church during the Dordrecht Synod 
(1618-9) had strengthened the duty of the state to "maintain the sacred service of the church, to 
prevent and eliminate every form of idolatry and false religion." This religious conscience, 
besides the new emphasis on permanent centers in the world of Asia, may have led to the 
insertion of the religious duty in the preamble of the VOC charter of 1623.33 However, it should 
be remembered, the pastoral and missionary obligations of taking care of proper religious duties 
had actually been formulated before in private instructions to the first two Governors General: 
Peter Both (1609) and Gerard Reynst (1613). They were obliged to "promote the eastern trade 
in service of the propagation of the name of Christ, the blessing of the non-Christians" ( cf. 
Steenbrink 2008). 
The arrival of the Dutch trading company was the end of Catholic growth in Ambon. 
When the first Dutch fleet arrived in Ambon in February 1605, Admiral Steven van der Haghen 
promised free exercise of religion to local Muslims as well as the Portuguese priests and their 
flock.34 However, Frederik de Houtman, the first governor of Ambon (1605-11) deemed it 
33 It has to be stressed, however, that the VOC never restricted its personnel to the Reformed. 
Not only among the common soldiers and marine personnel, but even among governors general 
some Protestants and Catholics were found, in addition to a smaller number of Armenians and 
Mennonites as traders. In other words, the VOC could not really behave as a strict Reformed body. 
This is different from the articles of the charter for the West Indies Company (WIC), where the 
company was given the task of proclaiming the knowledge of God to the inhabitants of Brazil. The 
VOC was given in the preamble only the general obligation to preserve the public faith (cf. Steenbrink 
2008; cf. Koolen 1993). 
34 Vander Haghen concluded a treaty with the chiefs of Hitu stipulating among other things 
that the Hituese would afford the Dutch assistance in both war and peace-time, that each would 
respect the other's religion, and that the Hituese would maintain friendly relations with the former 
Portuguese subjects who had now come under Dutch rule. This friendly relation, however, did not 
last long in Ambon. Tensions soon arose between the Dutch and many of the villages which had 
formerly been under Portuguese rule, among other reasons because the villages opposed the many 
heavy, unpaid services exacted by the Dutch. 
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necessary to expel all Portuguese, including the clergy, a few months later (May 1605]. The 
Portuguese were forced to leave Ambon and moved to southeastern regions of Maluku 
(particularly Tual, Tanimbar, and Aru), with the exception of those who converted to 
Protestantism. Up until then these regions had been the powerful stronghold of Catholics in 
Maluku35, while Ambon (Leitimor) remained the strongest base of Protestantism (Calvinism). 
Later, by 1635, the VOC began to encourage Christian proselytizing in Aru in the hope that this 
contact would contribute to the reestablishment of old commercial ties between this 
archipelago and Banda (Meilinck-Roelofsz 1962: 222). Thus the VOC and Christianity worked 
hand in hand in Maluku. 
From 1605 on the VOC sent ordained ministers and teachers to Ambon to preach 
Protestantism, establish religious schools, build churches, and translate sermons, catechism, and 
basic prayers into Ambonese-Malay. Later on the schoolteachers became the backbone of 
Ambonese Christianity. At the time the teacher was also the leader of the Sunday morning 
service so it is understandable that Ambonese Christianity was based on local schools. At the 
same time, the numbers of school grew rapidly from 32 schools with 1,200 pupils in 1633 to 46 
schools and 3,600 pupils in 1680, and finally 54 schools with 5,190 pupils in 1700 (cf. Husein 
2005; Steen brink 1993, 1995). In this period, as discussed before, the Muslims of northern 
Ambon, Hitu, were already very active and later they were involved in harsh rivalry with 
Christians. 
Like the Portuguese, the Dutch had initially come to the Moluccas for the spices (cloves, 
nutmeg, and mace). Ternate was until the 1560s not only the major market for cloves, it was 
also an important cultivation zone for this precious product. After the clash between the 
Portuguese and the Ternatans in the early 1570s, Ambon was founded as a Christian town. After 
35 Although the process of Catholicization begun in the time of Portuguese colonialism, the 
conversion of the entire community to Catholicism only took place in 1976-7 during the Suharto 
reign (Spyer 2000). 
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the Dutch rule became more and more stable in the 17th century, they concentrated the 
production of cloves in the Christian areas of the southern districts of Ambon and Lease islands 
(Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut). Not only that, in an attempt to control the production (and 
trade] of cloves and spices, which was previously under Muslim control, the Dutch destroyed the 
existing cultivation groves, especially cloves, and transplanted them to the Christian regions of 
Ambon and neighboring Lease islands. Atthe beginning of the 17th-century, it should be noted, 
there were no cloves growing in the Christian villages of Leitimor yet at all. As a result, by 1619 
the VOC, under the administration of jan Pieterszoon Coen (1619-23, 1627-29], had embarked 
on a policy of excluding Asian traders and the imposition of control over the clove-producing 
areas ( cf. Steenbrink 1995]. This monopoly of the VOC on the purchase of cloves affected 
primarily Muslim regions ofHitu (North Ambon] and Hoamoal (West Seram). 
The VOC's policy to establish an effective monopoly on the purchase of cloves, added 
with the Dutch policy of countering the spread of Islam and of introducing elementary forms of 
education and pastoral care for the sake of the consolidation and propagation of Christianity in 
Ambonese islands, had undeniably led to friction and resistance with Muslim chiefs of Hitu and 
Hoamoal. For the Dutch, Islam was the symbol and mortar of the opposition against the VOC's 
policy.36 The Dutch for their part endeavored to prevent the spread of Islam as much as possible 
and to protect the heathen and Christians against the Muslims of Hoamoal and Hitu as much as 
was in their power. 
As a result, from 1625 on there were yearly conflicts with the Muslims from these two 
regions that once had been the main Muslim centers in the Moluccas, in addition to Ternate and 
Tid ore. The conflict between the Dutch, along with Ambonese Christians, and local Muslims with 
36 This is not to suggest that the VOC had been successful in winning the loyalty of the 
Catholic communities established earlier by the Portuguese. The Catholics were also subject to the 
same demands and repression as their Muslim compatriots and the Dutch did not continue the 
pastoral care and education begun by the Portuguese. 
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the support ofTernate and java resulted in the violent suppression of Hitu (1642-46) and the 
nearly total depopulation of Hoamoal, the hotbed of all anti-VOC resistance, between 1651 and 
1656. Hoamoal's Muslim villagers were then moved by the Dutch in the Muslim villages of 
Leihitu, whereas its heathen population was relocated in Christian villages of Leitimor. The 
chiefs of Hoamoal, furthermore, had a place of residence assigned to them in Batumerah, in the 
vicinity of the VOC's chief fortress in Ambon. 
The direct rule of the VOC, which was initially restricted to Ambon town and the 
Christian villages on the islands of Ambon and Lease, was extended more and more to the 
coastal regions of northern Moluccas, as well as Seram and Buru, particularly in the Christian 
territories. Until the mid-17th century, when the VOC imposed its authority over Muslim 
territories ofHitu (Ambon), Hoamoal (Seram), Hatuhaha (Haruku), Buru, and Maluku's other 
regions, there was uneasy balance of power between the Dutch and the Muslim polities of these 
regions. Muslim resistances against the Dutch ended with the defeat on the part of Muslims. 
As a result the Muslim population was relocated to other regions. just as in the case of 
Hoamoal mentioned earlier, the Muslim population of the islands of Boano, Kelang and Ambalau 
was transferred to the island ofManipa. All the Muslim chiefs of the coastal areas ofBuru were 
obliged to settle in the neighborhood of the VOC's fort at Kay eli. The Muslims oflhamahu 
(Saparua), who had likewise taken part in the rebellion, were banished to Seram. The evacuated 
areas were systematically destroyed and rendered unfit for reoccupation. It is thus obvious that 
the separation ofMaluku's Christians and Muslims already took place since the Dutch colonial 
era. 
Additionally, the segregation of Christian and Muslim territory links to the formation of 
negeri (village) set up by the Dutch. During the colonial time, the majority of Ambonese lived in 
some 81 negeri and 12 kampung burger ("village of free citizen"), mostly dotted around the 
coastal areas. The negeri in the Ambon-Lease islands are either Muslim (at the time 26 villages) 
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or Christian (55 villages). With the exception ofNusalaut, the islands have negeri of both 
religions. The negeri in their current location are thought to date from the mid-17th century, 
when the Dutch forced local inhabitants from their mountain settlements, namely Nunusaku on 
Seram island that was considered to be the motherland oftoday's Ambonese society, down to 
the coast, where they, along with the clove cultivation could be more easily controlled (Leirissa 
1980: 69; cf. Pattykaihattu 2008a). 
The separation of the population into Christian and Muslim negeri dates from this Dutch 
colonial period (Chauvel1990a). This era also reflects the process of religious conversion that 
centered respectively on the peninsulas of Leihitu (for Islam) and Leitimor (for Christianity). 
The process of forced formation of negeri, furthermore, had caused great dislocation to the 
previous genealogically-based social organization. In the process of shaping the negeri the Dutch 
destroyed the pervious traditional uli system (i.e. federations offive or nine villages) which 
extended over wider geographic areas than the negeri which replaced them. With the 
destruction of the uli ("league") the cohesion of Ambonese society-symbolically and 
institutionally-rested in large part on the system of inter-village alliances (known as pel a-see 
Chapter 8). 
The defeat ofHitu, moreover, brought the Dutch a monopoly of clove cultivation and 
external trade. Not only that, the defeat resulted in the removal of Ambon from every form of 
Ternatan control and influence, as well as the abolition of the institution of the Ternatan 
governorship. For to day's Muslims of Hitu and other villages of Leihitu peninsula, the defeat of 
Hitu by the Dutch in collaboration with Ambonese Christians has left a bitter memory and a 
desire for vengeance so that during the Maluku conflict Muslims from these areas ardently went 
down to Ambon city to attack (and take revenge on) Christian communities and destroy their 
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properties.37 From the Muslim point of view, moreover, the defeat of Hitu not only meant the 
loss of their political autonomy, but with the imposition of the spice monopoly the Dutch 
severed to a large degree Ambonese links with other Muslim centers in the Malay-Indonesian 
archipelago. 
Ambonese Muslims were thus relatively isolated from the mainstream of Islamic 
thought and cut offfrom the sources of their religious ideas until the last decades of the 19th 
century. The intermittent nature of the early contact with Islam and the following centuries of 
isolation provided the historical context for the development of an accommodation between 
ad at (customary law] and Islam, in which ad at remained dominant in the Muslim villages 
(Ambonese: neg en) as shown by religious practices of Muslim Hatuhaha, Pelauw and Rohomoni 
respectively, in the island of Haruku and those who live in the jazirah Leihitu such as Hitu, Hila, 
Keititu, Wakal, Seith, among others. 
Ambonese Muslims themselves, unlike Ambonese Calvinist-Christians who tended to 
destroy local traditions and influences, were the principal arbiters in the process of 
accommodation between Islamic beliefs and practices and adat.3B Up to now, Muslims of 
Ambonese negeri, unlike to day's plural urban Muslims of Ambon city, have been the main 
defenders of local cultures, ad at and traditional practices; consequently attempts of purification 
of religious beliefs brought by Salafi Muslim groups-such as the )ama'ah Tabligh, Hizbut Tahrir, 
37 Interview with M. Salin Soulisa, Ambon, November 26, 2010. 
38 The domination of ad at in the Muslim negeri has led to observers such as Holleman 
[1923), writing in the early 1920s, to suggest thatlslam had a conserving influence on Ambonese 
society whereas Christianity was destructive. The retention of indigenous language [bahasa tanah) in 
the Muslim negeri and its virtual replacement amongst Christians by Ambonese Malay has been 
symbolic of difference. This in part reflects the nature of the colonial relationship for the two 
religious groups. Some observers [cf. Cooley 1961; Bartels 1977a) have also argued that, although 
Christian and Muslim negeri have shared many aspects of social structure, indigenous religion, and 
political and economic structures, the position of the raja and the adat structure he heads is stronger 
in Muslim negeri than in Christian ones. 
and Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)-have often met with popular resistance 
from local Muslims." 
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The boundaries between Christian and Muslim territories, which exist today, were 
already in place fixed in parts of Ambon and Lease islands as early as the mid-17th century. The 
Dutch historian Gerrit Knaap (1999) even reported that as early as 1638, in an attempt to rule 
Maluku indirectly through the Sultan ofTernate, the VOC divided the communities of Amboina 
(Ambon Island) into opposing Christian and Muslim dependencies. After the submission of the 
Muslim area of Hoamoal, the Ternatan stronghold on South Seram in 1656, various efforts were 
made for the spread of Christianity. It should be noted, however, there was almost no action to 
attract Muslims as a group to Christianity. The VOC took the position that those who were not 
yet Muslim should be discouraged from embracing this religion and encouraged to become 
followers of jesus Christ. In the Ambonese village ofWaai, where by about 1620 half of the 
Christian population had embraced Islam, the Dutch took firm action. The mosque was burnt 
down and the renegades were summoned to return to their former Christian faith ( cf. Knaap 
1987]. At present Waai becomes a Christian area and was engaged in bitter violence against 
Muslims during the Maluku wars of 1999-2002. 
It is clear that the European colonizers, notably the Portuguese and the Dutch, often 
encouraged political conflict and social divisions among the local population so as to divert local 
attempts of mass rebellion or suppress unified resistance to their presence. The historian of the 
Moluccas Leonard Andaya (1993: 146-7) also points out, not only did the Europeans depict 
armed local opposition to their own activities as a form of religious struggle, but they also saw 
hostilities between local groups as confrontations between Christianity and Islam, or between 
Christianity and paganism. 
3
' Interview with Raja of Keititu, M. Yamin, Ambon, April12, 2010. 
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Certainly, this strategy of actively creating communal tension and conflict was later 
employed by the Dutch colonial state in their differential treatment of Ambonese Christians and 
Muslims. The cost of these alliances for local people not only involved conceding sole rights to 
the VOC to buy cloves in the region but it also entailed compulsory service on the Company 
hongi, the punitive fleet oflocal and European vessels which was sent out to prevent the 
smuggling of cloves and attack dissident villages and their rulers. Acting in their dual capacity as 
merchants and colonists, the Dutch thus rationalized the violence in terms of commerce, 
pacification, proselytization, and civilization. 
The imperative to pacify and civilize the populace gained momentum in the last decades 
of the 19th century as many "Europeans powers were pressed to make their colonies look more 
legitimate, respectable and event benevolent" (Spyer 1998: 153). Early in the 20th century the 
Dutch issued the so-called Ethical PolicY"' (Ethische Politiek) which saw an intensification of the 
colonial state efforts to administer, educate, and convert the population of Maluku. In an effort 
to better achieve these civilizing objectives, the Dutch administration was comprised of a 
considerable number of Ambonese, mostly Christians, bureaucrats and soldiers. At the same 
time, punitive expeditions were launched against villages which continued to engage in inter-
village fighting and headhunting raids. Throughout the VOC period, Dutch missionaries were 
active in converting the population to Protestantism, and their activities gained further impetus 
after the proclamation of the Ethical Policy. Proselytization in this context had a two-fold 
objective: halting the spread of Islam and "civilizing" the natives so that the widely dispersed 
population could be more effectively controlled. 
'"'The Ethical Policy, officially inaugurated in 1901, was to replace the laissez-faire of 
liberalism by state interventions in economic affairs and an ambitious program of welfare legislation. 
It was to create viable social and political conditions in the colony that would counterbalance the 
disintegrative effects of the Western impact upon Indonesia (Benda 1958: 34). 
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The policy and endeavor of Christianizing the natives started since the early formation 
of the VOC. After some hesitation and a request from the Christian village leaders in 1607, the 
VOC adopted the policy that Christianity was seen as a means to promote the loyalty of the 
population to the Christian rulers. The VOC also attempted, with limited success, to curb the 
process of Islamization. As a consequence of the "Christianization policy" and an effort to 
suppress any political ambitions of Muslims that threatened the Dutch power, the Dutch 
destroyed Muslim villages. With the destruction of the centers of Ambonese Islam, added with 
the elimination of the Muslim elites as independent political actors, this meantthat the Muslim 
community was relegated to a subordinate position in colonial society compared with their 
Christian compatriots. Thus from the establishment of the VOC there was a greater distance 
between the Muslims and the Dutch authorities and Ambonese Christians. In this sense, the 
segregated pattern of Ambonese community relations in colonial society was put in place early 
on. 
Actually, during the Dutch colonial period, particularly after the bankruptcy of the VOC, 
a policy on religious neutrality was declared by the Dutch government. In the article 199 of 
Regeerings Reglement or Government Regulation of 1885, for instance, stated that the Dutch 
government recognized "freedom of religion and adopted a neutral attitude toward it" (Noer 
1973: 166). In practice, however, the Dutch often violated their policy of religious neutrality, 
and the missionaries continued their Christianization endeavors as previously conducted by the 
VOC. In the Royal address of 1901, it was stated: "As a Christian nation, the Netherlands have a 
duty to improve the condition of native Christians in the Indian archipelago, to give Christian 
missionary activity more aid and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have 
a moral obligation to fulfill as regards the population of those regions" (der Kroef1950: 53). 
Such a discriminatory policy was reflected in the unequal subsidies Christians and 
Muslims received from the Dutch. As we know, the Dutch gave generous subsidies to Protestant 
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missionary schools, churches, hospitals, and orphanages, as well as various tax exemptions. In 
193 6, the subsidies received by the Protestants amounted to f. 686,100, Catholics f. 285,500, and 
Muslims only f. 7,500. In 1939, this amount increased rapidly with f. 844,000 to the Protestants, 
f. 335,700 to the Catholics, and only f. 7,600 for the Muslims (cited from Staatsblad 1936 No. 
355; 1937 No. 410; 1938 No. 512]. In 1928, the Christians received subsidies off. 1,666,300 for 
church officials, priests, and teachers, while Muslims only received f. 3,950. During 1940, the 
number of Muslim primary schools receiving subsidies was 115 in comparison to 2,470 
Christian (both Protestant and Catholic] primary schools ( cf. Husein 2005: 66-7; Steen brink 
1995; Benda 1958]. 
Even though Muslim and Christian Ambonese in some places shared a common ad at and 
social structure, there was much about the experience of Dutch colonial rule that divided them. 
In 1849, the Dutch government issued a policy in the Algemeene Bepaling van Wetgeving 
(General Rule of Enactment] which stated that the native Christians were given the same legal 
rights and privileges as the Dutch, therefore grouping Muslims in less-respected category. 
Although the rule was abrogated in 1854, the Christians continued to enjoy special treatment by 
the government through some of its policies. Christians had access to Western education much 
earlier and to a much greater extent than did Muslims. This privilege enabled them to become 
officials in the colonial administrations, soldiers, and professionals. Muslims rarely participated 
in the colonial enterprise in this manner. 
It is commonly acknowledged that since its formation, the VOC had built a close 
relationship with the Christian part of the population. Already during the first decades ofVOC 
rule, Christians, especially the elites, dominated the Landraad (Land Court], the highest legal and 
administrative body of the colonial rule in which Ambonese participated. Muslims, on the other 
hand, were considered more untrustworthy and prone to rebellion and were therefore left out 
of the colonial administration (Knaap 2004]. The close relations between the Dutch and the 
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Christian Ambonese deepened-that means the relations between the Dutch and Ambonese 
Christians and local Muslims became worse-after the abolition of the world wide monopoly on 
cloves in 1863 and the ensuing economic malaise which gripped the whole Ambonese region. 
With the price of cloves plummeting and the expansion of the Dutch East Indies 
requiring a growing colonial administration, the number of surplus workers in the Moluccas 
willing to take up jobs in the colonial rule and the KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or 
the Royal Army of the Dutch Indies] grew significantly (cf. Chauvel1980, 1990a, 199Gb]. A 
substantial number of Christian Ambonese played an important role in Netherlands-Indies 
society as clerks, professionals, and soldiers. With predominantly Protestant Ambonese filling 
these jobs, a system of religious divisions was thus installed in which Protestant elites 
increasingly gained privileged access to the colonial bureaucracy and the political and economic 
advantages related to it ( cf. Bartels 2000; Adam 2009; 61-5]. Since then Ambonese Christians 
began to emerge as a new class in Ambonese society.41 
The emergence of Christian soldiers and minor officials as new social groups also 
highlighted the divergence of the Muslim and Christian Ambonese experience during the last 
century of colonial rule and the remarkably different relationship each community enjoyed with 
the Dutch. No less importantly, Ambonese Christians themselves went through a crisis of 
identity as they came into contact and competition with other Indonesians. Under colonial 
patronage, the historian ofMaluku Richard Chauvel (1980: 47] has noted, "They [Christian 
Ambonese J acquired a privileged status above their compatriots [and below the Dutch]." Their 
sense of superiority was an intrinsic part of their developing religious/ethnic identity. Their 
Christianity was considered as a step towards becoming Europeans. 
41 Within the Ambonese Christian community there emerged two distinct social groups: the 
soldiers and the minor officials1 who spent much of their working lives outside the homeland in the 
service of the colonial government and in each group there developed in the Ambonese identity a 
new dimension which reflected dependence on and loyalty to the Dutch colonial authorities. 
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The Muslim community at the time, it should be noted, did not participate in the late 
colonial enterprise. Most Muslims did not enjoy the education facilities and employment 
opportunities afforded to their Christian brothers. Unlike Kapitan Jonker42 (and Hasan 
Sulaiman), who collaborated with the Dutch, latter day Muslims regarded joining the colonial 
army as akin to becoming a kafir (infidel) . A prominent Muslim Ambonese A. HaHm Tuasikal in 
his article "De Islam in de Molukken" (1951) states, "In the colonial army there were very few 
Muslims recruited, because this occupation was considered according to Muslim law as haram 
(forbidden): Muslims of related clans would become enemies, as the colonial army was a 
military organization directed against Muslims in Aceh and other areas, who were defending 
their religion and the fatherland" (cited in Chauvel1980: 4 7). In his classic Field Notes on 
Indonesia: Ambon and Ceram, Raymond Kennedy also reported that as late as 1949 the Muslims 
ofTulehu, one of the largest Muslim groups in Ambon island, were not keen on joining the KNIL 
for fear of having to eat pork4 3 (Kennedy 1955: 48). 
Since Muslims had no formal education44 set up by the Dutch, in contrast to the 
Christians, they were involved in non-professional economic activities. Occupations such as the 
42 Kapitan Jonker was a paradoxical figure. In the first place, despites his long years of gallant 
service to the Dutch colonial empire, Jonker was ironically killed on suspicion on organizing a revolt 
against the kompeni (the Dutch). Ambonese choose to believe that Jonker was liquidated because he 
had grown too powerful. Accordingly, in the figure of Jonker, there was an ambiguous element in 
Ambonese loyalty to the Dutch: the kompeni had repaid Jonker's faithful service by killing him. In the 
second place, Jonker was a Muslim and his alleged revolt had "pan-Islamic" connotations to it, while 
the vast majority of Ambonese soldiers in the 19th and 20th century were Christians. Their 
Christianity was a crucial ingredient in their relationship with the Dutch and in their self-image. 
43 It is significant to notice that Muslims from elsewhere in the archipelago, notably java, 
appeared to have no such scruples about serving in the colonial army. Javanese in 1916 were the 
single largest Indonesian ethnic group in the KNIL numbering 17,854, while Ambonese 3,519, and 
Manadonese 5,925 (cf. Chauvel1990, 1980). 
44 Not only Western-typified formal education, religious education in Ambon's Muslim negeri 
before independence was also little known. Although it dates from the earliest contact, religious 
instruction appears to have been basic, based on recitation of the Quran. In the beginning of the 171h 
century there is evidence of special schools for the religious education of the children of the elite. The 
teachers were traders who had remained behind in Ambon for a year selling their wares and buying 
up cloves for the return journey. Gerrit Knaap (1987) suggests that the teachers were mostly 
Javanese with the occasional Gujarati. Unlike elsewhere in the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, there 
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civil service and the professions required Western education, while education, among the 
Ambonese, went hand in hand with Christianity. In Ambon, education on a Western basis began 
and remained linked to Christianity until the 20th century. The first schools in Christian negeri 
were established by the Portuguese for the children of village elites such as raja and kepala soa 
families. The number of schools operating when the Dutch assumed control is unclear, but the 
figures of31 schools on Ambon and a further 26 in the Lease islands of central Maluku has been 
mentioned. By 1628, 18 schools with more than 800 pupils had been created in the villages. At 
the end of the century there were 54 schools with 4,700 pupils. The historian Gerrit Knaap 
estimated that 30 to 40% of Christian children were enrolled in the schools (Knaap 1987: 94-5; 
cf. Chauvel1990a: 25-38). By 1924 every Christian negeri (villages) in the regions of Ambon and 
Lease (Haruku, Saparua and Nusalaut) had a second class government native school. 
By contrast, by the 1920s, the Dutch had established people's schools (volkschoolen) in 
only six Muslim negeri (villages), namely Tulehu, Hitumessing, Laha (all in Ambon island), 
Pelauw, Kailolo (Haruku island) and Kulur (Saparua island). These schools were the first 
attempts to extend secular government education into Muslim negeri. The schools provided a 
more rudimentary primary education over three years than the four or five years in the second-
class government schools in Christian negeri. The volkschoolen were built and maintained by the 
negeri with a subsidy from the Dutch administration. The subsidies, however, were significantly 
less generous than those enjoyed by schools in Christian villages and the teachers appointed 
were also less trained. 
By 1926, the six schools in Muslim negeri received a total subsidy off2,793 in 1926, 
whereas the Christian negeri of Kilang with a population of only 607 (compare with the Muslim 
were no pesantren or madrasah in the negeri. By 1924, a madrasah by the name of Alhilal was 
established in Ambon town by the Arab community where many of its students were Ambonese from 
the negeri. In today's Ambon, Alhilal, running more than 200 schools and 1 university, remains the 
largest single networks of Maluku's religious schools. 
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negeri ofTulehu which has a population of 2,027) received f3,950. Muslim participation in the 
Dutch-language schools in Ambon city was also very limited. Only 96 of the 1,980 students were 
Muslims. Due to lack of interest (note: only the one in Tulehu that could be compared with a 
school in a Christian negeri, albeit only a small percentage of children attended), by the mid-
1930s most schools had been closed. Given the education facilities available to each religious 
community, the rate ofliteracy was very high among the Christians and very low among the 
Muslims. 
What made Muslims reluctant to join the Dutch education has been the subject of 
debate. Colonial officials explained this situation in a number of ways. H.). Schmidt, an assistant-
resident in the early 1920s who established the six schools in the Muslim villages depicted 
earlier, thought that there were those who felt no need for education in Muslim negeri and that 
many "conservative" Muslim raja (village chief) did not want to know anything about the school, 
as it made their people averse to manual labor. A controleur in the mid-1930s NA. van Wijk, 
furthermore, remarked that there was a deep rooted belief held by Muslims that children who 
went to school became "Christian"-a notion which was promoted by guru ngaji ("Islamic 
teacher") (cf. Chauvel1990a, 1980, 1985). 
Even today Ambonese Muslims still express strong resentment about what they regard 
as the lack of educational opportunities under the Dutch colonial regime.4' The only Ambonese 
Muslims who did enjoy a degree of Dutch education were the children of (some) raja families, 
many of whom were trained as local administrators, or those of Muslim business families in 
Ambon town. In the post-colonial period they were to constitute the core and the leadership of 
45 The different educational opportunities for Muslims and Christians are very clearly 
reflected in government expenditure in negeri in the onderafdeeling Saparua in 1926. The average 
expenditure for Christians per head was: for education f. 3.04, public worship f. 1.16, for 
administration f.0.44 [totaling f. 4.66). For Muslims, f. 0.17 was allocated for education, nothing to 
public worship, and f. 0.38 for administration, making a total off. 0.55. Whereas the average taxation 
per head for Christians was f. 0.65, for Muslims f. 0.86 [cf. Chauvel1980, 1990]. 
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the emerging Muslim elites. Whether the Muslims deprived themselves or were deprived of 
educational opportunities remains the subject of debate. However, the issue of colonial 
education does reflect a "relationship of distance," mLxed with mutual distrust and 
misunderstanding, between the Dutch rule-as well as Ambonese Christians-and the Muslim 
community. 
As a result of the lack of formal education and professional employments, the Muslim 
population turned into second-class citizens in the colonial Ambonese society (cf. Chauvel 
1990a; Bartels 2003). To this day Ambonese Protestants are somewhat bitterly referred to as 
the "anak emas"-or the "golden boy" [of the Dutch]-by the Muslim population, while 
ProtestantAmbonese proudly call themselves "the Black Dutchmen" (Ambonese: Belanda 
!tang). The lower class status of the Muslim community is well illustrated by the Dutch doctor E. 
W. A. Ludeking who wrote in 1868 as follows: 
The people of the residency of Amboina can properly be divided into three classes: 
firstly, those who because of their Christianity, burger status etc can be given the 
collective name of Ambonese, to which belong by far the greatest portion of the 
inhabitants of the spice island ... ; secondly, the class of Alifurese who constitute the 
indigenous people of Ceram [Seram Island] and Buru; thirdly, the far less significant 
class of Moslems, together with Arabs and other Asiatics" (cited in Chauvel1980: 
40). 
ln brief, the abolition of the clove monopoly of 1863, the reform and extension of 
education for Ambonese Christians and their employment as clerks and soldiers not only 
changed the Ambonese relations with the Dutch, but also relations among Ambon's religious 
groups, particularly Christians and Muslims. The sharply divergent historical experience under 
colonialism of Christians and Muslims sketched above placed great strain on the unity of 
Ambonese society, strains which were to surface during the japanese occupation and the post-
colonial period. 
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Actually, at first, both Ambonese Christians and Muslims had been the subject of the 
Dutch colonialism. The Dutch, then, made an ally with the Christians to undercut Muslim 
dominance in both politics and trade. Once Dutch domination was secured both communities 
had to bear the burdens of the monopoly system set up by the VOC. Accordingly Muslims and 
Christian Ambonese initially had resisted, at times together, the Dutch political and economic 
domination such as in the case of the Pattimura War in 1817 (cf. Wairisal2005). However, since 
the mid-19th century, with the transformation and expansion of education facilities open to the 
Christian community, the relations of the two religious groups with the Dutch began to diverge 
dramatically. 
As discussed above, the educated Christians played a vital role in the colonial enterprise 
as soldiers, clerks, and professionals. In these positions Christians enjoyed a level of material 
welfare and a status not possible in their villages. The Christian dependence on the Dutch was 
reflected in a strong sense ofloyalty to and identification with their colonial masters. Due to 
unequal treatment and discriminatory policy the Dutch showed towards the two religious 
communities during three and half centuries of colonialism, the Muslims identified the Dutch 
and the Christians as "two sides of the same coin." Although very few Muslims participated in 
the colonial enterprise, the last decades of the 19th century and early 20th century had been an 
important phase of social change in the Muslim community, a change that led to the 
emancipation of the Muslims. 
The lifting of the monopoly in 1863, added with the improved transportation, facilitated 
easier contact between Ambon's Muslim group and their co-religionists elsewhere in the Malay-
Indonesian archipelago and beyond. Increasing numbers of Muslims left their villages, not as 
soldiers or clerks, but as pilgrims, sailors, and traders. Muslim Ambonese experience beyond 
their homeland involved the re-establishment of old contacts, a re-awakening of a sense of 
identification with fellow Muslims and a familiarization with beliefs and practices different from 
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their own. The Muslims' changes and emancipation got further impetus by the collapse of the 
Dutch and the advent of the japanese. 
The Japanese and the Changing Christian-Muslim Relations 
The japanese occupation, 1942-1945, had changed significantly the relations between 
Christians and Muslims in Ambon. In particular, the japanese colonialism was a critical period 
for the developing Muslim political awareness and participation and the war years had a radical 
influence on relations between the two religious communities (cf. Benda 1958; Husein 2005). 
An account by Ambon's Pattimura University academics has described the impact of the 
I apanese as follows: 
"It is possible for the reaction of Moluccan society to the japanese victory to be 
divided into three groups: first, Muslims welcomed the japanese as liberators and 
thought the Dutch as oppressors. They welcomed the japanese with gratitude which 
was expressed through the help they gave to destroy the Dutch collaborators in the 
area. Second} Christians saw the arrival of the Japanese as a great misfortune for 
their souls and security. The loss of the Dutch was the loss of their protector and 
supporter. Third, the nationalists received the japanese cautiously. But they used 
the opportunity to reorganize themselves. The nationalists consisted of both 
Christians and Muslims ... Muslims took this opportunity to exact revenge. They felt 
as if it was their time ... News of the japanese defeat was heartily welcomed [in a 
different way] by the [Ambonese] society. The pleasure was obvious in the Christian 
negeri while in the Muslim negeri it was less clear for them and the question arose 
whether with the defeat of the japanese and the return of the Dutch would they be 
secure again" (cited in Chauvel1980: 69). 
A similar analysis is also found in Dutch account of the "Fall of Ambon." A report 
compiled during the japanese occupation stated: "As a class, the Mohammedans [Islam] appear 
to have enjoyed better treatment than the Christians, and have not been subjected to the same 
indignations, but with the sharp decline in standards ofliving, it is probable that they, too, are 
now heartily sick of the japanese. The Christians, who have been strongly anti-japanese, are 
enthusiastic over a prospect of the return of the Allies [the Dutch and Australian). They strongly 
accuse the Mohammedans of being collaborators [of the japanese]" (cited in Chauvel1990: 182-
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3). The replacement of the Dutch by the japanese, thus, severed the special relationship the 
Ambonese Christian community enjoyed with the Dutch. The japanese authorities were also 
more supportive in organization terms of the Muslim community than the Christians. japanese 
support for Muslim Ambonese was then an important phase in the emergence of the community 
from its relative isolation under the Dutch. 
In the period between the fall of the Dutch power and the consolidation of japanese 
authority there were indications from Ambonese sources that there was considerable trouble 
between Christians and Muslims. Muslims obviously looted shops and the houses of the interned 
Dutch and their closest supporters and there were also assaults. This was interpreted as the 
Muslims taking their revenge against the Dutch and the Christians for the discrimination they 
felt they had suffered under the Dutch. In the brief moment between colonial regimes the 
resentments and frustrations of the previous decades surfaced and were violently expressed (cf. 
Chauvel1985). 
The initial attitude of the japanese, at the same time, did not serve to promote a 
harmonious relationship between the two religious groups. The japanese even suspected 
Ambonese Christians of being pro-Dutch. The japanese found it difficult to separate Christianity 
from the other western influences which they were determined to eliminate. In the beginning of 
1943 the japanese began to promote an Islamic organization46, and were strongly emphasizing 
their identification with Islam and their side with Muslims, while leaving the Christians 
organizationally to themselves and persecuting suspects. The japanese attracted the Muslims by 
46 The japanese "discovery" oflslam dates back to the mid-1920's, driven by the expansionist 
plans ofDai Nippon. From the mid-1920s on, institutes devoted to the study of Islam and periodicals 
dealing with Islamic problems made their appearance in japan. In 1933, several quarters started an 
agitation aimed at making japan the protector oflslam, and two years later the first group of four 
students was sent to Arabia and Egypt to prepare themselves for propaganda work. Later on, one of 
these students by the name of Kabayashi Tetsuo was sentto Ambon to begin a "propaganda" mission 
in the island. At the same time the Japanese authorities were encouraging Muslim students and 
teachers from the Middle East and Asian countries to come to japan. As a result of this endeavor, the 
first mosque was built at Kobe in 1935, and a japanese Islamic association was formed in 1938, with 
General Senjuro Hayashi, called a "Father of japanese Islam," as its president (Benda 1958: 103-5). 
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giving them more positions within the government. Additionally, they eliminated attitudes and 
policies of discrimination towards Islam and Muslims previously set up by the Dutch. Some of 
Japan's new policies that favored Muslims were the reopening of the religious schools, the 
creation of Kantor Urusan Agama (Office for Religious Affairs in which the first chairman was 
Prof. Husein Djajadiningrat)), the formation of the Masjumi (Muslim organization), and the 
establishment ofHizbulah, a "Muslim army" (cf. Benda 1958). 
In japanese Military Administration (1963: 244-5), it states, "Customs and relics based 
on the existing religions and beliefs shall be respected to the utmost, thus winning popularity, 
and the stabilization of the popular feeling shall be attempted, and the populace shall be 
enlightened so as to cooperate with our measures. Special attention shall be paid to winning 
popularity and utilization of Muslims in the field of Islam" (italic is mine). This positive attitude of 
the Japanese administration in the naval area towards Islam laid the basis for a close association 
with Arnbonese Muslims. As discussed above, Arnbonese Muslims, initially at least, warmly 
reciprocated the japanese approach. The implementation of the policy was in the hands of 
Kabayashi Tetsuo, a japanese who had studied at Al-Azhar University of Egypt, and used the 
Arabic name Haji Omar FaisaJ.47 He enjoyed the freedom to work outside the military structures 
and did so in Sulawesi as well as in Ambon. 
Assisted by a number of graduates of the Aukoku Gakuin (Patriotic School), Faisal's 
organizational efforts to mobilize Ambonese Muslims support appear to have begun in early 
1943 with the establishment of Djamijah Islamijah Ceram Qam'iyyah Islamiah of Seram). Having 
an impressive organization extending from Celebes (Sulawesi) to Borneo and Ambon and having 
a huge membership and financial resources, this japanese-sponsored Islamic organization has 
47 Born in japan in 1912, Faisal graduated from high school in 1937 and after that he worked 
in Djamijah Islamijah. He was sent to Al-Azhar University to study. Having made the pilgrimage twice 
[in 1937 and 1939), he had written a book of Muslim prayer in Japanese. japanese Military 
Administration [1963: 244) mentions that he was "killed in action" with no specification of its date 
and circumstances. 
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the distinction of being the first supra-village organization for Muslims in the Ambonese islands 
(Chauvel1980, 1985). The founding of the organization brought with it the promise of total 
transformation and a new era of Ambonese Muslims. The old-fashioned and conservative 
thinking that had dominated Ambonese Islam would be replaced by a new version of Shariah-
based purified Islam, and the "ad at sickness," which had given rise to so much misunderstanding 
and fighting, would be eliminated. In the context of the changes in and conflict over Muslim 
practices of the preceding decades, the Japanese came down firmly on the side of the reformists. 
Japanese support towards Islam did not mean freedom from interests. They wanted 
Ambon's Muslims to stand behind their campaigns against the Allies. The japanese attempt to 
mobilize Muslim support for the war went with the religious or jurisprudential explanation. The 
most notable was about their perception of the war againstthe Allies as a holy war (perang suez) 
and the related issue of the observance of fasting in the month of Ramadan. In August 1943, the 
Djamijah Islamijah Ceram announced that the fasting (puasa) would not be observed so that 
efforts could be redoubled in the war against anti-Islamic Allied powers, and for the movement 
towards the new Asia: "To fulfill the wish of Allah, the obligation to fast must be substituted by 
working truly to increase the produce for use in this Holy War" (Sinar Matahari, 21 August 
1943). 
Japanese support would have undoubtedly been welcomed by Ambonese Muslim 
reformists such as those of Kailolo and Ory in Haruku. At the national level, Masjumi also 
supported the Japanese. In a resolution of October, 1944, this Muslim organization stated, "With 
Nippon we stand, with Nippon we fall, in the path of Allah, to destroy a tyrannous enemy"48 [i.e. 
the Allies]. Although reformists supported the japanese, the response of the Ambonese Muslims 
as a whole may not have been uniformly positive since the "characteristics" of Ambonese Islam 
are pro-local traditions and cultures. Despite the worries and suspicions from some groups 
48 Reprinted inSoeara Moeslimin Indonesia, Vol. II, No. 20, October 15,1944, p. 2 
<.•·-:·-:,..,, 
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about the reformist orientation of the japanese promotion of Islamic activities, the promotions 
of things Islamic was an important development in the emancipation of the Muslim community. 
In contrast to the Muslim groups, Ambonese Christians did not receive much support 
from the japanese. The collapse of Dutch authority meant for the Ambonese Christian 
community an "overnight transformation" from being a relatively privileged group to one 
suspected ofloyalty to the defeated colonial power. The first year and a half was probably the 
most difficult for the Moluccan Protestant church, institutionally. The formally independent 
Moluccan Protestant Church (Gereja Protestan Maluku or GPM for short) was suddenly 
underprivileged and received a most hostile environment. A number of pend eta (pastor) were 
punished for not complying with government wishes. Frank Cooley (1962: 367) gives the figure 
of 90 pend eta killed by the japanese. Unlike in the Dutch colonial times where the church was 
financed by the government and the church's work in the remote villages was also subsidized, 
during the japanese occupation the GPM had to find themselves the financial means to support 
the central administration (the synod) and its pastoral work ( cf. Tapilatu 2008). 
The above depiction identifies the historical developments in which the experience of 
Christian and Muslim Ambonese has diverged. Central to these was the different relationship 
each religious community had with the colonial power. During European colonialism, especially 
the Dutch, Muslims were isolated and uninvolved with the colonial enterprise, while the 
Christian Ambonese played an important role in Netherlands-Indies society and many of them 
came to identify closely with the Dutch. The Christians' intense colonial relationship had a 
significant effect on the way they interacted with their Muslim compatriots and with other 
Indonesians. The japanese occupation and decolonization process resulted in Ambonese 
Muslims taking a full and active role in their own society and deeper integration into Indonesian 
society. 
~ ~-------~----
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Chapter 4 
Nationalist Movement, Religious Change, and Political Activism 
In this chapter, I will turn to the discussion of the dynamics of Christian-Muslim 
relations in post-colonial Indonesia. After the collapse of the Japanese and the proclamation of 
the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, Ambonese society had split into two main camps: the 
"nationalists" (i.e. those who supported the newly established nation-state Republic of 
Indonesia) and the "loyalists" (i.e. those who supported the Dutch). While most Muslims of 
Maluku supported the Republic of Indonesia, the Christians were divided between the two 
camps. The historical evidence suggests that there was a general, but by no means absolute, 
relationship between religious motivation and political orientation and that the Muslim 
identification with the Indonesian nationalist cause brought them into conflict with the elements 
of the Christian community in post-Dutch rule. The Muslim's nationalist role has become part of 
their historical tradition, as expressed by A. Halim Tuasikal: 
"In the history of the Indonesian independence struggle, we [the Muslims] come 
across not a few Moluccan national heroes, leaders of wars against the Portuguese 
and the struggle against the Dutch. After the struggle by the beginning of the 20th 
century had changed character and had become a political movement, the Islamic 
community in the Moluccas played a special role. The independence movement was 
based almost entirely in the Muslim group" (Chauvel1980: 67-8). 
Some elite member of the Christian nationalists, moreover, joined the Partai Indonesia 
Merdeka (PIM-Indonesian Independence Party), founded by the pre-war SarekatAmbon 
leader, E.U. Pupella. Having the principal pro-Indonesia political party on Ambon, PIM shared 
both the Sarekat Ambon secular nationalist tradition and its religious structure. Later on, in April 
1950, a substantial group of the Christian Ambonese loyalists established a separatist movement 
called the Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS-the South Moluccan Republic) under the direction of 
Dr. Ch. Soumokil and). Manusama. RMS was a turning point in the social history of Maluku. The 
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conflict between the RMS and the jakarta government left no Ambonese victors, creating a true 
tragedy for Ambonese society (cf. Bouman 1960; Chauvel1990a). If there were any Ambonese 
victors following the RMS rebellion, it was the Republican emigre leaders who during the 1950s 
and early 1960s did at times hold the senior civilian and military positions in Ambon. 
). Latuharhary, the former leader of SarekatAmbon who was appointed as Republican 
governor ofMaluku in 1945, was able to assume his position and retained it until1955. 
Muhammad Fa dang, an Ambonese Muslim, who had been a Republican activist in Surabaya of 
East java during the revolution, was governor between 1960 and 1965. Between 1965 and 1968, 
Col. Gerrit Latumahina, Muhammad Padang's deputy, was the last Ambonese to hold the 
position. The only Ambonese to be the military commander in Maluku (holding the position 
between 1957 and 1960) was Herman Pieters, who had fought with the TN! in java. Since 1968, 
the senior military a(ld civilian positions had been held by non-Ambonese/Ma!ukans. Neither 
the emigre nor Ambon-based elite were able to defend the region's autonomy as central control 
was strengthened with the consolidation of the New Order regime. 
Furthermore, by the establishment of RMS, the already strained relations between the 
Muslim and Christian groups suffered further through the obvious identification of the RMS 
civilian leaders and soldiers as Christians. Although there were a few Muslim elites in the RMS 
ministry and governmental structure, such as the Raja ofTulehu Ibrahim Ohorella (cf. 
Waileruny 2009), most Ambon's Muslims dubbed the RMS a "Christian political syndicate" 
pursuing independence for Maluku apart from Republic of Indonesia (or remaining part of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands]. Although some Christian elites in the RMS tried to be "empathetic" 
saying that the proclamation of the RMS was an expression of the popular will, many Ambonese 
Muslim leaders-either those who joined the PIM or not such as the Raja ofPelauw A B. 
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Latuconsina49-remained suspicious towards the establishment of the RMS. Muslims' suspicion 
to the RMS was reasonable since the RMS leadership did not recognize the need for at least 
token Muslim representation in the government. Additionally, the violence against Muslims 
committed by the elite troops of the KNlL (the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army) indicated 
that all was not harmonious in the relationship between Muslims and RMS ( cf. Matanasi 2007). 
Given the clear identification ofthe RMS leaders and soldiers as Christians and Soumokil's 
reputed appeal to deep-rooted fears of being overwhelmed by Indonesia's Muslim majority, the 
founding of the RMS, from the Muslim Ambonese perspective, was an effort to maintain local 
Christian dominance in the bureaucracy and political structure. 
The strained relations between Muslims and Christians as a result of the RMS were 
reflected in the development of political parties in the 1950s. Although there was a relationship 
between religious persuasion and political preference before the founding of the RMS, political 
parties and organizations had been secular in character and appeal. This characteristic, 
however, changed significantly with the establishment of branches of nationwide political 
parties. The pre-RMS separatist organizations-the PTE (Persatuan Timur Besar-Association of 
Great East) and the GSS (Gabungan Sembi! an Serangkai-federation of nine loyalists and 
separatis organizations)-simply disappeared and were discredited due to their connection to 
the RMS. 
The leadership of PlM, which supported the South Moluccas as part of the Republic of 
Indonesia, split. Pupela and M.K. Soulisa attempted to continue PIM's secular tradition in the 
new guise of the Ambon branch of the President Sukarno's Partai Nasion a/ Indonesia [PNI), 
whereas Hamid bin Hamid and other Muslim leaders founded an Ambon branch of the Masjumi 
49 A.B. Latuconsina, the Raja of Pelauw, provides an interesting contrast to Ibrahim Ohorella, 
the Raja ofTulehu. While not being member of PIM, Latuconsina consistently argued for the 
incorporation of South Maluku in Indonesia, and refused the offer of being a minister in the RMS 
government 
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when the Masjumi founder and Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir visited Ambon in early 1951. 
Hamid and other Muslim leaders who founded Masjumi were not initially motivated to join as a 
result of any particular identification they have with the party's modernism. At the time Muslim 
leaders thought there should be a specifically Muslim party to help overcome the consequences 
of colonial neglect. Why the Masjumi became the major Muslim party seems as much a matter of 
circumstance as ideology. Masjumi was the first Islamist political party to be established in 
Ambon and many Muslims there felt that after the suffering of the RMS it was important for the 
Muslim community to remain united. 
In the 1955 elections, the first and most democratic election to be held in the history of 
Indonesia politics, Ambonese society voted on the basis of their religious affiliations: the 
Protestants voted for Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia-Indonesian Christian Party) and 
Muslims voted for Masjumi. As a result, both Parkindo and Masjumi dominated the results. The 
PNI, which won nationally, was caught in the middle as Ambon's communal differences became 
deeply politicized 50 (cf. Feith 1957). Like elsewhere in Indonesia, Ambon's post-RMS political 
parties and organizations also turned into the a/iran ("stream") pattern of the country's politics 
of the period, with local Muslims and Christians allying themselves with powerful patrons in 
jakarta. 
Although national factors had greatly contributed to the Ambon's political character and 
patterns, regional motives for establishing religious-based parties, arising out of the tensions 
created by the RMS, should not be underestimated. On the basis of the 1955 election results, it is 
50 There were nine political parties that were involved in the 1955 elections of the Old Order. 
Nationally, PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia-Indonesian Nationalist Party] won the biggest vote 
with 22.3% of the total. Two of the Islamic parties, Masjumi (20.9%) and Nahdlatul Ulama (18.4%] 
came second and third. The fourth party was PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia-the Indonesian 
Communist Party) with 16.4%. Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia-Indonesian Protestant Party) 
and the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik) won 2.6% and 2.0% respectively. The other two Islamic 
parties were PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia] with 2.9% and Perti (Persatuan Tarbiyah 
/slamiyah] with 1.3%. The socialist party, PSI (Partai Sosia/is Indonesia] won 2.0% of the total vote 
(Husein 2005: 103-4). 
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possible that the Masjumi was successful in attracting most of PIM's Muslim support, while still 
leaving the PNI with more Muslim than Christian support. The overall pattern of the 1955 
elections, however, was that Ambonese voted on the basis of their religious affiliations. 
In post-RMS Ambonese society a number of developments, namely religious change, 
expanding educational opportunities and decolonization, worked together to produce one 
important structural change: the emancipation of the Muslim society. Ambonese Muslims began 
for the first time in centuries to take an active role in all areas of society, including most 
importantly those from which they had been previously excluded: politics, bureaucracy, and 
education. Decolonization meant, as had been foreshadowed by the japanese occupation, a 
change in the religious make-up of the government. With the disappearance of the Dutch, 
Ambonese were living in a predominantly Muslim Indonesia rather than a Christian-ruled 
Netherlands Indies. The change shattered Ambonese Christians' peculiar feeling of identity with 
the colonial elite. There was no longer any special status to be gained through association with 
the Dutch. For Ambon's Muslims, conversely, the distance they felt from the ruling elites was 
stripped ofits religious content. Some of them became members of the new local elite. 
The privileged position of the Christians did not disappear overnight, however. Their 
patrons (the Dutch) may have gone but their educational and occupational skills they enjoyed 
since the Dutch colonial period remained. This is among the reasons why the Christians still 
enjoyed elite positions in local government, parliament, bureaucracy, and education during the 
New Order prior to the governorship of Muhammad Aqib Latuconsina in early 1990s. However, 
as time passed, the Christians have outnumbered Muslim rivals for these positions. 
The post-independence period has seen the emergence of an educated Muslim elite, led 
initially by those from raja families schooled under the colonial regime, but now becoming more 
broadly based. It was in urban Ambonese society that, unlike in the negeri, the rivalry for 
positions between Christians and Muslims was most keenly felt and where the common bonds 
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of ad at and pel a were weakest. It was also in urban settings where people from diverse ethnic 
groups coming from various regions in Indonesia live, and compete with one another for 
positions in political and economic domains. It was also urban Christian and Muslim groups of 
the town of Ambon who were initially involved in a brutal warfare started in january 1999. 
Whereas most Christians (Protestants) who resided in Ambon were Ambonese coming 
from the "Ambonese cultural areas," mainly the islands of Ambon, Lease (Haruku, Saparua, and 
Nusalaut) and Seram ( cf. Bartels 1977, 2003), Muslims living there were from various 
ethnicities. In the city of Ambon the Muslim community consisted mainly of, in addition to 
Ambonese which composed the major group, Butonese, Bugis-Makasarese, Javanese, Arabs, 
Chinese, Seramese, Keiese, Ternatans, Bandanese, and other Indonesians. Many of the Muslim 
families had been there since early VOC times and had intermarried with each other and with 
the Ambonese. The Chinese and Arabs had a particular influence in the Muslim community, but 
by the 1920s the traditional respect in which the Ambonese held for foreign Muslims began to 
fade. 
The conflict between the Ambonese Muslims and the Arabs was symbolized in the 
replacement of the Arab imam of the Ambon's great mosque (Mosque AI-Fatah) by an Ambonese 
Muslim. As a result of the conflict, the Arabs built their own mosque in the town (Mosque An-
Nur). The conflict, however, was not simply a matter of Arabs opposed by Ambonese. As long-
standing religious practices had been at issue the Arabs enjoyed the support oflocal 
conservatives. Amongst the Arabs themselves there was a strong generational dispute in which 
the leaders of the younger generation, the kaum mud a who supported the reformist ideas of 
Islam, had close associations with nationalist organizations. 
It is in this environment that a branch of the Muhammadiyah, one of the oldest java-
based Islamic organizations founded by KH Ahmad Dahl an in 1912 that was intent on 
developing Islamic reformism, was established in Ambon in 1933, under the sponsorship of Haji 
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Abdul Kadir Kimkoa. The establishment of the Muhammadiyah initially tried to spread its 
teachings into the Muslim negeri (rural areas) and attempted to break down the reluctance of 
Muslims of Ambon to attend government schools. The Muhammadiyah's attempts to attract 
rural Muslims, unfortunately, were unsuccessful, and only brought a minor change. In the field 
of Muslim education, Muhammadiyah was not alone. There was the Perkoempoelan Pendidikan 
Islam (Association oflslamic Education) established in 1939 by R.A.N. Hassannoesi. Since the 
1920s, there had been an Arab school and a madrasah. In 1930 nearly half the students 
attending the Arab school were non-Arab Indonesians. 
Despite these little developments there remained great resistance to religious change 
and to ''modernist" ideas carried out by the Muslim reformers. A. Halim Tuasikal argued that 
Moluccan Muslims consider the teachings of their spiritual leaders and ad at elders as 
indisputable and consequently those (Islamic) ideas not confirmed by their own leaders were 
thought to be mistaken. This is among the reasons why when two famous non-Ambonese 
Muslim reformers, Habib Dahlan and HAMKA, came to Ambon and attempted to speak at the 
great mosque in the town, resulted in the unceremonious removal of the two religious leaders. 
Even reformers of Ambonese origin had a difficult time. 
In 1932, A.M. Sangaji, a member of Sarekat Islam, visited his negeri, Rohomoni, where 
his brother was raja. Rohomoni is one of the more adat-oriented negeri in Hatuhaha (Haruku). 
Sangaji came to his village to seek a support of the local people in establishing Sarekat Islam 
schools and exhorted them to follow the true doctrine. The only result appeared to be that the 
majority of the people in Rohomoni took a hostile attitude towards him and he left without 
success. Up to this day Rohomoni remains minimally affected by the changes brought by 
reformist Muslims. Not only in Rohomoni, to day's Muslim areas of rural Ambon remain the 
powerful base of ad at and local traditions of Islam, and any attempt of religious reform brought 
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by reformist Muslim groups-such as the jama'ah Tabligh and ex-Laskar jihad-were 
consistently rejected by local Muslim villagers.Sl 
Religious change in the uli Hatuhaha" of Haruku island, in particular, began in Kailolo 
about a century ago and has been most extensive there (later Pelauw and Kabau were affected). 
The number of haji (pilgrims of Mecca) in a negeri is often seen by Ambonese as a measure of 
religious change. By 1920, while in Rohomoni there were only three or four of haji, Kailolo 
counts its haji in the hundreds. As elsewhere in java, Sumatra, or Sulawesi, haji, in addition to 
religious teachers, had been the channel of Maluku's Islamic reform and religious changes. It is 
difficult to estimate when the difference of religious practices and beliefs began to emerge in the 
Hatuhaha, possibly in the last decades of the 19th century or the early 20th century, but the 
differences only began to threaten the unity of the Muslim negeri, especially Pelauw-the 
"political capital" of the uli-during the 1930s, leading to physical conflict between modernists 
or reformists and the traditionalists (i.e. the defenders of ad at and local practices of Islam) in 
1939. The Dutch intervened and moved the reformists to Ory, just a few kilometers from 
Pelauw. At present, this newly established sub-village has become one of the reformist 
strongholds in Hatuhaha." 
In the 1940s, after the war Persatuan Mus/imin Indonesia (Permi-the Union of 
Indonesian Muslims), many of its members linked to Partai Indonesia Merdeka (PIM-
51 Interview with Raja ofKeititu, M. Yamin, Ambon, April11, 2010. 
5z Uli Hatuhaha originally consisted of five negeri, these are Pelauw, Rohomoni, Kabau, 
Kailolo, and Hulaliu. The latter, according to the Hatuhaha Muslims, was forcibly converted to 
Christianity by the Dutch. 
53 Later, during the Maluku wars of 1999-2002, the Muslim Hatuhaha became one of the 
largest supporters of the jihad movement waged by leading Ambonese Muslims. It is significant to 
highlight the role of the Hatuhaha Muslims here since they played an immense role during the last 
decades of the New Order. The famous Muslim clans of Hatuhaha such as Latuconsina, Marasabessy, 
Tuasikal, Sangaji, Salampessy, and many others have long dominated Ambon's bureaucracy, 
economy, and education until the governorship of Karel Albert Ralahalu in 2004. The new governor, 
as I will discuss in the following chapters, replaced vital positions in the provincial/regional 
government formerly occupied by the "Hatuhaha clans" with the Muslim elites of the )azirah Leihitu, 
Seram, Kei, or Banda. Due to the replacement, some elites of the Hatuhaha Muslims dubbed Governor 
Karel"pro-Christians" and "anti-Muslims." 
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Indonesian Independence Party), was established by leading Ambonese aiming at fostering 
Islamic education. In a matter of religious reform, Permi, having been viewed as a reaction to the 
great popular resistance towards Muhammadiyah, was thought to be more evolutionary and 
flexible than Muhammadiyah. Having a school headed by Abu Sangaji, Permi was the 
institutional representation of the reformist orientation in the Muslim community. 
The Muslim traditionalists had no organization as such but a leading figure was the 
imam of the great mosque and he had the sympathy of many of the Muslim raja and other 
village's elites. They sought to preserve the old ad at and were opposed to the establishment of a 
Mahkamah, an Islamic court of justice, which had been promoted by Permi and would diminish 
their powers. The conservatism of many Muslim raja need not necessarily be attributed to their 
own inclination and interest. After Indonesia gained independence the pace and character of 
religious change altered with the founding of the Department of Religion set up by the 
Indonesian government, which has done much to extend and raise the level of Muslim 
education, through subsidies to private schools and the introduction of religious instruction into 
government schools. The establishment of the Department of Religion marked an important 
break with the past in two respects. First, it was the first institution to coordinate religious 
affairs above the negeri level. Second, it represented government involvement in religious 
affairs, in a constructive sense, and the new government could be seen as at least religiously 
mixed or neutral rather than solely Christian as that of the Dutch. 
Despite gaining little success in the village level, the Muslim reformists, having 
emphasized pure Islam at the expense of traditional ad at beliefs, attracted some urban Muslims. 
In urban centers, some of the leaders were from different ethnic groups, some of whom were 
from outside Ambon, and had little empathy for Ambonese ad at. As the older, more traditional 
Moluccan Muslim leaders died away, they were replaced with younger people, more open to 
Islamic purity and pan-Islamic ideas. Islam then became associated with modernity. For young 
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Muslims the future was in the overwhelmingly Islamic Indonesian nation and, eager to be 
accepted by non-Moluccan Muslims, they embraced Islamic universalism over ethnic 
parochialism. As ad at weakened due to increasing Islamic universalism and reformism, 
especially in urban spheres, ideas of Muslim-Christian brotherhood weakened as well. 
A similar process of religious change as that of the Muslim community has been 
occurring amongst the Ambonese Christians. Since the Ambonese church became independent 
in 1935, some Ambonese Christians have been examining the role of their own church and their 
relations with their Muslim compatriots. The reformers, in general, have sought to shift the 
emphasis away from beliefs and practices of ad at origin to those perceived as "Christian." 
Furthermore, when the Moluccan Protestant Church (GPM-Gereja Protestan Maluku) became 
independent from the Dutch Reformed Church, the new indigenous church leaders continued 
the sporadic attacks on ad at and traditional religious practices that were previously committed 
by the Dutch ministers, especially since the time of joseph Kam54-the "Apostle ofMaluku" and 
later B.N.j. Roskott55; consequently there was a constant tension and conflict between the 
Protestant pastors [pend eta) and ad at leaders (kepala ad at) in the villages (Bartels 2003a). 
After World War II some young Christian ministers were given the opportunity to study 
at prestigious theological schools in Europe and the United States. As these ministers gained 
leadership positions within the church, they strived to achieve universally accepted standards of 
54 The Dutch minister joseph Kam came to Ambon in 1815. Kam, as well as the English 
Baptist missionary jabez Carrey who landed in Ambon one year earlier, was, in fact, the first 
missionary in Maluku since the Portuguese had been obliged to leave Ambon. Kam's (and Carey's) 
arrival rang in a new period of active attention to the more intensive and extensive propagation of 
the Christian faith in the island. While Carey was obliged to stop his work in Maluku at the end of the 
British rule in 1817, Kam continued his work until his death in 1833. joseph Kam made a major 
contribution to the development ofMaluku's church and Christianity in the 19th century. On the 
history ofjoseph Kam see Enklaar (ny]. 
ss After the death of joseph Kamin 1833, the missionary B.N.j. Roskott was in charge of the 
training of teachers from 1834 up to 1864. He formalized this training by instituting a teachers' 
training college1 which received government recognition. He introduced a high degree of variety in 
the training course and tried to produce teachers whose personalities were moulded in conformity 
with the missionaries' ideals (van Fraasen 1983: 35-6). 
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Protestantism and were thus determined to purify Moluccan Christianity by ridding it of 
ancestor veneration and any customs or those so-called "bad ad at'' that were contrary to 
Christian beliefs and religious practices like ancestor worship, but keeping the "good ad at'' like 
pela. Later, the church largely succeeded in the Christianization of pel a pact rituals. This reduced 
role of ad at (customary) in the Christian villages diminished the common basis of interaction 
with their Muslim fellows leading to an increase in the social distance between Christians and 
Muslims in interfaith alliances. 
The previous depiction suggests that the Christianization process within the Christian 
community and Islamization process within the Muslim community had weakened the ad at, 
institutions, and the ideas of Muslim-Christian brotherhood. At the same time, this process of 
religious revitalization increasingly brought religion to center stage in society, with language 
and religious symbols assuming greater importance with respect to matters such as citizenship, 
ethnicity, and competition for economic and political power. In brief, the decades of political and 
religious changes have shaken the very foundations of Ambonese identity. 
There were at least four cornerstones of the foundation: common ethnicity, ad at, the 
respective world religions, and the colonial relationship. Although in one sense no longer 
relevant, the colonial relationship remains very much alive in Ambon's historical traditions. For 
Muslims, their anti-colonial traditions, let alone the case of Kapitan Jonker, have become an 
important part of their emerging identity and assertiveness. Conversely, for Christians, their 
previous intimate relationship with the Dutch, let alone the 1817 revolt of Thomas Matulessy or 
Pattimura, resulted in the considerable adjustments in post-independence period. 
Some of the Christian traditions, particularly their loyalty to the House of Orange, are no 
longer all that useful in an independent Indonesia. The colonial relationship, as an element in 
Ambonese identity, thus remains a divisive factor. Luckily the newly appointed President 
Sukarno was not concerned about Christian-Muslim division. What mattered for him was only 
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issues of national integration; consequently those who tried to challenge these issues-either 
Christians (e.g. RMS) or Muslims (e.g. DI/TII),-would be driven out. 
Christians and Muslims during the New Order 
With the shift of presidency from Sukarno to Suharto, the relationship between 
Christians and Muslims underwent some substantial changes. These changes stemmed from one 
major policy issued by Suharto's New Order regime (1965-1998), namely the policy of SARA 
(Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan-tribal, religious, racial, and intergroup relations). The New 
Order was particularly sensitive to the role of religion in national politics and it systematically 
repressed political identities based on these SARA issues. Throughout Suharto's New Order 
SARA was tabooed; consequently discussions on ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group 
relations were banned. The reason given for the taboo and banning of the discussions of SARA 
was that such conversations might lead to communal conflicts and destabilize the unity of the 
Indonesian nation. Like Sukarno, Suharto, in the first decades of his reign, did not care about 
religious-based positions in his government. Wbat he cared about was social-political stability 
and loyalty to his authority. 
Accordingly during his rule, elite members of Christian communities (Protestants and 
Catholics), abangan (nominal and syncretist Muslim Javanese), and non-Muslims enjoyed key 
positions in the army and bureaucracy whether in national or regional level. In Maluku, abangan 
and Christians from military background held key positions such as governors (i.e. G.). 
Latumahina, Soemitro, Soemeru, Hasan Slamet and Soekoso) and regional secretary (Sekwilda) 
such as). Sahetapy, M.K. Soulisa, G.A. Engko, and j.M.E. Soukotta (Maluku Dalam Angka, 
2005/2006). 
Until the late 1980s, santri (devout Muslims), by contrast, were absent from Suharto's 
bureaucracy and the military. The peak of the exclusion of santri occurred when the Catholic 
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General Benny Murdani was trusted by Suharto to control the armed forces from the mid-1970s 
until the late 1980s. He gained more power in 1983 when he was appointed Armed Forces 
Commander. Benny Murdani had built a prominent support of non-Muslims in both military and 
civilian sectors. He, moreover, had surrounded himself with military officers from abangan, 
Christians, and other religious minority backgrounds, therefore excluding many santri within 
the army from numerous leading positions (cf. Husein 2005: 1117 -8). 
Indeed, early in the New Order regime, Suharto had strategically isolated Islamists by 
promoting Christian and abangan military officers and technocrats, but when these nationalists 
became critical of his corrupt regime and threatened his power, Suharto took a firm action by 
eliminating them from their strategic positions (cf. Hefner 2000) and replacing them with more 
loyalists. This was what happened in the late 1980s of his presidency when some Christian elites 
challenged his power, Suharto turned his support to modernist Muslims resulting in the 
"greening" of the military and cabinet through the 1990s, as symbolized by the rise of 
individuals like General Faisal Tanjung and Professor B.). Habibie (cf. van Bruinessen 2002). In 
December 1990, Suharto supported the founding of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia-Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) under the chairmanship of B.). 
Habibie. 
After the establishment of ICMI the national political climate changed dramatically since 
the "green forces" (a term for the Muslim groups) had "greened" the new cabinet and the 
military. Suharto used ICMI as a means to co-opt middle class Muslims, and correspondingly, 
ICMI members utilized the organization as a steppingstone to power. Later on, when moderate 
Muslim leaders, in their turn, became critical of Suharto, and embraced the reformasi 
(democratic reform) movement to topple his throne, Suharto turned to radical Muslim groups 
and conservative religious organizations such as KISDI (Komite Islam untuk Solidaritas Dunia 
Islam-Islamic Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World) whose goals include the 
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propagation of Islam through social action and the institutionalization of Islamic law ( cf. Hefner 
2000, 2003). 
The elimination of santri from the military and bureaucracy prior to 1990s was due to a 
number of reasons. First, the abangan-dominated military officers who backed Suharto's regime 
viewed Islamic teachings as a hostile to their syncretic tradition. The second reason is that 
Suharto was afraid of the possibility of the revival of the Islamism that challenged his power. 
Suharto's worry was reasonable since the Islamistjseparatist groups had once emerged in the 
stage of Indonesian politics during Sukarno's Old Order aiming at establishing an Islamic state. 
It is obvious that during the early period of the New Order, Suharto turned to control 
Islamist elements, even though these Muslim groups had contributed in putting up Suharto in 
power by participating hand-in-hand with then-the New Order to destroy PKI (Indonesian 
Communist Party). Religious affiliation was indeed required of all citizens as a means to counter 
communism, but the political potential of Islam was carefully contained through promotion of 
the secular ideology ofPancasila, management of political parties, discrediting of (some) Islamic 
organizations and Islamist leaders, and when necessary, outright repression ( cf. Bertrand 2004). 
Due to Suharto's ruthless policies toward Islamists, Indonesian Muslims began to shift from the 
sphere of politics to culture. 
In short, during his presidency, especially until the late 1980s, Suharto skillfully played 
"Islamic and Christian cards" through his SARA policy by positioning the latter as scapegoats for 
policies unpopular to Muslims. This policy and strategy helped intensify Muslim animosity 
towards Christians, which had sat in Muslim consciousness since colonial times. Although 
Suharto was unwilling to see the development of Islamism, he supported non-political Islamic 
dakwah (propagation). It was clear that Suharto wanted to keep Muslim political activism at the 
margin but at the same time to support cultural activities of Muslims. 
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In the name of SARA and the establishment of the stable political order, moreover, 
Suharto intensively pacified the society through violent/military means. People were thus afraid 
of talking about this SARA issue and of committing SARA-based violence. As a result, ethno-
religious communal conflict was almost entirely absent throughout his presidency until the mid-
1990s (cf. Varshney et. al. 2004). In Maluku and Ambon, there was also no large-scale violent 
conflict between Christians and Muslims throughout his reign so when Suharto's Minister for 
Religious Affairs, Tarmizi Taher, visited Ambon he was amazed by the peaceful relations of 
Christians and Muslims in this island, and intended to make Ambon or Maluku as a "pilot 
project" oflndonesia's interreligious tolerance.'' 
However, it should be noted, the absence of communal violence at this time did not 
mean there was no Christian-Muslim conflict, rivalry, or tension. Since Suharto was 
disappointed by Christian elites, particularly with Benny Murdani who wanted to challenge 
Suharto in the presidential candidacy, Suharto turned his support to modernist Muslim groups 
and technocrats, especially exponents ofiCMl. Since then ICMI cadres dominated the cabinet, 
bureaucracy, and military. In Maluku, in order to win support from Muslim groups, Suharto also 
twice appointed Ambonese Muslims of Pelauw and ICMI members to the governorship (first, M. 
Aqib Latuconsina in 1992 and M. Saleh Latuconsina in 1997), rather than giving the job to 
military officers who had previously enjoyed his favor (cf. !CG 2000). 
Since Aqib was appointed as Governor of Maluku (1992-1997), a change of political 
climate began to emerge in Maluku. Governor Aqib quickly began to apply a policy of the 
"reformation of bureaucracy" by (1) sending Muslim bureaucrats, particularly those from his 
clans and region (Pelauw and Kailolo of Haruku or Hatuhaha), to study in Makassar and java by 
using funds from the province ofMaluku, (2) "Islamizing"-and therefore de-Christianizing-
the state bureaucracy (provincial and regional government) by placing Hatuhaha Muslims in 
ss Interview with H. Idrus Tukan, Chairman of Moluccan Ulama Council, February 21,2011 
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positions of authority in his administration; and (3) recruiting Muslim school teachers and civil 
servants. 
As described before, Ambonese Christians were far more educated than the Muslims. 
Accordingly, since vital positions in the bureaucracy require high education, they, until the late 
1980s, still enjoyed key positions in provincial/regional government, except in the top 
leadership (governor). For a governor, Suharto himself would appoint his loyal cadres, usually 
those having military backgrounds and abangan Javanese, to this position. 
As a bureaucrat, Governor Aqib realized that without high education, at least master's 
degrees, Muslims could not expect to occupy key positions in the government and military 
because these positions will be determined by a rank (kepangkatan) and this rank was based on, 
among others, education. Thus, the higher an education someone had the more easily it was to 
get high positions. Upon their return from education in java and Sulawesi, many Muslims from 
Pelauw and Kailolo held key positions (e.g. kepala din as and kepala bagian) in governmental 
bureaucracy, not only in the province of Maluku but also in some Muslim-dominated districts 
(kabupaten) such as Maluku Tengah (central Maluku) and Seram Bagian Barat (west Seram), so 
that they dominated and controlled the government (cf. Pieris 2004: 222-30). 
Aqib's nepotism and "clan-ism" provoked much criticism on the part of Christians and 
Muslims outside Pelauw and Kailolo (such as those from Leihitu, Seram, Banda, Buru or Kei). 
The policy also strained Christian-Muslim relations, and heightened tensions among local rival 
groups. Some Christian leaders felt that during Aqib administration, and later developed further 
during the governorship ofM. Saleh Latuconsina (1997-2002), there had been a systematic 
effort to eliminate Christians from bureaucracy. john Pieris (2004: 228) reported that former 
minister of transmigration during Suharto administration, Siswono Yudohusodo, told him that 
he had received a letter from Governor Akib stating that the provincial head of the office of 
transmigration in Maluku should be given to a Muslim. Siswono, fortunately, refused his request. 
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Based on this description, it is unfair to say that, as some Maluku's Muslim elites have accused, 
Christian domination in bureaucracy and Muslim discrimination in this domain as the root 
causes of the Maluku conflict in 1999 (cf. Kastor 2000). 
It is true that Christian Ambonese have been displaced from many sectors, not only 
political arenas during Aqib administration (and Saleh's) but also those ofthe economy by more 
competitive immigrants from java and Sulawesi. The BBM (Buton, Bugis, and Makassar) 
migrants from South and Southeast Sulawesi, in particular, came to dominate the commercial 
life of Ambon town, especially transportation and the local markets. In Ambon town and semi-
urban areas of Seram and Buru, the indigenous population resented the preferential treatment 
given by the national government to sponsor trans-migrants who were overwhelmingly Muslim. 
The loss oflarge tracts of land with little or no-compensation, added with economic success and 
domination of the newcomers, created long-smoldering resentments among the native 
population. Most of the affected villages were Christians. 
In the 1970s when transmigrasi (transmigration), a long-standing national policy under 
which people from densely populated islands are moved to islands with supposedly low 
population densities, was barely underway, the old villages were sleepy and mostly reachable 
only by the sea. In the late 1990s, however, they were all connected by a highway along which 
many new businesses and settlements were located, almost exclusively owned by non-
Ambonese Muslims ( cf. Bartels 2003). Some of the villages in Seram island had turned into small 
towns which had lost their Christian and rural character. While the Muslim newcomers 
prospered, the native Christian economy stagnated. When I visited villages in Seram in 2010, 
some local Christians jokingly said, "If we want our island developed, economy advanced, and 
transportation to progress, invite Muslims and Javanese to come and settle here. The central 
government will immediately build the roads and provide markets." 
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Transmigration policies encouraged under Suharto since 1970s not only changed 
Maluku's economy but also shifted the balance between Christians and Muslims due to a steady 
flow of predominantly Muslim immigrants. The Muslim population in Maluku increased from 
slightly less than 50 per cent of the total in 1971 to nearly 60 percent by 1999. During the same 
period, the Christian population declined from about 47 percent to roughly 40 percent. The 
impact of immigration is clearly evident in the steady increase of non-native Muslims, from 
about 5 percent of the total Maluku population in 1971 to.more than 14 percent in 1995.57 Most 
of these Muslim migrants came from South and Southeast Sulawesi: Buton, Makassar, Kendari, 
and Bugis, with substantial numbers emigrating from java. From 1969 to 1999, there had been 
25,319 households (almost 100,000 people) transmigrated to Maluku and North Maluku, with 
more than half settling in the Central Maluku regency, as well as the islands of Ambon, Buru, and 
Seram. Additional migration not related to the government policy also took place. Although the 
number of these unofficial migrants is difficult to estimate, the vast majority of these migrants 
were Muslims (cf. Panggabean 2004: 416-37). 
When the political reformation, known in lndonesia as reformasi, opened the door of 
lndonesian politics and Suharto's political legitimacy was under serious threat, following the 
economic crisis that hit Southeast Asian countries, Maluku underwent a critical political 
transition. The process of reformasi intensified political and socio-economic uncertainty that 
was exploited by political entrepreneurs in traditionallndonesian fashion, namely by translating 
it into neo-aliran or sectarian terms (Goss 2004), often resulting in ethno-religious communal 
conflict. The local effect of the political transition was to destabilize established patronage 
networks and intensify the politicization of ethnic and religious identities (van Klinken 1999, 
2007). ln Maluku, access to political resources has been influenced by religious affiliation since 
57 These statistics are derived from official sensus figures of Survei PendudukAntar Sensus 
for 1985,1990, and 1991. 
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the colonial era, and indeed old resentments at the preferential treatment of Christians by the 
Dutch, or the collaboration of Muslims with the japanese, have resurfaced in the context of 
communal violence in 1999. 
The depiction sketched above suggests that the shifting ethno-religious balance, the 
reforms of village administration in 1979 that undermined the role of adat, the modernization of 
Protestant Christianity, the purification of Islam under the influence of reformist Muslims, the 
general expansion of education opportunities, and the influx of non-Ambonese Muslims, all 
contributed to the intensification of Christian-Muslim rivalry well before the outbreak of 
communal violence in Maluku in 1999. 
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Part Three 
The Maluku Unrest, 1999 - 2004: 
Religion, Civilian Groupings, and Collective Violence 
Although many political observers and social scientists regard the Maluku carnage as not a religious 
conflict, religion in fact became the powerful source of violence. Religious symbols were scattered all 
over the archipelago to characterize that the warfare was a religious one. Religious-based 
demarcation occurred in all levels of society, not only in the settlements but also in offices and other 
public areas, and all were divided along religious lines-the Christian and Muslim. This fact 
illustrates that religion undeniably played a significant role in the escalation and persistence of the 
communal conflict5& 
Rev. jacky Manu putty, a Hartford Seminary-trained Ambonese GPM pastor. 
Introduction 
This section will examine three main issues. The first issue it will examine is the 
dynamics of the Maluku unrest from 1999 to 2004. In this regard, it describes stages and 
changes in the nature of the Maluku carnage from religious-driven conflict (early phases of the 
conflict) to separatism (with the emergence of the separatist FKM) and terrorism-motivated 
violence (such as the case of Ongen Pattimura and the jamaab Islamiah-linked terrorist groups 
operating in Ambon and Seram). Explaining phases of the Maluku conflict is imperative because 
the violence, from 1999 to 2004, involved various actors/agents, root causes, and motives.59 
Unfortunately, however, most analysts of the Maluku strife tended to homogenize or generalize 
"Email interview with Rev. jacky Manuputty, january 2, 2011. 
59 Stages ofthe Ambon conflict can be summarized as follows: Phase one ran from january to 
May 1999. It was the initial stage of the Ambon violence. Phase two broke out at the end ofjuly 1999, 
as the election results became known (the election was held on June 7, 1999). By early 2000 an 
uneasy peace had been reestablished/ though it was disturbed by Christian-Muslim riots in northern 
regions ofMaluku. Phase three began in April2000, as thousands of Muslim militias, particularly the 
Laskar jihad, arrived from java to help their religious brethren in Ambon and Maluku. Phase four was 
acts of sporadic fighting until February 2002, when peace negotiations were concluded in Malina of 
Sulawesi1 resulting in the second Peace Pact (the first Malina agreement was for Paso). Phase five, 
mysterious bombings and shootings continued to occur after the Malina accord1 but the incidents no 
longer involved mass attacks as before. The one exception to this waning of violence was a riot on 
April 25, 2004, during a parade to commemorate the breakaway RMS movement of 1950, the 
separatist movement established by, among others, Ch. Soumokil and). Manusama (cf. van Klinken 
2007; Trijono 2001; Pieris 2004). 
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the conflict and neglect its local dynamics. The true situation has been quite different, however, 
with the nature, intensity, and duration ofthe violence varying significantly from place to place 
and from time to time (cf.lCG 2000a, 2001, 2004). 
Giving the variation seen in the Ambon violence, it is thus misleading to conclude that 
the conflict was driven by a single root cause (such as the disappointment of the military elites) 
or purpose (such as to destabilize the nation), and committed by a single actor (e.g. security 
forces). The violence, known in Ambon as the kerusuhan (unrest, riots), as political scientist 
jeroen Adam (2010: 29) rightly states, cannot be viewed as a period of steady warfare but 
"should be understood as a communal conflict that occurred in different waves at different 
places" with different motives. 
The second issue 1 will examine in this section is the role of religious identities, 
teachings, doctrines, symbols, discourses, organizations and networks-both in !slam and 
Christianity-during the Maluku wars. For Ambonese Christian and Muslim militants, religion 
did matter during the wars. An ex-Christian fighter of Rumahtiga told me eagerly, "The role of 
religion during the Maluku wars was not only important but very important. Christians and 
Muslims fought and killed each other due to their religion being humiliated by other religious 
communities. Because of religion Christians and Muslims in Ambon were involved in the wars 
for about five years since 1999."60 Many Ambonese Muslim jihadists and Christian fighters had 
indeed considered the conflict as the sacred war and a means of purifying previous sins, 
misconduct, and bad things committed before the wars (see Chapter 6). An ex-field commander 
of the Christian militia group, PM, for instance, reveals: "For me, the Ambon war was a sacred 
60 Interview with ML in Ambon, 2 September 2010. Since there had been plurality of actors 
and motives during the conflict1 it is complicated to generalize a conclusion: whether religious 
identity had played a central role during the conflict or only provided symbolism and ideological 
conviction for those involved in the campaign to achieve more worldly goals. It is significant to 
recognize that there were some people that had been motivated by 11Worldly orientations1' in their 
involvement in the conflict (cf. Adam 2009, 2010). However, there were also people that were driven 
by "religious passion" and "unworldly goals" for their engagement in the Maluku warfare. 
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war so that whoever killed (Muslims) will be rewarded a paradise by God."61 PM also believes 
that the war was a medium of self-purifying. For him, the term self-purification has something to 
do with, not only the unworldly matters (e.g. repent from his sins) but also worldly things such 
as purifying from negative behaviors to positive ones. More or less the same expression was 
stated by ex-Muslim jihadists of Maluku. 
The militant leaders in both groups, moreover, portrayed the wars as a sacred duty for 
the adherents of Christianity and Islam to defend religion. The Muslim jihadists framed the wars 
as Perang Sa biZ (a "war in the path of God") and therefore their fighting was considered to be 
jihadfi sabilil/ah to protect Islam from Christian invasion and missionary activities. Taking 
similar frame, the Christian warriors regarded the Maluku war as a Perang Salib (the Crusades) 
intended to guard (1) Christianity from the Muslim dakwah (Islamic propagation) and forced 
conversion (ls/amisasl), and (2) the Maluku territory which they saw as a "Christian land," 
referring to the Canaan land in the Biblical tradition. As I will explain in the following chapters, 
over the course of the conflict, religious symbols, texts, teachings, and discourses scattered 
throughout the island. To complement the analyses, I will present significant findings of a survey 
questionnaire I distributed to one hundred ex-Christian fighters and Muslim jihadists, mostly 
under 3 0-years old during the conflict, on the islands of Ambon-Lease aiming at highlighting 
how religion had contributed to the increase of the Maluku wars and how unearthly motivations 
became the major contributing factors for actors involved in the violence. 
The third issue I will examine in this section is the complex roles played by Maluku's 
religious actors, local Christian fighters, Ambonese Muslim jihadists, ordinary masses, and 
civilian groupings in initiating and intensifying the mass violence.62 This is to say that 
61 Interview with PM, Ambon, August 10, 2010. 
6Z This focus certainly differs from most studies on the Maluku conflict that stresses the 
central role ofJakarta-based civilian and military elites, Suharto's cronies, "foreign provocateurs," or 
java-based Laskar jihad and other paramilitary groups. 
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throughout the communal conflict, Maluku's local actors had played as "active agents" and not 
"passive victims." It is interesting to note that despite the fact that local actors, masses, and 
unions have greatly participated in the post-Suharto collective conflicts, including the Maluku 
warfare, their role has been largely neglected in any analyses and studies on the communal 
violence. 
The Maluku case thus illustrates the appearance of not only the Muslim politics but also 
the Christian politics. During the communal violence, Islam and Christianity, Muslims and 
Christians all tended, in some part, to perform violent and antagonistic characters and 
behaviors. In the Maluku context, Islam and Christianity configure the politics of, in the words of 
Dale Eickelman and james Piscatori (1999: ix), "a broad swathe of the world." As in the Muslim 
politics, the Christian politics also involves the competition and contest over both the 
interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions, formal and informal, that produce, 
reproduce, and sustain them. 
This section is divided into three chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 5) discusses the 
dynamics of the Maluku conflict, aiming at understanding the changing nature, plurality, and 
specificity of the Maluku communal conflict. The second chapter (Chapter 6) describes the 
Muslim jihadists, both Ambonese and non-Ambonese Muslims, and how they utilized Islamic 
discourses, teachings, symbols, and networks to support their jihad actions throughout the 
collective violence. The third chapter (Chapter 7) examines the Christian involvement in the 
violence describing why and how the Ambonese Christian militants and warriors used Christian 
discourses, teachings, symbols, and Biblical texts during the Maluku wars. 
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Chapter 5 
The Events: Describing the Maluku Sectarian Conflict 
In the beginning of 1999, when elsewhere in Indonesia hundreds of churches and 
several mosques had been damaged already as a result of communal riots, Ambon and Maluku 
were still free from unrest. Placards promoting interreligious harmony appeared throughout 
Ambon city by the end of 1998, weeks before communal violence erupted. These placards were 
distributed by a couple ofNGOs following the church burnings in the Ketapang district in jakarta 
and anti-Muslim campaigns in the city ofKupang in West Timor on November 30, 1998. 
At the end of1998, at ecumenical meetings in the Maranatha church in Ambon city, 
measures were openly discussed in case unrest would break out (Adam 2010). Prior to the 
eruption of the communal conflicts, many people in Ambon and Maluku believed that the 
famous Ambonese traditional system of intergroup brotherhood (pel a gandongJ would prevail 
over any menace of violence. Ambon has also been famous for its jargon, Ambon Manise-the 
Sweet Ambon-which is the common trope in everything from official speeches to pop songs. 
However, in 1999, it turned out otherwise, and Ambon had finally fallen into bloody wars for 
more than four years ( cf. Dean 2000; Hedman, ed. 2008). The events were a shock to the wider 
Indonesian public. 
The Outbreaks of Communal Violence 
The outbreak of mass violence in the region was sparked by a small quarrel between an 
Ambonese Christian minivan driver named Yopi Qakob Lauhery) from Mardika and a Bugis 
Muslim passenger named Nur Salim from Batumerah on january 19, 1999. That day coincided 
with the holy Islamic day ofldul Fitri (1 Syawal1419 in an Islamic calendar], the biggest 
Indonesia's Muslim holiday that marks the end of Ramadan-the Muslim fasting month. The 
incidenttook place in the region of Batumerah, a predominantly Muslim neighborhood of 
Ambon town.63 Initially built by the Dutch for Muslim workers, Batumerah, its today's 
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population is more than 45,000 people, is the only-and the oldest-Muslim negeri in Ambon 
city64 
Fights between neighboring districts and villages are common in Ambon and Maluku ( cf. 
Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 1991). Clashes were also so common between the 
lower-class Batumerah and Mardika suburbs that at first no one took much notice. Ambonese 
informants told me that interpersonal and intergroup fighting between the people ofMardika 
(predominantly Christians) and those ofBatumerah (predominantly Muslims) were normally 
easily resolved by local authorities as well as community and religious leaders (cf. Acciaioli 
2001). But this time was different. What set this fight apart lay in its rage, the speed with which 
it rapidly spread to other parts of the city and the province, the way it targeted religious 
symbols, and the way it used religious identity. The rioting looked sudden and mutual from the 
beginning. There seem not to have been crowds on the streets before the first mass attacks 
began. 
However, tragically, this small quarrel quickly turned into major rioting between 
Christians and Muslims after rumors had spread that the revered Silo Church (Gereja Silo), one 
of the main GPM churches, in the middle of the town had become the target of a Muslim attack. 
63 It is interesting to note that just days before the outbreak of violence in Ambon town, 
between january 13 and january 17, Christian and Muslim communities had clashed in the little town 
ofDobo, in the district of Southeast Maluku. Some provocateurs misused the loudspeaker of the 
mosque to incite Muslims to wage wars on Christians. The local security apparatus had been unable 
to manage the violence and requested support from Ambon. The provincial government of Mal uku 
responded by sending a mobile brigade (Brimob) in january 19-just hours before the violence 
broke out in Ambon town. 
64 The municipality of Ambon covers about 40 per cent of Ambon Island's territory. Ambon 
city refers to the commercial and administrative center of the municipality of Ambon and is situated 
on the southern side of Ambon Bay. The remaining 60 per cent of Ambon Island is part of the 
kabupaten (district) of Central Maluku ( cf. Deane 1979; Leirissa, at a!. 1982, 2004). 
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This false alarm triggered both sides to get ready for a large-scale fight-the Muslims with white 
headbands and the Christians with red ones; consequently on the mutual opposing parties were 
called "the whites" (for Muslims) and "the reds" (for Christians). How the hundreds of young 
men and ordinary people had been mobilized to take part in the initial onslaught from both 
sides remains mysterious. However, it seems that the mobilization did not come from above, 
from the jakartan elites but more likely the local masses were organized sporadically from 
below (cf. van Klinken 2001, 2007) based on existing neighborhood solidarity, of which religion 
becomes part. 
How they came to be wearing red headbands on the Christian side and white ones on 
the Muslim side also remains unclear. Towards the end of the day-and continuing throughout 
the whole night-in multiple neighborhoods in Ambon city, Christians and Muslims clashed with 
each other, thereby causing heavy infrastructural damage (cf. Lange and Goss 2000). What was 
initially a conflict between indigenous Ambonese and migrants, however, was now quickly 
defined in religious terms as attacks and counter-attacks led to the burning of churches and 
mosques. The burning of mosques by Christian rioters, in particular, enraged Ambon's Muslims, 
who allied themselves with their co-religionists rather than their ethnic brothers (cf. 
Salampessy and Husain, eds. 2001; Trijono 2001). 
The following day rumors spread that Al-Fatah Mosque (Masjid Al-Fatah), Ambon city's 
main and largest mosque, was being burnt by the Christians, and that many Muslims had 
become victims of Christian savagery. What actually happened was the burning of a church in 
the Muslim suburb ofSilale, near Ambon's harbor. Muslims who saw the smoke from the other 
side of the bay mistakenly decided it came from the nearby Al-Fatah mosque, and called in help 
from Muslims in Hitu on the north coast of the island. As a result, masses of Muslims from Hitu 
and the surrounding areas in the uplands ofjazirah Leihitu in Ambon Island marched down to 
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Ambon city. In the town, they killed Christians and destroyed and burnt their houses, religious 
centers and worship places. 
It is important to remember that opposition and conflict between Muslims of jazirah 
Leihitu and Christians of)azirah Leitimor (Ambon) was already present since colonial times (see 
Chapter 3). Indeed old resentments at the preferential treatment of Christians by the Dutch, or 
the collaboration of Muslims with the japanese, resurfaced in the context of the Maluku 
communal violence (cf. Goss 2004: 15). Muslim fighters ofLeihitu not only targeted Christians in 
Ambon city, but also those living in the rural areas of Ambon Island. The Christian community 
living between the border of Hila and Kaitetu, as well as in Larike was chased away, and their 
churches were devastated. Yet, six people were killed in Hila who were staying at a Bible camp 
organized by the New Covenant Church of Christ (Gereja Kristus Perjanjian Baru-GKPB) (Adam 
2010). 
Meanwhile Christian rioters based at the Rehoboth church in the region of Kudamati set 
about systematically trashing the market stalls run by, mainly, Butonese and Bugis-Makasarese 
Muslims. In the next few days, violence spread to different areas on Ambon Island. By early 
February 1999, the mass violence spread rapidly to other parts of the region and to neighboring 
islands such as Haruku, Saparua, Seram, and Burn. A confrontation with much bloodshed took 
place between the Muslim village ofTulehu, together with Liang, and the Christian village of 
Waai, which lies between the former two. Then, in March, violence spread to the Kei islands of 
Southeast Maluku,65 bringing destruction and bloodshed to a large number of Muslim villages on 
the west coast of Kei Kecil. Most surviving residents fled to the local capital ofTual, faraway 
from Kei Islands (cf. Thorburn 2002; Bohm 2005). 
65 The Kei Islands lie at a distance of about 500 km Southeast of Ambon. They have a mixed 
population of Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics, each accounting for about one-third of the 
population. 
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In Tual, more vicious fighting exploded on March 31,1999, two days before Good 
Friday and three days after the Muslim holiday of Idul Adha. Clashes between Catholics and 
Muslims in Kei were triggered by an incident involving the exchange of insults between two 
youths on March 27. The violence spread to more than thirty villages and to the local capital city 
ofTual. Reports estimate more than eighty people were killed, more than sixty people were 
wounded and hundreds of houses were destroyed. Explained by the local police as an outgrowth 
of a local conflict, the violence in fact mirrored the Ambon carnage, with Muslims adopted the 
label white group against the Christians identified as the red group, as they had done in Ambon 
(Bertrand 2002: 79-80). 
After a pause for peaceful elections, rioting started again in july of 1999 and continued 
intermittently to the end of that year. In july, violence broke out in the village of Siri Sori'6 on 
Saparua Island and in the town of Saparua after Muslims discovered that a Christian from a 
neighboring village was intentionally damaging the village's clove trees. Anthropologist Dieter 
Bartels (1977a: 173) noted that Siri Sari was converted half to Islam and half to Christianity. 
Until1717, before the Dutch divided them, Siri Sari was one unified village. The religious rift 
goes right through the clans. The two villages considered themselves as brothers and the 
relationship was generally quite good before the bloody conflict of1999 ( cf. Soumokil 2011). As 
Christians and Muslims fought each other in Saparua, renewed high-intensity violence erupted 
in Poka and Rumahtiga on the outskirts of Ambon, and the violence eventually spread to Ambon 
town. For many weeks both sides unleashed almost unprecedented destruction and fury. The 
riots in Poka were known as the second stage of fighting in Ambon which lasted until late 1999 
or early 2000 (cf. Trijono 2001; Ratnawati 2006}. 
66 Siri Sari is divided into two areas: Siri Sari Salam for Muslims and ·siri Sari Sarane for 
Christians. After the wars, the names change to become "Siri Sari Islam" for Muslim communities and 
Siri Sari Kristen for Christian group. The changing name reflects the significance of religion over adat. 
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Throughout August and September, the city and the island of Ambon were plagued by 
major riots. By the end of the month, Ambon city and surrounding hamlets were severely 
damaged and an increasing number of people were living as refugees in the Al-Fatah mosque 
and Silo church, as well as other worship places around the city. It was the most severe violence 
since the january outbreak, with a higher number of casualties. In the beginning of October, 
heavy fighting broke out again in the neighborhoods of Batumerah, Benteng, and Air Salobar. 
The region of Seram Barat also became affected by interreligious violence resulting in dozens 
dead (Suara Maluku, December 6, 1999). Towards the end of 1999, it looked as if Ambon and the 
surrounding island were descending into total chaos with some of the worst clashes ever taking 
place. The start of this intensive round ofriotingwas the burning of the Silo church in Ambon 
town on December 26,1999. News of an attacks on Christians spread to other regions of central 
and southeast Maluku and triggered similar rioting. In Tanimbar, Southeast Maluku, Christians 
attacked several mosques in retaliation. The following day, the An-Nur mosque in the city of 
Ambon, built by a group of Ambonese Arabs, was totally destroyed. just three days after the 
burning of the Silo church, 58 deaths were reported in Ambon town alone and hundreds more 
wounded. If violence erupted in january 1999 known the "Idul Fitri berdarah" (bloody Idul Fitri), 
Ambonese newspapers referred to the violence broke out at the end of1999 as the "natal 
berdarah" (bloody Christmas). 
Ambon was left in a state of disarray after this second wave oflarge-scale violence. 
Thousands more people began to leave the town and the conflict-ridden areas in the Moluccas. 
Refugees who had returned in March with expectations of a more peaceful feature left with no 
intention to return. Violent incidents continued to erupt on a regular basis and normal activities 
could not be restored. Provincial and district departments were relocated to other regions of 
Maluku, as employees could not safely reach their offices. Local markets and schools were 
segregated along religious lines and opened in territory secured by each community. Permanent 
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outposts and borders were set up between Christian and Muslim quarters. The crisis in Ambon 
began to take on a dynamic of its own but reflected the deep distrust between Christians and 
Muslims. Local competition for resources and positions, the polarization of religious identity, 
fears over the future opportunities and threats to each community provided a fertile ground for 
violence to erupt. Rapid democratic transition increased the uncertainty of outcomes over these 
struggles that had already created high tensions between Christians and Muslims well before 
Suharto's resignation. 
Previously confined mainly to Central and Southeast Maluku, the conflict spread to 
North Maluku with some of the worst violence to date. The North Maluku Christian-Muslim 
conflicts, although influenced by events in the southern regions of the Moluccas (Ambon 
respectively), had their own dynamic involving the resettlement 25 years earlier of a Muslim 
community in a Christian district and the centuries-old rivalry between the sultanates of 
Ternate and Tidore. These now focused on the struggle to dominate the newly established 
province of North Maluku.67 A native and specialist of Moluccan studies, the sociologist Thamrin 
Amal Tomagola (2000) argued that local issues were at the heart of the violence. The violence 
actually began in August 1999, shortly after a government decree was issued to create a new 
district, Malifut, located at the border between North and Central Halmahera. Malifut included a 
majority of Muslim villages inhabited by Makianese, who had been resettled in 1975 when their 
place of origin was threatened by volcanic eruption. Other local villages populated by Christians 
rejected the creation of this new district and initiated the violence.68 They viewed the new 
"The province ofMaluku was divided into two on 16 September 1999. It is speculated that 
the Habibie government granted the demand two months before the presidential election because it 
was assumed that the strongly Islamic new province of North Maluku would provide an additional 
five regional votes in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) for Habibie (ICG 2002). 
''The violence began in August 18, 1999, when Christians from the village of Sosol and 
Wangeotak in the sub-district of Kao insulted Malifut's Muslims and burnt their houses. As a result, 
communal riots betvveen the two religious groups cannot be denied. Since October 24 onwards1 
thousands of Christians of Kao attacked Makian Muslims of Malifut resulting in the destruction of 
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district as a loss of territorial control for Christians and an attempt to prevent the spread of 
Christianity to Central Halmahera (Nanere, ed. 2000; Wilson 2008; Adeney-Risakotta 2005]. 
In November 1999, twenty people were killed when violence erupted in the cities of 
Ternate and Tidore. By mid-December official figures revealed that 775 people had been killed, 
1,108 seriously wounded, and 115 churches and mosques had been destroyed (Kompas, 13 
December 1999]. In the final week of 1999 as Christians celebrated Christmas and Muslims 
fasted during Ramadan, fighting was widely renewed. The period of the Natal Berdarah (the 
"bloody Christmas"] in Ambon coincided with massive killings in North Maluku. In late 
December 1999 and early january 2000, violence reached unprecedented levels in North 
Halmahera, predominantly Christian area of North Maluku. The violence started in the region of 
Tobelo on December 26 and several hundred people were killed in subsequent days in Tobelo, 
Galela, and jailo!o. The conflict in North Maluku was already simmering from August 1999 
onwards but erupted full-scale from December 1999 until early 2000. Deaths at least doubled 
during the three weeks after 26 December and by mid-january 2000, the number of refugees 
had risen to 276,446, of whom 99,572-presumbly mainly Butonese-had fled to Southeast 
Sulawesi (Kompas, 14 january 2000]. 
By December 27, 1999, Protestants massacred more than 400 Muslims (others 
estimated as many as 800 were killed] and forced another 10,000 to flee the district (ICG 2000, 
2001] at Tobelo on Halmahera Island in the province of North Maluku. The riots in Tobelo were 
driven by the news of the burning of the Silo church. Outrage over the destruction of Silo church 
led Christians ofTobelo to exact terrible revenge on Muslim militants from the neighboring 
town of Galela (Duncan 2005; Wilson 2008]. This event, in which Protestants killed hundreds of 
defenseless Muslim civilians in one night, was a sad climax and turning point in the violence. 
hundreds of houses and a number of worship places that belonged to the local Muslims, as well as 
deaths on the side of the Muslims. 
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This particular event boosted the impression among many Muslims in the rest of Indonesia that 
Islam was threatened in the Moluccas and needed help and protection the state could not 
guarantee (Davis 2002: 15-6). This served as a multiplier for the involvement of new armed 
militias from outside Ambon, especially java. Until May 2000 the fighting was limited largely to 
Ambon's local Christians and Muslims. However, news of the massacre of hundreds of Muslims 
in Tobelo of Halmahera described above, in particular, stirred Muslims throughout Indonesia 
and strengthened the perception that the Christian side was winning and occupying Muslim 
communities. 
The Arrival of Java-based Jihadist Groups 
The next round of fighting, from May 2000 to the signing of peace pact in February 
2002, contrasted sharply with the earlier period in two respects. First, java-based holy war 
militias, especially the Laskar jihad69, arrived in Ambon to reinforce the Muslim side. They 
arrived in Ambon in May 2000. Laskar jihad forces were moved into Muslim neighborhood in 
Ambon city as well as other villages on the island, Seram and Buru (cf. Schulze 2002). The 
Laskar jihad elites believed that the central government was incapable of protecting their fellow 
Muslims in Ambon and Maluku. Through radio broadcasts, publications, public statement, and 
religious meetings, the Laskar jihad mobilized both humanitarian and armed support for the 
Muslim cause in Maluku. 
69 Laskar Jihad was formed by people of different professions and backgrounds, mainly 
recruited from variousjamaah pengajian [religious study groups] and with mainly low socio 
economic status. It was a paramilitary group of the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunah Wal]ama'ah or 
FKA Wj for short [i.e. communication forum of those who upheld based on the practice and authority 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions]. It claimed to have some 10,000 members, many of 
whom were young men who were seeking moral assurance amidst the uncertainty of Indonesian 
political life, particularly after the fall of Suharto regime in May 1998. Its leader, )a' far Umar Thalib 
[b. 1961], a Malang, East java-born of Yemeni descent, united people of the same vision and mission 
to oppose "the oppression and humiliation directed towards the Indonesian Muslims" 
[www.laskarjiad.or.id]. 
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The Laskar Jihad also advocated the arrest, trial and conviction of the Christians they 
accused of instigating the conflict in january 1999. Although at the beginning few Muslims were 
enthusiastic about the presence of the Laskar Jihad and most did not identifY closely with the 
militias, many were grateful to it for its role in fending off Christian fighters and shifting the 
balance of power between the two conflicting religious communities. The arrival of the Laskar 
jihad forces and other smaller non-Ambonese militant groups collectively known as the Laskar 
Mujahidin such as jama'ah Islamiah UI), KOMPAK, and the splinter groups of the Darul Islam 
(DI) movement ( cf. ICG 2005) thus Jed to a new escalation of the conflict and re-energized the 
military power of the Muslims. 
The Laskar Mujahidin members, some attracted by the Salafi jihadist ideology of Osama 
Bin Laden, were more committed to establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. The KOMPAK 
office in Solo in the province of Central java, was instrumental in recruiting, financing, and 
training mujahidin volunteers. It is also significant to note that the Laskar Mujahidin forces had 
a systematic program of military and religious training, including in Mindanao (Philippines), 
where DI and )I ran separate camps. In Ambon, they were more inclined to target churches and 
priests than control territory, as the Laskar Jihad did. If some Laskar Jihad members saw the 
battle in Ambon as largely against Christian separatists-the remnants of the RMS separatist 
movement-Laskar Mujahidin saw it as against the infidels (Arabic: kuffar). Although for a very 
brief period, these two radical-extremist groups worked together, but personal, tactical, and 
ideological disputes quickly prevented further cooperation ( cf. ICG 2001, 2005). A former 
member of the Laskar Jihad told me that the Laskar Mujahidin was a terrorist group whose 
primary objectives were (1) to expel the "unbelievers" (i.e. the Christian communities) from the 
land of Maluku and (2) to establish an Islamic nation based on the principles of Islamic syari'a, 
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while claiming the Laskar jihad's main mission in Ambon was to defend the Muslim ummah and 
Ambonese soil from the separatist movement."70 
The Laskar jihad, moreover, follows the Salafi tradition (Arabic: salafal-shalih) which 
seeks the revival of the lifestyle based upon the way of the prophet and the four righteous 
Caliphs-the Khu/afa al-Rasyidin. The Laskar jihad seeks to purify Islam from beliefs, rulings, 
and manners that have corrupted !slam following the first three generations after revelation. 
Like other Salafi movements, the Laskar jihad draws upon the words of the 14th-century Muslim 
scholar and activist Ibn Taimiyya (d. 1328) whose works, in turn, were inspired by Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal (d. 855)-the great ninth-century founder of one of the four orthodox schools oflslamic 
jurisprudence. It also adheres to the teachings and practices of 18th-century preacher 
Muhammad IbnAbd al-Wahhab (d.1792) (cf.Abou El Fadl2005). 
The Laskar jihad's ideology is staunchly conservative as reflected in its views on human 
rights, women, democracy, non-Muslims, and the West. Democracy is seen as an alien idea 
incompatible with Islam. Equally incompatible is a female head of state. The most obvious 
Middle Eastern influence, however, lies in the generous dose of anti-Zionism that pervades 
Laskar jihad's rhetoric and underlines its belief that the conflict in Ambon was the outcome of 
Christian conspiracy politics and the hegemony of world Christianity and Zionism. Based on the 
fatwa (Islamic edict) issued by a Yemeni ulema, Syekh Muqbil Bin Hadi al-Wadi, the Laskar 
jihad's leader ja'far Umar Thalib declared that jihad (i.e. going to the wars) in Ambon wasfardlu 
'ain (individual obligation) for all Ambonese I Moluccan Muslims, andfardlu kifaya (communal 
obligation) for all non-Ambonese Muslims ( cf. Schulze 2002: 57 -69; Noorhaidi 2006). The 
declaration of jihad asfardlu 'a in resulted in an upsurge of recruitment of Ambonese or 
Moluccan Muslim jihadists when the Laskar jihad came to Ambon in May 2000. 
?o Interview with UK, Ambon, December 31, 2010. 
133 
Secondly, although individual army and police personnel were involved from the 
beginning, it became increasingly obvious that some military units were supporting the Muslim 
militia groups, while some police units, especially Mobile Brigade (Brimob], stood behind the 
Christian fighters. Both sides, in particular, had received significant help from deserting soldiers 
and policemen. In Ambon and elsewhere in Maluku, these contaminated security forces fought 
alongside their co religionists serving as patrons, suppliers, and sellers of guns and ammunitions, 
as well as intelligence. Ambonese Christian fighters and Muslim militias whom I interviewed 
during the fieldwork confirmed this view. 
They also trained militias and fighters, and taught them how to make bombs. As conflict 
continued, these security forces developed vested interests in the violence. Members of the 
security apparatus became involved in economic activities and profited from the conflict, by 
engaging in trade, providing intelligence and interisland transport and escort, as well as offering 
protection to those wanted to go to other secure places (cf. ICG 2000, 2002; Azca 2003]. Rivalry 
between the military and the police, who were officially separated from the military from April 
1999, was among the major sources of instability and chaos. 
Before the coming of java-based holy wars militias-particularly the Laskar jihad, 
Laskar Mujahidin, Hizbullah, and the jama'ah Islamiah-the Muslim side was predominantly on 
the defensive, in particular in the city center of Ambon where they were pushed into a small 
strip near the harbor. This condition changed after the arrival of the non-Ambonese jihadists 
who did not just bring fresh fighters, superior arms, and logistical support (Goss 2004; ICG 
2000] but also fueled the spirit of many Ambonese Muslims (Noorhaidi 2006]. Thus before the 
coming of the Laskar jihad and other paramilitary groups, Christians had the upper hand in the 
fighting. 
Ambonese Christians appeared to have better organizational resources from 
propaganda to finance, from arms manufacture to a battlefield hierarchy. Muslims never 
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properly overcame the diversity oflocal mosque organization, each with its own leadership. The 
Muslims repeatedly resorted to extreme intimidation of its own members in order to surmount 
these difficulties (cf. van Klinken 2007). When peace negotiations initiated in late 2001, Muslim 
members of the delegation suffered more than did Christians from fellow-believers who accused 
them of selling out. Thus not until Muslim jihadist militias arrived from java in May 2000 did the 
strategic balance begin to approach equivalence. While Muslims-at first-welcomed the 
jihadist militias, Christians portrayed their arrival as a serious escalation of the war. Some 
Ambonese Muslims also believed that the arrival of the java-based jihadists was what forced the 
Christians to the negotiating table. 
Shortly upon the arrival of the first Laskar jihad, some daring, simultaneous attacks 
were launched on the 17th of May, 2000, at different strategic points in the city center of Ambon 
(Suara Maluku, May 19, 2000). Around the same time, the Brimob (Mobile Brigade) 
headquarters in Tantui was attacked through which additional professional weaponry was 
obtained. In the succeeding weeks, agonizing fear gripped the Christian Ambonese population. 
Catholic priest C.). Bohm (2001, 2005) reported on june 22, 2000: "The town of Ambon is more 
and more being surrounded by the jihad troops, who in this way will prevent any Christian to 
escape the great-scale slaughter they have in mind and is apt to be launched any moment now." 
Furthermore, he states, "the Christians are trying to defend themselves to their last drop of 
blood, but are outnumbered and do not have adequate weapons." 
Although the Christians held their positions in Ambon city, some considerable defeats 
were suffered in other parts of the region. In May 2000, the Laskar jihad arrived in Buru island 
resulting in large expulsions of Christian communities. In june, major fights between local 
Muslims, with the help of the Laskar jihad, and Christians exploded in the regions ofPoka, 
Rumahtiga, and Hative Kecil. Due to the seriousness of the situation, the central government 
proclaimed a civil emergency (darurat sipiTJ on june 23 in which the military gained extra power 
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to intervene in case of new emergencies (Kompas, june 24, 2000). However, the civil emergency 
status was not able to stop inter-group violence. The city of Ambon remained paralyzed by open 
warfare on the borders between the Christian and Muslim neighborhoods throughout the month 
and afterwards. 
In early july, renewed attacks were launched in Poka and Rumahtiga which led to the 
expulsions of all remaining Christians and the total destruction of the villages' houses, shops, 
buildings, and the main and largest university in Maluku-Universitas Pattimura (Unpatti), an 
institution that has always been considered an important stronghold of Christian elitism. Poka 
and Rumahtiga, with population of more than 20,000, were important sites for the Ambonese. In 
these areas, a number of educational, training, and research institutions are established (such as 
Unpatti, Poltek, and LPMP). Government-sponsored houses for civil servants (perumnas) were 
also built in this region. My informants in Rumahtiga told me that mostAmbonese elites, mainly 
Christians, have also built their houses in this semi-urban village. During my stay and visits to 
this region, from 2010 to 2011, I still saw the remnants of the damaged houses and buildings. 
Some have rebuilt their houses, but others still left their houses in ruins. During the Laskar jihad 
campaign in Poka and Rumahtiga, the jihadists headquartered in the hamlet of Kotajawa, a 
Muslim stronghold in Rumahtiga. 
At the beginning of August, 2000, the large Christian village ofWaai came under fierce 
attack, ultimately resulting in its total destruction. The fall ofWaai and Rumahtiga were 
important symbolic markers illustrating renewed Muslim power resulting from the entrance of 
the Laskar jihad and other non-Ambonese armed groups, thereby fuelling the panic among 
many Christians that total defeat was imminent. In September, furthermore, heavy fighting 
renewed on the island of Saparua. A coalition of different Christian villages attacked the small 
Muslim enclave of Iha. After enduring attacks on this village, people were forced into the sea and 
many could only reach safety by swimming to a nearby heavy vessel. 
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In this final attack, 18 people from Iha were killed. Iha, located in the middle of Christian 
villages, was the only Muslim village defeated by the Christian fighters since the arrival of the 
Laskar Jihad (cf. Haulussy 2009). As Christian fighters gathered to wipe out lha, some other 
Christian villages on the island of Saparua such as Sirisori Kristen and Pia were left behind 
undefended and came under heavy attack (Siwalima, September 25, 2000). Fighting in and 
around Sirisori Kristen would continue to the end of October of 2000 (cf. Soumokil 2011). Other 
hotbeds where conflicts broke out were the villages of Hative Besar and Suli. Due to the 
continuing stream of attacks, large parts of the Ambonese Chris ian population persistently kept 
asking for outside j international intervention. From December onwards, although open warfare 
as witnessed in the villages ofWaai, lha, or Suli started to decrease, sporadic small-scale 
communal violence still emerged on Ambon city and surrounding regions. 
The turning point in the conflict during which serious and persistent attempts were 
made by the security forces to regain control had started some time earlier, especially when Col. 
I Made Yasa had been appointed by PresidentWahid as the new military chief commander of the 
Pattimura Military Command (Kodam Pattimura) in Ambon. A Hindu religious background, I 
Made Yasa could transcend the Christian and Muslim divide. Shortly upon the appointment, he 
established the Yon Gab (Batalion Gabungan-Joint Battalion), destined to be deployed in 
special emergencies (ICG 2002). The Yon Gab unit, which was composed of three different 
military divisions: the navy, the army, and the special force named Kopassus (Koman do Pasukan 
Khusus or Special Force Corps), started their operations on August 9, 2000. The Yon Gab began 
to arrest army and police personnel who were aligned with the warring parties. 
Another linchpin of the policy by I Made Yasa was the disarmament of armed civil 
groups. These actions often provoked renewed fighting between armed militias and the security 
forces. The clashes between the Yon Gab and the Laskar Jihad often turned to harsh violence. 
One of the most dramatic examples was the siege of the Wijaya II hotel, situated at the volatile 
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border zone between Batumerah and Mardika, in january 2001. Another dramatic conf;ontation 
took place on june 2001 when Yon Gab attacked the Medical Clinic of the Laskar jihad, causing 
the death of 24 Laskar jihad members and wounding 34 (Noorhaidi 2006: 216). 
The Yon Gab also attacked the Laskar jihad's headquarters in Kebun Cengkih in the 
highland of Batumerah region. This situation gave the Yon Gab the label of being pro-Christian 
and anti-Muslim. Indeed, responses of my Ambonese informants differed with regard to this 
"special unit". While Christians praised I Made Yasa and his Yon Gab for having neutrality in the 
military intervention, Muslims criticized them of being pro-Christian?1 Subsequent to this 
attack, the role of the Laskar jihad in Ambon was largely diminished. Moreover, the grip of the 
Indonesian government on the Laskar jihad tightened after the 09/11 terrorist attacks in USA 
( cf. Schulze 2002: 61). The Laskar jihad was officially disbanded on December 12, 2002, five 
days after the devastating Bali bombings. 
Adding to the increase in efforts to regain control over the situation in Maluku was the 
arrest of some major protagonists of the Ambon wars in the first half of 2001. Laskar jihad 
founder ja'far Umar Thalib72 was arrested at the airport of Surabaya on May 5, 2001, and put 
under house arrest (ICG 2002: 15-6). Some days before, on the 25th of April, 2001, the leader of 
FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku-Front for the Sovereignty of the Moluccas) Alex Manuputty 
was also arrested. Around the same period, a prominent leader of the Christian militias, Agus 
Wattimena, was shot dead under suspicious circumstances on March 22, 2001. The reasons 
behind his death are still widely speculated on. Among many Ambonese, there exists a deep held 
conviction that Wattimena knew too much about close collaborations between the Kopassus 
71 Due to this criticism, the Yon Gab was replaced in November 2001 by a Kopassus unit. 
n ja'far Umar Thalib was born in Malang of Arab-Madurese descent. The grandson of a 
Yemeni trader, his formative experiences included fighting with the Afghan Mujahidin in 1988-89 
and studying in (1) the Saudi Arabia-sponsored LIPIA in jakarta and (2) the Maududi Intitute in 
Lahore, Pakistan. Both have shaped his view of Islam as well as the struggle in Ambon and elsewhere 
in Indonesia's trouble areas. 
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(Komando Pasukan Khusus-Special Forces Command) and Christian militias and was therefore 
shot dead by these same Kopassus units. Other rumors have it that he was shot by his wife for 
"having funs" with other women. Yet, regardless of the circumstances and plausible motives, the 
role ofWattimena, who still enjoys prestige among sections of the Ambonese Christians, was 
played out. 
From December 2000 onwards, despite the fact that communal relations remained 
tense and conflict could be easily stirred up, large-scale collective violence involving large 
crowds of people that resulted in open warfare became rare, and was replaced by violence of a 
more hidden nature. A remarkable exception in which far-fetched rumors could still provoke 
major upheaval was the visit of the Dutch ambasador to Ambon city on May 19, 2001.ln the 
days preceding his visit, rumors among Muslims spread that a big RMS conspiracy was being set 
up in the Netherlands, and the visit of the ambassador should be understood against this 
background (Timmer 2002: 74-7). When the ambassador finally arrived mass violence broke 
out in multiple places in Ambon town resulting dozens of deaths on the Christian side (Suara 
Ma/uku, 22 May 2001). As a result, the ambassador had to be evacuated from his hotel by the 
military and had to abruptly end his visit. Typical examples of violent acts throughout 2001 and 
2002 were shoot-outs or bomb attacks on speedboats in and around Teluk Ambon (Ambon Bay). 
Other examples were hidden bomb attacks on public transport facilities (e.g. minibuses) or 
nightclubs. 
The arrest of some top leaders of the Ambon wars, the success of the Yon Gab in their 
operations of disarming "contaminated" military and police personnel, as well as armed civilian 
groupings, coupled with the weariness of Muslims and Christians with fighting that had left the 
city in ruins, led to a long series of interreligious meetings facilitated by various outside 
mediators, including the central government under the endeavor of Coordinator Minister of 
Social Welfare M. jusufKalla, to end the wars and establish peace. A peace agreement was finally 
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signed in February 2002, in Malina (South Sulawesi); therefore it is called the "Malina II Peace 
Accord" (the Malina l was for Paso). 
Since the signing of the peace pact, some sporadic incidents of terror-random sniping, 
bombings, and assassinations-had indeed continued to occur, particularly in and around 
Ambon city. Some incidents were apparently linked to the military (e.g. anti-FKM campaigns on 
April25, 2004) and Islamist terrorist groups (i.e. the Laskar Mujahidin networks), such as the 
case of an attack on a karaoke bar in the subdistrict (kecamatan) ofTelukAmbon-Baguala. The 
attack was led by Ongen Pattimura (Amin Tabrani Pattimura), a Seramese Muslim. On May 16, 
2005, these terrorist groups also attacked a paramilitary police post in Seram ( cf. Bohm 2005; 
lCG 2005). Although some sporadic incidents of violence continued to occur, however, gradually 
a "fragile peace" returned to Ambon. 
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Chapter 6 
Religion, Violence, and Muslim Jihadists 
Behind the crowded Muslim village ofWaihaong in Ambon city, there lies a large stone 
grave written on the gate ofthe graveyard: "Kuburan Para Syuhada" ("the Cemetery of the 
Martyrs"). The remains of hundreds of warriors rest inside the tomb, all Muslims from various 
ethnic groups who died in a clash with the Christians during the Ambon conflict from 1999 to 
2004. The gravesite holds special significance for Muslims in Ambon because it is the resting 
place for Muslim warriors who died in the defense of Muslim community and territory from 
Christian attacks. This graveyard tells us how Ambon's local Muslims portray the previous 
bloody violence. This resting place, moreover, symbolizes how religious identity had been a 
significant element of the Christian-Muslim unrest of 1999-2004. 
To begin this chapter, let me quote an interesting statement by Hayati, a female 
Ambonese Muslim ex-militia member, to highlight how the contribution of religion was vital 
during the Ambon/Maluku mayhem. Hayati was one of Maluku's Muslim jihadists who believed 
that the Ambon conflict was a holy war to defend Islamic religion and Muslim ummah from the 
attacks of Christian fighters. She is an example of ordinary Muslims who waged jihad struggle 
and were involved in the warfare for unworldly purposes and driven by religious passion and 
not materialism. Hayati states, 
I was one of the Muslim women (in Ambon] who was directly involved in the 
fighting during the Ambon conflict. Along with Pasukan]ihad [the jihad Forces, not 
to be confused with the Laskar jihad], I was engaged in the warfare against the 
Christian infidels. When the "january 19" incident broke out, I conducted sa/at 
(praying] in a mosque in Batumerah. Suddenly there was a honge [an Ambonese 
term for crowded, chaotic situations]. People shouted: "Christians attacked Muslims 
in Mardika." I abruptly went out leaving the sermons to check my husband and kids. 
In the next days, I saw Muslims were murdered and shot by the "jewish Christians." 
Muslims' houses were already burnt down by the Christians. My family was also 
shot by Christian troops on A. Y. Patty Street Since then I was involved in the 
combating. I wore trousers and a white headband. The shouting of"Allahu Akbar'' 
was everywhere. I was sad and crying. I moved forward and couldn't remember 
anything. I was ready to die in the name oflslam and defending Allah's religion. For 
three years I joined with the Laskar jihad from java. I used blade and guns. 
Whenever riots happened I was there. Throughout the Ambon conflict, I killed 
several Christians-male and female.73 
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Already from the very early days, the Ambon violence was not a spontaneous outburst 
Before the "january 19 incident" that sparked the Maluku mass violence, a Muslim Butonese 
came to the house of an aged Ambonese respected Muslim leader, KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke 
(known Ustad Pol poke) in the suburb of Ambon city. This Butonese told him that there will be 
massive attacks by supporters, mostly Christians, of the RMS-the separatist Moluccan 
Sovereignty Republic founded in 1950 (see van Kaam 1980)-on Ambon's Muslim 
neighborhoods on January 19, 1999. "I pray may Ustad Pol poke will be safe, and prior to ldul 
Fitri I will be leaving for my home town in Buton [in Southeast Sulawesi]." 
Ustad Pol poke knew nothing about where the information came from, but he knew this 
Butonese man. "We were very often together in the mosque for praying and attending religious 
sermons," told Ustad Pol poke. Soon after getting the information Ustad Pol poke, who is one of 
Maluku's Nahdlatul Ulama religious leaders, announced through a loudspeaker in An-Nur 
Mosque near his home: "Muslim communities [in Ambon] are obliged to prepare with guns, 
because in the day ofldul Fitri there will be vast attacks committed by RMS. If you die in the 
warfare you will become a martyr but if you are not involved in the war and then you die, you 
will become an infidel." Upon hearing the announcement, Ustad Pol poke said, "Muslims thought 
I was crazy, but after the incident happened they assumed I was a saint-a holy person." 74 
Ustad Pol poke, educated at East java's famous Islamic boarding school Pesantren Gontor 
(graduated in 1965), played a central role during the Maluku conflict. He was one of the militant 
Muslim commanders that waged jihad movement against Christian fighters before the arrival of 
73 Interview with Hayati, Ambon, December 28,2010. 
74 Interview with KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke in his house in Ambon, 4 October 2010. 
142 
the Laskar Jihad. Believing that the january 19 tragedy was initiated by the Christian RMS 
supporters-therefore he called it a Christian movement-he was among the first Muslim 
leaders in Ambon who passionately resisted the Christian combatants during the Maluku 
warfare. Ustad Pol poke, moreover, believed that the chairman of Moluccan Protestant Church 
Synod Rev. Sammy Titaley [now retired) was behind what he called "the january 19 Christian 
movement." Accordingly, in order to create security and stability in Ambon, he asked for local 
government and authority to detain Rev. Sammy Titaley. Ustad Pol poke was not alone. Most 
Muslim Ambonese, elites or ordinary masses, accused Rev. Sammy Titaley-and the RMS-as 
the prime mover or mastermind of the Christian movement in the Maluku wars75 [cf. Kastor 
2000; Putuhena 1999; Salatalohy 2004, 2008; Salampessy and Husain, eds. 2001; Ratnawati 
2006). 
Ustad Polpoke, however, refrained from the jihad struggle after Christians gave up and 
showed their willingness to end the wars. On television, Ustad Pol poke said, Christians were 
crying stating that we-Ambonese Muslims and Christians-actually came from the same 
forefather and therefore the conflict must end. Upon hearing that Christians gave up and were 
willing to end the wars, Ustad Pol poke began to cool down and accepted the government 
proposal of peace agreement at Malina. Since then he became among the proponents of the 
Malina II peace accord, and thus became among the opponents ofja'far Umar Thalib and his 
allies such as, among others, Rustam Kastor, Ali Fauzy, Salim Basoan, lkram Abu Bakar, Mo 
Attamimi, Abdul Wahab Lumaela, and Burhan Tid ore, who consistently refused the initiative of 
75 For Muslim Ambonese, RMS and Christians cannot be separated. As stated by Umar 
Attamimi (head of Al-Hilal Foundation], RMS and Christians are identical: RMS is Christian and all 
Ambonese Christians supported RMS. If there were a Muslim who supported RMS, he said, he/she 
must be a "stupid Muslim" or at least hisjher Islam should be questionable. He, furthermore, said that 
during the Ambon conflict, all RMS leaders-both in Ambon and the Netherlands-were involved in 
the warfare to "take advantage" of the conflict, namely they saw the conflict as an opportunity to 
create Ambon and Maluku as an "independent archipelago" and a "Christian area" away from 
Muslims. Attamimi also said that RMS leaders in Holland gave money and supplied guns, while those 
who lived in Ambon led the wars. Interview with Umar Aly Attamimi, Ambon, October 4, 2010. 
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Christian-Muslim reconciliation. Ustad Polpoke's story cited above indicates that the january 19 
tragedy was by "design communal riots." However, who designed and initiated the unrest 
remains unclear. Each religious community accused their opposing religious group as the 
initiator and designer of the mass conflict. Both communities also condemn orang Iuar 
("outsiders") as the provocateurs of the conflict without giving further clear explanation. 
It is also vital to remember that the Maluku unrest was not a matter of spontaneous or 
uncoordinated attacks. Within a few days of the first outburst of rioting, the two religious 
organizations already being appropriated to deal with the growing threats responded with a 
concrete action by setting up crisis centers and Pasko (abbreviated from Pas Koordinasi or 
"coordination center" but sometimes became Pas Komando or the "command post") for each 
religious group. The main tasks of the Pasko included to mobilize people, particularly male 
youths, to attack opposing religious groups, and to defend certain neighborhoods from the 
outside rioters. The mobile units that were mobilized by the Pasko came to be known in Ambon 
as the akar rum put(" grassroots"). In Ambon, the English term "grassroots" is more commonly 
used than the Indonesian "akar rumput." The term referred to those who fought on the 
battleground against fighters from opposing religious groups. 
The coordination offices of Christian and Muslim communities were established in the 
main religious buildings of each religious group. Muslims built a crisis center called the Satgas 
Penanggulangan Idul Fitri Berdarah (the Task Force for Coping with Bloody Idul Fitri) at the Al-
Fatah mosque. Implicit in its name was the allegation that Christians had been the first to spill 
blood on this holy day. The Satgas was initially led by the former military commander in Ambon, 
Brig Gen (ret.) Rustam Kastor, then effectively by his vice chairman Muhammad jusuf Ely, a 
businessman and former naval officer and his secretary Thamrin Ely, Muslim modernist and 
former chairman of the Maluku branch of a national-based political party PAN (Partai Am an at 
Nasional). Later jusuf Ely and Thamrin Ely opposed Rustam Kastor due to their disagreement 
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with regard to the mechanism of conflict resolution and Christian-Muslim reconciliation 
processes, particularly the proposal of the Malina II peace deal. Rustam Kastor, later joined the 
Laskar Jihad and served as the main advisor of this jihadist organization, refusing any attempts 
of peace building processes with the Christians, while Jusuf Ely and Thamrin Ely became among 
the main advocates of the reconciliation and conflict resolution process (see Chapter 9). 
The Satgas was officially part of the Maluku branch of indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) 
chaired by R. Hasanusi, former police officer. As well, at the AI-Fatah mosque there was Al-Fatah 
Foundation (Yayasan Al-Fatah) directed by the ageing former district head and the great imam 
of Al-Fatah Abdullah Soulissa. Al-Fatah was not only a gathering place for Muslim fighters in the 
city of Ambon but also served as a clinic (health center) for the wounded (including civilians) 
and was a temporary refuge to the many Muslim Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), 
particularly those from Ambon town. Until recently, when renewed mass conflicts broke out in 
the city (e.g. the Christian-Muslim riots on September 11-13, 2011), Al-Fatah,located in the 
center of the crowded Ambon town, becomes the main destination for Muslim refugees. 
During the conflict of 1999, the Satgas had difficulties in building up the communication 
network with the many different religious organizations based at mosques around Ambon. It is 
understandable because Muslims in Ambon are not organized or coordinated under a single 
authoritative Islamic organization. In Ambon, Muslims have no equivalent of the Protestant 
community. The major Indonesian Islamic associations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah are much weaker in Maluku than in Java. Mosque organizations operate 
independently of each other. Nor is religious socialization as thorough for Muslims as it is for 
Christians. Ambon also has no religious boarding schools like pesantren (Islamic boarding 
schools) in Java or Sumatra. 
Furthermore, central government-sponsored Islamic organizations such as MUI (the 
Indonesian Ulama Council) and ICMI (association of Indonesian Muslim intellectuals) only 
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played a role in tying Islam up to the state (bureaucracy) or organizing Muslims politically, and 
have never had power, influence or "control" over local adherents of Islam-both urban and 
rural Muslims. An Ambonese Muslim ofTernatan descent, Hanafi, articulates his disappointment 
with MUI as follows: "While Ambonese Christians (i.e. Protestants) were well-organized under 
the command of church and synod, Muslims had no organization. At the time, MUI did not 
function. It was only a place to put things. It was just a name!"76 The Satgas finally failed to 
coordinate Ambon's Muslim organizations and civilian groupings. 
After the failure of the Satgas in coordinating and integrating Muslim groupings, some 
Muslim leaders decided to form Sekretariat Bersama or Sekber (the "joint secretariat") followed 
by the establishment of a new association named Bad an Imarat Muslim Maluku (BIMM-the 
"Leadership Body of Moluccan Muslims"). This organization was led by the aged ex-Masjumi 
leader and the admirer of Mohammad Natsir, Ustad Ali Fauzy, and imam of Al-Fatah mosque 
Ustad Abdul Azis Arbi. Nahdlatul Ulama leader from Southeast Maluku Nasir Rahawarin was 
appointed as secretary of this newly established Muslim association. Later on Ustad Ali Fauzy, 
one of the most militant Muslim leaders in Ambon, and Ustad Abdul Azis Arbi went to jakarta to 
raise Indonesian Muslim support, collect funds to support Maluku's Muslims, and join the Laskar 
jihad. This organization, consisting of ad hoc units such as the Defense Unit, the Law and 
Advocating Unit, and Logistics Unit, also failed in integrating Ambon's Muslim groups. 
Local Muslim Jihadists 
In brief, during the communal conflicts, Muslims in Ambon were not well organized.77 
There was no one command for all Muslim communities. However, this does not mean that there 
were no Muslim groupings in Ambon that coordinated local jihadists called Pasukan]ihad Qihad 
76 Interview with Hanafi Marhum, Ambon, December 14, 2010. 
77 Interview with Thamrin Ely, Ambon, 28 March, 2011 
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Forces). There were also Ambon's militant Muslim leaders, either ArabjYemeni descent or the 
natives, who organized their followers based on clan networks, ethnic/tribal associations, or 
communal and family ties. Muslim figures like Mo Attamimy, Umar Aly Attamimy, Ikram 
Ibrahim, Lc., or Salim Basoan (all Ambonese Arabs), Ali Fauzy (Ambonese of Chinese descent), 
Abdullah Tuasikal, Amir Latuconsina (Pelauw), Husni Putuhena (Ambonese), Hanafi Marhum 
(Ambonese Ternatan), Abdul Wahab Pol poke (Leihitu), Man Divinubun (Kei), Abdul Karim 
Rumbara (West Seram), Anshar Wattimena and Abdullah Wattimena (East Seram), and many 
others all played a central role in either organizing the combatants, provoking and mobilizing 
masses, or financing the wars. 
Prior to the arrival of java-based holy wars militias in May 2000, there were also some 
local militant Muslim organizations and civilian groupings responsible for the intensification of 
the communal warfare. These uncivil groupings included, among others, (1) Forum Umat Islam 
led by Mo (Mohammad) Attamimi, an Ambonese Arab of Hadrami descent (now head of the 
Maluku branch of Ministry of Religious Affairs), (2) Front Pembela Islam (Muslim Defenders 
Front) led by Husain Toistuta (formerly Imam of Ahuru mosque, now a parliament member 
from Partai Golkar), (3) Front Pembela Islam Maluku (Moluccan Muslim Defenders Front, 
chaired by Husni Hentihu), (4) Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala (Forum for Muslim Youth of 
Baguala, led by Hanafi Marhum); (5) Pusat Koman do jihad Maluku (Maluku's center for jihad 
command); (6) Satgas Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar (the task force for commanding the right and 
forbidding the wrong); (7) Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam Maluku; (8) Ikatan Persaudaraan 
Muslim Nusa Ina (Association of Muslim Brotherhood of Nusa Ina, led by Irwan Patty); and (9) 
Front Islam Maluku (Moluccan Islamic Front). 
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The aims of these organizations included (1) organizing or mobilizing Ambonese 
Muslim jihadists78, (2) collecting donations to support the wars and help the victims, (3) 
defending Muslim territories, and (4) attacking targeted Christian areas. In addition, the leaders 
of these organizations also issued afatwa (Islamic edict) of jihad struggle.79 In its official 
statement issued on April16, 1999, Front Islam Maluku (FIM), for instance, declared five points 
highlighting the obligation of jihad for Muslims in Maluku against the Christians. These five 
points are as follows: 
First, FIM-or Muslims in Maluku in general-refuse any attempt of pseudo peace 
offered by anyone, and command for all Muslims in Maluku to establish the spirit of 
"Islamic militancy" through jihad struggle for the sake of Islam until death comes. 
Second, urge Muslim elements in Maluku to build Islamic solidarity I brotherhood 
(ukhuwah Islamiah), under the spirit of tauhid in order to take concrete actions 
though jihad movement to defend and secure Muslim communities. Third, insist on 
all elements, including security forces and central government, to not hinder jihad 
movement waged by Ambonese I Moluccan or other Indonesian Muslims. Fourth, 
FIM believes that crimes and cruelty committed by Moluccan Christians can only be 
stopped through jihad struggle. Without the jihad Muslims' rights in Maluku will 
endlessly be threatened and suffered. Fifth, FIM declares open resistance against the 
evilness and brutality committed by Moluccan Christians. Allahu Akbar, Allahu 
Akbar, Al/ahu Akbar. 
The statement cited above indicates that the jihad struggle in Ambon had already been 
waged by AmboneseiMoluccan Muslim leaders since the early days of the conflict, and not since 
78 It is interesting to note that Ambon's Muslim jihadists involved in the warfare were mostly 
ethnically Ambonese or those from "Ambonese cultural area" (cf. Bartels 1977a) such as Ambon 
Island, Lease (Haruku and Saparua), and Seram. Non-Ambonese Muslim migrants such as Javanese, 
Butonese and Bugis-Makasarese mostly fled to their home regions in java and Sulawesi (Celebes). 
Due to this incident, to day's Ambonese Muslims have become somewhat disappointed with the 
Muslim migrants saying that the Muslim migrants-or in their terms, "anak dagang" ("trade sons") as 
opposed to "anak negeri" ("village sons" meaning "indigenous people")-only come to Ambon for 
trade and money! 
79 Fatwa (pl.fatawa] or Muslim jurists' opinions, may address either a specific problem of 
interest to a particular person or a matter of public concern. In the classical age1 Muslim scholars 
strict qualifications that a jurist or a lim (pl. ulama] had to meet before becoming qualified to issue a 
fa twa, and the more serous the subject the higher the qualifications demanded of a jurist In the 
contemporary age, however, the situations that enforced this system of qualifications have crumbled 
and disappeared. Today, practically anyone can appoint himself a mufti (a person who issued a 
fatvva) and proceed to spew out fatwa1 without either a legal or a social process that would restrain 
him (cf. Abou El Fadl2005: 28-9). 
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the arrival of the Laskar jihad. Besides those organizations, youth associations like Gerakan 
Pemuda Islam (Muslim youth movement, led by Adnan Hatala) as well as Maluku's branches of 
national Muslim student bodies such as HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), PMII (Pergerakan 
Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), IMM (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah), and KAMMl (Kesatuan 
Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) became among the key elements of mobilizing Muslims in 
Ambon town to fight againstthe Christians. 
When the Laskar jihad ofja'far Umar Thalib arrived in Ambon, some organizations 
mentioned above merged or joined with the Laskar jihad (e.g. that of Mo Attamimi), while others 
operated independently (e.g. that of Hanafi Marhum). After first outbreaks of the violence in 
1999, Hanafi Mar hum, along with other militant Muslims such as Rusli Amiluddin, Sulaiman 
Watupono, Sayuti Marasabessy, and Wahab established Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala (forum 
for the Muslim youths ofBaguala), a local jihadist group based in Kotajawa set up to defend 
Muslim communities from Nania to Laha in the seashore of Ambon Bay (called Baguala). 
Local Christian informants said that the Forum played significant role during the conflict 
in Ambon, particularly in Poka-Rumahtiga, serving as the agitators and actors of the killings of 
Christians and burnings of their houses. However, in doing so the Forum acted independently, 
separated from the Laskar jihad. The leader of the Forum, Hanafi Marhum, states, 
"We were not directly involved with the Laskar jihad albeit they sometimes invited 
me to a meeting. It seems that the Laskar jihad members have a religious school of 
thoughts that differs from us so that we were in distance. In brief, there were huge 
differences among us (Ambonese Muslims and the Laskar jihad) not only in terms of 
ritual practices and religious thoughts but also the ways we organized militias and 
the guns we used during the warfare time. Unlike US1 their plans of attack were well-
organized. They also had hierarchy of command like in military. In short, there was 
no coordination between the Laskar jihad and our group. We had our own way. I 
also did not know the goal of the Laskar jihad whether purely to help Ambon's 
Muslims or they had political interests and agenda. We just wanted to help Muslims 
from Christian attackers."80 
so Interview with Hanafi Marhum, Ambon, 14 December 2010. 
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In addition to the above jihadist organizations which played a great role in Ambon city, 
each Muslim negeri (Ambonese term for a village) throughout the rural areas and downtowns of 
the islands of Ambon, Lease, and Seram had their own Pasukan jihad (the jihad Forces, 
sometimes called Pasukan Putih" -the White Forces) aimed at defending their villages and 
attacking the Christian fighters. As a result, there were Pasukanjihad Kailolo, Pasukanjihad 
Hitu, Pasukanjihad Pelauw, or Pasukanjihad Negeri Lima. Such groups of Pasukanjihad were 
established since the early days of the conflict far before the coming of the Laskar Jihad. 
They were coordinated and organized by respected village leaders and figures such as 
Bapa Raja (village head), haji (the hajj), Bapa Imam (the prayer leaders), tuang guru (Islamic 
teacher), and habaib (Ambonese Arabs who were believed by local Muslims to be the 
descendents of the Prophet Muhammad). just days after the first incident of january 19, 1999, 
most Muslims, particularly the youths and men, were involved in the jihad struggle. After some 
ceremonies in the mosques, Muslim jihadists from )azirah Leihitu, led by the raja and imam, 
came down to Ambon town to attack Christian areas and killed followers of jesus Christ who 
were considered Muslim enemies intent on destroying Islam and Muslim community from the 
land of Maluku. 
In addition to arrow (panah), blade (parang), and fish bombs, they used a white piece of 
cloth as a headband. This cloth was taken from "kain sirathal," namely a cloth that functioned to 
substitute for a sajadah (prayer rug) when the sajadah is being washed. Due to its significant 
function, accordingly, local Muslim villagers considered this kain sirathal as sacred, and 
therefore whoever used the headband from this particular cloth would be safe and protected 
from danger in the battleground. On the headband is written: La i/aha ilia Allah, Muhammad 
Rasulullah ("No god but God and the Prophet Muhammad is Allah messenger"). For local Muslim 
jihadists, this white headband (pita putih), along with the writing of La ilaha ilia Allah, 
Muhammad Rasulullah, is considered as jimat (amulet) that could protect its user, besides being 
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a marker of Islamic identity.81 There were indeed a number of rites, ritual practices, and 
ceremonies before the jihadists went to the combat zone. Some ex-jihadists told me that they 
were bathed or showered by local imam or tuang guru by using prayed or blessed water. Prior 
to taking a bath, the jihadists were obliged to wear a white cloth prepared by the imam. The 
jihadists believed that by doing so they became kebal ("invulnerable") and in turn would be safe 
in the battlefield. 
Furthermore, in Ambon city, there were also regional or clan-based coordination 
centers (Posko)-outside the one in Al-Fatah mosque mentioned earlier-established by 
Muslim villagers living in Ambon city. This particular Pasko aimed at (1) taking care of their 
Muslim brethren from their own villages who had become the victims of the wars; (2) recruiting 
or mobilizing Muslims, particularly men and youths, to become the jihadists; (3) coordinating 
with other jihadists to attack targeted Christian areas; ( 4) sending jihadists to defend their 
villages and assisting other Muslim jihadists; and (5) collecting funds to aid the victims and 
support the wars. Accordingly, in the town of Ambon, there were, among others, Pasko Negeri 
Lima, Pasko Tulehu, Pasko Kailolo, Pasko Pelauw, Pasko Wakal, Pasko Hitu, and Pasko Hila. 
These clan-based networks were useful in coordinating with other local jihadist groups and 
assisting Muslim communities that had been attacked by Christian fighters. 
It is vital to highlight that for local ordinary Muslim Ambonese, especially the jihadists, 
the interreligious conflict in Maluku was portrayed as the sacred wars. Ordinary Christian 
fighters, as discussed in Chapter 7, have the same view. An-ex Muslim jihadist from Negeri Lima 
ofLeihitu Peninsula told me: 
When the communal conflict erupted in Ambon on the 19th ofjanuary, 1999, the 
only thing that Ambonese Muslims thought was wagingjihadfi sabi/illah ("jihad in 
81 The description of the involvement of Muslims from the '1M us lim negeri" in the Leihitu 
Peninsula, consisting of 12 villages, in the Ambon war is summarized from a number of my 
Ambonese Muslim informants-all from the jazirah Leihitu-including M. Safin Soulissa, Yusuf 
Laisouw, Ismail Heluth, M. Yamin, Alidad Hataul, and Ikbal "Eten" Pelu. 
the Allah path"). If there were a child or member of the family who died in the 
battleground, they were happy because they died as a martyr [mati syahirf) so would 
be guaranteed immediate admission to heaven. When the dead bodies were brought 
to their home villages, they were enthusiastically welcomed by people with the 
shouting of "Allahu Akbar" [God is great] and crying not because of sadness but 
cheerfulness. Before going to the battlefield, the jihadists were gathered in a mosque 
to receive advice [tausyiah) from local imam, mosque staff [ta'mir), or raja (head of 
negeri). They commonly advised on a number of activities that were considered as 
taboo (haram) during the warfare time. These included [1) the prohibition of 
insults, mocks or vile remarks; (2] the ban of using "dirty words"; [3) the prohibition 
of robbing or stealing; ( 4) the prohibition of drunkenness. In addition to these 
taboos, the jihadists were advised to conduct good things like sa/at (praying]. People 
who had previously committed "forbidden activities" based on Sharia Law (such as 
stealing and gambling), did not do such activities during the Ambon war because 
they feared that these particular acts would contaminate their sacred jihad struggle 
and mission. Thus during the conflict, the level of people's religiosity and piety 
became very high. In the aftermath of the conflict, many of these ex-jihadists 
"returned to normal"-stealing and gambling."82 
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It is thus obvious that for local ordinary Ambonese Muslims, the image of the communal 
violence of 1999-2002 in Ambon was a religious-based conflict or the "sacred wars" in which 
religious identities, symbols, and discourses became a significant contributing element of the 
conflict. A questionnaire survey I distributed to the ex-Ambonese Muslim jihadists confirmed 
this view. Of 50 persons I surveyed, 90% of respondents believed that the Ambon war was a 
religious war stating that religion became a significant factor of the conflict (90%], and 92% of 
respondents convinced that the battle was a sacred war. 
Moreover, 92 per cent of respondents confirmed that the reason for engaging in the 
jihad struggle was to defend religion and Muslim communities, the other main reasons were due 
to mosques having been destroyed (90%], the Qur'an having been burnt (90%], Allah SWT 
having been insulted (84%], and religious leaders having been killed (72%]. Only 18% of 
respondents answered the war was a chance to gain land or properties from other opposing 
communities, and 56% due to their properties having been destroyed. When they were asked 
about shouting Allahu Akbar (God is great] or shalawat (prayers of adoration to the Prophet 
82 Interview with SS, Ambon, November 26, 2010. 
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Muhammad] during the war, 98% of respondents answered positively. During the wars, these 
jihadists also brought the Qur'an and the takbir or tauhid-writing white headbands. As stated 
earlier, for the Muslim jihadists, the white headbands (pita putih] not only served as a group 
marker or religious identity but also an amulet Uimat or azimat]. 
Based on the survey, the reasons for Ambonese jihadists said that the Ambon conflict 
was a religious war are as follows (1) the killings of Muslims committed by Christians. In other 
words the killers and victims identified themselves as the followers of Islam and Christianity; 
(2) rudeness to the religion and its adherents; (3) the first attacks conducted by Christians 
during the holy day of Idul Fitri; ( 4) the targeted people for murdering were the adherents of a 
certain religion and the main targeted buildings of being devastated or burnt were those 
associated or that belonged to certain religious groups (worship places, houses, hospitals, or 
religious centers); SJ the assaults were for defending religion and religious communities; (6) 
Christians and Muslims fought each other; and (7) people brought religious symbols to the 
combat zone. 
MostAmbonese Muslim jihadists also believed that the Ambon war was a sacred war for 
a number of reasons. First, religion became the main conduit of mobilization in the war. Second, 
the war was to defend aqidah (Islamic faith) and God (Allah SWTJ from Christianization efforts. 
Third, Christians attacked the Muslims dignity and honesty. Fourth, the war is God's order or 
command to erect kalimat ilahi (God's words]. Fifth, the Ambon war was Perang Sabi/ Uihadfi 
sabilli/ah or jihad in God's path). Sixth, the Ambon war was honored in the eyes of God. And 
seventh, the involvement of religious leaders in the conflict. For Ambonese Muslim jihadists, 
furthermore, the Ambon conflict was viewed as the creation of the Ambonese Christians and 
RMS supporters who joined forces with international Christian-jewish communities to destroy 
Islam and Muslim communities from the land of Maluku. They also believed that the battle was a 
means or tool to (1 J expand Christianity in the land recently dominated by Muslims, (2) convert 
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Muslims, and finally (3) establish a Christian state of Maluku. This is why for most Muslims in 
Ambon the war was regarded as a sacred/religious war to rescue Islamic faith (aqidah 
islamiyah) from Christian infidels. 
Due to the perception that the Ambon conflict was a holy war, when the jihadists 
gathered in the mosque-before going to the battlefield-the imam, bapa raja, and tuang guru 
advised them about the rules of wars, namely certain misconduct behaviors or wrongdoings that 
could contaminate the jihad sacred mission. These include the prohibition of stealing, robbery, 
killing women and kids, mocking, rape, or drunkenness. This perception changed after the 
coming ofjava-based Laskar jihad forces. For the Laskar jihad members, in the time of war, 
properties belonging to opposing religious groups (Christians) are allowed to be carried away or 
utilized because these were considered to be the anfaa/ ("bounties of war"). Moreover, the 
Laskar jihad, according to the Ambonese jihadists, only thought about the "ends" (winning over 
the Christians) not the "means." In contrast, for Ambonese jihadists, the means determine the 
end. This is among the reasons why some factions of Ambonese jihadist groups refused to join 
with the Laskar jihad and preferred acting independently. For mostAmbonese jihadists, jihad 
(i.e. holy war) is the most sacred duty of a Muslim because of God's command and guarantees 
him/her a safe passage to paradise. 
Throughout the meeting the imam or tuang guru quoted a number of verses from the 
Qur'an that supports the jihad movement against Christians whom they saw at the time as the 
destroyers and foes of Islam and Islamic community. Favorite verses of the Qur'an which the 
jihadists cited included: "And fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress 
limits; God is not transgressors. And slay them whenever you catch them, and turn them out 
from where they have turned you out, for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but 
fight them not at the sacred mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay 
them. Such is the reward of those who suppress faith. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, 
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Most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail 
justice and faith in God; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice 
oppression (Q.S. 2: 190-193). 
For Muslim jihadists, the verses (ayat) cited above were considered as the "rules of war" 
in lslam,83 and not talking of metaphorical battles or of moral crusades; the verses are talking 
about the real battlefield. Ustad Abdul Wahab Pol poke (native Ambonese) and other Ambonese 
jihadist leaders such as Ustad Ali Fauzy (Chinese-Ambonese), Ustad Ikram Ibrahim, Lc. (Arab-
Ternatan), and Ustad Mo Attamimi (Ambonese Arab) also quoted these popular verses when 
they declared jihad struggle or issuedfatwa on the obligation of jihad against Christian fighters. 
Another favorite verse often quoted by the jihadists is: "Never will the jews or the Christians be 
satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion ... " (Q.S 2: 120).84 
Ambonese Muslim jihadists interpreted this particular verse as, more or less, "tireless 
endeavors of Christians and jews to weaken and defeat Muslim communities until they 
surrender and become a Christian or a jewish." This particular verse has influenced Ambonese 
Muslims' thoughts and attitudes toward Ambonese Christians whom they saw, at the time, as the 
deceivers and distrustful people. Ambon's Muslims often say:jang percaya deng Obet /ai ("Don't 
believe with Obet again"). In Ambon, Obet, derived from Robert, is a sarcastic term for 
Christians. For some local Muslim jihadists, the Ambon conflict was viewed as part ofjudeo-
Christian conspiracy to cleanse Ambon from Muslim influences; hence waging jihad was the only 
solution to defend Muslim territories and protect Muslim communities. 
83 The verse cited above started with the phrase "wa qatilu" meaning in Arabic "to kill each 
other"; hence it was clear that the context of the verse was the battlefield, where killing is expected. 
However1 for some militant conservative Muslims1 those verses were used, not only to justify the 
obligation of jihad [fighting] in the battleground but also that of fighting [and killing] against those 
[i.e. non-Muslims] who try to convert Muslims. For them, attacking aqidah [belief) through 
missionary activities is as dangerous as attacking Muslims physically (cf. Husein 2005: 163-66]. 
B4 There are a number of verses in the Qur'an, to be sure1 dealing with the jihad struggle, the 
obligation of war for Muslims to defend their religion and community of believers [Muslims], or the 
sacred duty to wipe out the infidels or unbelievers, including Christians and jews [e.g. Ibn Warraq, 
ed. 2003: 414-17]. 
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To legitimize the jihad struggle, during the wartime, the jihadist militant leaders divided 
the Land of Ambon and Maluku into two opposing groups-the Muslims and Christians. The 
Muslims are members of the Islamic community, the umma, who possess territories in the Dar 
ai-ls/am-the Land oflslam-where the edicts of Islam are fully promulgated. The Christians, 
moreover, are regarded as the harbi or "belligerent infidels"-people of the Dar al-Harb (the 
land of warfare), any country (nation, land, and area) belonging to the infidels or unbelievers 
that not has not been subdued by Islam but which, nonetheless, is destined to pass into Islamic 
jurisdiction either by conversion or by war. All acts of war are permitted in the Dar al-Harb. 
It is interesting to point out that, for some conservative, militant Muslims in Ambon, 
Christians are the same with the jews or "two sides of the same coin," albeit there is no jewish 
community in Ambon. It is unclear what actually the rationale behind this view-whether the 
Islamic discourses on judaism and Christianity have contributed to the Ambonese Muslims' 
understandings toward the adherents of these Semite religions, political practices of (some) 
international Christians and jews, or the dark history of Christian-Muslim relations in Ambon 
that actually have shaped the perspectives of Muslims on the ground. But, coincidentally, most 
Ambonese Christians are proud to be associated with jews or even Israelis. While Ambon's 
Muslims stand behind the Palestinians, Ambonese Christians give their supports to Israelis in 
the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Some Ambonese Christians believe that whoever supports jews 
God will support him/her. 
In Ambon, people translated their everyday experiences of conflict into broader 
frameworks they knew from other places in the world. Typical examples are identifications with 
the conflict in the Middle East. Writings such as "We are the Best Israel" or "Bravo jews" are 
easily found in deserted houses of Christians and other public buildings in the Christian regions. 
Similar sorts of graffiti can still be retrieved in many Muslim places depicting militant 
organizations such as Hezbollah or references to the Intifada. Thus, Ambonese Christians and 
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Muslims translated localized events into external frameworks. The religious rationale behind 
the Ambon communal violence was followed with great attention as many Muslims and 
Christians in the rest of Indonesia felt concerned or even sympathetic with their religious 
brethren. This religious affinity made it possible for certain entrepreneurs to mobilize new 
actors towards violence. This happened both inside and outside Ambon. 
For Muslim jihadists and exclusivists in general, furthermore, Christians are no longer 
seen as ahl al-kitab (People of the Book) who had a special status within Islam but as infidels or 
community of unbelievers (kafir) intent on destroying Muslims and Islamic belief. Certainly the 
changing discourse of Christians-and the jewish-from ahl a/- kitab to kafir is not a new 
phenomenon, and not unique to Maluku. The Qur'an itself shows seemingly contradictory 
notions of Christianity and Christians. On one hand, the Qur'an regards Christians as ahl al-kitab 
having granted a special position (Q.S. 42:15). However, on the other hand, the Qur'an also 
reminds Muslims that the People of the Book had denied the truth and attempted to make 
Muslims follow their religions (Q.S. 3: 64). In short, the Christians' status as ahl al-kitab did not 
exempt them from being called to the right path (cf. Husein 2005: 157-66). 
This seemingly ambiguous position of the Qur'an, added with ongoing processes of 
proselytization (Christianization) as well as unequal experiences of both religious communities 
toward colonialism in which Ambonese Muslims portray Christians as part of the European 
colonialists or the collaborators of the Europeans (e.g. the Muslims call Ambonese Christians as 
the "Black Dutch Men" or "Belanda Hitam"), to a significant extent influenced the jihadists' and 
exclusivists' interpretations and unwelcoming attitudes toward Christians and Christianity. 
This is particularly true if we look at the portrayal of Christians and Europeans by 
Hikayat Tanah Hitu, the oldest Ambonese Muslim text (composed in Ambonese-Malay language 
with Arabic script in the 16th century by Imam Rodjali of Hitu), which is still preserved by 
to day's Ambonese Muslims ofLeihitu. In the Hikayat Tanah Hitu, for instance, onA/kisah XX/35, 
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it is stated that the Ambonese Muslims portrayed Europeans and Christian counterparts as kafir, 
and described the wars between Moluccan Muslims and European colonialists (Portuguese and 
Dutch) as Perang Sabil ("war in the path of God" or "holy war" for short). Christianization of local 
inhabitants, including in the Muslim villages, had given further impetus for the Muslim side to 
not welcome Christians as their religious fellows who came from the same origins (i.e. People of 
the Book). The kapata (Ambonese traditional poetry) from jazirah Leihitu (composed in 
Ambonese-Malay) describes the warning process of Christian proselytization, with special 
reference to the Halong region, as follows: 
Topu kelane, haria topu kelane 
Topu Isilame, haria topu kelane 
Halonga Isilame,jadi Halonga Nasarane 
Topu lsilame, haria topu kelane85 
The following is the English translation of this pantun: 
Hold firmly, please hold firmly 
Hold Islam, please hold firmly 
(Because) Muslim Halong has become Christian 
Grasp Islam, please seize firmly 
Islamist Concepts of Jews and Christians 
In the context of Islamic history, the idea that sees Christians and jews-or non-Muslims 
in general-as infidels or community of unbelievers came, among others, from Ibn Taimiyya (d. 
1328), the medieval scholar of the Hanbalite school of Islamic jurisprudence who had 
characterized Mongols as "false Muslims" and blessed those who fought them. Ibn Taimiyya has 
been the influential figure in the Muslim sa/aft circles who persuasively argued that Islam 
requires a state power and proclaimed that the Mongol-Muslims who had conquered the core of 
the Islamic world were infidels and unbelievers who had to be fought against (Esposito 2002: 
45-8). In the eighteenth century, a politically ambitious Arab, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (d. 
ss My thanks go to Thamrin Ely for citing this kapata. 
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1792), reinstalled Ibn Taimiyya's spirits for the sake of his ethnic supremacy. In politics, Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab considered the Turk as a threat to Arab supremacy, and called for jihad against the 
'ajam (non-Arab) domination (cf. Abou El Fadl2005; Esposito 2002). 
The next influential thinker ofjihadist movement is Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949). Unlike 
Ibn Taimiyya and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, al-Banna's contribution to jihadistvision is his 
recognition of Europe (and the West in general) as an intellectual and physical threat. He called 
Muslims to fight against Westernization and the "mental colonization" of Muslim through 
Islamic education. Al-Banna argued that the first battlefield would be against unbelievers who 
had occupied Islamic territory and afterward jihad would reach out to include the rest of the 
world. To carry out his plan and mission, al-Banna founded al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (the Muslim 
Brotherhood) in 1928 in the Suez Canal City of lsmailia. Although he was killed by the Egyptian 
Police under accusations of assassinating the Prime Minister of Egypt in 1948, his legacy-the 
Muslim Brotherhood-still existed as the militant group. 
Abu A'la al-Maududi (d. 1979) was another leading figure for Salafi-jihadist groups. A 
native of Hyderabad, India, Maududi was a brilliant systematic thinker, a prolific writer, a 
charismatic orator, a shrewd politician, and the organizer of the South Asian Isla mist 
organizationjamaat-i-Islami. Maududi, whose works encompass from "Islamic economics" to 
"Islamic constitution," believed that jihad in the sense of "physical battle" is the only means to 
establish an ideal state power on the basis of Shari'ah. Maududi's core concept, based on the 
traditional affirmation of Islam as a complete and comprehensive way of life, was the 
establishment of religion (Arabic: iqamat-i-deen)-the total subordination of the institutions of 
"civil" society and the state to the authority of divine law as revealed in the Qur'an and practiced 
by the Prophet Muhammad. 
Perhaps the greatest influential thinker in the more conservative wing of the al-Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin was the Egyptian militant, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), a schoolteacher, essayist, and 
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activist who joined the Brotherhood in 1951 after returning from three years of study in the 
United States. The teachings of Qutb, a catalyst in the rise ofSunni Muslim extremism, exemplify 
the Isiamist ideological pattern. Qutb, who had been imprisoned during one of the roundups, 
wrote two important works, exegeses of the Qur'an called Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the 
Qur'an) and Ma'alim a!-Tariq [Milestone); both of which have become bestseller in jihadist 
circles and provided much of the ideological and theological foundation for modern jihad [ cf. 
Mousali 1992; juergensmeyer 2003). 
In his 1960 treatise Milestones, which became the manifesto of Sunni extremism, Qutb 
developed an interpretation of jihad, Islamic holy war, which would become the core doctrine of 
worldwide extremist groups from the Islamic Liberation Organization of Egypt and jordan to 
jamaah Islamiah oflndonesia. Qutb also supported the idea of fighting against the unbelievers, 
and equally against Muslims whom he accused of rejecting to admit the absolute lordship of God. 
He called Muslims to do jihad in responding to endless adversary of jews, Christians, and 
unbelievers (Arabic: kuffar). For Qutb, the doctrine of jihad in the Qur'an must be interpreted as 
offensive as against infidels and apostates around the world. Qutb insisted that jihad is not the 
defense of a national homeland. But, rather, it is a command to extend the borders of !slam to 
the ends of the earth. In his Milestones, Qutb denounced minimalist interpretations of jihad 
arguing that the Prophet's prohibition against fighting was only a temporary stage in a long 
journey during the Meccan period (cf. Mousalli 1992; Appleby 2000: 91-5). 
Before the 1990s, all jihadist movements intended to strike ultimately against the rulers 
of their own homelands. Both Banna and Qutb struggled against nationalist-secular Egyptian 
rulers, whereas Maududi called for jihad against Indian Hindu-rulers. They battled against their 
own nationalists and secular rulers-or the "near enemy" (al-'aduww al-qarib)-within the 
national framework in order to create an Islamic state, which encompasses earthly political 
power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Afghan war, however, there has 
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been a new shift of focus away from localism to globalism against the "far enemy" (ai-'aduww ai-
ba'id]. The Afghan war (1979-1989) was an important event and locus for jihadist groups, which 
contained of thousands of militants from various nationalities, to exercise their military 
capabilities and to establish secure bases for their military trainings ( cf. Rashid 2001). 
As we have seen, the Ambon war from 1999 to 2004 became an arena of show afforce 
of the Afghan war veterans such as the elite members ofthe Laskar jihad, jamaah Islamiah, and 
Laskar Mujahidin, the armed wing of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia) ( cf. Hefner, ed. 2005: 273-98). During the Maluku's Christian-Muslim conflict, the 
jamaah Islamiah had provided secure training facilities, increased logistical support, and 
opportunities to undertake joint operations for many jihadist groups, including Laskar 
Mujahidin and Laskar jundullah (Zuhri 2010: 259). The Laskar jihad also conducted war 
trainings and techniques for many Muslim volunteers of jihad struggle both in Bogar of West 
java (prior to coming to Ambon) and Leihitu Peninsula in Ambon Island (during the warfare). It 
was the elite members of the Laskar jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, and jamaah Islamiah who framed 
the Ambon war as an international American-jewish-Christian conspiracy and the Ambonese 
Christian RMS supporters to attempt to wipe out Muslim communities from the land of Maluku. 
The leaders of these radical groupings also introduced the works of, mainly, the leading 
figure of radical Salafy: Sayyid Qutb to the Ambonese Muslims during the wars through various 
public means such as pengajian (religious gatherings), khotbahjum'at (Friday sermons), radio 
(SPMM-Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maiuku or the Voice of Struggle for Moluccan Muslims, 
established by the Laskar jihad), and the Internet. The commander-in-chief of the Laskar jihad, 
ja'far Umar Thalib, who joined the Afghan War in 1987 under the financial aegis of the Muslim 
World League [Rabithatul A lam al-Islamz), also claimed himself as an admirer of Sayyid Qutb. 
ja'far himself attended the program at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan. 
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The History of Anti-Christian Jihad in Ambon 
Moreover, the idea of jihad against non-Muslims, especially the Christians, as a holy war 
is not a new phenomenon in the social history of Maluku. I have stated earlier in this chapter, 
that the 16th-century Hikayat Tanah Hitu, the oldest Ambonese Muslim text, has already 
depicted the war against European-Christian colonialists as a Perang Sabil (war in God's path). 
In the local kapata (Ambonese traditional poetry), some poems also describe "anti-Christian 
sentiments." More systematically, the notion of jihad as a holy war in Ambon was first brought 
by japanese-sponsored Islamic organization, Djamijah Islamijah Ceram (founded in 1943 by AI-
Azhar University- trained japanese scholar Kabayashi Tetsuo or Haji Omar Faisal), the first 
supra-village association for Muslims in the Ambonese Islands. The organization declared the 
war against the Christian Allies as a holy war (perang sue!) which was mandated by Islam (cf. 
Chauvel1980: 40-80). 
The second canal of jihad ideas in Ambon was carried by Maluku's Masjumi leaders such 
as the Arab Hamid Bin Hamid and respectively Ustad Ali Fauzy, a reformist, Muhammadiyah 
member, and the admirer of Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993). A devotee and enthusiast of 
Hassan al-Banna, Natsir was one of the eminent leaders of Masjumi, an Islamist political party 
during the Sukarno era that supported the implementation of Islamic Law within Indonesian 
Constitution and the founding of an Islamic state in the country. 86 In 1951, Natsirvisited Ambon 
to set up Masjumi. Being the first Islamist political party to be established in Ambon, Masjumi 
received Muslim support and won votes in the island in the 1955 election. 
For Ambonese, both Christians and Muslims, the aged Ustad Ali Fauzy has been 
portrayed as "militant, pious Muslim religious scholar" (a/im, pl. ulama) who, during the Ambon 
war, became one of the radical Muslim leaders who issued a fa twa of jihad against Christians 
B6 Due to some political leaders ofMasjumi who were involved in a rebel movement held by 
PRRI against the Sukarno presidency, Sukarno banned this political party in 1960. 
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and routinely provoked Muslims to be engaged in the Islamic holy war. During the Old Order 
and the New Order governments, Ustad Ali Fauzy, under the sponsorship of the Department of 
Religion of Republic of Indonesia, frequently trained Muslims throughout the Moluccas to 
become religious teachers (Ambonese: tuang guru) in their home villages. Upon returning to 
their Muslim negeri, the disciples then established madrasah (religious school) or pengajian 
(religious meetings) to spread modernist-reformist ideas of Islam. Besides conducting religious 
trainings for teachers, Ustad Ali Fauzy had his ownjamaah Ta'lim (a religious gathering] in Poka 
on the seashore of Ambon Bay which had substantial members. 
Last but not least, some militant factions of Ambonese-Arab groups had been the main 
channel of jihad ideas in Ambon and Maluku, and transformed the notions of jihad set forth by 
Ibn Taimiyyah, Hasan al-Banna, and Sayyid Qutb within Ambonese cultural, political, and social 
context. Some militant leaders of Ambonese-Arabs mentioned al-Banna and Qutb without giving 
more specific explanations about their thoughts or books. Religious leaders of ArabjYemeni 
descent like Ikram Ibrahim, Lc. (the Middle East-trained scholar], Muhammad Attamimy, Umar 
Ali Attamimy (Ambonese Arabs ofHadrami descent), and Salim Basoan had been among the 
leading figures in Ambon who introduced the ideas of jihad against Christians through Friday 
sermons, tablig akbar (a vast religious gatherings) and other cultural public means. 
Over the course of the collective conflicts, religion had indeed been an effective source of 
mass mobilization. What motivated some lay Muslims to go to the battleground was not a desire 
to occupy land, marketplace, buildings, and other secular sites or to take over government, 
campuses, or political bureaucracy, but "group solidarity" built based on the basis of religious 
identity. Most of my Ambonese Muslim informants who were engaged in the warfare said that 
their involvement in the jihad struggle was driven by ukhuwah Islamiah ("Islamic 
brotherhood"), that is, a sort of a religious communal solidarity. In this regard, many scholars 
have emphasized the potential of religion to function as a major source of identity. 
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Religion therefore seems to be an ideal means for an effective identity project. Using the 
concept of flexible and negotiable identities ( cf. Barth 1981), identity markers can shift 
according to the situation, and religion can easily become extremely important for people 
involved in the conflict. Ambon's local Muslim jihadists, in particular, were engaged in the 
fighting due to the murdering of Muslim brethren, Muslim areas being attacked, Islamic symbols 
being insulted, and their worship places being burnt and destroyed (roughly the same reasons 
were given by ex-Christian fighters as discussed in the next chapter).An ex-Ambonese Muslim 
jihadistfield commander of Yemeni descent Umar Aly Attamimi states: 
"On the past conflict, I myself previously have no problems with Christians. But after 
mosques being devastated, Islamic symbols being destroyed, the Prophet 
Muhammad being insulted and so forth I must defend Islam. I told to my Christian 
fellows: "You are fine if you want to expel all Javanese, Butonese, and Bugis-
Makasarese, but if you want to destroy Islam and banish Muslims I couldn't stand 
and will defend them ... " Before the arrival of )a' far Umar Thalib and the Laskar jihad 
in May 2000 those who organized Muslims in Ambon for jihad struggle against 
Christians needed only the phrase "Allahu Akbar." This is the superiority of Islam-
only by the words "Allahu Akbar", Muslims gathered. This is why the Western world 
is afraid of Islam and M uslims."87 
Hanafi Marhum, the founder of the jihadist group Forum Pemuda Muslim Baguala also 
expressed the same view, highlighting the significance of religious identity and solidarity as a 
driving force of his involvement in the combat zone before the signing of the Malina II peace 
agreement in February 2002. He states: 
"My involvement in the warfare was motivated by religion, togetherness, and 
ukhuwah Islamiah. As a Muslim, I could not stand looking my religious brethren 
suffered and became the victims of the violence. I had to help them. It was a call and 
God 1s will because there were some Muslims who were not involved in the fighting 
due to fear and other reasons. Very often, I left my wife and family in home for four 
days and more. I left my home village Wayame to help Muslims. At the time there 
was no influential Islamic organization; accordingly I established Forum Pemuda 
Muslim Baguala [a jihadist association based in Kotajawa of Ambon Island]. Thus, 
my participation in the jihad struggle was motivated by religion to help Muslim 
87 Interview with Umar Attamimi (translated by author), October 4, 2010. Attamimi now 
becomes the head ofYayasan Alhilal, an Arab-based foundation that run over 200 schools across 
Moluccan Islands. 
brethren. I thought that taking part in the fighting was a jihad. At the time I did not 
know the root causes of the conflict Since I witnessed Muslims had been massacred, 
I had to help them as part of religious solidarity. There were no particular goals and 
agenda. We stood behind them [Muslims] because we are brethren as ummah, albeit 
we came from different tribe and ethnicity. It was my deep goal of my life. Death was 
not important for me. I had been shot several times, but thanks goodness, Allah 
saved me. Perhaps, because of that, I had been appointed [by Muslims in the areas of 
Baguala from Nania to Laha] as a "field commander." However, after the Malina II 
Peace Pact, I was responsible to dismiss my troops1 organizations, and other militant 
Muslim groupings."" 
The Laskar Jihad and Jihad Movement 
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Although the notion of jihad struggle emerged since the beginning of the conflict, it was 
the Laskar jihad leaders-both Ambonese and non-Ambonese Muslims-who enthusiastically 
and regularly waged the spirit of jihad movement againstAmbonese Christian enemies through 
various public means such as pengajian (religious discussion forums), tabligh akbar (huge mass 
meetings), khotbah jum'at (Friday sermons), radio, print media, and the Jnternet89 (cf. Eriyano 
2003; Hill and Sen 2005). German anthropologist Birgit Brauchler (2003: 123-51) has nicely 
showed how Muslim jihadists and Christian fighters utilized the Internet to gain public 
support.90 
Over the course of the Maluku conflict, the Internet, due to its ability to create virtual 
communities, had also become a medium of mass mobilization. Brauchler (ibid: 128) compares 
88 Interview with Hanafi Marhum, Ambon, December 14, 2010. 
B9 The function of the Internet as a medium during conflict has been little researched. Its 
potential for influencing a conflict is high since the Internet is almost uncontrollable, and its sites 
offer extremely selective, barely verifiable, information. Birgit Brauchler (2003: 123-51) argues that 
the Internet makes online environments ideal playgrounds for the construction process of individual 
as well as group identities, the latter providing means for the imagination of communities, which 
constitute part of the Moluccan conflict Many websites concerned with the Moluccan conflict have 
been created since its outbreak. 
90 The Moluccan Christians are primarily represented on the Internet by the Crisis Center of 
the Diocese of Ambon (CCDA, Catholic) and Masariku Network (Protestants); the Muslims by the 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Surrah wal jamaah (FKAWJ). The contributions of all three groups are 
clearly religiously oriented. While the Muslims direct their appeals mainly to Indonesian Muslim 
community and the world Islamic umat, the Christians plead mostly with international Christian 
associations, the Christian-dominated countries (e.g. the US, Australia, Holland, etc.), international 
community, and the United Nations (cf. Brauchler 2003). 
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the concept of virtual communities with that of Benedict Anderson's (1983) "imagined 
communities" arguing that virtual communities are as real as Anderson's imagined ones, where 
"traditional terms of spatial proximity are put aside and a more abstract level is applied."They 
are also part of real life for the people concerned. Thus, for Brauchler, it does not make sense to 
confront "real" and "virtual" as opposed terms. 
The Muslim jihadists spread the message of the significance of the jihad struggle 
routinely through the above public means not only in Ambon city but also in the rural Muslim 
areas across Moluccan Islands. On june 2, 2000, just days after the advent in Ambon, the Laskar 
jihad held a tabligh akbar, a religious mass forum, atAI-Fatah, Ambon's largest mosque, 
attended by thousands of Muslims. Titled "Kumandangkan]ihad untuk Mempertahankan 
Eksistensi Muslim dari Tipu Daya Muslihat Kaum Kristen" [Waging jihad to Defend Islam from the 
Deceit of Christians], the speakers of the tabligh akbar, among others, Ustad Ali Fauzy, Ustad 
Ikram Ibrahim, Lc., Ustad Mo Attamimi, Rustam Kastor (all Ambonese /Moluccan), and )a' far 
Umar Thalib (the supreme leader of Laskar Jihad), determinedly invited or "provoked" Ambon's 
Muslims in order to unite againstAmbonese Christian infidels whom they saw as the "evil 
power" intent on wiping out Muslims from Maluku and destroying Islamic religion. 
Again, on September 3, 2000, in a tab/igh akbarheld in the AI-Fatah Mosque, which was 
broadcasted by the radio of Gem a Suara Muslim (Echo of Muslim Voice), )a' far Umar Thalib 
asserted that the Islamic community would continue waging war until all slander towards the 
Muslims by the Christians ceased. ja'far, moreover, revealed: "Keep on fighting the Christians 
until all of their potential to pester the Muslim community will be obliterated. Any negotiations 
of peace are impossible. The war will only be over as soon as the Muslims control Ambon town. I 
am sure we can end the conflict by means of war. There is no other way to pave the way for a 
bright future for our children and grandchildren. It is not the Muslims who are the rioters and 
agitators; on the contrary they are the victims of Christian RMS insurgents." 
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ja'far, furthermore, expected his audience would behave as genuine Muslims, 
meanwhile fervently praying to Allah. He compared the actual calm situation in Ambon to a 
"break" such as in a soccer match since he could not see any sincere disposition on the side of 
the Christians to foster peace. On the contrary, the Christians, he affirmed, just wanted to 
dominate Maluku, their ultimate goal being-with the help of the UN-the separation ofMaluku 
from Republic of Indonesia. He then called PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur] a traitor, 
saying, 'With the help of Allah, Gus Dur will be sentenced by the people, because he never 
defends the rights of the Muslims" (cited in Bohm 2005: 70]. 
Besides through pengajian, tabligh akbar, and Friday sermons, the jihadists utilized the 
Internet, print media, and radio to message their holy war creeds. They, for instance, employed 
the existing print media, Ambon Express, and its own radio, Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku 
(SPMM] to spread their jihad messages. Established by the public division of the Laskar jihad in 
the mid-2000, SPMM broad casted pengajian, tabligh akbar, and khotbahjumat of the Laskar 
jihad leaders. It also put on air any event relating to the Laskar jihad's activities during the 
communal conflict. Not only that, the radio had also been used as a means of provocation and 
mobilization to wage the spirit of jihad struggle (cf. Eriyanto 2003]. 
The Muslim jihadists were primarily represented on the Internet by the FKA Wj (Forum 
KomunikasiAhlus Sunah waljama'ah-Communication Forum of the Followers of the Sunnah 
and the Community of the Prophet], an Islamist reformist organization that was founded in 
1998 and went online in 2000.91 Robert Hefner called the FKAWj and the Laskar jihad 
movement a "neo fundamentalist or neo-Salafi" because it "emphasizes extreme political views 
91 The FKAWj was established by ja'far Umar Thalib and officially inaugurated as a tabligh 
akbar (a mass religious meeting) in Solo, Central java, on February 14, 1998. Even before its official 
foundation, the FKA Wj was already in existence. It had its beginnings in the development of the 
jama'ah Ihya al-Sunnah (the Community of the Revival of the Sunna], which was basically an 
exclusive da'wa (propagation oflslam] movement, insisting on the correct implementation oflslamic 
shari' a (see Noorhaidi 2006, 2002]. 
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not associated with earlier variants of Salafism, including those still popular in Saudi Arabia. One 
such emphasis is the firm belief that the United States and Israel are leading a world-wide 
conspiracy to destroy Islam and the response by Muslims to this effort must be armed jihad" 
(Hefner 2002: 6; cf. Hefner 2005a). The FKAWJ claims to have forty-seven branches all over 
Indonesia, one of them in Ambon town. The FKAWJ presents itself using quite an elaborate 
website, radio, and a newsletter. It uses Yahoo at its group platform for sending its messages 
since Yahoo offers this service for free. The mailing list was founded on May 17, 2000, just days 
after the arrival of the Laskar Jihad in Ambon. 
The homepage of the FKAWJ offers the most recently updated news on ongoing conflicts 
in Maluku. When opening the webpage, one is immediately confronted regarding the Laskar 
Jihad's interpretation of jihad in the Moluccan case: the logo of the Laskar Jihad fills the 
background, showing how crossed sabers with the opened Al-Qur'an in the center and the 
Islamic creed ("No god but God and the Prophet Muhammad is Allah's messenger") written in 
the Arabic letters above. The site's title declares "Jihad in Ambon: Victory or Martyrdom" and is 
bordered by the picture of a bullet. This daily updated news page is completed by citations from 
the Qur'an andfatwa (Islamic edicts) concerning jihad (risalah jihad) from various respected 
Muslim clerics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The determination to fight jihad in Maluku required 
the Laskar Jihad members, as part of the transnational da'wa community, to requestfatwas 
(religious decrees) from a number of prominent religious authorities in the Middle East (esp. 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen), all of whom were linked to Shaikh Bin Baz, the former head of the 
Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Ulama. These muftis included 'Abd al-Razzaq ibn 'Abd Mukhsin 
al-'Abbad, Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, Salih al-Suhaymi, Ahmad Yahya 
ibn Muhammad al-Najm, and Wahid al-Jabiri (cf. Noorhaidi 2002, 2006). 
Based on the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, "Those who die in defending themselves 
shall be considered as martyrs," Shaikh Abd al-Razaq al-'Abbad, a Medina Salafy mufti and 
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expert on hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, for instance, instructed Muslims to go to Maluku 
and engage in the warfare in order to defend their Muslim brethrens, so they are lawful in the 
name of Islamic law. Shaikh Ahmad an-Najmi, a member ofHaiah Kibar al-'Ulama al-Su'udiyyah 
in jizan, Saudi Arabia, stated that an important obligation for Muslims is to help other oppressed 
Muslims [as those in Maluku]. Shaikh Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, a famous Salafi mufti in Mecca, 
furthermore, declared that the jihad in Maluku was an obligation of every Muslim since Maluku's 
Muslims were being attacked by Christians. A Medina-based Salafi mufti Shaikh Salih al-Suhaimi 
maintained that jihad in the conflict area such as in Ambon and Maluku is compulsory for 
Muslims if they have an enough power to carry this out. However, if the Muslims do not have 
adequate strength, they must strive for a peaceful resolution as the Prophet Muhammad did 
with the unbelievers. Moreover, Shaikh Wahid al-jabiri stated: "to defend Muslim brothers who 
are attacked by their enemies is lawful in the name of Islamic Law." 
Of all the Salafi muftis mentioned above, it seems that Shaikh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi'i, 
a well-known salafi-mufti from Yemen, was the most influential cleric for the Laskar jihad elites, 
especially )a' far Umar Thalib and Muhammad Umar As-Sewed. Shaikh Muqbil called for the jihad 
struggle in Maluku as an individual compulsion (Arabic: fard 'ayn) for the Indonesian Muslims 
and a collective duty (Arabic:fard kifaya) for all Muslims. He clearly asked the Salafis "to rise 
and conduct jihad in the name of God and overthrow Christians who occupy Muslim territory" 
and advised all Muslims "to assist the mujahids [those who engaged in the warfare] by 
contributing property and any valuable thing, because God will bestow guidance on those who 
help each other." 
He, moreover, noted six conditions with regard to the jihad struggle in Maluku: (1) 
Muslims have the capability of waging jihad against the infidels; (2) the Muslim ability to arouse 
jihad does not cause conflict among Muslim themselves; (3) the capability of having Muslims in 
the battleground is based purely on the intention of Allah; (4) jihad must be based on the 
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Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad; (5) jihad does not divert Muslims from learning 
straightforward Islam; and (6) jihad is not applied by Muslims to gain any political position or to 
get personal interest in this world (cf. Noorhaidi 2006: 117 -23; Sukidi: 2003: 85-90). 
It is worth mentioning that though not binding, the position of fa twa as a religious 
decree specifically given by learned (qualified) persons (muftis) in response to questions posed 
by mustaftis (those who request the opinions) is crucial in Muslim world. It has become an 
integral part of the legal practice and discourse of Muslims. Based on thesefatwas, java-based 
jihadist groups sailed to Ambon. They were convinced that the Moluccan conflict was simply a 
"pilot project" of the enemies of Islam to Christianize Indonesia within the framework of the 
"Proyek Kristenisasi Salib" (a Christianization crusade) led by the Zionist-cum-Christian 
international powers, the success of which would determine their subsequent agendas. The 
Salafi jihadists concluded that the Maluku conflict was in fact a war between Muslims and 
Christians. This conclusion projected the medieval Christian crusades into the present in such a 
way that it reinforced the religious dimension of the war. 
Laskar jihad founder ja'far Umar Thalib proclaimed, "The Maluku violence is an uprising 
launched by Christians in the region under the operation code "Troops of Christ, God of Love 
and Affection." It is a Crusade whose aim is to expel all Muslims from the islands, on which a 
Christian State of Alifuru, which include Papua, the Moluccas, Eastern Nusa Tenggara, and East 
Timor, will be established, separated from the Republic of Indonesia" (Thalib 2001: 34-5; cf. 
Noorhaidi 2006: 116). Furthermore )a' far declared, "Listen, you accomplices of the United 
States, you co-conspirators of the Church World Council. Listen, you collaborators of Zionist 
evangelists. Listen you jews and Christians: we Muslims are inviting the US military to prove its 
power in the Moluccas. Let us fight to the finish. Let us prove for the umpteenth time that the 
Muslim faithful cannot be conquered by over-exaggerated physical power." 92 
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By projecting the image of the Maluku conflict as the product of a conspiracy contrived 
by the Muslims' enemies aiming at undermining Islamic religion, wiping out Muslim 
communities, and destroying the integration of the Republic of Indonesia, the Salafi jihadists 
skillfully combined religious rhetoric and nationalist sentiment. Indeed, the concepts of God and 
nation, state and religion (Islam) were all blurred in their rhetoric. This fusion undoubtedly 
made their argument stronger. They now had a strong rationale to claim the prerogative of 
securing Islam and the Muslim umma from the attacks of belligerent infidels (kafir harb1), and, at 
the same time, of safeguarding the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia in a way reminiscent of 
the Indonesian soldiers' slogan. In this way, they shared incentives among members to the 
extent that they emerged as heroes for their religion and religious fellows and simultaneously 
the patriots of their beloved state. This self-proclaimed image in turn bolstered their new 
collective identity, which would mobilize followers and provide cohesion (cf. Noorhaidi 2002, 
2006). 
However, it is essential to underline that not all java-based jihadist militias and Salafi 
groupings during the Maluku wars were driven by nationalist sentiment and "religious passion" 
like the Laskar jihad. While some militia groups were purely motivated by the annihilation of 
the Christians from the land ofMaluku, others were driven by the implementation of Shari' a Law 
or the even establishment of Islamic state, and the rest were inspired by the religious solidarity 
to help their Muslim brethrens whom they saw as the war victims that needed urgent help. The 
members of the Laskar jihad, it should be noted, also varied ranging from holy war forces 
(pasukan perang) to those joined in this group for da'wa mission (amar ma'rufnahy munkar) 
"ja'far's statement cited here is part of"Text of the Declaration of War" by ja'far Umar 
Thalib broadcast on Radio SPMM (Voice of the Maluku Muslim Struggle), BBC Morning International 
Reports, May 16, 2000. See also the Ambon Berdarah Online website. 
and humanitarian agenda [i.e. helping Muslim refugees, providing medical assistance for the 
Muslim wounded, and so on). 
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Furthermore, the Laskar jihad's rhetoric of the religious elements in the Maluku conflict 
can be found in their official website. It is obvious that the Laskar jihad website is a religious 
project, which regards the Maluku conflict as part of a struggle against what they called a judea-
Christian dominance worldwide. The only authorities accepted are the sources provided by 
Islam-as they are interpreted by its founder )a' far Umar Thalib-such as the Qur'an, the Sharia, 
and fatwa of well-know Muslim clerics. The Laskar jihad website constitutes an authentic 
symbol of the true Islamic religion and seeks to inculcate in visitors a pure Islamic group 
identity, forestalling any negotiations. Noorhaidi [2002; 2006) argues that the FKA Wj elevates 
itself to become a central authority for establishing identity by providing strong guidelines and a 
coherent image of Islam in times of crisis, when all other identities seem to vanish. In their 
reports, they often use the terms Perang Salib [Crusade) or Perang Sabil [Holy War). 
The birth of the Laskar jihad, a paramilitary division of the FKA Wj consisting of around 
ten thousand young members, militants who prefer to wear jalabiyya [long flowing robes) and 
long beards, owed much to the Ambon and Maluku conflict. On january 30, 2000, which marked 
one year of the conflict, there was a mass religious gathering in Yogyakarta to reflect on the 
Muslim condition in Ambon and Maluku [North Maluku included) in general. ja'far came up with 
a jihad resolution with a three-month deadline for central government to solve the problem. 
After this deadline elapsed and there was no final solution to the problem, on April 6, 2000, 
)a' far and a great number of his followers established Laskar jihad Qihad Paramilitary Force) 
and declared a holy war against Ambonese Christians. 
They believed that their actions were a holy ibadah for Muslims and would be rewarded 
by paradise to those who went to Ambon for war. A couple of weeks later, the first Laskar jihad 
fighters set sail for Ambon. It is estimated that at its peak, there was about 3,000 Laskar jihad 
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members operating in Ambon. In comparison with other java-paramilitary groups, the Laskar 
jihad had been the most active in sending voluntary militias to the Moluccan Islands. It had 
emerged on the scene as undoubtedly militant Islamic group, overwhelming much of the 
country through the onward march of its members willing to martyr themselves for the cause of 
God.93 However, it should be noted, not all the Laskar Jihad members were engaged in the 
fighting. Some of them were involved in social services such as teaching and nursing. As well, 
even after the arrival of the Laskar jihad, the majority of the Muslim militias still consisted of 
Ambonese Muslims (cf. Noorhaidi 2006: 207). 
The Disband of the Laskar Jihad and ex-Jihadists 
The Laskar Jihad was very active in promoting their thoughts and creeds through the 
bulletin Laskar jihad, the Salafi magazine, and their website before it dissolved itself on October 
5, 2002.94 Having been considered the most exclusive Muslim paramilitary group that emerged 
after the collapse of the New Order regime, the Laskar Jihad officially released the statement of 
93 The Laskar jihad began to catch the public eye when they held a tabligh akbar (a mass 
religious gathering] at the Senayan main stadium in jakarta at the beginning of April 2000. Attended 
by about 100,000 participants, this tabligh akbar decried the disaster that had been afflicting the 
Muslims in Maluku, who were perceived to be confronted by a genocidal threat Seeking to 
counteract the threat, the Laskar jihad leader ja'far Umar Thalib, proclaimed the necessity of raining 
the banner of jihad, which, for him, meant armed holy battle. Openly, ja'far stated the determination 
of his members to go to the battlefield in Ambon and Maluku, and to stand with the 
AmbonesejMoluccan Muslims fighting against their Christian foes. Subsequently, he established a 
paramilitary training camp in Bogar, West java, to train thousands of young men declaring 
themselves prepared to engage in combat in a number of Indonesia's troubled spots, especially 
Ambon and Maluku. After this tabligh akbar, the Laskar jihad marched to the presidential palace. 
They demanded that the government restore social order and curb the ethno-religious conflict in the 
Moluccas. Six representatives of the Laskar jihad, some of them Ambonese Muslim leaders, met 
PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid. They were ja'far Umar Thalib, Ayif Syafruddin, Brigadier General 
(ret] Rustam Kastor, Ustad Ali Fauzy, Abu Bakar Wahid al-Banjari, and TasrifTuasikal. They accused 
the president of favoring Christians in Maluku and of having led his country into the trap set by a 
West-cum-Zionist conspiracy. The meeting came to an abrupt end after President Wahid had them 
thrown out of his office (Kompas, April 7, 2000). 
'
4 I do not intend to give a broad overview about the ideological origins ofthe Laskar jihad as 
this falls outside the main focus of my study. For an elaborate account on this group see the 
outstanding work of Noorhaidi (2006]. 
its dispersal on October 16, 2002, just a few days after the devastating Bali bombings. 
Speculations began to spread that the disclosure of the Laskar jihad was related to the Bali 
bombing and government pressure after the 09/11 terrorist attacks in the USA (cf. Schulze 
2002: 61). However, ja'far rejected this rumor. 
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Laskar jihad stated a few reasons for its disbanding, including its concern that some of 
the organization's members tended to be involved in practical politics, which would distort the 
vision of the organization. It could be true that the disbanding of the Laskar jihad was somehow 
related to the Bali bombing. However, a few other reasons are worth considering. It appears to 
be correct that the FKAWJ held its final conference around two weeks before the Bali bombings 
and resolved to disband the Laskar jihad. Among the reasons relating to its dissolution could 
include, first, the fa twa issued by some ulama, including Syaikh Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, a 
Salafi ulama from Saudi Arabia, who suggested that Laskar jihad should change its orientation 
from jihad (war) to da'wa (proselytization) movement. 
Second_ was the loss of military support. It is true that the Laskar jihad worked hand in 
hand with some factions in the military during the Ambon war (cf. Waileruny 2009; Azca 2003; 
Aditjondro 2000); hence when the military no longer supported the Laskar jihad, they had 
insufficient funds and guns to continue their operations. Third was the trial ofja'far, who was 
charged with provoking and delivering deliberate enmity and hostility to the Indonesian 
president. ja'far's criticism against the government not only caused the government's anger but 
also the split among the Laskar jihad's members, especially those who came from Salafi-Wahabi 
traditions. Dr. Haris Fathigehon, an Ambonese Muslim leader who had some connections with 
the Laskar jihad's members and other jihadist groups, told me that the Salafi-Wahabi factions in 
the Laskar jihad criticized and disagreed with )a' far's harsh criticism toward the government in 
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part due to in their traditions (Salafism-Wahabism) criticizing the government (amir) is haram 
(prohibited) 95 
Accordingly, when )a' far started to criticize and insult the government (e.g. with former 
President Abdurrahman Wahid and President Megawati), they began to split from the Laskar 
jihad and preferred doing da'wa movement to jihad struggle (i.e. war). When )a' far dismissed 
the Laskar jihad and called its members to return to java, they (Salafi-Wahabi factions) chose to 
live in Ambon and the surrounding regions to continue to spread da'wa and teach the true and 
right Islam, not to commit violence as that of the Laskar Mujahidin. These ex-members of the 
Laskar jihad live in the suburbs of Kebun Cengkih, Batumerah, Gunung Malin tang and so forth, 
and married local Muslim women, particularly Butonese and Bugis-Makasarese. To fulfill daily 
expenses, they work in the sectors of informal economy as petty traders, shop keepers, and 
small-companyworkers (buruh). 
These reform-minded Muslims have now gone on to establish their own madrasah 
(Islamic schools), pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), masjid (mosques), andjamaah 
pengajian or majelis taklim (religious study groups).Through Abu Bakar Shiddiq Foundation, 
these ex-Laskar jihad members also run religious schools from kindergartens (Taman Kanak-
Kanak) to Madrasah Tsanawiyah (named Al-Manshurah), junior-high schools. Maluku's Islamic 
boarding schools (pesantren) founded by these ex-Laskar jihad members included (1) Pesantren 
Al-Ikhwan (BTN), (2) Pesantren Ittaqullah (Kebun Cengkih, led by Zawali Laitupa), (3) 
Pesantren Al-Khairat (Kotajawa, led by Ikram Ibrahim), (4) Pesantren Al-Anshar (headed by 
Abdulkarim Rumbara), and (5) Pesantren Al-Ishaka (directed by Muhammad Thaib Hansow). 
Besides these Islamic boarding schools, some ex-members of the Laskar jihad established a 
religious study group Uamaah taklim) such as Nasaruddin who founded the jamaah takiim at 
Ponogoro in Ambon city. 
95 Interview with Dr. Haris Fathigehon, Ambon, December 22,2010. 
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Fourth was the loss of suport from Ambon's local Muslims. At first, the advent of the 
Laskar jihad militias in Ambon was enthusiastically welcomed by local Muslims. There had been 
"three missions" of their arrival in Ambon: (1) humanity (helping the victims of the wars, 
particularly Muslims); (2) religion or syi'ar (preaching) Islam; and (3) war (against Christians). 
Later, the Muslims in Ambon accepted the humanity and war missions, but refused the religious 
one in part because the Laskar jihad members spread Islamic doctrines and teachings which 
were opposed to the local understandings and practices of Ambonese Islam. The Laskar jihad 
members, my Ambonese Muslim informants told me, developed and insisted on the reform 
and/or avoidance of Ambonese adat, cultures and traditions, regarding these customary 
practices as bid'ah or religiously unacceptable innovation. Ambonese Muslims, moreover, have 
long practiced local cultures and traditions as part of Islamic/religious practices. 
For indigenous MuslimAmbonese, local ad at customs are not just a matter of 
Ambonese culture but as an integral part of the Islamic culture and teaching itself; consequently 
they have simultaneously practiced both Islamic and ad at rituals symbolized by the use of 
Arabic and Ambonese-Malay and the appearance oflocal requirements (e.g. the use of so pi-
intoxicating fermented drinks from a sugar palm tree) in ritual practices. Accordingly religious 
practices of Ambonese Muslims are a sort of amalgamation between Islamic doctrine and local 
tradition. As a result, the reformist ideas of anti-adat have received popular resistance among 
Ambonese and Moluccan Muslims. For this reason, these Islamist reformists preferred to live in 
Ambon city where Muslim communities are more plural and heterogeneous than those in the 
rural areas; consequently their ideas are more acceptable in the city than in the villages.96 
"While indigenous AmbonesejMoluccan Muslims mostly resist the reformists' ideas of 
Islam, urban migrant Muslim Butonese and Bugis-Makasarese tend to welcome these ex-jihadists 
stating that their religious practices and understandings are "more Islamic" and authentic than those 
of Ambonese Muslims. 
.( ': _-·-::--:~~~*#·;""'-~~::-"·)~'9"4~~:~~7' 
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Bringing the ideas of a strikingly conservative and puritanicallslamism, these lslamist 
reformists, in turn, have challenged not only Ambonese Christian community but also the 
traditional authority oflocal Ambonese Muslims identified with the customary, adat-based 
profession of Islam. Indeed, Muslim reformists had come to Ambonese islands since the early 
twentieth century and since that early period, there had been occasional periods of conflict 
between the reformists and the practitioners of a more ad at-based Islam, especially in the 
region ofPelauw ofHaruku island (Chauvel1980). 
However, the intra-religious conflict greatly intensified with the arrival of substantial 
numbers of the above non-Ambonese reformist Muslims connected to various Islamist groups in 
java. Due to different practices and understandings oflslam, most Ambonese Muslims were no 
longer in support of the Laskar jihad and other java-based militias. 
Chapter 7 
Religion, Violence, and Christian Militants 
Not only Ambon's Muslims, but also ordinal)' Ambonese Christians considered the 
Ambon conflict as a holy war in which religious discourses, institutions and actors greatly 
contributed to the rise and increase of the violence. To begin this section, I will quote a 
statement of Rev. John Sahalessy, a Protestant religious leader.97 Rev. Sahalessy says: 
All [Protestant] pastors on Moluccan Islands, directly or indirectly, were involved in 
the Maluku wars, except me. You can notice this [statement]. Thus it is wrong if they 
told in the public that they were not involved in the fighting. Before going to the 
wars, the pastors brought their followers to the church for praying and blessing. 
They said: "God will accompany you". This is a little example of how pastors were 
engaged in the fighting. Going to the war [against Muslims] was initiative of the local 
churches, from the pastors, and not from the Synod [i.e. Moluccan Protestant Church 
Synod]. They convinced that the "Ambon War" was the "religious war" to defend 
God. In fact, God does not need our defense; God will defend us. They also believed 
that if Christians prayed faithfully and went to the battlefield, they would get victory. 
They went into the combat zone while singing the "Onward Christian Soldiers" 
song.98 
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Sahalessy's statement cited above could be a hard slap for Christian apologists who have 
denied the engagement of Ambonese Christian leaders and institutions in the previous warfare. 
Even if Sahalessy did not believe that the Ambon conflict was a religious war, his comment 
indicates that most Christian leaders and lay adherents of Christianity were convinced that the 
wars were a religious, sacred war. The survey findings also confirm Sahalessy's comment. The 
majority of the respondents (76%) of the survey I distributed to fifty ex-Ambonese Christian 
fighters believed that the Ambon war as a religious war. Indeed most ordinal)' ex-Christian 
"john Sahalessy was one of the participants of the Malina II Peace Agreement, and the 
initiator of the Tim 20 Wayame-a village-level interreligious association based in Wayame, in 
Ambon Island, consisting of Christians and Muslims (10 Christians and 10 Muslims] aimed at 
establishing peace and averting conflict in the village. During the Ambon conflict, the Tim 20 Wayame 
successfully prevented Wayame from entering mass violence, albeit minor incidents occurred and 
some outside Christian and Muslim radicals tried to provoke its habitants to engage in the warfare 
(cf. Pariela 2008). 
" Interview with Rev. john Sahalessy, Ambon, August 14, 2010. 
178 
fighters whom I interviewed portrayed the Ambon war as a holy war. Throughout the communal 
conflict, they represented themselves as Abel (a symbol of goodness) while Muslims were 
portrayed as Cain (a representation of evilness) as described in the Bible. As well, although 
Sahalessy's remark of the involvement of all Protestant leaders (except him) could be an 
exaggeration since there were indeed some Christian religious leaders who faithfully advocated 
the peace process since the first outbreaks of the violence (see Chapter 9), itis hard to deny the 
fact that most Protestant priests were involved-directly or indirectly-in the warfare. 
In an online chat with me, Hartford Seminary-trained Ambonese Protestant reverend 
and activist, jacky Manu putty, also recognized the participation ofthe Ambonese Christian 
leaders, either in the form of giving a blessing and motivating the (Christian) combatants before 
going to the battlefield or directly participating in the fighting. jacky Manuputty himself 
admitted that, prior to his involvement in the peace and reconciliation process with the Baku 
Bae Movement, he was engaged in the war as Christian communities were being attacked and 
their properties devastated. Rev. Manuputty, moreover, said "Today's Ambonese Protestant 
pastors might be shamed of recognizing their involvement in the previous wars. In fact, there 
were no Christian warriors who moved forward to the battleground without praying and 
blessing from the priests and Church ministries. Indeed, they used to consider the Ambon 
conflict as a sacred war. The attacks of the Gambus Market in the first stage of conflict, for 
instance, were released with worship rituals in the Maranatha Church led by Rev. No Pattinaya. 
During the conflict, whoever acted as Moses would be respected by the Christians. They 
preferred to choose Moses as an ideal figure to jesus."99 
Indeed, no doubt, since the beginning of the conflict Christian leaders and institutions 
were involved, directly or indirectly, in the warfare. There were two main centers of 
coordination for Ambonese Christians. Catholics established a Krisis Center (the Catholic Crisis 
"Online chats with Rev. jacky Manu putty, September 1, 2010. 
Center) at Keuskupan Ambo ina (the diocese of Moluccan Catholics) led by respected Fr. Agus 
Ulahay, Pr100 Protestants, Ambon city's majority religious group, established a similar 
communications office called Bankom101 (Bantu an Komunikasi-the "Communications 
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Assistance") at Maranatha Church, beside the Moluccan Protestant Church Synod building, just a 
few minutes walk from the main mosque of Ambon's Muslims: Al-Fatah Mosque. The Bankom 
quickly built up a network of radio communications to every church throughout Moluccan 
Islands. Like the Al-Fatah network, this one had the tactically critical task of collecting and 
disseminating battlefield intelligence. It was led by Rev. Hery Lekahena, secretary general of the 
Protestant church youth movementAM-GPM (Angkatan Mud a Gereja Protestan Maluku) under 
the auspices of Rev. Sammy P. Titaley, chairman of the Moluccan Protestant Church Synod in the 
time of conflict. 
A second important Protestant center was in the fiercely religious Kudamati suburb, on 
a hill a few kilometers west of Maranatha. Hundreds of Christian fighters were stationed at the 
home of Agus Wattimena, former civil servant, devout church activist, and supporter of a secular 
nationalist political party PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan). He could instantly 
send them to any trouble spot in Ambon and the neighborhoods where local fighters feared 
being overwhelmed. In addition to these main centers, the Protestants also built Pasko at the 
village level under the auspices of local churches,jemaat (a smallest unit of Protestant 
100 The Catholic Crisis Center at Keuskupan Amboina played less significant in the 
mobilization process of Christian fighters as Catholics remained less substantial in the Ambon city, 
consisting of about five percent of the total population. The Center, conversely, played an important 
role in the negotiation process of conflicting religious groups. Fr. Agus Ulahay and Bishop Mandagi 
became among the prime movers of the peace process negotiation. 
1o1 Sammy Titaley admitted that in the time of conflict, the Protestants established Pasko 
(not Bankom), but this Pasko, Titaley said, stands for "Pas Komunikasi" (the communications post), 
not "Pas Komando" (the command post) as Muslims had assumed. The Pasko was designed, according 
to Titaley, as a medium of communications aiming at (1) identifYing Christian areas attacked by 
Muslim fighters and (2) building communications with the Moluccan authorities-the provincial and 
district government, the police, and the military to prevent renewed violence. 
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congregation), majelis gereja (church ministries), and klasis (unit of Protestant churches at the 
district level). 
The Bank om at the Maranatha Church and the Pasko at Kudamati were set up to gather 
information around the conflict, identify the victims of the wars, collect funds, and mobilize 
Christian fighters, especially youths and men. Kirsten Schulze (2002: 57 -69) estimates that over 
the three years of mass violence from 1999 to 2002, there existed about 25 Christian militia 
groups consisting of about 100 to 200 members operating all over the island of Ambon. About 
60% of these militia fighters consisted of, mainly, youths between 12 and 25 years old-few 
were women. The young Christian fighters were referred to as Agas, initially a small mosquito 
with a nasty bite. Agas also stands for Anak Gereja Allah Sayang ("Child Church God Love").102 
Explicit in its name is that the formation of Agas was regarded as a blessing from God. Agas was 
vital in its role during the conflict. The A gas militia members were very often in the frontline 
during the attacks. Ronald Regang, an ex-Agas militia member who fought since he was ten 
years old, in the Unicef Asia-Pacific Meeting held in Yogyakarta told his brutal experiences of 
killing people (Muslims) and destroying their worship places (mosques) and houses. A staff 
member of Unicef asked him: "Why did you commit violence and murder Muslims?" Regang 
replied, "Because that was a holy war, and I had already submitted myself to jesus of the 
Christ." 103 
The Christians used boy warriors as an integral part of their military force in Ambon. 
The Agas formed disciplined fighting units that are headed by adults and given specific 
assignments in battle. Herry Penturi, a 16-year-old-Christian, was another Agas member known 
102 Muslims also had the young fighters (the child militias) known as linggis ("crowbar") due 
to in every riot, these child soldiers brought a crowbar to lift up and destroy targeted buildings-
houses, shops, churches, etc-before plundering and burning them. 
1o3 Online chats with Rev. jacky Manu putty, September 5, 2010. Later, jacky adopted Ronald 
Regang and transformed him to become a peace maker and a peace ambassador for Maluku in 
international forums. 
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as small commander due to his regular involvement in the fighting against the Muslims. Herry 
and his family were affiliated with the Bethabara Church community in Ambon. Although only 
sixteen years old, Herry was a clever enough to make and detonate bombs. He claimed that his 
participation in the battle ground was to save the Christian community. His mother, Maria 
Penturi, always allowed him to go to the battlefield, because, she believed, God had a plan for 
him. She explained, "If I do not permit him to go to the battlefield, then I oppose God's plan. It is 
obvious thus, for Maria Penturi, God had given permission to commit acts of violence and killing 
against Muslims. 
In his study on Ambon's child militias [pasukan ci!ik), both Christians and Muslims, 
Rizard jemmy Talakua (2008) argues that religion had been the strongest reason and motive for 
their involvement in the warfare. An ex-Agas member from Kudamati, told, "Since the first days 
of the communal riots, I and my friends were involved in the combat zone to defend Christian 
communities, help Christian brethren, and in the name of jesus" (Talakua 2008: 37). Agas 
members, ages from roughly 8 to 16 years old, mostly came from the crowded troubled areas of 
Kudamati, Batugantung, and Benteng. Talakua discussed not only Christian child soldiers but 
also Muslim child militias group called Lingg is ("crowbar"). Interestingly, their engagement in 
the battlefield was also driven by "religious passion." An ex-Linggis member from Air Kuning in 
Ambon town said, "We [Muslim child militias] were involved in the violence because ofukhuwah 
Islamiah [Muslim brotherhood] to aid and protect Muslim communities from Christian infidels 
attackers. We were not afraid of death since we defended God's religion" (Talakua 2008: 37 -8). 
In addition to Agas, there were two famous Christian fighter groups, all linked to 
Moluccan Protestant Church, based in Kudamati in the upland of Ambon city. These were the 
Kudaputih (the "white horse") under the leadership of Agus Wattimena, a member of the 
Rehoboth Church who was depicted by The Economist as "a latter-day jesus with his wiry frame 
and long flowing flocks," as well as the Coker under the direction of Berty Lou patty (member of 
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the Emanuel Church at OSM). Agus Wattimena was one of the renowned Ambonese war 
commanders who claimed to be the leader of approximately 20,000 Christian fighters across the 
Moluccas. Although the numbers could be exaggerated, he nevertheless played a great role 
during the war. In The Age, Agus Wattimena stated, "Ambonese are traditionally strong fighters. 
If we are attacked, and the enemy is not strong, we counterattack. This is a real war. We have to 
protect ourselves" (Murdoch 2000). 
Moreover, in an interview with Doug Band ow from the Cato Institute at Washington, 
DC., Agus Wattimena said, "Go back to America and tell Christians that they must help us here" 
(The Wall Street journal, May 3, 2002). Agus refused any idea of reconciliation as long as the 
jihad warriors were still in the Moluccas. He asserted that the jihadists from java did not come to 
Ambon for social and humanitarian purposes, but only to make war on the Christians. Not only 
that, Agus accused the jihad warriors of having a clear agenda of Islamization ofMaluku. Along 
this line, the jihadists, Agus asserted, provoked Christians to continue the conflict so it would 
destroy the Christian community. Agus said, "The Moluccas are a sort of barometer for the 
jihadist groups; accordingly as long as Maluku is subdued and its ethnic roots eradicated, the 
rest of Indonesia will be an easy prey'' (Bohm 2005: 71,113) .. After the death of Agus Wattimena 
on March, 22, 2001, the Kudaputih came under the headship ofEmang Nikijuluw, Femmy 
Souissa, and Melkianus Tuhumury, in addition to Hendrik Wattimena, the son of Agus 
Wattimena. 
Moreover, the Coker originally stood for cowok keren or the handsome boys, a name 
given by its leader Berty Lou patty, one of leaders of jakarta-based Ambonese street hoodlums. 
This group existed before the communal conflict erupted. At first, the group consisted of dozens 
of unemployed youths but soon after, many Ambonese Christian young men joined. During the 
conflict, the Coker members became one of the main Christian forces due to their ability in the 
fighting and their bravery in the face of Muslim fighters. An Ambonese Protestant priest 
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described the Coker as "a group of Christian fighters who were willing to die (pasukan berani 
mat!) in the battlefield against Muslim jihadists and rioters, and was always in the forefront in 
each act ofviolence."104 The Coker gained its fame since they became the vanguard of Christian 
communities and territories. For that reason, Ambonese Muslims call this group cowok Kristen 
(the Christian boys) and not "cowok keren-the handsome ones. 
There were a number of smaller groups under the direction of the Coker such as the 
Farmasi (the "pharmacy") and the Rumah Tingkat (a house more than one floor), names were 
given based on the places where they centered. However, the Coker was split after its members 
learned that their leader, Berty Loupatty, had become an agent of the Kopassus (the Special 
Forces), which supplied guns and other war ammunitions to the group. However, sadly, later on 
Berty Lou patty was arrested by the Kopassus and was sent to a jail in Cijantung, jakarta 
(Kopassus' headquarter) after being caught for blasting bombs. At present, Berty Loupatty has 
been released from the prison, and had become the loyalist and bodyguard of Tommy Suharto, 
President Suharto's youngest son. Agus Wattimena fell to the same fate. After its members knew 
that he was the spy of the Brimob (Mobile Brigade) and used the war funds for personal gain, 
the Kudaputih group came apart. Agus Wattimena was finally shot and died in March, 2001. It is 
unclear the reason behind the shooting. Some Ambonese informants said that he was shot by his 
wife because of jealousy due to his habits of womanizing, while others said that he shot himself 
(committed suicide). 
Biblical Justification and Church Support 
It is imperative to note that the Kudamati Christian militia groups were also supported 
by local churches (such as Gereja Sinar, Gereja Paulus, Gereja Rehoboth, Gereja Christy, and 
Gereja Natalia),jemaat (a smallest unit of Protestant group), and klasis-the Protestant 
1o4 Interview withAL, Ambon, April26, 2010. 
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congregation-of Ambon city. Protestant ministers who were in charge at Kudamati during the 
conflict included Rev. Simon Maskikit, Rev. 0. ). Tetelepta, Rev. N. Pattinaja, and Rev. N. 
Latuihamallo. In the time of conflict, their jobs included first, leading ritual ceremonies for the 
Christian militias prior to going to the combat zone. Second,_motivating the militias and giving 
religious sermons by quoting verses in the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, to justify their 
actions. The Old Testament's verses containing David's struggle against Goliath, in particular, 
were applied to give a theological explanation of the warfare. Christian militias attached 
themselves with David as a symbol of truth and goodness, while Muslims were portrayed as 
Goliath symbolizing wickedness and immorality. 
The third role of the Protestant ministers during the conflict was blessing the weapons 
to be used in the wars. These included tombak (spear), parang (blade), panah (arrow), senapan 
(guns), senjata rakitan (home-made guns), peluru (bullets),granat (grenades), and bam ikan 
(dynamite). Before it was to be used in the battleground, this ammo was put in a particular place 
or altar in a church, the ministers then anointed that ammo by using the prayed/blessed water. 
After anointing the weapons, the church ministers, wearing clerical suites, prayed to God and 
asked Him to protect "His sons" -Ambonese Christian warriors-in the battlefield and give 
them triumph over the "God's enemies," namely Muslim jihadists. After the ritual ceremonies 
were over, the Christian warriors then took the weapons and went to the combat zone. 
Besides these groups, each Christian village across Moluccan Islands mostly had the 
Laskar Kristus ("Army of Christ'') or Laskar Kristen-the Christian militias-responsible for 
protecting their regions, and attacking the Muslim rioters105 This Laskar Kristus, mainly if not 
10s Information on the Laskar Kristus can be found, for instance, in the Presidential Decree 
(Keputusan Presiden No. 38/2002) regarding Pembentukan Tim Penyelidik Independen Nasional 
untuk Konflik Maluku (the Establishment of the National Independent Investigation Team for the 
Maluku Conflict). Headed by I Wayan Karya, the team was mandated to investigate (1) the incident of 
january 19, 1999, (2) Republik Maluku Selatan (the RMS-the South Moluccan Republic), [3) the 
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all Protestant, was mainly coordinated by local churches and the klasis (unit of Protestant 
church at district level]. Officially and institutionally, sin ode (a Protestant congregation at 
provincial level named the Protestant Moluccan Church Synod or the GPM Synod for short) did 
not give a direct command to Christian communities to be engaged in the warfare, but the Synod 
did not also prohibit Ambonese Christians for engaging in the wars. The Synod was not able to 
ban the Christian fighters since many pastors, ministries, and church officials were also involved 
in the fighting. 106 
The name of the Laskar Kristus or Laskar Kristen existed before the arrival of the Laskar 
jihad in May 2000. The University of Indonesia sociologist Thamrin Amal Tomagola, a native of 
North Maluku, even argued that Laskar Kristus existed before the january 19,1999, incident. 
But the group gained its fame after the arrival of the java-based Islamist paramilitary group. The 
village-based Christian fighter groups were also called the akar rum put ("grassroots"). It is 
unclear who named the Christian militias as the Laskar Kristus. But the naming indicates that 
they portrayed the Maluku conflict as a holy war. The above Christian fighter groups were 
formed at the beginnings of the conflict and gained momentum with the Muslim destruction of 
Ambon's old church, Gereja Silo. 
On November 22, 2001, a jakarta-based newspaper, Tabloid Adil, reported the story of 
Laskar Kristus from Ambon-based Petra Church. After witnessing a series of bloody religious 
communal conflicts in Ambon, the Petra Church organized the Maluku Prayer Movement 
(Gerakan Maluku Berdoa or GMB] as part of the Church community's response to the safety of 
people in Maluku. On Friday, November 9, 2001, religious services of GMB consisted of baptizing 
a member of Laskar Kristus. The minister delivered a sermon entitled "To Become a Model of 
Faith, You Should Be Loyal unto Death" (Menjadi Pahlawan !man, Hendaklah Engkau Setia 
Christian RMS, [ 4) Laskar jihad, [5) Laskar Kristus, and [6) coercive religious conversion and human 
right violation. 
1o6 Online chats with Rev. jacky Manu putty, September 1, 2010. 
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Sampai Mat1). One of the self-acknowledged of the Laskar Kristus warriors was a 15-year-old 
Roy Pontoh. When he died in the village of Hila in Leihitu Peninsula of Ambon Island on january 
20, 1999, just a day after the initial outbreak in Ambon City, his last statement was "!am Laskar 
Kristus." It is believed that Pontoh's death made him a martyr of Christ. On August 13, 2000, 
clergyman Timotius Arifin delivered a similar story of Laskar Kristus at the Church Birthday 
Anniversary. He recounted the testimony of a martyr of Christ in Ambon, who also proclaimed: 
"Beta Laskar Kristus!" (I am Laskar Kristus). 
However, it should be noted, unlike the Laskar jihad, the Laskar Kristus did not receive 
special training. In the words of Ongky Siahaya, a field commander of grassroots in the region of 
Talake, near UKIM (Universitas Kristen Indonesia Ma/uku-the Protestant's main university in 
Ambon city) "we prayed first and then there were only two options-kill or to be killed."107 
Whereas Muslims had access to modern guns from Pindad (Perusahaan Industri Angkatan 
Darat-the Army's industrial company), as well as support from java-based holy war militias, 
particularly the Laskar jihad, and some elements in TN! (Tentara Nasionallndonesia-the 
Indonesian military forces) (Schulze 2002: 63), the Christian militias used mainly traditional 
arms such as knives, machetes, poisoned arrows, home-made guns, and a few automatic 
weapons, either acquired from the deserted police or smuggled in from Kupang, West Timor. 
Some Ambonese Christians were expert in the making of home-made guns. They included Thorn 
Pelmelay who has been widely known as the "professor" due to his expertise in making the 
bombs. The bombs were then distributed to Christian fighters across Ambon and Maluku. In 
general, however, Ambonese Christians were painfully aware that they were technologically at a 
disadvantage, with limited finances, and faced difficulties in obtaining arms and ammunition. As 
a result, many Christian fighters were killed during the wars of1999-2004. 
10
' Interview with Yongky Siahaya, Ambon, june 12, 2010. 
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Indeed unlike the Laskar jihad forces, Christian fighters did not have financial support 
from the GPM Synod to purchase guns and ammunitions. As a result, Christian individuals 
voluntarily conducted fundraisings through Christian networks and communal ties not only 
throughout Ambon and Maluku but also in java. Some funds were collected through family ties 
of Ambonese Christians who had settled in the Netherlands since the KNJL time (1950s), while 
other funds were distributed through FKKM (Forum Komunikasi Kristen Maluku-Forum for 
Communications of Moluccan Christians) chaired by jan Nanere (former rector of Pattimura 
University) and Yunus Tipka (a member of regional parliament from PDKB or Partai Demokrasi 
Kasih Bang sa-a Protestant-affiliated political party) as his secretary. 
Founded in 2000, FKKM was part of the networks ofFKKJ (Forum Komunikasi Kristen 
jakarta-Jakarta-based Christian forum) and FKKS (Forum Komunikasi Kristen Surabaya-
Surabaya-based Christian forum Jed by Paul Tahalele) which existed far before the Ambon 
conflict. The FKKM's goals, Yunus Tipka said, were (1) to help Christians who had become the 
victims of the Maluku conflict by providing medical assistance or food supplies, (2) to assist 
Christian fighters in finding guns and ammunitions, and (3) to channel Moluccan Christians with 
non-Maluku Christian communities.108 
The grassroots (the Laskar Kristus) agenda, some ex-Christian fighters have claimed, 
was defending Christian faith, territories and communities, and was never a voice for separatism 
as Muslims widely assumed. The grassroots' objectives thus differed from those of the Front 
Kedau/atan Maluku (FKM-the Maluku Sovereignty Front). Founded by the physician Alex 
Manu putty on july 15, 2000, in Kudamati, the FKM was not made public until the 18th of 
December in that year. After his capture in April, 2001, Alex moved to Los Angeles, USA. Some 
Christian informants said that Alex has received a green card from the US government; thereby 
speculations of the US involvement or judea-Christian conspiracy to borrow the term of the 
1os Interview with Yunus Tipka, Ambon, june 12, 2010 
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Laskar Jihad chief advisor Brigjen. (ret.) Rustam Kastor in the Ambon conflict emerged among 
Muslim militants. 109 
Alex Manuputty was a devout Christian and a member ofjemaat Gereja Sinar (Sinar 
Church member) in Kudamati. The pastor of the church, Rev. Simon Maskikit-and many other 
members of the Sinar Church-also became the supporters of the FKM. The FKM's goal is, the 
founders claimed, the restoration of the sovereignty given to Alifuruese, namely the indigenous 
people and forefathers of Ambonese society, with the establishment of the Republic of South 
Maluku (RMS) in 1950.110 Unlike the grassroots and other Christian militia groups, FKM is not an 
armed but a moral and political movement. 
The FKM, however, does not have much public sympathy despite Alex Manu putty's 
claims that he has broad support from Ambon's Christian and Muslim communities. The 
Protestant Synod, the Catholic Diocese of Ambonia, and Muslim leaders have all distanced 
themselves from FKM which they believe is no more than a passing phenomenon supported by a 
minority and even then not out of ideological conviction but frustration with the lack of 
response from Jakarta. FKM's small player status has been underlined by the fact that the 
organization remained relatively obscure until Manu putty and a handful of supporters raised 
the RMS flag on April 25, 2001, to mark the anniversary of the proclamation of the RMS. His 
109 Interview with Rustam Kastor, Ambon, 31 December 2010. 
noRMS, established by, among others, Ch. Soumokil and J. Manusama following the 
integration of all Maluku into the Republic oflndonesia, is the group occupying the largest space in 
the threat perception of the Laskar Jihad and Ambon's Muslims in general. Based in the Netherlands, 
the RMS continued to function as a government in exile with the aim of continuing the struggle for a 
free Maluku. Yet the Netherlands, despite being the host country of an estimated 45,000 Malukans, 
never even acknowledged the RMS movement RMS's struggle gained notoriety in the 1970s when 
demonstrations and violence (train hijackings] propelled it into the Dutch public eye. Support for the 
movement started to wane in the 1980s and by the 1990s it had imploded into 17 factions, was 
paralyzed by internal disputes and was disregarded by a second generation whose interests in 
Maluku had given way to integration in Europe. Despites some attempts after the collapse of Suharto 
and the loss of East Timor to enter into negotiations with the Indonesian government under 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the momentum remained lost Of the original leaders, three are still active: F.l.j. 
Tutuhatunewa, Pieter Thenu, and j.W. Wattilete. The fact that many of its offices have stayed 
unoccupied since the resignation or death of its holders it is a clear indication that RMS is a 
movement of the past-a ghost of an era long gone. 
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subsequent arrest for violating articles 106 and 110 of the criminal code dealing with 
insurgency and separation propelled FKM briefly into the public attention, revealing that this 
organization is indeed a separatist group. It is obvious that the specter of separatism was and is 
not imminent. There is not going to be a replay of the East Timor scenario since Ambon is a 
more horizontal conflict rather than a vertical one. 
The description sketched above suggests that what had begun as a brawl between 
young men from neighboring lower-class suburbs of Batumerah and Mardika in Ambon town 
had within a few days been transformed into a war organized out of the two central religious 
groups and institutions of Ambon's Christians and Muslims. !twas through these main religious 
institutions, added with smaller (religious-based) groupings at village level and clan-based 
networks, that Muslims and Christians were recruiting, coordinating, arming and feeding the 
fighters, while at the same time building a strong if one-sided narrative of religious victimization 
through their internal sermons, their display of refugees and their external press briefings. The 
repertoire of shocking actions deployed by each side was similar. Actions served to terrorize the 
enemy, as well as inspire one's own. Enemy actions were retold in the narrative and shaped 
perceptions of the other side's cruelty. 
A major element of the repertoire was to attack churches and mosques, the main 
religious symbols of the enemy's identity. Each time one was torched it triggered wild rejoicing 
on the attackers' side and outrage and renewed determination among the defendants. 
Performing religious songs was a feature in the battleground. On january 20, 1999, a large group 
of Christian warriors left the Rehoboth Church in Ambon City, and repeatedly sang the 
following: 
We don't want to go back (three times) 
We had won with the Blood of Christ 
We had won with His blood. 
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Furthermore, the Christian fighters-both ordinary "flocks" and elites of the church-
moved forward while the church choir solemnly sang "Maju Laskar Kristus" (Onward Christian 
Soldiers)-with trumpet accompaniment. The song of Onward, Christian Soldiers was translated 
into Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian language) and spread it out throughout Ambon and 
surrounding islands. This song was taken from Kidung Dua Sahabat Lama or Kidung jemaat No. 
339. Composed by Sabine Baring-Gould (for the text, in 1865) and ArthurS. Sullivan (for the 
music, in 1871), the English original lyrics of Onward, Christian Soldiers is as follows: 
Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war, 
with the cross ofjesus going on before. 
Christ, the royal Master, leads against the foe; 
forward into battle see his banners go! 
Onward, Christian soldiers, marching as to war, 
with the cross ofjesus going on before. 
At the sign of triumph Satan's host doth flee; 
on then1 Christian soldiers, on to victory! 
Hell's foundations quiver at the shout of praise; 
brothers, lift your voices, loud your anthems raise. 
Like a mighty army moves the church of God; 
brothers, we are treading where the saints have trod. 
We are not divided, all one body we, 
one in hope and doctrine, one in charity. 
Crowns and thrones may perish1 kingdoms rise and wane, 
but the church of jesus constant will remain. 
Gates of hell can never gainst that church prevail; 
we have Christ's own promise, and that cannot fail. 
Onward then, ye people, join our happy throng, 
blend with ours your voices in the triumph song. 
Glory, laud, and honor unto Christ the King, 
this through countless ages men and angels sing. 111 
111 httn: //www.hymnsite.com/lyrics/umh575.sht A 19th century English hymn, the hymn's 
theme is originally taken from references in the New Testament to the Christian being a soldier for 
Christ, for example II Timothy 2:3 (KJV): "Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of jesus 
Christ" The lyric was written as a processional hymn for children walking from Horbury Bridge, 
where Baring-Gould was curate, to Horbury StPeter's Church near Wakefield, Yorkshire, 
at Whitsuntide in 1865. It was originally entitled, "Hymn for Procession with Cross and Banners." 
Baring-Gould originally set the lyrics to a melody from the slow movement of joseph 
Haydn's Symphony in D, No. 15. This was printed in 1871 in an English church periodical, the Church 
The following is the Indonesian version of Onward, Christian Soldiers. 
Maju, Laskar Kristus 
(Kidung jemaat 339) 
Maju Laskar Kristus, lawan kuasa gelap! 
Ikut Salib Yesus, sungguh dan tetap! 
Rajamu sendiri jalan di depan; 
Majulah, iringi panji cemerlang! 
Ref: 
Maju, Laskar Kristus, lawan kuasa gelap! 
IkutSalib Yesus, sungguh dan tetap; 
Saat dianjungkan panji Penebus, 
Kuasa Iblis mundur, dikalahkan terus 
Goncangkanlah neraka1 karena mendengar 
Sorak soraimu nyaring menggegar 
Bagai laskar jaya Gereja maju terus 
Di jejak tela dan saksi yang kudus 
Kita satu tubuh yang kudus dan am; 
Satu pengharapan, satu pun iman. 
Kuasa duniawi timbul tenggelam; 
Tapi Gereja Kristus takkan terbenam! 
Alam maut tak sanggup menjatuhkannya; 
Kristus memenuhi isi janji-Nya. 
Karena itu maju! Ikut Salib terus; 
Turutlah memuji Raja Penebus: 
"Hormat1 kemuliaan, Tuhan1 terimalah!" 
lnsan dan malaikat sujud menyembah. "112 
By Ambonese Christians, Onward, Christian Soldiers was considered to be a march of 
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war. During the conflict, this song was indeed helpful for Christians to arouse the spirit of war. A 
Christian woman in Waai (Ambon Island) told, "When we were attacked or engaged in the war, 
we, along with other Christian women, sang that song [Onward, Christian Soldier] while beating 
Times. The hymn did not receive wide acceptance1 however, until Sullivan wrote the tune 11 St 
Gertrude" for it 
112 I owed Rev. Agus Lopuhaa and Rev. Elifas Maspaitella for citing the Indonesian lyrics of 
Onward Christian Soldiers. In addition to this "churchly song," there was a Christian pop song sang by 
Christian fighters during the wars. Here are the lyrics of the song that was originally sang by 
Moluccan artist Freddy Hitipeuw: "Di tengah kesukaran, sebabnya dosaku. Terbitlah pengharapan, 
tolonglah Tuhanku. Kendatijalanku di susah perang, Tuhan penolong hidupku, beri aku menang. Se/alu 
aku berdoa,ya Tuhan tolonglah." I thank jacky Manu puttY for introducing this melancholic, gloomy 
song. 
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dustpans to awake the enthusiasm of fighting. By singing this song, we felt we were getting a 
"new spirit" and courage in the face of enemies [Muslim jihadists]" (Patty 2006: 33). Still, early 
in the morning (around 4:30a.m.) in December, 2000, a group of about forty Christian young 
men from the neighborhood of Batumeja Dalam walked down Pattimura Street in Ambon town. 
They were brandishing their long knives (parang) and spears and, again, were singing 
the Indonesian version of Onward, Christian Soldiers. In front of them walked a young female still 
unemployed Protestant minister in official black vestment, carrying "Moses' stick" that "she had 
found in the wood." People said she had had a dream, urging her to do so. Thus they walked up 
to the A.). Patty Street, just inside the Muslim quarters. They marched down "Ambon's business 
center street" toward the Al-Fatah Mosque. The military came into action, and at last had no 
choice but direct shooting (Bohm 2005: 113).ln addition to the song of Onward, Christian 
Soldiers, slogans such as "I Love jesus" (Beta Cinta Yesus) or "jesus is Victorious" (Yesus Raya) 
were used by the Christian warriors to support the psychology of war. 
While Christian fighters marched and sang the Onward Christians Soldiers, on the other 
hill white-clad Muslim men streamed down while the valley echoed to the praise of God's name 
from the mosque. Massacres of the faithful adherents and religious leaders, in particular, had a 
powerful terrorizing effect on the victims besides bolstering their determination. All religious 
minority enclaves were expelled in this manner. Refugees from such expulsions would then be 
housed in the central mosques and churches of their own faith community where, every Friday 
and Sunday, other worshipers saw their pitiful plight and rekindled their anger. 
As noted earlier, the GPM Synod and Catholic Diocese of Amboina did not directly-and 
institutionally-support the warfare by, for instance, providing funds to purchase ammunitions 
for wars or issuing a sort of ''fa twa of war." There is not enough evidence to suport Ambon's 
Muslims' claims that the GPM Synod provided money, gave a command of the wars, and 
controlled the Christian fighters. Ambon's Muslims also accused Rev. Sammy P. Titaley, the 
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chairman ofMaluku's Protestant Synod (Sino de GPM) from 1995 to 2000, as the mastermind of 
the Ambon conflict who provoked Christian fighters to attack Muslims and their territories. For 
the Muslims in Ambon, the involvement of Rev. Sammy Titaley can be seen, for instance, through 
a Surat Edaran or "Bloody Sosol Letter" which, according to the Muslims, was issued and signed 
by him. The letter contains a call to urge Christians in order to convert Muslims who were 
depicted as "stupid, ignorant, and ill-mannered." 
Triggered and provoked by this Bloody Sosolletter, anti-Christian violence erupted in 
North Maluku's Tid ore and Ternate leading to the shifting pattern of the nature of the conflict 
from ethnic-based riots to religious violence, from small-scale disputes in a distant and remote 
area ofMalifutthathad little connection to religious differences to massive sectarian violence 
along religious line. The dreadful events in the regions ofTidore and Ternate were, moreover, to 
lead to extensive, widespread, and far more deadly interreligious violence across the new 
province of North Maluku as the innocent adherents of Christianity and Islam, including women 
and children, were harshly killed by the rioters. 
By the end of 1999, thousands of Muslims, particularly in Ternate and Tid ore, had been 
mobilized by their leaders to launch attacks against Christians in north Halmahera; thereby 
North Maluku entered the new millennium in the grip of full-scale religious war.m Political 
scientist Chris Wilson in his study on the North Maluku conflict (2008) states that while the 
letter was obviously fake, its origins has remained uncertain, thereby the intentions behind it 
are still unclear. For that reason Wilson suggests not overstating the role of rumors and 
113 Most existing studies of the violent conflicts in Ternate and Tidore explain the rioting in 
the province's two main cities as an unplanned outburst of Muslim anger at anonymous provocation 
in the form of the "Bloody Sosol" letter. Indeed many studies of communal riots assume that 
particular ethnic or religious violence are spontaneous eruptions of outrage at the barbaric stories 
found in rumors and other forms of propaganda. However, Chris Wilson (2008: 182) has argued that 
the November Tid ore and Ternate riots were neither a spontaneous reaction to the Malifut violence 
nor to the "inflammatory letter that attempted to draw a link between that violence and the local 
Christian church." 
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propaganda in instigating mass violence since they are designed mainly to make rioting "that 
has been meticulously planned" appear spontaneous, and therefore "should not be considered a 
cause of rioting themselves" (Wilson 2008: 182). The violence that emerged, Wilson added, was 
organized by local politicians, and community, and religious leaders (ibid: 94-5). 
In my interview with Rev. Sammy Titaley, he also refused the originality and 
authenticity of the letter. Sammy Titaley maintained that the Jetter (Surat Edaran Ketua Sin ode 
GPM Maluku) containing a call for jihad against Muslims and an urge to Christians to defend 
their territories was false. Rev. Sammy Titaley told me that "one day a head of the police 
department in the district of North Maluku (Kapolres Maluku Utara. At the time North Maluku 
was part ofMaluku province) came to my house to check the accuracy of the letter, and I saw 
that in the letter there was no my signature. Only the name of Sammy Titaley put on it. In fact, all 
letters I signed I never used the name "SammyTitaley" but S.P. Titaley, instead." Sammy Titaley, 
moreover, admitted that he never gave an instruction to Christian fighters to attack Muslim 
communities. Conversely, he once urged Christian fighters to pull out from the Al-Fatah Mosque 
on june 22, 1999, albeit they had occupied it and was ready to attack thousands of Muslim 
refugees who used the mosque as a shelter. 114 
It is significant to underline that even if Rev. Sammy Titaley denied supporting-again 
formally-the Ambon conflict, that does not mean there were no factions among Protestant 
elites who wanted to use the Synod as a means of mobilizing masses and as a financial resource 
to support the Christian side. In a congress held in March, 2001, to appoint a new chairman of 
GPM Synod, Rev. Hengky Leleury, one of the militant Protestant leaders, mobilized the 
114 Interview with Rev. Sammy Titaley, Ambon, june 16, 2010. I found Rev. Sammy Titaley in 
a dilemma during the periods of conflict On one hand, he was accused by the Muslims of being 
"provocateur" and mastermind of the Ambon conflict1 and of having connections with the RMS 
supporters in the Netherlands. On the other hand, he was threatened and terrorized by Christian 
militants for not issuing an "order of war" and providing funds to support Christian warriors and to 
buy ammunitions of the wars. 
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grassroots and other "radical factions" of Moluccan Protestants to support his candidacy as a 
future head of the Synod. Leleury's main aim in stepping forward in the candidacy was to utilize 
the GPM Synod as an institutional and financial support for the Maluku conflict. Luckily, the 
majority of the delegates of the meeting did not vote for him as a new chairman of the Synod. 
Instead, they chose Rev.l.j.W. Hendriks, a relatively peaceful, non-militant Protestant leader. 
Although finally I.j.W. Hendriks won the votes, the process of the meeting (Sidang Sin ode GPM) 
ran with high intensity full of emotions and anger. Rev. jacky Manu putty illustrated the meeting 
as follows: "In the meeting there were almost huge clashes between the grassroots (the radical 
factions) and the Protestant pastors. I was also almost involved in a fight with other pastors who 
supported the Christian radical militants' agenda." 1 15 
Furthermore, although the GPM Synod did not directly endorse the Maluku wars it does 
not mean that there were no Christian institutions that supported the conflict. In the region of 
Ambon, in particular, support had been given by two main klasis (a unit of Protestant 
congregation at the districtjregionallevel). Moluccan Protestant Church (GPM) in Ambon had 
been divided into two major klasis: Ambon Island (headed by Rev. R. Lekransi) and Ambon City 
(chaired by Rev. A.Z.E. Pattinaya). Each klasis was responsible for coordinating a group of 
Christian fighters from their congregations and territories. The office of the Ambon Island's 
k/asis was located at the Rehoboth Church in Batu Gantung and the Sinar Church in Kudamati. 
The field coordinators who organized the Christian fighters in the Ambon Island's klasis 
were Agus Wattimena and Femmy Souisa. Moreover, the k/asis of Ambon city, consisting of 
churches in the town of Ambon, was centered on the Maranatha Chruch, and were coordinated 
by Ferry Wattimuri and Herman Nikijuluw as field commanders. Besides these two klasis, there 
were a number of Protestant groupings in Ambon city such as the Coker and Kudaputih, which 
us Online chats with Rev. jacky Manuputty, September 1, 2010. Due to jacky Manuputty's 
resistance to the Christian radical groups, he was accused of being a judas who secretly worked with 
Muslims. As a result, his house was burnt down by the grassroots. 
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coordinated a small group of Christian fighters. As well, each Christian region, in the city or rural 
areas, also had a group of fighters which were organized by the local youths' leaders, mainly 
from AMGPM (Angkatan Mud a Gereja Protestan Maluku-the youth organization of GPM) under 
the auspices oflocal priests and church ministries (Majelis Gereja). 
The Role of Pastors and Church Ministries 
The role of Protestant priests and church ministries were central during the communal 
conflict. They had served not only as a canal to distribute information and issues about the 
development of the conflict they received from other Christian centers or Pasko to the local 
Christian communities and fighters, but also Jed ritual ceremonies before the fighters went to 
the combat zone, gave a blessing to the combatants, and ran Sunday sermons to motivate the 
Laskar Kristus and the Christians attending the church in general. Common themes delivered in 
the sermons (khotbah Minggu) often dealt with issues of Israel's struggle to occupy the Land of 
Canaan in the times of King David and Solomon as stated in the Old Testament. Ambonese 
Christians depicted themselves as part of the tribes oflsrael, and portrayed the Land of Ambon 
as the Land of Canaan, whereas Muslims were represented as Goliath and the evilness that 
conquered and took over Ambon which they saw as belonging to their ancestors. 
Verses in the Bible talking about Israelites who entered the Land of Canaan, and were 
ordered by God to drive out the Amalek-both people and its animals- (later known as the 
"Theology of Amalek"-a theology of attacking the Amalek by the Israelites) were used by some 
pastors and church leaders to justify the obligation of the wars against Muslims (e.g. joshua 1: 1-
10). This "religious duty" in particular is set forth in the verse, "The Lord will have war with 
Amalek from generation to generation" (Exodus 17: 16). Thus, if any people seek to destroy us, 
said some Christian leaders, we are commanded to do battle against it when it rises up against 
us, and this battle of ours, on the basis of that verse, is an obligatory war. 
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For Christian fighters, in the context of Maluku, the Muslims were considered to be the 
destroyers of their land. Amalek, a descendent ofEsau, was not only the ancestor of those who 
attacked Israel in the wilderness but also, by rabbinic reckoning based on I SamuellS: 8 and 
Esther 3: I, the ancestor of Hamman in the Esther story. In Rabbinic literature, Amalek thus 
becomes a cipherfor evil in the world, for the arch-enemy oflsrael, and, by implication, of God. 
Some Christian informants told me that some priests justified the compulsion of going to the 
wars by citing a verse in the Old Testament as follows: "We are obliged to defend and preserve 
the life which God has given to us, and if there are people who want to destroy the life, we need 
to guard it, even through the wars." 
Prior to the communal conflict, the Protestant body responsible for selecting religious 
texts and Biblical verses based on certain themes that would be used as a guide for pastors and 
ministries for their services throughout Maluku was Lembaga Pembinaanjemaat Gereja 
Protestant Maluku (LPj GPM). The LPj GPM was a division in the GPM Synod whose main job is 
building spirituality, morality, and religiosity of the Protestant adherents. Every month the LPj 
produced some 5,000 copies of a guiding booklet called Bin a Khotbah for Sunday sermons, 
religious services in the unit (the smallest Protestant group) as well as Protestant youth and 
woman groupings. When the mass violence erupted, however, all office activities quit; 
consequently the LPj could not print and distribute the Bin a Khotbah. As a result, local pastors, 
church ministries and officials were responsible to choose particular Biblical verses and 
religious texts to be applied in the Sunday sermons and other religious services based on socio-
political contexts and developments. 
Generally, pastors and church ministries selected popular Biblical verses in the Old 
Testament talking about violence and struggle of jewish tribes against their enemies to be used 
in their religious services such as the Books of Genesis, Deuteronomy, Exodus, joshua, judges, 
Samuel (I, II), Kings (I, II), and Psalm. During the conflict, ordinary Protestants also recited these 
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verses. Wherever and whenever they went to other places or to the battleground they carried a 
small Bible in their pocket for self-protection, making it easier to recite the particular verses, 
and waging the spirit of war (cf. Patty 2006). 
Among the common verses in the Bible which the Christian fighters "ritualized" during 
the war included first, tales of jews freed from Egyptian nation (Exodus 1-19); second, stories of 
war between jewish tribes and other people, and those having to do with the rules of war (e.g. 
Deuteronomy 3, 7-9,11, and 20); third, an account of when the Israelites fought with other 
people before entering the Land of Canaan under the leadership of joshua Qoshua 1: 1-11); 
fourth, the jewish narratives of fighting against the people of Moab, Amari, Mid ian, Ed om, Amon, 
and Amalek under the headship oflsraeli judges Qudges 1-15); fifth, an account of Israeli tribes 
against the nation of the Philistines under the command of Israeli kings, especially Saul and 
David (e.g. I Sam 7; 17: 40-54; I Kings 18: 20-46). 
Whatever verses were cited by the pastors and church elites (majelis jemaatJ one thing 
that is obvious is that they used Bible, particularly Old Testament, to seek a theological 
foundation or to legitimize acts of violence or, in their terms, self-defense wars. Many Ambonese 
Christians, as Rev. l.j.W. Hendriks has remarked, associated themselves to the Israeli people as 
described in the Bible (i.e. Bang sa Israel Alkitab) who suffered; consequently they needed to 
fight against Muslims to gain victory and freedom from suffering. Not only that, Ambonese 
Christians imagined themselves as Israeli tribes narrated in the Bible. If Israeli tribes fought 
against the people of the Philistines, Amalek, Egypt and so forth, Ambonese Christians battled 
against Muslims whom they saw, at the time, as a representation of the foes of Israeli people. 
Ambonese Christians believed that God would be on their side during the difficult times against 
the Muslims, and would give them victory as He granted triumph for the Israelis. 
They, moreover, were convinced that God would help and protect them from the Muslim 
enemies as He helped and protected the Israelis (e.g. Deuteronomy 20: 1-4 and Psalm 3, 11, 23, 
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27). In other words, God was portrayed as the hero, helper, and guardian of the Ambonese 
Christians, and who would destroy Muslims. Ambonese Christians, furthermore, claimed that 
they were part of the umat perjanjian ("the covenant people"), present-day Israeli tribes, the 
chosen people, and God's heroes, and the Land ofMaluku was the Land of Canaan granted by 
God through their forerunners-the Alifuruese. Such as when God had made a covenant with the 
Israelis as told in the Bible, the same God had "made a contract" with Ambonese since they 
became the followers of jesus and received the Gospel. Since Ambonese Christians believed that 
the Ambon war was a sacred duty granted by God, throughout the conflict, they-especially the 
Christian fighters-purified themselves by actively conducting ritual practices, religious 
sermons and services, reading the Bible, practicing God's order, following the rules of war, and 
avoiding wrongdoings as instructed by the Holy Book (e.g. Deuteronomy 20: 1-20). 
According to the Christian fighters (it is confirmed by survey findings), the rules of war 
they practiced during the conflict included: the ban of initiating the attack, the ban of robbery of 
properties belonging to opposing groups, prohibition of mocking or ridiculing the other, the ban 
of torturing the opposing people, and so on. In addition, the Christian fighters were prohibited 
to have conflict with their wives or parents before going to the combat zone, of talking the name 
of jesus in improper places, of insulting other religions, and of transgressing the 10 
commandments of the Torah. All of these things were considered to be the "taboos of war" that 
would contaminate the mission of holy war against the Muslims. 
Why did Ambonese Christians use the Old Testament-and not the New Testament-as 
a Biblical justification? Why did they prefer David to jesus in the time of conflict? The answer is 
obvious: because the New Testament, my Christian Ambonese informants said, teaches peace 
not violence, love not hate, and brotherhood not conflict, while the Old Testament contains 
heroic stories in the warfare. Whereas jesus taught his followers and pupils to "love their 
enemies," David went to the battlefield against Goliath! An ex-Ambonese Christian fighter told 
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that during the time of conflict every Sunday the verses he recited were those of the Old 
Testament, particularly those having to do with gloomy and heroic stories oflsraeli people and 
kings of Israeli tribes (Saul, David and Solomon), which were regarded fitting into the Ambon 
socio-political settings. 
Although verses in the Old Testament were more common among Ambonese Christians 
than those of the New Testament throughout the collective conflict, this does not mean that the 
Gospel was useless to them at all. Some Christian fighters utilized some verses in the New 
Testament to justify their acts of violence. Among the favorite verses often quoted by the 
Christian radicals were the Ephesians (6: 10-20). The text talks about the requirements fulfilled 
by the inhabitants of the Ephesians in the face of the power of wickedness (kuasa kejahatan). In 
the context of Ambon, Christian militants regarded Muslim jihadists as the representation of this 
evil power needed to be annihilated from Moluccan archipelago. The Christians read these 
verses aiming at getting power and support from God in their struggle against the Muslims, and 
most importantly, gaining victory. ln order to be successful against the enemies, the verses 
require the Christians to complete themselves with prayers, God's words (Firman Allah), the 
Bible, truth and justice, and so forth which Ambonese Christians considered to be "God's 
ammunitions.!! 
Some conservative Christians, furthermore, utilized the Biblical texts of the death and 
resurrection with Jesus of the Christ (Rome 6: 1-14), Jesus' suffering as a model for Christians (I 
Peter 4: 12-19), and other verses in the New Testament talking about pain and the resurrection 
of Jesus (e.g. Matthew. 26-8; Mark 14-6; Luke 21-4; John 18-21) as a theological basis and 
justification of their struggle againstthe Muslims. For some Christian militants, Jesus was 
portrayed as a champion of war who fought against the power of darkness and evilness, and 
won the battle. Such texts and discourses were beneficial for the Christians serving as both the 
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spirit and courage of fighting, and the spiritual diversion to those who suffered in the period of 
war. 
The facts outlined above clearly suggest that religious discourses, teachings, symbols, 
and doctrines had shaped people's actions and views on the ground. Some Christian militant 
leaders manipulated those Biblical texts and translated successfully into the Ambon's socio-
political contexts. The depiction suggests that one cannot underestimate the role of religion in 
the battlefield. Most ex-Ambonese ordinary Christian fighters whom 1 interviewed and survey 
claimed that their engagement in the warfare was not driven by worldly orientations such as 
getting jobs, lands, marketplaces, and properties but something related to "unworldly matters." 
Most respondents of my survey confirmed that their motives of involving in the fighting 
were because (1) to defend religion (Christianity) and Christian communities (90.2%); (2) jesus 
was being insulted (80.4%); (3) churches being burnt/destroyed (80.4%); (4) the Bible was on 
fire (70.5%); (5) priests and Christian leaders were murdered (64.7%), and 98% ofrespondents 
refused an opinion that the war was an opportunity to gain new lands and properties that 
belonged to the Muslims. The religious significance during the conflict was also confirmed by the 
fact that 94.1% of the respondents said that prior to going to the battleground they gathered in 
the church to be blessed and prayed for by the pastors and ministries (Maje/is Gereja). During 
the war, 86.6% of respondents said they sang the song Maju Laskar Kristus (Onward, Christian 
Soldiers) and other spiritual songs (lagu-lagu rohamJ, and 80.4% of which brought religious 
symbols-the Bible, the Cross (Salib), the "David flag", and Christian red headbands. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Based on the description sketched in the previous chapters, few conclusions can be 
drawn here. First, religion did matter during the Ambon conflict. Both ordinary Christians and 
Muslims in Ambon considered the sectarian conflict as a sacred war rewarded by the paradise to 
those who joined the battle. The distinction is that while Muslims considered death in the 
battlefield to be mati syahid (martyrdom) and something honored, the Christians believed that 
the death in the warfare is a symbol of sinfulness and dishonor on the part of the deceased. They 
were convinced that Christian fighters who died in the combat zone did so mainly because they 
had committed bad things, dishonesty or transgressed the rules of (holy) war such as the ban of 
theft, mocking, or adultery which they considered to be the taboos of war. For Ambonese 
Christians, salvation is equal to living. It was thought that those who survived the warfare had 
not committed any wrongdoings and had not transgressed the tabooed rules of war. 
Moreover, in the concept of charismatic Christian theology, the war was deemed a 
process of selection for Christians, a sort of "survival of the fittesttheory." Those who survive 
the war were regarded as the "chosen people" while those who died in the warfare were 
considered as the logical consequence of the illegal behavior or unlawful activity they 
committed during the wartime. For Ambon's Muslims, conversely, both death and survival were 
regarded as part of the holy jihad as long as they followed the "Islamic rules of war." It is 
interesting to note that during the wartime some Christian groups in Ambon city built a minaret 
of prayer (menara do a) on the highest floors of hotels assuming that prayer in a highest place 
would be heard and answered by God. The establishment of the minaret of prayer in part was a 
reaction of Christian loss from Muslim attacks. The defeat, they believed, was partly due to (1) 
the lack of prayer on the part of Christians, and (2) their Christianity was not pristine so they 
need to be purified. In order to be victorious over Muslims, Ambonese Christians should become 
true Christians by practicing norms and values taught by the Bible. 
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It has been remarked that observers from secular traditions generally find it difficult to 
acknowledge the degree to which different logics and moralities affect behavior in religious 
communities (cf. Goss 2004), and they consequently underestimate the degree to which religion 
underwrites violent conflict on its own terms (cf. Appleby 2000). Academic observers also tend 
to downplay the role of religion in the conflict, insisting that what appears to be a religious war 
is upon closer analysis really motivated by material-based political interests, socio-economic 
reasons, and territorial grievances that are mobilized and manipulated by the greedy elites, 
outside provocateurs, or agents of conflict (Aditjondro 2000; van Klinken 2007). After analyzing 
the contribution of the Laskar jihad in the Ambon wars, German scholar Kirsten Schulze, for 
instance, states: "Closer analysis of the underlying causes of the violence, however, reveals that 
the Ambon conflict was a social conflict rather than a religious one" (Schulze 2002: 62). 
Much has been written about the Maluku conflict, including that of North Maluku, by 
social scientists analyzing its cultural, ideological and political backgrounds, and the roles of the 
government and the military. But, religion is still out of the analysis. On the discussion of the 
Maluku conflict, German anthropologist Birgit Brauchler (2003: 124) states, "Even if religion 
itself was not the cause of the conflict, the people involved in the conflict very soon grouped 
around religion as their main identity marker." The question remains: if religion is not the 
source of the conflict, why were the people "very soon grouped around religion as their identity 
marker?" The political scientist Chris Wilson (2008) who undertook research on the North 
Maluku conflict also concluded that despite the convenience of religion as a mobilizing 
instrument for violence, the question still remains: "do people actually join 'religious' militia and 
participate in violence because of religious zeal and threats to their religion" or something else 
such as economic and political-related factors?" 
Although Wilson recognizes the complexity of the link between religious sentiment and 
mobilization, and suggests not exaggerating or underestimating the role of religion during times 
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of crisis and conflict, he clearly put religion in a secondary element of violence stating that it was 
only a "peripheral issue" (ibid: 193). Moreover he said thatthroughoutthe North Maluku's 
conflict there was no connection between religiosity and involvement in the violence. For many 
militias, Wilson added, religious identity merely provided symbolism and ideological conviction 
for their campaign "to achieve more worldly goals" (ibid: 175, emphasis added). Despite the 
influence, appearance, and visibility of religion in the recruitment and mobilization of the militia 
and ensuing violence, the North Maluku case, according to Wilson, illustrates that "some 
apparently religious militias are at heart formed as a reaction to specific socio-political contexts 
rather than in response to calls for jihad or other transnational ideologies" (ibid: 176, emphasis 
added).116 
We don't have to agree entirely with statements proposed by the Laskar jihad main 
ideologue Rustam Kastor or the Christian militia commander Agus Wattimena who portrayed 
the Maluku conflict as a "truly religious war" (Kastor 2000; ICG 2000). However, neither should 
we dismiss the religious justifications of violence by those involved in the conflict as evidence of 
"false consciousness" or "public falsehood." In brief, violence in God's name is not simply a 
spurious cover for grievance or greed (cf. McTernan 2003). 
Religion plays an important role in communal conflict because, as historian R. Scott 
Appleby (2000: 4; cf. Gaylin 2003) has noted its confessional loyalty translates into clearly 
defined and durable community and its model of faith counters rational calculation and 
enlightened self-interest, cultivates a righteous sense of persecution, and provokes passion 
against evil that fuels the excesses of group hatred. Although religions are indeed manufactured 
or invented within particular historical and political contexts, their creeds, Appleby (2000: 57-
116 Moreover, Wilson states, "Many, if not most, of the mujahid came from To bela, Galela, and 
Malifut and first and foremost sought retribution for their expulsion by Christians. Partly because of 
this local nature of the conflict, but also because Muslims enjoyed such numerical superiority in 
North Maluku, the Pasukanjihad declined the offer of help from more extreme and militant external 
Muslim organizations, such as the Laskar jihad" (Wilson 2008: 175]. 
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61) has argued, are represented as fundamental truths, providing some security in times of 
uncertainty, and countering the challenges of relativism and secularism of!ate modernity. 
Moluccan and Ambonese societies have for centuries been defined in terms of religious 
adherence, and even in urban Ambon, the geographical mixing and social intermixing of 
populations is limited, so the religious other is easily discriminated. The historical origins and 
experiences of religious communities, as we have seen, are distinct, and the current conflict 
could be presented as continuous with an older competition and conflict, as well as with a 
modern struggle on a global scale. If Ambon had once seemed a model of religious tolerance, the 
conflict was represented and experienced in terms of"Manichean struggle" (Goss 2004) 
between Muslims and Christians. 117 
World religions, particularly Abrahamic religions-judaism, Christianity, and Islam-
also possess a stock of material metaphors and military imagery and promise reward for violent 
sacrifice. The concept of some transcendent authority-the will of God-which translates into 
the absolute authority of church officials, and religious myths of election (e.g. the concept of the 
"chosen and blessed people" for the Christians or the "best religious community of believers" for 
the Muslims) and persecution, provide a powerful alternative to the delusional formation of 
paranoia which transforms victim-hood into vengeful action (cf. Gaylin 2003: 115; Smith 1999). 
Religion potentially translates secular differences between a particular us and them, the 
known and the unfamiliar, on to the cosmic plane and thus into a moral struggle between the 
amorphous forces of order and chaos, and good and evil, for which the ultimate sacrifice-
murder or martyrdom-is possible Uurgensmeyer 1992: 114). In the case ofMaluku, for 
exampleJatwa (religious edict) were issued by, among others, clerics in Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen, and Maluku's Christians were identified as kafir harbi (belligerent infidels), the most 
117 The Laskar jihad's homepage, for instance, wrote: "jihad in Ambon: Victory or 
Martyrdom". Christian combatants also declared "die well or kill the enemy" [Muslims]. 
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dangerous category of non-Muslims who may be (even must be) killed with religious blessing. If 
public statements by top leaders of Christian communities were generally more tolerant, the 
churches widely distributed exaggerated images of their victimization, as evidence in their 
sophisticated web presence through sites such as Ambon Berdarah Online ("the bloody Ambon 
online"), Masariku Networks, and Crisis Center of the Diocese of Ambon (Brauchler 2003). Lay 
leaders, moreover, pushed increasingly fundamentalist radical interpretations of the conflict, 
especially following the arrival of the Laskar jihad and an increase in Christian losses. 
Furthermore, religion did matter during the Maluku conflict since it provided a more 
powerful and effective force for mobilization than other forms of collective identity. This 
because religion is "not only strongly linked to a sense of self, but also provides a far-reaching 
and uplifting ideology, powerful institutional structures and an enduring and clear-cut definition 
of an 'other'" (Wilson 2008: 148). Militias fighting in religious violence, unsurprisingly, often 
emerged to be driven by religious zeal. As described above, the mobilization of the militias in 
Maluku's sectarian conflict was full of religious symbolism. Religious institutions became a main 
conduit of mobilization waging people for violence in the name of faith and God. These 
institutions moreover exercised vast emotional influence over adherents of Christianity and 
Islam, as well as provided social meeting places, communication networks and pools of 
resources. 
Finally, religion provides the concept of a sacred territory and a set of ready material 
and symbolic targets whose attacks provokes intense feelings; accordingly mosques and 
churches were desecrated and destroyed, sacred texts and beliefs were ridiculed, prophets were 
slandered, and other symbols of faiths violated. The attacks by Muslim villagers of Leihitu 
Peninsula on Christian neighbors early in the conflict in Ambon, for instance, were in response 
to rumors of the violation of the greatAl-Fatah mosque, whereas the Laskar Kristus ("Christian 
warriors") gained significant momentum after the destruction of the old Silo church in 1999. 
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Religious calendars are also evoked: it is no coincidence that january 19, 1999, the date the 
violence began in Ambon was the day of Idul Fitri celebration, and Christians so feared that 
Muslims in North Maluku's Tobelo and Galala were conspiring to create a "Bloody Christmas" 
that they preemptively attacked villages and slaughtered hundreds of Muslims sheltering in a 
mosque in December 1999, an act that directly provoked the formation of java-based armed 
paramilitary Islamist groups, including the Laskar jihad and Laskar Mujahidin. 
The brutal acts of the rioters in murdering religious leaders (e.g. pastor, priest, and 
ustad], burning down Christian churches or Muslim mosques, and driving out Muslims or 
Christians, allied Ambon to a religious-based sectarian conflict. These facts suggest that religion 
thus played a complex role in determining the trajectory and shaping the intensity of violence. 
Religion was not only used as a means of provocation by interest groups, but also 
simultaneously heightened the emotions of combatants, facilitated the mobilization of militias, 
determined the form of that mobilization (e.g. the names, clothing, and symbolism used by the 
militias] and provided the ideology that sustained those militias in the field. The use of religious 
doctrine, teachings, and symbols by (ordinary] Christian and Muslim militias to legalize fighting, 
killing, and other forms of violence, along with the fears of Christians and Muslims regarding 
their lives and the sustainability of their faith, made violent conflicts more intense and vicious. 
Many Muslims declared an obligation, willingness, and enthusiasm to wage jihad, 
rhetorically, to prevent Christian expansionism and missionarism in the predominantly 
Christian city of Ambon. In addition, a large number of Muslim militias who joined the Pasukan 
jihad were motivated by what Chris Wilson calls "jihadist principles"-a desire to defend Islam 
and defeat those who had attacked Muslims. As well, the Christian groups in Ambon town, 
where interreligious civil wars took the hardest form, put emphasis on religious solidarity and 
symbolism as a vehicle of mobilizing the unity and courage needed to oppose and fight against 
the Muslim militias and the rioters. Members of the Protestant Churches also evoked Christian 
• 
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sentiment in mobilizing combatants. Christians wore large crosses in the battlefield and 
proclaimed their struggle to protect Christianity and other Christian fellows in Ambon and 
elsewhere in Maluku. There were many Christians said that their ultimate objective during the 
conflict was to "defend jesus." 
To be sure, religion itself, definitely, does not cause communal violence. just as "guns do 
not kill people," religion also does not slaughter human beings. However, religion provides 
teachings, doctrines, rituals, symbols, metaphors, and discourses that can be easily used or 
manipulated by those (e.g. actors of violence, agents or managers of conflict, interest groups, 
etc.) who are concerned about, or interested with, political interests-in the Weberian sense, 
either materially or immaterially based. This is precisely what happened in Ambon and Maluku 
where radical Christians and Muslims-both elites and lay people-utilized, translated, and 
transformed religious symbols, doctrines, and discourses into the Ambonese and Moluccan 
settings not only for awakening the spirit of fighting or justifying their violent acts, but also 
protecting and safeguarding their lives. 
Without a doubt, this case is not unique Ambon. In Iran or Lebanon, for instance, the 
traditional rituals and devotions that sacralize personal self-sacrifice has become in extremist 
hands of the Shi'i communities a means of preparing the devout cadres for physical warfare. The 
self-flagellation oflranian or Lebanese Shi'ites during the Ashura ritual commemorating the 
martyrdom of Imam Husayn is a form of militant religiosity. This sort of ritual is not inherently 
extremist but it becomes a source of extremism and militancy for the Ashura penitent exacts 
vengeance on Husayn's contemporary persecutors. Such prescribed-prayers and rituals, 
interpreted by a militant leader, locate the believer in a sacred cosmos that rewards martyrdom 
or imprisonment endured in a divine cause. 
Although there is much that I still do not understand about the "drama" of the Maluku 
conflict, I can conclude that the communal violence was likely the product of complex causation 
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involving the experience of socio-economic insecurity, political discrimination, and unresolved 
historical resentments that, combined with opportunistic leadership, resulted in the 
intensification of nationalism and religiosity, ultimately igniting passions sufficient to sustain 
bloody sectarian conflict over more than three years. The polarization of religious identities and 
heightened tensions, in particular, was the outcome of what jacques Bertrand (2002: 84) calls 
"institutional factors" of which were legacies of authoritarian rule. 
The authoritarian resolution of the role of! slam in the state created uncertainties. 
Christian and javanist Muslim dominance in the early New Order perpetuated Christian 
dominance in Maluku and reinforced Muslims' sense of regional disadvantage. Suharto's later 
use oflslamic groups for political support re-opened uncertainties about the role of Islam, and 
gave new means of access to modernist Muslims in the Indonesian state and Muslims generally 
in Maluku.ln turn, these changes raised fears of marginalization among Christians in the region. 
The authoritarian resolution of definition of the nation, and particularly the terms of inclusion of 
religious groups, therefore contributed to fears of marginalization and exclusion in both 
communities. 
Patrimonial networks also contributed to the polarization of religious identities. Under 
authoritarian rule, patrimonial linkage became the primary means of access to state positions 
and resources. In Maluku, patrimonial networks were formed along religious lines that were 
drawn during colonial times. Each group vied for control of various state sectors, with Christians 
maintaining a regional advantage until the mid-1990s. Once the formation of ICMI and policy 
changes in suport of modernist Muslim groups led to the displacement of Christians and javanist 
Muslims at the national level, a similar trend in Maluku allowed Muslims to reduce their 
disadvantage regionally and seek greater control. Institutional change at the national level, thus, 
opened up the field of possibilities, thereby further polarizing the two religious communities. In 
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the absence of any clear institutional means of guaranteeing the protection of group interests, 
the potential for violent conflict was much stronger. 
Although these institutional factors provided the context for violence to erupt, it cannot 
explain its intensity and scale. Combined with local factors, such as the historical division 
between Christians and Muslims from colonial times, the process of religious radicalization 
within the two religious groups, the absence of religious discourses for tolerant-in-pluralism, the 
almost equal numbers of both communities and the effects of migration, they all made Maluku 
particularly prone to violence. Provocation may well have been a factor in triggering violence 
but certainly could not explain why it had such devastating consequences. 
Finally, while religion never acted autonomously as a cause of conflict, ignoring its role 
completely would preclude a proper understanding of much of the violence in Ambon and 
Maluku. Throughout the region's communal violence, religious sentiment, material interest and 
political motives interacted with one another, magnifying and altering the influence each would 
have had in isolation. Take away one factor, such as religious tension, economic inequality or 
political competition, the violence would not occur. 
Second, besides religion, there is another larger political lesson from the Maluku case: 
the "uncivil civil society." The Maluku case shows the involvement of ethno-religious-based 
civilian militias, anti-pluralist groupings, and radical-fundamentalist alliances in the Christian-
Muslim sectarian violence. In the Maluku conflict, state officials and military forces played a 
central role in some of the violence, but it would be a gross oversimplification to ascribe the 
violence to an all-powerful state (cf. van Klinken 2001, 2007; Adam 2010). Such blame-the-state 
generalizations are especially unhelpful in post-Suharto communal strife, because, as Robert 
Hefner (2005: 283) aptly points out, "a key symptom of post-New Order crisis was that the state 
itself had lost its cohesiveness, as opposed factional elites struck coalitional bargains with rival 
entities in society." 
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Equally important, and contrary to a certain romanticism of "civil society" in some 
Western scholarships ( cf. Putnam 1993), it is obvious that actors in civil society were also 
complicit in the violence. Sociologically speaking, the uncivil civilian groupings and unions in 
Ambon and Maluku in general (e.g. Muslim jihadist groups and radical Christian institutions) are 
all voluntary organizations situated in the space between the family and the state that are 
traditionally dubbed civil society at least according to the definitions mostly widely used during 
the 1990s (cf. Hall1995; Hann and Dun, eds.1996; Hefner 1998a). However, as with Hindu 
nationalists in India mobilizing their networks to attack Muslims (Brass 2002), Rwandan priests 
using their leadership capital to goad parishioners to kill Tutsis (Mamdani 2001), Ambonese 
Christian leaders utilizing their Protestant networks and kinships to fight against Muslims, or 
Maluku's Muslim jihadists using their clans (Ambonese: Jam) and religious sentiments to drive 
out Christians, all prove that the notion that all civil society associations and all social capital are 
positive for democracy, pluralism, and citizenship culture are inaccurate. 
All this is to say that associations that are part of the membership of civil society are not 
always civil in terms of the attitudes they inspire or the political culture they promote (Hefner 
2001). As recent studies have indicated, including this present dissertation, many organizations 
in civil society have been the main conduits of social conflicts, unhealthy power struggles, and 
inter-group communal violence (Varshney 2002; Tambiah 1991). For that reason, Robert Weller 
(1999) tends to avoid the term civil society and prefers to call it "alternate civilities." 
In other words, real-and-existing civil societies are always rife with social tensions 
because they are crosscut by divisions of religion, ideology, ethnicity, clan, gender, and class. As 
Augustus Norton has aptly stated, "like any social phenomenon, civil society can, and often, does 
have, a negative side. Self-interest, prejudice and hatred cohabit with altruism, fairness and 
compassion, and the unrestrained free play of civil society is a chilling thought, not a warm and 
fuzzy one" (Norton 1995: 8). Using Robert Putnam's categorization (2000: 22), these "uncivil" 
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civilian groupings are "bonding social capital" typified by "inward looking and tend to reinforce 
exclusive identities and homogenous groups." 
Moreover, notwithstanding the romantic view of civil society as entirely independent of 
the state, the development of these stabilizing arrangements depends not only on forces in 
society, but on symbolic collaborations across the state-society divide (Evans 1996; Hefner 
2001). lt is precisely this state-society collaboration that made most Maluku's religious radicals 
willing to put their weapons down, and pursue the peace agreement in Malina of South Sulawesi 
in 2002. Although the Peace Pact does not guarantee the creation of enduring peace in the 
region, it was nonetheless a hopeful first phase for Maluku's Christians and Muslims in the 
pursuit of their future integration, stability, justice, and democratic stability. 
ln the next section (Part Four), 1 will turn to the discussion of Maluku's state and societal 
actors-Christians and Muslims-, religious leaders, and civil society groupings in the struggle 
of building peace in this archipelagic province. 
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Part Four 
Struggling for Peace: 
Religion, State-Society Collaboration, and Reconciliation 
"Some people said that involving the government in the peace process in Maluku is useless since it 
was part of the conflict. But for me, neglecting the role of government had resulted in efforts of 
reconciliation processes in pre-Malino period fruitless. If the government is part of the problem, then, 
it must be involved in its solution. In Ambon, religious leaders, civil society associations1 and the 
government worked together to create conciliation before and after the Malina II peace pact." 
Rev. l.j.W. Hendriks, former chairman of GPM Synod, 2001-2005. 
Introduction 
In Part Three, I have discussed the role of religion, both as normative discourses and 
social networks, in the Maluku sectarian conflict. Now, I will turn to depict uneasy attempts at 
building peace, reconciliation, and citizenship culture, either in the time of the collective 
violence or after the signing of the Malina peace pact in 2002 played by the region's social 
actors. There are three social groups or actors of reconciliation I want to analyze in this section: 
first, moderate religious groups (both Christians and Muslims); second, civil society agenciesns 
such as local NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), CSOs (civil society associations), women's 
groups, intra-village community leader unions, and voluntarily grassroots alliances; and third, 
government and state institutions. 
By presenting these three social groupings, this section aims at outlining various 
peace building initiatives taking place in Maluku ranging from religious peacemaking (attempts 
of creating sustainable peace promoted by religious leaders and associations), grassroots 
ns The separation of"religious leaders" and "civil society groups" in this chapter is only to 
make easier the description and analysis of this thesis. In fact, for the most part, in the context of 
Ambon, it is difficult to divide both groups since Ambonese religious figures had been part of (some) 
NGOs and CSOs (e.g. the Concerned Women's Movement ofMaluku, the Baku Bae Movement, or the 
Tim 20 Wayame) which promoted Christian-Muslim reunion. 
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reconciliation (the peace processes initiated by the agents of civil society and community 
leaders), to state-sponsored negotiation (the government's efforts to find the middle ground 
between the conflicting parties). This is to say that this section is intended to describe, not only 
the "reconciliation from below" but also the "reconciliation from above."119 Moreover it 
discusses the challenges pro-peace factions within Christianity and Islam faced against their co-
religionists who supported a continuation of the conflict. In addition, this section will explain 
Moluccan traditional practices of conflict resolution and indigenous social institutions of 
brotherhood. 
The aim of this section is to show that the Maluku case is not only about conflict, 
fighting, malice, and bigotry as portrayed by many political scientists and social observers (e.g. 
Pannell, ed. 2003; Adam 2009; van Klinken 2007, Bertrand 2002; Schulze 2002; Sidel2006), but 
also nonviolence, collaboration, reconciliation, and tolerance. Christians and Muslims in Maluku 
were not only involved in the warfare but also engaged in the peace process. Even during the 
wartime, there were a number of social groups and individuals that initiated interreligious 
gatherings, set off inter-group meetings, and tried to find peaceful solutions by using local ad at 
and traditions (e.g. Brauchler, ed. 2009; Pariela 2008). 
Prior to explaining endeavors of Maluku's social actors in building Christian-Muslim 
reconciliation, I will describe briefly traditional institutions of brotherhood and indigenous 
practices of dispute resolution in Ambon and Maluku customarily used by elders (tua-tua), 
119 The notion and popularity of reconciliation (Indonesian: rekonsiliasi) is a rather recent 
phenomenon. The term gains its fame after nations and people worldwide tried to cope with the 
aftermath of civil war, genocide, or a brutal dictatorship and deal with those who committed grave 
human rights violations. More specifically, the term "reconciliation" has received public attention 
after the successful effort of the "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (TRC] in South Africa. 
Sociologist and peace activist john Paul Lederach (1997] underlines four elements of reconciliation; 
these are truth, mercy, justice and peace. In a reconciliation handbook of the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, reconciliation is promoted as an umbrella term for the 
"over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice/ forgiveness, healing and so on. 
Reconciliation thus recently has become a key term in international conflict and peace discourse, yet 
one that remains insufficiently conceptualized and poorly understood. 
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village chiefs (raja, upu /attu, patti or orang kaya), and ad at leaders (bapa jou) in resolving 
individual and communal disputes. The depiction of these "local wisdoms" aims at highlighting 
the richness ofMaluku's traditions of building relationship, as well as native instruments of 
conflict resolution and social integration. Most of these traditional instruments were destroyed 
in the course ofthe disastrous Maluku wars of1999-2004. Such traditional mechanisms of 
reconciliation have also been used by present-day Maluku's conflict resolution practitioners, 
religious and community leaders, and government officials in settling recent Christian-Muslim 
communal conflicts. With the growing numbers of conservative religious militants in the post-
war Ambon that reject any idea of "irreligious cultures" or "ungodly traditions," these 
indigenous practices in turn have faced a serious challenge of its existence in the years to come. 
1 will divide this section into four chapters as follows. The first chapter (Chapter 8) 
discusses traditional institutions of brotherhood and indigenous practices of dispute resolution. 
The second chapter (Chapter 9) depicts various endeavors of reconciliation initiated by 
Christian and Muslim leaders. The third chapter (Chapter 10) describes Maluku's civil society 
institutions (CSOs) in their efforts of establishing peace and interreligious integration. The 
fourth chapter (Chapter 11) discusses the government responses towards peace building 
initiatives. More specifically, Chapter 11 discusses various efforts of a number of political actors 
in the government, both central and provincial or regional governments (Maluku and Ambon), 
in bringing the warring parties to the negotiation table. 
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Chapter 8 
Traditional Institutions of Brotherhood and Indigenous Practices 
of Dispute Resolution 
Maluku, comprised ofhundreds of islands referred to as the "Thousand Islands" (Seribu 
Pu/au), is blessed by "local wisdoms," traditions, and cultures (e.g. Deane 1979; Cooley 1961; 
Grimes 1993; Polman 1983). Among these traditional systems are indigenous means and 
practices of dispute resolution. Over a long period, Moluccan societies built and managed 
various social institutions to enable practical cooperation between individuals and communities. 
Moluccan ad at institutions, furthermore, had previously provided mechanisms for dealing with 
and controlling dispute and promoting reconciliation between different villages, individuals, and 
religious affiliations (Soselisa 2000: 69). 
As elsewhere in the world, for instance, thejirga in Afghanistan (Yousufzai and Gofar 
2005), the sulha in the Middle East (Abu-Nimer 2003), or the nahe biti in Timor-Leste (Babo-
Soares 2004), Maluku, particularly islands of Ambon, Central Maluku, and SoutheastMaluku, has 
a number of traditional institutions of brotherhood, as well as indigenous mechanisms of 
dispute resolution and reconciliation. These include, among others, gandong (lit. "uterus"), baku 
bae (lit. "be good each other"),jamili (lit. "family"), masohi (lit. "working together"), makang 
patita (lit. "communal feasting"), larvu/ ngabal (i.e. a customary law containing mechanisms to 
govern social relations in Southeast Maluku), and pel a (i.e. a pact of relationship between two 
villages in central Maluku). 120 
120 Because of these rich traditional systems ofinter-groupjreligious harmony1 the Moluccas 
had once been the example of interreligious cooperation and unity. When elsewhere in Indonesia had 
been caught by communal strife, President B.j. Habibie had also singled out Maluku as the model of 
religious tolerance. The flare-up of mass violence then appears to have caught Indonesia by surprise. 
Moluccans everywhere asked what happened to the traditional Christian-Muslim brotherhood and 
its safeguards like pel a. 
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Gandong ("uterus" or kandung in the Indonesian language), furthermore, is created on 
the basis of genealogical ties. Ambonese historian M. Nur Tawainella (cited in Amirrachman, ed. 
2007: 166-7) said that pre-modern society of Maluku was made up of swidden agriculturalists 
who migrated from place to place in order to find food, seek secure areas, avoid the attacks of 
other tribal enemies, or in short, to get a better life. As a result of this migration, members of one 
family very often lived apart in different villages, or even islands. As Christianity and Islam 
entered Maluku, the offspring of these relatives who lived separately in distant places 
sometimes embraced different religions. To restore their brotherhood, they formed a pact called 
gandong, aiming at safeguarding and helping each other as a family member. The shape of this 
gandong pact is accompanied by a pledge "your blood is our blood, your living is our living" 
(darah satu darah semua, hid up satu hidup semua). 
The institution of Gandong can involve more than two villages, for instance, the gandong 
relations between Siri-Sori Salam (Islam) and Siri-Sori Serani (Christianity) in the island of 
Saparua in Central Maluku, Tamil ow (Islam) in South Seram, and Hutumury (Christianity) in the 
Ambon city. According to the local oral tradition, their ancestors came from North Seram. The 
gandong relation between villages from different religions also happens between Seith (Muslim) 
in Ambon and Ouw (Christian) in Saparua. In 2005, Seith and Ouw conducted a ceremony called 
pan as gandong ("heating up the gandong") to restore their relations and ties destroyed by the 
preceding wars. 
Members of the gandong alliances were customarily obliged to help each other in times 
of need. It is considered to be disgraceful or dishonorable if one's gandong partners or villages 
held construction projects such as building mosques, churches, and bail eo, the village's central 
meeting place, or even social works and they do not help or participate in the project. They 
believed that if they intentionally do not assist their gandong partners, the ancestors will curse 
and punish them since thegandong pact was formed with a sacred oath in the name of their 
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forebears. The existence of gandong was then ritualized in a traditional song entailed Gandong, 
which, according to the Ambonese people, becomes "/agu basudara" (the song of 
brotherhood).121 
Another Maluku's social institution of brotherhood is called Jamili. Whereas gandong is 
the relation of brotherhood based on genealogical ties since the creation of a village (Malay-
Ambonese: a man or henna]Jami/i is formed on the basis of the same clan (Ambonese Malay: 
Jam or marga]. Moluccan tradition generally places Jam, derived from the DutchJamilienaam 
(Effendi 1987: 50], as the main family thereby one clan is regarded as one family. As members of 
one Jam migrated to other villages and married local women in their new settlements, the need 
to establish a system that could tie and preserve the spirit of brotherhood cannot be denied, 
albeit they might embrace different religions (Islam or Christianity]. 
The Jamili network not only exists in two or three villages, but many since they 
scattered to a number of villages, islands, and towns. The Jam Pelupessy, for instance, can be 
found in Siri-Sori Salam (Islam], Ouw (Christian], Paperu (Christian], Siri-Sori Serani (Christian], 
and various areas in Ambon town. This also happens with other Jamili, for instance, Maspaitella, 
Aipassa, Salampessy, Wakano, Limba, Manuputty, Tanamal, Latuconsina, Wattimena, 
Marasabessy, Toisuta, Tuasikal, Ely, Tuheleley, and many others. The members of these Jams 
have lived in a variety of places, not only in Maluku or Indonesia, even overseas, particularly in 
the Netherlands, where substantial numbers of Ambonese and Moluccan societies have settled 
since the 1950s (cf. Bartels 1977b, 1990]. 
121 Here are the lyrics of the song: Gandong Ia mari gandong; Marijua ale yo; Beta maju 
bilang ale; Katong dua satu gandong; Hidup ade deng kaka; Sungguh manis lawang e; Ale rasa beta 
rasa; Katong dua satu gandong; Gandong e sioh gandong' Mari beta gendong; Beta gendong alejua; 
Katong dua cum a satu gandong e; Satu hati satujantong e121 (Zx] 
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It is interesting to point out that, before the Maluku communal violence, members of the 
same Jam generally visited each other, especially during the Islamic holiday of Idu/ Fitri or 
during the Christmas, even though they had embraced different religions and lived apart. The 
Christians who have pel a, gandong, and Jam iii pacts with Muslims, moreover, provide special 
kitchen utensils and dinnerware such as glasses, plates, spoons, forks, woks, pans, cups, and so 
forth because Muslims are not allowed to eat pork or use any tools previously used for cooking 
pork or any prohibited meats. The aim of providing these special things is to respect their 
Muslim brethren. Not only Christians, the Muslims having pel a, gandong, or Jamili pacts with the 
Christians also provide particular kitchen and dining utensils for their Christian fellows in order 
to not contaminate and keep their dishes pure. Some Ambonese said that the spirit of 
brotherhood based on theJamili ties, is stronger than that of pel a or gandong in part because the 
members of this Jam consider themselves as core relatives (ke/uarga intz) (Amirrachman, ed. 
2007: 168-9). 
Masohi is another Maluku's social institution aiming at the provision of mutual aid, 
especially for those who have a ceremonial feast (hajatan), hold a party, or build a house. This is 
voluntary assistance so there is no social sanction against those who do not participate in the 
masohi. In addition, the masohi is occasionally used as a means of bridging two differing 
individuals or groups. To restore relationships and reconcile conflicting parties, Ambonese and 
Central Moluccan society also employed what they call baku bae, which was initially the peaceful 
spirit used in children's games to restore friendships after a quarrel. In 2000, inspired by this 
traditional practice of reconciliation, some religious leaders and nongovernmental organizations 
activists founded the Baku Bae Movement (Gerakan Baku Bae) which became one of the most 
visible civil society responses to the Maluku violence (e.g. van Tongaren, Brenk, Hellema, and 
Verhoeven, eds. 2005: 667-72). 
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Moluccan society, furthermore, has traditionally practiced makang patita ("communal 
feasting"). This is a term to refer to a tradition or custom of eating together or communal feast 
among Ambonese society, particularly those who live by the seashore (pesisir), aiming at 
creating unity, togetherness, and solidarity among Moluccan societies, as well as reconciling 
conflicting groups or restoring broken relationships among members of the society. During my 
dissertation research I also participated in this tradition held by the Christians and Muslims of 
Rumahtiga in Ambon Bay, Maluku's worst place devastated by the Laskar Jihad campaign. 
Before the ceremony that took place on March, 26, 2011, the organizing committee chair, jou 
Maspaitella gave an opening speech, "This patita (communal feast) of the sons ofNegeri 
Rumahtiga is held to re-strengthen our brotherhood (tali hidop orang basudara) established 
hundreds of years ago by our forefathers, Christians and Muslims. This event is also conducted 
to warn us that the past Christian-Muslim conflict in 1999 that destroyed our negeri and 
brotherhood was a dark history that cannot reappear in the future." After a welcoming 
reception, representatives of Christians and Muslims gave a short speech, followed by a closing 
ceremony, namely prayers by a Protestant pastor and a Muslim cleric, as well as handshakes and 
hugs symbolizing reconciliation. The last and the core of this ceremony is makang patita or 
eating together-Christians and Muslims-accompanied by singing and dancing to celebrate 
their renewed brotherhood. 
The most significant social institution still practiced in some parts of contemporary 
Ambon and central Maluku to restore broken relationship caused by conflicts and a means of 
reconciliation would be the pela122 (cf. Huwae 1995; Brauchler, ed. 2009; Soselisa 2000). While 
many other customs and institutions in central Maluku are quite the same with those found 
122 The word pela has various meanings including "brother" and "trusted friends." In his 
1881 work Van Hoevel commented: "Likewise it is true that today it [pela] has the meaning of 
brother, trusted friends. Yes this is even true in a very broad sense, so that when an Ambonese calls 
somebody beta poenja pe/a, he indicates a very close friendly relationship, even if they are not 
members of the same pela" (cited in Huwae 1995: 77-95). 
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elsewhere in Indonesia, the pel a alliance system was unique and thus evolved into a core 
identity marker, symbolizing both Ambonese identity and Moluccan Christian-Muslim unity. As 
such, pela had taken on an aura of sanctity among common people, particularly in the villages. 
The pel a, a system of relationships tying together two or more villages, often far apart and 
frequently on different islands, is also the most important institution integrating Ambonese 
society beyond the village level (Bartels 1977 a: 28-9; Cooley 1961: 260-72). Based on these 
reasons, in this chapter I will give a particular emphasis on the explanation of this vital social 
system, and describe how the Maluku communal conflict, added with political and religious 
processes before and after the violence, have weakened this institution. 
Pel a, conceived of as an enduring and inviolable brotherhood, is an inter-village alliance 
system in the islands of central Maluku (Ambon, Lease and Seram). Derived from the local 
bahasa tanah ("land language") peia, /aha and lui a, the original meaning of pel a is a pact of living 
with love, mercy, and compassion in the spirit of brotherhood (Takaria 2001: 55-6). The 
establishment of the pel a system was driven by various reasons, such as (1) to give help to other 
people/villages in times of crisis (e.g. natural disasters, wars); (2) to reconcile people involved 
in the fighting; (3) to strengthen kinship relations; and (4) to preserve the spirit offriendship123 
( cf. Soselisa 2000: 68-9). In order to keep the pel a tradition alive and to make the youths aware 
of their obligations toward their pel a partners, the pela alliances hold what the Ambonese 
society call pan as pe/a ("heating up the pela") periodically.124 A pel a is heated up when the 
participating villages feel that the alliance is in danger of sinking into oblivion, or is threatening 
to fall apart. But a pel a alliance can also be warmed up in times of economic despair or social 
"'Sylvia Huwae (1995: 77-92] underlines the various reasons of the creation of the pela 
system, including to prevent fights, to strengthen family ties, to conclude a peace treaty, to establish 
friendship, and to promote mutual trade. 
124 The ceremony of"warming up" the pela (biking pan as pela) varies from village to village. 
Dieter Bartels (1977a: 240-1] wrote, "In some alliances the pela is heated up at regular intervals, say 
every four to seven years. In others the ceremony is held about once in a generation, while in some 
cases the alliance has been passive for decades, or has lain dormant ever since its conclusion." 
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unrest (cf. Huwae 1995: 77-92). During the pan as pel a ceremonies, the population of all pela 
partners meets in one of the villages for as long as a week to celebrate their unity, accompanied 
by a renewal of the solemn sacred oaths, feasting, drinking, singing, and dancing. 
Anthropologist Dieter Bartels, who conducted dissertation research on inter-village 
alliances, religious syncretism, and ethnic identity among Ambonese Christians and Muslims in 
Central Maluku in the mid-1970s, argues that some of these inter-village alliances have their 
origins in the distant past, long before Europeans invaded the Moluccas in search of cloves and 
nutmeg (cf. Andaya 1993a; Amal 2010a, 2010b). Bartels (1977a, 1980, 2003), moreover, argues 
that the pel a started as an alliance system in the context of head-hunting. Villages, as well as 
clans, concluded these pacts to attack their enemies or to defend themselves against raids of 
others. They were also concluded to gain peace after a period of prolonged feuding between 
adversaries. Many pel a alliances date back to the 15th and 16th centuries, during which great 
confusion and uncertainty were caused by the advent of Islam, and then Christianity shortly 
afterwards. Early European reports, nonetheless, suggest that these pacts were only temporary 
until the earlier half of the 17th century (e.g. feuding could resume after a ritual uprooting of a 
banana tree, a symbol of permanence and continuity, which had been planted at the conclusion 
of a pact). During the Portuguese and Dutch conquests in the 16th and 17th centuries, moreover, 
the pel a system was utilized to resist foreign intruders, and to help each other in times of need. 
However, as a matter of fact, relatively few of the still existing pel a pacts were 
established during that period, often binding Muslim and (recently converted) Christian villages 
together. Many new pel a arose during the last desperate struggle against Dutch colonialism, the 
Pattimura War, which was led by Thomas Matulessy in 1817 (cf. Lapian, ed. 1982; Wairisal 
2005). After this struggle was lost and the region experienced an economic depression, pel a was 
utilized as an instrument to gain access to foodstuffs when many poor villages of Ambon-Lease 
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established ties with the sago-rich villages of West SeramlZS ( cf. Cooley 1961, 1987). In brief, the 
pela alliance was initially the outcome of specific historical events, the memory of which is still 
recalled in old songs and legends. In the first three decades of Indonesian nationhood, pel a was 
still in full bloom, mainly as a vehicle of Moluccan identity in the pan-Indonesian state and also 
to further village development without governmental aid. 
Although the number of alliances any village may engage in is unlimited, most villages 
have only one or two such pacts. A few ofthe traditional villages (kampung) along the inner bay 
of Ambon Island, as well as some newer villages, have none at all. In a few rare cases, pela 
alliances are concluded between clans from different villages. If a village has multiple alliances, 
each pact is treated as a separate unit. With the exception of Lei timor uplands of Ambon Island 
where several neighboring villages are engaged in such pacts, pel a partners live usually far apart 
and are often located on different islands (see Bartels 1977a; Cooley 1961). Most alliances are 
between Christian villages but a considerable number are between Christian and Muslim 
villages such as the Muslim Seith and the Christian Ouw, Wakal (Muslim) and Rumahtiga 
(Christian), or Batumerah (Muslim) and Passo (Christian). Purely Muslim pelado not exist. In 
contrast to Ambonese Christians who use ad at (i.e. practiced traditional beliefs and customs as 
they were instituted by the ancestors in pre-Islamic/Christian times) rather than their common 
religion to establish formal ties between villages, Muslims consider themselves all part of the 
Islamic community (umma) and thus find no need to further strengthen the ties among one 
another (e.g. Ruhulessin 2005; Iwamony 2010). There are, however, a few pel a, all based on 
genealogical ties, involving several Christian and Muslim villages and in this case the 
participating Muslim villages also consider each other as pel a partners. 
In the central Moluccan society, there are at least three sorts of pela. First is hard pela 
(pel a keras). The hard pela originated because of the occurrence of some major event usually 
125 Ambonese people refer to this pela as pe/a perut ["stomach pela") [Bartels 1977a: 142-4). 
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war-related such as the spilling of blood, undecided battles, or extraordinary help given by one 
village to the other. Villages having this type of pela include Aboru and Kariu (both Christian 
villages in Haruku Island), Booi (Christian) and Hualoi (Muslim), and Ulath (Saparua island) and 
Oma (Haruku, both Christians) (Cooley 1987: 183-88). The second kind ofpela is pela of the 
uterus (pel a gandong or pel a bong so). This pel a is based on genealogical ties, namely one or 
several clans in different villages claim common ancestry. This may lead to the conclusion of a 
pact between the villages from which the related clans originate. At this point, the idiom of 
kinship is transferred to everyone in the newly allied villages. An example of the pel a gandong is 
the alliance between the villages ofTamilou (a Muslim negeri), Siri-Sori, which is divided into 
Siri-Sori Serani (a Christian) and Siri-Sori Salam (a Muslim), and Hutumory (a Christian village). 
Dieter Bartels (1977a) argues that both hard pel a and pel a of the uterus (or genealogical 
pel a) generally function in a similar way. The two pel a are also concluded through a series of 
sacred ad at ritual ceremonies. There are some taboos and prohibitions for those involved in the 
pel a pact. Both pel a, furthermore, are concluded through a powerful oath which is backed up 
with a terrible curse upon any potential transgressor of the treaty. The participants then drink a 
concoction of palm wine called so pi and blood is taken from the leaders of the two parties, after 
the immersion of weapons and other sharp objects in it. These objects will turn against and kill 
any offender. The exchange of blood seals the brotherhood. The third sort of pel a is called soft 
pel a or pel a tempat sirih126 which is concluded after some minor event, such as to restore peace 
after some small incident or after one village does a favor for another. Pela relations of this sort 
are also established to facilitate trade relations. Examples of villages having this sort of pel a are 
Tiouw (Christian) and Asilulu (Muslim). 127 The depiction sketched above suggests that the pel a 
126 Tern pat sirih means "betel box." Sirih is a quid consisting of betel leaf, areca nut1 tobacco, 
and lime. 
127 Other types of pela are the marriage pela (pel a perkawinan] such as N oloth and Haruku, 
Alang (Leihitu] and Latuhalat (Leitimor], and the "younger-older brother" pela (pe/a ade-kaka) such 
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has territorial and genealogical features. lt is not only a system of inter-village allegiance but 
also inter-individual commitment (cf. Takaria 2001: 56). 
For most of the older generation in central Maluku, pela was previously conceived as an 
enduring and sacred brotherhood between all people of the partner villages. Bartels (1977a: 29; 
cf. Cooley 1961, 1987) highlights four main ideas underlying the foundation of the pel a. First, 
villages in a pela relationship assist each other in times of crisis (e.g. war or natural disasters 
such as earthquakes, tidal waves, or famines). Second, ifrequested, one partner village has to 
assistthe other in the undertaking oflarge community projects, such as building of worship 
places (churches and mosques), baileo (the negeri's main gathering center where village and life-
cycle rituals took place and where village problems were discussed and solved), and schools. 
Third, when individuals visit one's pela village, food cannot be denied to them, nor do 
they have to ask permission to help themselves to agricultural products which they can take 
home with them. And fourth, all members of villages in a pel a relationship are considered to be 
of one blood; consequently marriage between pela members is considered incestuous or taboo. 
Any transgression against these rules is severely punished by the ancestors who founded this 
institution. This punishment consists of sending illness, death and other misfortunes to the 
offenders, or even their children. Those who break the marriage taboo are, if caught, also 
paraded around their respective villages, dressed only in coconut leaves, with the villagers 
heaping abuse upon them.''" 
Dieter Bartels (2003: 128-153) argues that the pel a system worked still very well in the 
Central Moluccas (Maluku Tengah) from the end of World War II until about the 1980s. 
as Hutumory (Ambon, Christian], Siri-Sori Sarane (Saparua, Christian], and Tamilau (Seram, Muslim) 
(cf. Cooley 1987]. 
''"The soft pela is excluded from these rules. For the members of this pela, inter-marriage is 
allowed and any future help given is voluntary, and not backed up by ancestral sanctions. This is 
because the soft pela is concluded without an oath, and merely by exchanging and chewing betel 
together, a traditional custom of establishing friendship between strangers. 
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Ambonese anthropologist Hermien Soselisa who did fieldwork on tbe pel a alliance between two 
villages of different religious affiliations in a relatively small island of Buano in West Ceram of 
Central Maluku province reaches the same conclusion. Soselisa maintains tbat for a long period 
prior to tbe communal conflict, tbe orang serani (Christians) of Buano Selatan (South Buano) 
and the orang sa/am (Muslims) ofBuano Utara (North Buano) maintained their kinship 
relationship, even tbough they had been separated by different faiths and traditions. The 
inhabitants of tbe two villages regard each other as basudara (sibling), so it is considered 
incestuous (taboo) for tbem to marry each other. Several clan (mata rum a) names are found in 
both villages and tbe populations of the two villages still maintain tbeir close relations, 
attending rituals for building and repairing clan houses. Until about 30-years ago, local 
communities said, the building or repairing of the worship places (mosque and church) was a 
collective project because villagers felt tbat these religious buildings were owned jointly by botb 
communities (Soselisa 2000: 67 -82). 
However, it should be noticed, altbough the pel a system still worked well, particularly 
during pre-New Order Maluku, this does not mean that the Buano Island-as elsewhere in tbe 
Moluccas-was free of communal disputes. As argued in Chapter 3, the existence of pel a and 
other Moluccan traditional systems of inter-village alliances was itself related to tbe widespread 
practices of inter-group conflicts in the archipelago. Buano Island experienced the same tbing. 
As Hermien Soselisa shows in his piece (2000: 73-4), while living as neighbors, sharing tbe same 
origins but separated by choice on the basis of religious affiliation, the two villages have been 
historically involved in conflicts either caused by internal island disputes or as a result of 
regional conflict. In 1983, villagers oftbe two villages had again engaged in a brutal violence. 
The conflict was driven by a dispute over marine resources and resulted in the burning down of 
houses in Buano Selatan by a group of Buano Utara attackers. 
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After the 1983 tragedy Buano Utara was afflicted with several epidemic diseases, which 
were widely believed to be a supernatural consequence of the violence, which should not have 
happened between these two villages since they were tied by the pel a pact. The epidemic was 
seen as vengeance (bahala) of the ancestors for the attack on their kin, and the people argued 
that such conflicts must be avoided in the future. But, tragically, the people of Buano were again 
caught up directly in the recent fierce unrest when a group from Buano Utara attacked the 
Christian village of Alang Asaude on mainland Seram on December 3, 1999, resulting in the 
death of about forty people from both sides. Then, early on the Sunday morning of january 16, 
2000, apparently motivated only by religious identity, villagers from Buano Utara attacked 
Buano Selatan, destroying houses and the village ad at house, and burning the church. The attack 
caused the death of several Buano Utara people and destruction of most of the Buano Selatan 
settlement (cf. Soselisa 2000: 73-5). 
The Maluku conflict from 1999 to 2004 has been the most serious factor weakening of 
the inter-village alliance in Buano Island-and elsewhere in Maluku. Another factor that 
contributed to the deteriorating of the pel a institution included generational change. Buano 
Island's elders regard the young generations as having neglected the local ad at which plays such 
an important role in community's life. For the young people in Buano Utara, who had spent part 
of their life outside the island for schooling or working, the older people ofBuano were 
considered to be too tied to the old ad at beliefs and too backward. Besides this evident 
generation gap, factions in local politics were also an important factor in increasing tensions in 
community life and fading the pel a alliance. In Buano Island, as Soselisa (2000: 75) has noticed, 
political factions emerged and sharpened inter-village tensions. 
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Politics, Religion, and the Decline of Local Customs 
Indeed, politics does matter in its contribution to the decline of the pel a system. 
Attempts of the Indonesian government of political centralization and cultural uniformity since 
independence, and especially since the New Order, led to a general fear ofloss of a distinct 
Ambonese ethnic identity. In 1979, in a seemingly indigenous effort of, in Bartels' term (2003) 
"gleichschaltung," namely "to raze local customs and to bring everyone on the same wave 
length," the Suharto long-running regime issued a village government law or Undang-Undang 
Pemerintahan Desa (Undang-Undang No. 5/1979). This Village Law has in turn abolished the 
adat-based traditional system of village administration, replacing it with a completely new, pan-
Indonesian structure patterned after the Javanese system of village rule. The Village 
Government Law of 1979, juliet Lee (1997: 59-77) has argued, was intended to standardize the 
structures and procedures of village government throughout the country, and as a result, it has 
caused considerable conflicts and tensions in some parts of Indonesia, including Maluku since it 
took effect in 1985.129 Most of the conflict has focused particularly on the issue ofleadership, 
notably the position of the village head. 
Before the application of this Village Law, Ambon and Central Maluku-area villages had 
traditionally been governed by hereditary leaders, the raja, who worked in consultation with the 
saniri negeri, councils usually made up of the heads of the various subdivisions comprising each 
village. While these officials attend to political and legal matters, spiritual matters are overseen 
by the tuan tanah ("lord of the land"), which is also a hereditary position. The tuan tanah 
mediates between the people of the village and their departed ancestors and other spiritual 
powers of the land. The role of the tuan tanah is to safeguard the sanctity of the village, which in 
I29 In other regions outside Maluku there have also been problems with various aspects of 
the Village Law. In Sumatra, for instance, much of the conflict has centered on the way the law has 
redefined the village community, conjoining some villages and breaking others into several 
administrative units (e.g. Watson 1987), while in Bali the tension has surrounded the ambiguous role 
of the banjar and the banjar leader (e.g. Schulte Nordholt 1991). 
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this sense means not only the people and the land, but also the moral force that integrates these 
(Lee 1997: 69-70]. 
Religious matters in the village, furthermore, would be overseen by the pendeta 
(Protestant pastors] in Christian neged and imam in the Muslim negeri. Cooley's study (1961, 
1966] of the relationship between "altar and throne" (religion and government] in Christian 
villages describes these institutions as distinct and more or less independent of each other in 
part because the pend eta should be an outsider representing the authority of the Moluccan 
Protestant Church to whom they are answerable and by whom they are appointed ( cf. 
Maspaitella 2001]. This condition differs in the Muslim villages partly because the imam is a 
member of the local village elite, often from a respected specific lineage. 
By the implementation of the Village Government Law of 1979, all central Maluku's 
villages, traditionally called negeri,'30 were now forced to call themselves desa-the Javanese 
term for village. The traditional Ambonese villages are self-contained autonomous units. In 
Ambonese society, the negeri is the laq:;est organizational unit. Above this level, each village ties 
separately and directly into the national governmental superstructure which is beyond the 
realm of adat and thus beyond Ambonese society proper. The only other integrative body is the 
Moluccan Protestant Church (the GPM], an extremely well-organized institution covering both 
Maluku and North Maluku provinces. But, by its very nature, this institution is confined by 
religious boundaries and thus cannot serve overall integration. More gravely, as juliet Lee 
(1997) has said, the complete traditional village hierarchy based on heredity was 
disenfranchised and replaced with an elected kepala desa (village head, formerly raja) and an 
13o "Negeri" in the Malay language literally means "country" or "land." In Central Maiuku, it 
refers to traditional villages. In the traditional political system in central Maluku these villages were 
considered as independent entities which were called by the Dutch during the colonial period 
"dorpsrepublieken" [i.e. "village republic"]. It is also considered to be the largest political unit of 
Ambonese society, discounting the superimposed administrative structure of the Indonesian 
government These traditional villages are made up of a number of mostly exogamous patri-cians 
which randomly intermarry with one another. 
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elected village council Lembaga Musyawarah Desa and People's Resilience Council called 
Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (formerly called saniri negeri whose membership includes 
the raja, the soa heads called Sapajou and often their deputies, as well as a varying number of 
people occupying certain ranks in the traditional system). 
The kepala desa (kades for short) is an elected official who no longer needs to be from a 
specific village, and does not even need to be from the village, but merely to have resided there 
for at least four years. The Village Council is also not elected, and for that reason, the kades 
generally appoints its members. While the traditional office holders are usually the guardians of 
ad at and knowledgeable about village and pela history, the new village government officials had 
little or even no knowledge about these subjects, which put their own political authority and 
legitimacy into question ( cf. Lee 1997, 1999). By making no formal linkages between the kades 
and the spiritual and religious leadership, the Village Government Law of1979 allowed the 
political leadership of the village to operate completely independent of these, and severely 
undermined the authority and operative power of the religious and spiritual leadership. The 
effect of this order, without a doubt, was devastating to the region's local traditions and cultures. 
On one hand, the traditional leadership was rendered largely powerless in many, if not most 
villages. On the other hand, the new leadership was tied in closely with the country's overall 
governmental system which lent its legitimacy to their offices and made them personally 
dependent and answerable to the ruling Indonesian government. 
The resulting vacuum was filled partly by both Indonesian nationalistic ideology and an 
acceleration of Christianization and Islamization. This fact, in turn, led to a further erosion of 
Christian-Muslim relations. Since the mid-1970s, the trends toward increasing Islamization and 
Christianization of the respective local customs (adat) and traditions of the Ambonese society 
were already discernable. In his doctoral thesis that appeared in 1977, Dieter Bartels had 
already warned that religious polarization and other cultural processes such as purification of 
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the traditional Ambonese belief systems in Christian and Islamic terms will lead to its semantic 
depletion and thus undermine Christian-Muslim ethnic unity (Bartels 1977a: 330; cf. Bartels 
1976). 
What weakens and therefore threatens Ambonese local traditions and Maluku's future 
Christian-Muslim harmony is not only the purification of ad at as Bartels has argued but also the 
tendencies of proselytizing or converting other faiths which had been historically so strong in 
both Christian and Muslim communities ( cf. Chauvel1980, 1990a; Henken 2002; Aritonang and 
Steenbrink, eds. 2008) as well as the growth of religious militants, especially ex-Muslim 
jihadists, in post-wars Ambon. Rather than rejuvenating the local traditions, ad at customs, and 
the pel a institution, this conservative group tries to diminish the existing local cultures, blaming 
them as ungodly practices and opposing the spirit of Islam. As Abidin Wakano131 has noted, the 
conservative Muslim groups have always emphasized the significance of religion (Islam) over 
ad at stating that religion will bring a safety to those who embrace it, not only in this world but 
also thereafter, while ad at is only limited in this world. They have also tried to convince Muslims 
that religion can assure its adherents into the heaven, while ad at cannot guarantee its followers 
the same. 
Besides religious processes and developments described above, future cultural 
developments in the Central Moluccas will largely depend on the direction oflndonesian 
national politics. As a result of these religious and political processes, both Christians and 
Muslims had become aware of the threat that the ongoing religious polarization posed for 
Muslim-Christian unity. While urban politicians were fighting for the spoils offered by the new 
system, people at the grassroots level reacted to the twin threat ofloss of identity and social 
disunity by placing a renewed emphasis on pe/a, whose dense web spanning across the islands 
and religious boundaries was traditionally the major force of social integration. 
131 Interview with Abidin Wakano, Ambon, December 15, 2010. 
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"Pel a Gandong" and Adat Revivalism 
Whereas much of the traditional ad at was crumbling, pel a was experiencing a great 
revival in post-war Maluku, and became the ad at institution whose rules are most severely 
followed. Many urban intellectuals, religious leaders, conflict resolution practitioners, NGO 
activists, CSO leaders, politicians, and government officials also grasped the value of pel a in 
preserving a measure of cultural autonomy and ethnic unity. They seem to realize the damage 
that was done with the destruction of adat. A Christian institution, Yayasan Sa/a Waku (the Sala 
Waku Foundation), for instance, pleads for the "revitalization of organization and functions of 
the traditional village institutions" (Bartels 2003). The GPM Synod, Maluku's largest Protestant 
body, assuming that religion has become more a dividing force, has also taken the same stance, 
highlighting the significance of ad at revitalization for Christian-Muslim unity in the province (cf. 
Iwamony 2010; Ruhulessin 2005). In the post-wars Ambon, in particular, there has been a 
growing conversation on the idea of the application of pel a gandong beyond the village level set 
up by some campus academics, community j religious figures, and high-ranking bureaucrats. 
The discussion of the pel a gandong is not in the context of traditional genealogical 
alliances between certain Muslim and Christian villages. Rather, pel a gandong has suddenly 
become idealized as a sort of mythical pact of brotherhood encompassing the entire population 
of Ambon and Central Maluku. A Moluccan Muslim Jaw scholar, M. G. Ohorella, for instance, 
suggests that the concept of the pel a gandong needs to be modernized and formalized to become 
a new [integrating] force in a process of renewing Christian-Muslim relations. Ohorella 
envisions a pela system beyond the village level by creating first pela pacts encompassing all 
villages in a given provincial sub-regency (kecamatan) which eventually will be expanded to a 
system of alliances between the various kecamatan in the whole province, presumably including 
areas where pela has hitherto not been practiced. The whole process, he maintains, has to be 
given the force oflaw and officially sanctioned by the Maluku provincial government (Bartels 
2003: 128-53]. A major error of Ohorella's plan is that, like the Sal a Waku Foundation's 
proposal, it does not address how to remedy the causes that triggered the unrest. 
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This sort of pela gandong idea, moreover, was soon picked up by the media across the 
country and around the world hoping that this new (or renewed) type of the pel a system would 
become the "magical medicine" to heal the wounded. The problem is that there is no, and never 
was, such a pel a alliance that binds together the two religious groups beyond the village level. As 
well, the pela institution traditionally and historically only ties Ambonese or Central Moluccan 
society-either Christians or Muslims-in the village level. As a result, non-Ambonese migrant 
societies which have substantial numbers in Ambon city and some small towns in Central 
Maluku, for instance, the Butonese and Kendariese (from Southeast Sulawesi), Bugis-
Makasarese (South Sulawesi), Javanese Qava Island), Ban danese (Banda Island), the 
Southerners (SoutheastMaluku), Keiese (Kei Island), and Ternatans (North Maluku), have never 
felt tied to this pel a system. 
The question still remains: can this ongoing effort of ad at revivalism succeed in 
integrating the two opposing religious groups? It is imperative to underscore that traditional 
pel a alliances function on the village level alone and traditionally only tie the pela partners who 
have maintained this custom. Each pel a pact has a life of its own, separate from all other pacts, 
even from other pacts of any given village. Thus the notion of "scaling up" the pel a gandong 
beyond the village level and beyond the Ambonese society would have little impact on the 
Ambon's entire populace. Pel a pacts, as such, also had little influence on the politics of 
government, religion, and economy beyond the village level. However, although the pela has 
little influence on non-Ambonese society, it has been used in some villages in the Central 
Moluccan regency to restore their broken relationship due to the previous wars (e.g. Brauchler, 
ed. 2009: 97 -118). It is also worth noting that, in the Southeast Maluku regency (Kabupaten 
Maluku Tenggara], the stronghold of Catholic communities in Maluku Province, as Fr. Agus 
Ulahay, Pr (Pastor Agus) has noted, adat institutions (e.g.larvu/ ngabal) appear to have been 
( 
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successful in bringing a speedy resolution to the conflict there and a reconciliation of the parties 
involved (Catholics and Muslims).132 In Ambon, moreover, while a small number of villages 
having the pela pacts have conducted the pan as pel a ("warming up the pela"), others struggled 
to rebuild communication and relationship, and the rest are still reluctant to hold a ritual 
ceremony of rejuvenating the pel a alliance. 
Broadly speaking, the pel a gandong alliances and associated ad at institutions such as 
sasi (traditional environmental management strategies) and the like as mentioned above are 
undoubtedly historically important and have been a focus of peacebuilding efforts in the region. 
However, it is also important not to romanticize them or overstate their potential for promoting 
social cohesion, both in the past and in the future. As Bartels (2003) has noted, pe/a gandong has 
become a political discourse. Today's Ambon's political leaders and elite members of society 
imagine the pel a gandong as a sort of mythical or magical pledge of brotherhood covering all 
Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Maluku that can be used as a means of creating enduring 
peace. Even as its height, pela gandong did not, and was never meant to, ensure cohesion or 
integration between broad social groups across the region. 
132 Interview with Fr. Agus Ulahay, Ambon, june 24, 2010. Similar to Pastor Agus's 
observation, in North Maluku, conflict tended to be lower and inter-communal relations better in 
areas where adat institutions were strong. In the region ofMaba Selatan (East Halmahera), for 
instance, Christian villages were apparently protected from attack by Muslims, reportedly because 
the inhabitants (Maba and Buli) are indigenous people and belong to "one big family'' under the 
traditional authority of the Sultan of Tid ore and adat law. Peace agreements were made early on 
through the intervention of the village heads and ad at leaders. 
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Chapter 9 
Christian and Muslim Leaders and the Idea of Reconciliation 
In March 2001, aSidang Sinode, the highest forum in the GPM Synod for decision 
making, was held in Ambon city to appoint a new chairman of the synod of Moluccan Protestant 
Church (GPM-Gereja Protestant Maluku), the largest body of Protestant congregation in the 
Moluccas covering Maluku and North Maluku provinces. Throughout the Sidang Sinode 
Protestant leaders and the conference delegates split. One faction backed up Rev. Hengky 
Leleury, another supported Rev. I.).W. Hendriks to be the new leader of the Synod to replace 
Rev. Sammy P. Titaley. While Rev. Leleury represented the Protestant radical militant blocs who 
supported the war against Muslims, Rev. Hendriks represented the moderate camps of 
Moluccan Christians who stood for nonviolent and peaceful means of resolving conflict. Whereas 
Rev. Leleury in his campaign promised to use the Synod as a buttress of the wars against 
Muslims, Rev. Hendriks rejected to use (in his words "misuse" or "abuse") the Synod as an 
institutional support and financial resource of the fighting. 
The meeting was running with high emotion, depression, and anger since the beginning 
in part because each group tried to push their agenda in order to be accepted by the 
conference's members and participants. Each faction also wanted their man to win the votes. 
Outside the building where the conference took place (Gedung Sinode GPM, near main 
Maranatha Church) many supporters of both candidates cheered their champion. "We almost 
fought each other," Rev. jacky Manu putty told to me to illustrate the conference's circumstances. 
At the time, Ambon was still undergoing the bloody sectarian conflict so it is understandable 
why the meeting was running with high temper and frustration. The majority of the conference's 
delegates, finally, voted for Rev. Hendriks as the new chairman of GPM Synod (Ketua Bad an 
Pengurus Harian Sinode GPIY[j from 2001 to 2005. 
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The portrayal sketched above illustrates how Ambonese Christian leaders, as in the case 
in Islam, fell apart into two opposing camps: pro-war militants and pro-peace moderates. Since 
the beginning of the conflict, it should be noticed, both factions had competed over religious 
discourses and texts to seek a theological foundation or religious legitimacy for their deeds. 
Those who supported the war against the Muslims tried to legitimize their violent acts by 
quoting verses in the Old Testament that narrate glorious wars of Israeli tribes and their 
commanders such as Saul, David, and Solomon (see Chapter 7] as well as referring to particular 
history within Christianity that sustain the just war tradition (e.g. heroic stories of the Crusade, 
Constantine, and Augustine]. On the contrary, Christian leaders supported the ideas of peace and 
reconciliation tended to utilize, mostly, the narratives of jesus Christ and the Apostles, as cited in 
the New Testament, thatteaches love, forgiveness, and, definitely, peace. jesus' teaching "Love 
your enemy" (Matt5:44] had been influential among this group to legitimize their nonviolent 
movements. This anti-war faction, furthermore, tried to add the Ambonese local cultures of 
Christian-Muslim relationships (pel a, gandong, etc.] to the central debate about the significance 
of interreligious reconciliation. 
The battle of thoughts was thus on the stage since the early phases of the sectarian 
conflict. Ambonese social actors, by engaging in theological discourse, commentary, and 
exegesis, linked local social events to authoritative religious texts. For Ambonese Christians, 
however, these texts are not limited to Bible or Gospel but include the historical narratives of 
Christian-Muslim opposition, oral traditions of brotherhood history, and traditional systems of 
interreligious reconciliation. The difference lay in which traditions they chose. While the pro-
war radical faction tended to refer the local history of Christian-Muslim antagonism during the 
colonial time (from the Portuguese to the japanese), the anti-war moderate group tried to 
revitalize the indigenous institutions of Christian-Muslim cooperation (e.g. pel a). 
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It is interesting to note that the theological debate over the foundation of war and peace 
also occurred within Muslim communities. As discussed earlier in Chapter 6, the pro-war 
Muslim jihadists justified their jihad struggle against the Christians by citing particular verses in 
the Qur'an, the Hadith or prophetic traditions (Sunnah), and exegeses (tafsir) from certain 
religious scholars (ulama). They also referred to the Islamic historical accounts of Muslim 
resistance against the Christians (as in the case of Perang Sabil-the "war in God's path") and 
local narratives of the Muslim opposition toward Ambonese Christians and the colonizers, 
particularly the Portuguese and the Dutch (see Chapter 3). This group tended to undervalue 
Ambonese traditional systems of inter-village alliances dubbing these particular local 
institutions as ungodly traditions and un-Islamic practices, and accordingly they deemed these 
cultures as haram (outlawed) for Muslims to practice. 
In a similar manner, the pro-peace Muslim group linked their peace building initiatives 
and nonviolent movements to authoritative religious texts, either in the Qur'an, Hadith, or 
exegeses offuqaha (Muslim jurists), especially those having to do with Islamic tolerance, 
pluralism, and nonviolence. This group also sought the foundation of their actions by referring 
to particular historical reports of how Prophet Muhammad treated non-Muslims tolerantly and 
peacefully (e.g. the case of Fathu Makkah or the Opening of Mecca, a historical event that marked 
the triumph of the Prophet and Muslims over their opponents of Arab/Quraish tribes) and 
established close contacts with the Eastern Christians. 
This group, moreover, especially those of AmbonesejMoluccan origins, tried to channel 
their notions of interreligious reintegration by, again, connecting to the traditional practices of 
Christian-Muslim union and friendships since these were part of the "Moluccan Islamic 
traditions and cultures." The Ambon case thus provides a critical examination for Tala] Asad's 
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conception of Islam as a "discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding 
texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith" (Asad 1986: 14). For some Ambonese Muslims, conversely, 
the Qur'an and the Hadith are not the sole foundations of Islamic knowledge, but only part of it 
since they have valued local narratives, traditions, and cultures as integral part of their Islamic 
practices and values (cf. Bowen 1993). 
Christian Contributions to Peacemaking 
Apart from the debate pertaining to the religious justification of war and peace taking 
place in Ambon, religious contribution to reconciliation in the region is undisputedly enormous. 
Since the first outbreaks of violence, some religious leaders were involved in the reconciliation 
processes. While some religious radicals went to the combat zone by bringing weapons-
traditional or modern ones-to fight against the opposing religious parties, this anti-war 
religious group were busy trying to reconcile the Christians and Muslims. 
just four days after the initial outburst on january 19, 1999, a group of religious leaders 
from Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic faiths, together with local government and authorities, 
drove around Ambon city holding a "parade of peace" (pawai perdamaian). They invited the 
crowds to join the convoy and stop violence. Furthermore, an Imam of Al-Huda Mosque in 
Ahuru, Husein Toisuta, told me that since the early days of the conflict he had tried to set up 
contacts with the Christians to quell violence in his area. Along with other Muslims, the Imam 
visited Petra Church in Ambon town to hold a meeting with the Christians. The meeting was 
ended by an unwritten agreement to protect one another. This event was closed by makang 
patita bersama, a traditional ceremonial feast of eating together between two or more groups 
aiming at creating togetherness and reconciling the warring parties. Unfortunately, however, 
such an event was only a few days old when violence again broke out across the town. 
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One of the most remarkable collaborations between Christian and Muslim leaders took 
pla,ce in the Wayame village, a few kilometers away from the Pattimura airport. Although its 
neighboring villages (Rumahtiga and Hative) fell into the brutal conflicts, Wayame remained 
peaceful. Ambonese sociologist Tonny Pariela (2008) argued that the peace in Wayame was the 
product of intensive Christian-Muslim cooperation to protect the village from outside influences 
and provocateurs. Special credit must be awarded to the village's respected Ambonese religious 
leaders, notably Rev. john Sahalessy (Protestant GPM pastor) and Abdurrachman Marasabessy 
(Muslim imam), who had guaranteed security protection, and worked closely across religious 
boundaries to keep religious harmony in the village. To assure the security, the imam frequently 
visited churches in the village. In the churches, he promised to guard the Christian community 
from the Muslim attacks, telling that the Qur'an obliges the Muslims to be peaceful with all 
humans. 
Similarly, Rev. john Sahalessy regularly went to the mosques and prayer houses 
(mushalla) to pledge the Christian security protection of the Muslims. A participant of the Malina 
II peace pact, Rev. john Sahalessy is a prototype of nonviolent Christian militant. His large house 
in Negeri Lama on the seashore of Ambon Bay was burnt down by the Muslim rioters from 
jazirah Leihitu, while his properties were looted. His brother had also been murdered by the 
angry rioters. "This tragic event happened on the 19th of january, 1999," john Sahalessy told to 
me when I visited him in his modest house in Wayame in August, 2010. He noted that he does 
not know why his house and family became the target of the attackers. Many Christians at the 
time thought that he would take revenge, mobilizing his people to attack the Muslims. "But I 
thought that retaliation was useless, and cannot solve the problem. Conversely, I thought how 
this bitter tragedy did not escalate to my new home village: Wayame," john Sahalessy 
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explains.'33 Driven by this passion, he then began to organize the population in Wayame to 
shape a solid team consisting of Christians and Muslims that aimed at quelling conflict and 
preserving harmony in the village. This interreligious team was later known as "Tim 20" [Team 
of20), which became the foundation of the Wayame peace [see Chapter 10). 
In an attempt to prevent violence in his village, john Sahalessy established contacts with 
other Christian and Muslim leaders, not only in Wayame but also in the adjoining villages such 
as Hative Besar (Christian village) and Kotajawa [Muslim base). To be sure, his efforts to build 
conciliation were not always welcomed by Christians and Muslims. Rev. Sahalessy usually 
visited resistant religious zealots, either in houses or worship places, and then said, "You 
become a Christian when you are in a church, and you become a Muslim when you are in a 
mosque. Outside church and mosque, you are Moluccan and Indonesian. Accordingly unity and 
integrity as one nation and nationality should be preserved." Due to the successful story of 
Wayame, john Sahalessy said, many people around the world have come to this place stating 
that this village has become an "oasis in the desert" of the troubled Moluccan Islands. 
Ambon's female religious leaders also deserve mention in their endeavors of 
reintegrating the two conflicting groupings. A women group called Gerakan Perempuan Peduli 
(Concerned Women's Movement Group, see Chapter 10) which contributed to the peace 
movement in Ambon was initiated by local women religious leaders-Protestant, Catholic, and 
Muslim-including, among others, Sr. Francesco Moens, Sr. Brigita Renyaan, Rev. Margaretha 
Hendriks, Ece Pattinama, juul Pelu, Thurn Tayib, and Anisa Latuconsina. The establishment of 
this interreligious nonviolent movement was not merely driven by the desire to stop fighting but 
also by the religious mandate to message peaceful missions. Rev. Margaretha Hendriks in an 
m Interview with Rev. john Sahaiessy, Ambon, August 14, 2010. 
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interview with me said, "I was involved in this movement due to religious motivation to spread 
peace in this earth."134 
The Biblical texts that particularly influenced her involvement in the peace movements 
included 2 Corinthians 5: 18 as follows, "And all these things in this earth are from God, which 
by the way of) esus Christ He had reconciled us with Him, and had entrusted this service of 
peace to us." This verse, Margaretha Hendriks-Ririmasse said, "has made me feel of getting a 
mandate from God to create peace in this world." Another Biblical text that influenced her 
engagement in the movement was Isaiah 2:4, as follows, "He shall judge between the nations, 
and shall arbitrate for many people; they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their 
spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn 
war any more." For Rev. Margaretha Hendriks, this verse is regarded as "a vision about future" 
which is freed from war and violence. 
While Margaretha Hendriks was engaged in the reconciliation process along with her 
Concerned Women's Movement group, her husband, Rev. I.).W. Hendriks struggled to send 
Christian messages of peace and nonviolence through his GPM Synod. Upon his election as a new 
chairman of the GPM Synod, the largest Protestant congregation in Maluku and North Maluku 
provinces, in 2001, he began to reorganize structures of the GPM by pointing appropriate and 
anti-war persons to his team. As depicted in Chapter 4, during the chairmanship of Rev. Sammy 
Titaley (before the time of Rev. I.j.W. Hendriks), GPM Synod was accused by the Muslims to be 
the mastermind of the Ambon conflict. Rev. Sammy Titaley was charged of having mobilized the 
sympathizers of the RMS in order to be involved in the carnage. Although Rev. Titaley rejected 
this allegation, Muslims still believed it, and constantly portrayed the GPM as the prime mover of 
the Ambon bloodshed. 
134 Interview with Rev. Margaretha Hendriks, Ambon, july 30, 2010. 
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Now, the job of revitalizing the GPM was on the l.j.W. Hendriks' hands. Wben the radical 
factions of Protestants urged Rev. Hendriks to issue a sort of"jatwa perang" (a war order) and 
demanded the GPM Synod to support-institutionally and financially-to the warfare, he 
refused these demands because he wanted "God himselfto resolve the Maluku conflict." He 
continued to say, "Besides, as a Christian institution that follows the teachings of jesus Christ, it 
is disallowable for the GPM Synod to support and commit violence and killings."135 During the 
Rev. Hendriks period (2001-2005), the GPM focused on the societal empowerment to 
strengthen theological foundations for Christian nonviolence and peace teaching. 
The GPM, in particular, developed a churchly way (cam gerejawz] toward the collective 
conflict. Wbat Rev. Hendriks meant by a churchly way is the ways ofjesus in resolving violence, 
namely by using the means of nonviolence, peace, compassion, and love. "We, as the followers of 
jesus, and His capacity as the Head of Church, need to go behind Him. All Christians as the 
community of Church must be taught to practice these of jesus' teachings," Rev. Hendriks 
explains. He, then, quoted a few verses in the Gospel: "Love your enemies and pray for those 
who persecute you" (Matthew 5; 44) and "Blessed are the peacemakers" (Matthew 5: 9).lndeed, 
jesus, who was crucified after a dubious trial, refused to use violence against adversaries and 
lived a radical message of forgiveness and reconciliation beyond enmity. jesus never held office, 
never commanded armies, and refused to pass judgment. He was peaceful ( cf. Bartoli in Coward 
and Smith, eds. 2004: 147-66). 
To achieve his peaceful mission, this vibrant Protestant pastor began to carry out a 
series of nonviolent actions. He decided, at first, to meet the aged KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke 
(known Ustad Polpoke), a respected Ambonese Muslim leader from Nahdlatul Ulama, to talk 
about the possibility of interreligious dialogue, a dialogue that could possibly bring peace to the 
city of Ambon and the whole archipelago of Maluku. Due to his decision to work for peace with 
135 Interview with Rev. I.j.W. Hendriks, Ambon, june 23, 2010. 
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Muslims, Rev. Hendriks experienced harsh treatments from the Christian hardliners and some 
grassroots commanders. In the early phases of sectarian conflict, Rev. Hendriks points out, 
talking about peace and reconciliation was taboo. Rev. Hendriks asserts, "What they thought of 
was only fighting and defeating the Muslims. For these militant groups, the Ambon conflict was 
perceived as a religious war and sacred battle." For that reason, Rev. Hendriks' position 
presented a dilemma: on one hand the GPM Synod and some elite members of the Protestant 
church supported peace negotiations and Christian-Muslim dialogue while the grassroots (a 
term referring to Christian fighters], including some pastors and vestries, agreed to engage in 
the warfare which they saw as a sacred duty of Christians. 
However, Rev. Hendriks and his colleagues in the GPM Synod were committed to dealing 
with the conflict through nonviolence and dialogue. "During my time in the Synod, we had one 
voice in responding to the conflict, a voice of anti-violence and pro-peace," Rev. Hendriks 
asserts.136 The Synod's response to conflict through nonviolent ways was formalized and 
legalized in the Sidang Sin ode. In this Sidang Sinode it was discussed about the significance of 
renewing the theology of church (of GPM]. "In Christianity," Rev. Hendriks emphasizes, "the 
position of theology is crucial because it guards the church and Christians in their daily 
individual actions and social life." Noting the centrality of theology within Christian 
communities, Rev. Hendriks then proposed the notion of a pro-life theology (teo/ogi pro-hidup] 
antithetical to the theology of just-war developed by the pro-war Christian militants that valued 
martyrdom in defense of religion. 
The choice of this sort of theology was motivated, Rev. Hendriks argued, by the 
conviction that "over the course of the conflict life was undervalued and worthless. Chicken was 
more valuable than humans. Muslims who entered Christian areas were killed, and Christians 
lost in the Muslim centers were murdered. It seems that everyone had the right to eliminate 
136 !nterview with Rev.l.j.W. Hendriks, Ambon, june 23, 2010. 
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other lives on behalf of religion and God." During this difficult time, Rev. Hendriks, then, put 
forward this theology of pro-life stating that "living is valuable as bestowed by God; accordingly 
no one has the right to take human's life. This means that peace must be achieved because, 
respecting lives means acknowledging the plurality of lives including ad at." Rev. Hendriks 
explains that some Christians feel that adat is separated from Gospel, meaning that ad at is 
considered to be an ungodly thing, whereas in fact ad at is part of human cultures, and therefore 
part of God's gift that must be cherished. 
Along this line, Rev. Hendriks suggested the Christians, particularly the members of 
GPM, to esteem-and practice-pel a andgandong (and other local positive traditions and 
cultures) as part of God's will to the Ambonese society. Although Rev. Hendriks does not 
recommend the Christians venerate Ambonese ancestors, he nonetheless commands them to 
safeguard their cultural heritage. Rev. Hendriks asserts that this notion has become not only his 
vision, but also the vision of church since it had been decided in the Sidang Sinode as the highest 
forum for decision-making within the GPM. The GPM Synod's vision of pro-life theology was 
then followed up and socialized in the lower levels of GPM meetings: Sidang Klasis (GPM 
meeting at district level) and Sidang ]em a at (the GPM conference at village level) throughout the 
Moluccas. 
Under the leadership of Rev. Hendriks, as part of the implementation of his pro-living 
theology, the GPM Synod chose a five-year-guiding theme entitied "Find God You will Live" 
which became ajuklak ("practical guide") and]uknis ("technical guide"), a sort of set of written 
rules, for the Protestant church and the Christians in their everyday life, and for pastors in 
composing Sunday sermons (khotbah Minggu).137 Rev. Hendriks explains that this topic was 
13
' The GPM has a tradition that every five year the Synod selects a theme that becomes a 
guide (or "rules") for the church and the Protestants for five years under the new selected GPM 
Synod chairman. The theme was approved by the delegates of the Sidang Sin ode that took once 
within five years. 
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derived from the words of Amos in the Bible: "Seek the Lord and Live ... " (Amos 5:6). This verse, 
Rev. Hendriks has argued, indicates how valuable the living is. Amos, who was among the 
shepherds of Tekoa, appeared when Israeli Kingdom was split into two smaller empires: North 
and South Israel. 
During the time of Amos, Rev. Hendriks clarifies, the Israeli Kingdom was prosperous, 
but unjust. Only elite members of the Israelis enjoyed the prosperity, whereas ordinary people 
lived in poverty, and even were treated unfairly and violently. The tendency Amos criticized at 
the time is that the elites routinely conducted religious practices and rituals in the worship 
places, but they had no social responsibility. In other words, they were "good with Lord but bad 
with humans." Based on this situation, Amos, who lived in the days of King Uzziah of Judah and 
of King Jeroboam son of)oash, demanded the common folks of Israeli tribes to "seek the Lord" 
(notin the worship places as the Israeli elites did but in somewhere else) so that they will find 
"living" (i.e. justice and prosperity). 
Besides pushing the GPM to implement what he called pro-life theology, Rev. Hendriks 
held a sequence of nonviolent actions including a plan to conduct fasting for three days in front 
of the provincial government office as a symbol of protest toward the ongoing deadly sectarian 
conflict and the government's fruitless response. He talked about his plan to his wife, Etha 
Hendriks-Ririmasse, hoping to get her permission. His wife not only gave permission but she 
wanted to join her husband in the fasting as well. After having permission from his wife, Rev. 
Hendriks headed off the Maluku administration office, wearing a clerical suit (baju pend eta) and 
bringing the Bible. He put a carton paper written with "Stop Violence" on his body. After 
reaching the government office he sat alone under the flagpole of Indonesian flag while closing 
his eyes and praying to God to end the hostility. After a few moments, some pastors and elite 
members of the GPM joined him. 
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Governor Saleh Latuconsina, then, came down to meet this GPM Synod leader, embraced 
him, and said, "1 can feel what you felt, let us solve together this conflict." It is imperative to 
notice that Rev. Hendriks' demonstration was not part of what james Scott (1987) called, 
"protest of the weak." But rather it was a protest of a faithful person having deep 
understandings of conflict resolution, religious knowledge, and Christian practices. As a 
dominant religious group in Ambon city, the Protestants could-and did-fight against the 
Muslims until the last minutes. However, Rev. Hendriks believed that there is no winner in 
warfare, as Indonesian aphorism states, Menang jadi a rang kalah jadi abu ("winning becomes 
charcoal losing becomes dust"). 
Rev. Hendriks certainly realized that his action was ineffective and indeed failed to stop 
violence, but it was not useless. His main intention of doing this action was to send a message to 
the public-both Christians and Muslims-a memo about the GPM's vision of nonviolence and 
peace. This was a sign that the Ambon carnage should be resolved through peaceful and 
nonviolent means. This protest also symbolized that the Synod did not want blood spilled on 
Ambon and Maluku. "At least, by doing this action, people, including the government, knew our 
vision," Rev. Hendriks said. Rev. Hendriks' action was significant in part because he was the 
leader of the largest Christian group in Maluku. 
From its inception, Rev. Hendriks' peace movements involved a variety of religious 
groupings, not limited to the GPM, including the Muslims, Catholics, and the Pentecostals (e.g. 
churches of Bethel, Pentecost, and Bethlehem). Over the course of the conflict, Rev. Hendriks 
said, Christians from various congregations were united. That was the era of "honeymoon" 
among Christians and churches in Ambon. The Pentecostals held a peaceful and nonviolent 
protest in the form of fasting and living in each house for three days to commemorate what they 
called, "the gloomy day." 
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In attempts to reintegrate Christian-Muslim who were in conflict, furthermore, Rev. 
Hendriks collaborated with the government. He believed that without the involvement of the 
government and state authorities, efforts ofpeacebuilding and reconciliation would be fruitless 
and limited success. He noticed the failure of civil society-supported pre-Malina II interreligious 
meetings was due to lack of support from the government and authorities (I will discuss this 
issue in the following chapter). No doubt, Rev. Hendriks' endeavors helped to pave the way 
toward the signing of the Malina II peace deal. However, it should be noted, his efforts were not 
limited to the period before the Malina II but continued afterwards, attempts that later on were 
continued by his successor: Rev. Dr. john Ruhulessin. 
A liberal minded Protestant leader, john Ruhulessin was elected to be the new leader of 
the GPM Synod in 2005 with the support of the progressive faction and the youth. With this 
support, he was able to defeat his senior Protestant pastors: Rev. Sammy Titaley and Rev. j. 
Ospara. john Ruhulessin is not a new comer in the GPM. When Rev. Hendriks became the 
chairman of the GPM Synod in 2001, john Ruhulessin was elected to be the new leader of 
Angkatan Mud a GPM (the youth wing of the GPM). Like Rev. Hendriks, john Ruhulessin was 
involved in the reconciliation processes since the first phase of the conflict. just two days after 
the first outbreak on january, 19, 1999, john Ruhulessin was appointed by Governor Saleh 
Latuconsina to be one of the members of the so-called Tim 6 (Team of 6), which was a team 
comprising six Moluccan religious leaders from Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim faiths. They 
were john Ruhulessin, Thos Laelosa, Thamrin Ely, Lutfi Sanaky, Fr. Agus Ulahay, and Richard 
Ufie. 
Shaped by the local government, this team aimed at finding the root causes of the bloody 
incident and the possible way to stop fighting. Later on this team was transformed to become 
the Pus at Rujuk Sosial (FRS), a sort of reconciliation center, which involved a broader 
community including political, traditional, and youth leaders, as well as government officials. In 
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a conversation with me, john Ruhulessin explains thatthe major tasks of the PRS included 
finding acceptable solutions for both parties and coordinating with all elements of society and 
government concerned about the peaceful resolution of the collective conflict. This team, john 
Ruhulessin claimed, was an embryo of the Malina 11 peace accord. Moreover, under the headship 
ofjohn Ruhulessin, Angkatan Mud a GPM (AMGPM), which previously had been used to support 
the war, was transformed to become the vanguard of intergroup reintegration by building 
intensive communication with key elements of Muslim society and non-GPM groupings. A 
graduate of Satya Wacana Christian University, john Ruhulessin is a courageous man who has 
wide-ranging contacts from elites to the grassroots, a network that later he utilized to sustain 
the idea of reconciliation. To accomplish his mission, he visited trouble spots, including in the 
Muslim areas, to defuse tensions and tried to pacify the militants.138 
One of the major contributions ofjohn Ruhulessin during his period in the GPM Synod 
(from 2005 until now) 139 was his rigorous endeavors to transform Ambonese local cultures of 
brotherhood and sisterhood (pel a andgandong) into Christian practices and theological 
concepts of GPM. He tried to bring these indigenous customs that were formerly tied, and were 
practiced by, two or three villages into wider perspective encompassing all Moluccan societies 
across regional, cultural, and religious boundaries. He proposed the notion that Ambonese social 
institutions ofpe/a andgandong should be elevated to become the foundation of public ethic for 
Moluccan society as a whole, an ethic that, hopefully, could bring together all people in Maluku. 
This idea of pe/ajgandong as a public ethic was written in his doctoral thesis in the Graduate 
School of Sociology of Religion, Satya Wacana Christian University. In the introduction of his 
dissertation (Ruhulessin 2005: iii), he wrote, "The basic assumption of this study is that the pela, 
as a living world, local genius, and the root of common morality born from the paradigm oflocal 
1
" Interview with Rev. john Ruhulessin, Ambon, September 1, 2010. 
139 john Ruhulessin was reelected in the second period as Chairman of GPM Synod in the 
Sidang Sino de held in 2010. 
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community, has strong principles of public ethic. The plea, thus, can be used as the basis for a 
perspective of contextual and applicable public ethic within the contexts of togetherness for the 
sake of goodness and integrity of all societies in the Maluku provinces." Thus the desire to lift up 
the pel a into the public ethic of Moluccan societies was driven by his passion to integrate or 
reunite the people in Maluku who were previously separated by the war. 
To attain the ideals of this "transformed pela," john Ruhulessin developed two distinct 
approaches. First, for the internal Christians (GPM in particular), john Ruhulessin developed a 
concept of Christian theology that covers Maluku's positive ad at practices. In brief, he tried to 
provide religious rationales for good Moluccan customs, meaning that he attempted to cloak 
profane cultures with religious garb, a sort of theological transformation of adat-pela. 
Commenting on the GPM efforts to transform ad at, john Ruhulessin notes: 
"First, it is a must for the church to transform its understanding about local culture. 
Until now, there have been many different points of view in seeing local culture. 
Some people see the pe/a as paganism because it comes from ones ancestors. Other 
people, including me, understand that the pel a must be [viewed in] the context of 
[central] Moluccan [society]. I see the pel a as a common ground morality through 
which people will be helped to live together. The pel a must be a principle of ethics in 
the Moluccas. In order to help to develop the pel a, the church needs a new method in 
developing theology. Therefore, the church must take a clear position and 
perspective about the pel a. Unfortunately, we have no special theological study of 
the pe/a yet. Second, principally, local cultures have values. For the GPM, Christ 
transforms culture. The GPM takes an open view on local culture. Local cultures 
always develop. A culture is not static. The participants of a pela are also in the 
process of becoming" [cited in Iwamony 2010: 94). 
The GPM Synod's attempts at providing theological explanations oflocal ad at practices 
created questions of pros and cons among the Protestants140 in part because the ad at had long 
140 The following is the observation of Victor Untailawan, the Secretary-General of the Board 
of the GPM Synod, with regard to the divided opinions among the Ambonese Protestants regarding 
the perceptions of adat. "We have to categorize local wisdom into three types. First, local wisdoms 
which support the Gospel. GPM must develop those types in doing its mission work in the Moluccas. 
Second, local wisdoms which have spiritual value but are against the Gospel. This kind must be 
transformed. For instance} believing in ancestors. According to me, believing in ancestors has power 
but it must be transformed. Moluccan Christians have received the Gospel for more than 450 years 
but it has not changed their points of view about ancestors yet. Third, local wisdom which is against 
250 
been regarded by the missionaries (both Dutch and Ambones e) as paganism opposite to 
Christian theology and teachings, and therefore it was suggested the Christians abandon it (cf. 
Aritonang and Steenbrink, eds. 2008; Cooley 1961; Bartels 1977a). As a result of this avoidance, 
the positive aspects of local cultures and traditions (e.g. the spirit offriendship shaped by the 
pela) could not be advanced either by Moluccan Christians or Muslims in order to form their 
religious lives. Both relate well in the sense of being Moluccan people only. They are not able to 
see and accept the values that existed in their local culture. They fail to view it as a good form of 
life that could be expanded in their religious lives. 
As a consequence, they tend to make a distinction between being a Moluccan and being 
a religious person. Moluccan Christians, for example, follow a common cultural custom to attend 
Islamic religious ceremonies in a mosque, and Moluccan Muslims attend Christian religious 
ceremonies in a church. However, this is only understood as a Moluccan action: "It is not a 
Muslim activity or a Christian one, but it is a Moluccan activity," said some Ambones e. This 
implies a dualistic understanding of their life. On one hand, Moluccan Christians and Moluccan 
Muslims think that their religions do not teach them to have a good religious relationship, while 
on the other hand their cultural life encourages them to maintain good religious relationships. 
As religious people, both Moluccan Muslims and Moluccan Christians must live according to 
their respective faiths. They do not see any relationship between the cultural and the religious 
aspects of their life (Iwamony 2010: 114-5). This is the underlying reason for the need of 
"theological transformation of pel a" among elite members of GPM. 
Christian faith and cannot be transformed. The GPM must reject this type. For instance, healing by 
mystical practice. There are some positive aspects in local cultures which can be accepted. In my 
opinion, pela-gandong has the same meaning as brotherhood-sisterhood relationship. The 
participants of a pela-gandong who live in a brotherhood relation must continually extend this 
relation. Now, the church accepts positive cultures as examples of God's work in the Moluccas. Those 
positive cultures indicate that God has already worked in the life of Moluccans before they accept the 
Gospel. The fact that God has already worked in the Moluccas can be seen in those positive cultures 
which have the same values as Biblical messages" (quoted in Iwamony 2010: 94-5). 
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Despite some oppositions, particularly from the conservative Protestants, nominal 
Christians, and old generations, john Ruhulessin and his colleagues in the GPM Synod continued 
to promote the idea that local cultures must be appreciated since these are part of God's work. 
In the words of Rev. Margaretha Hendriks-Ririmasse, vice chairman of the GPM Synod, 
"Moluccan societies have developed their theology through local culture. God works through 
local culture or more precisely, God works in the life of Moluccan people to develop the notion of 
intergroup relationships in the forms of pel a and gandong." Accordingly, Margaretha Hendriks 
argued, "GPM tries to develop local cultures and wisdoms as the basis for developing theology." 
It is not my intention to further discuss this issue since this is not the main focus of my 
study (cf. Ruhulessin 2005; Iwamony 2010), but it is sufficient to say that, for the GPM, a 
theological transformation is necessary to show how central Moluccan cultures like the pel a can 
be interpreted by Christians in such a way that first, it can increase Christian-Muslim relations, 
and second, it can open up itself for outsiders (outside the pel a pact members). The GPM's 
theological transformation is built based on the idea of the crucified Christ. 
Through the eyes of the crucified Christ, the pel a can only work in the multicultural 
society when its participants and the Moluccan people as a whole are able to comprehend it in a 
new perspective. To reach wider Christian groupings and congregations, as well as in order to 
be understood by the Protestants, this new vision and viewpoint of GPM was systematized and 
broken down into systematic topics, and then published in journals and bulletins (Binajemaat 
and Essau). These publications were distributed to all GPM churches throughout Maluku and 
North Maluku. These monthly journals and bulletins, then, have been utilized by pastors and 
church ministries as a "guiding theme" in the Sunday sermons, as well as religious discussions 
and meetings. 
In addition to building up a new concept of theology that includes the pel a in order to 
attract the Christian audience, john Ruhulessin-and the GPM Synod-also tried to expand the 
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notion of pela as a common value of brotherhood beyond ethnic and religious lines. This second 
approach, in particular, was intended to reach the Muslims-whether Ambonese/Moluccan or 
not, settlers or migrants. To be sure, Muslims' responses toward this idea vary. For some 
traditional Ambonese /central Moluccan Muslims having pelajgandong alliances in this way is 
received with great appreciation. However, for the reform-minded Muslims [Ambonese or not) 
and the migrants such an idea was met with cynicism or even mockery. Apart from these 
differences and results, however, john Ruhulessin and the GPM efforts for reconciling the 
divided Christians and Muslims must be valued. 
Rev. jacky Manu putty, a Hartford Seminary-trained GPM pastor, is another elite member 
of GPM who played a central role in the process of pacification and reunification. Although he 
admitted that, at first, he was also engaged in the warfare, whether in the form of giving support 
for Christian combatants or leading a prayer for the fighters before they went to the battlefield, 
jacky Manu putty later on became one of the Christian peacemakers and activists that greatly 
contributed in the process of Christian-Muslim reintegration. Over the course of the conflict, he 
joined the Bake Bae Movement, one of the civil society groupings in Maluku [founded in 2000) 
that played a role in bringing Moluccan leaders into subsequent meetings outside Maluku to 
discuss the possibility ofresolving the Maluku conflict [see the next chapter). Due to his later 
engagement in the peace process, he was accused by the Christian radical factions to be "judas" 
[the traitor in the Christian history) who sold Christianity to Muslims. His house was also 
destroyed and burnt down by the Christian militants. jacky Manu putty also headed a GPM Crisis 
Center to examine the development of conflict and to coordinate with other elements of society 
concerned about a peaceful Maluku. 
More importantly, he led the Lembaga Antar-Iman Maluku [LAIM), Ambon-based 
interfaith center founded by a coalition of Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim leaders, with the 
support of the local government. The Center had been a melting pot for religious leaders 
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concerned about the Christian-Muslim reconciliation. Designed as a learning center for 
pluralism, the Center tried to "realize a sustainable interfaith interaction mechanism at each 
social segment in order to create mutual understanding, trust, and tolerance for the sake of 
social recovery." LAIM creates institutional capacity-building programs, develops positive public 
discourse, and builds a network of pluralistic conflict prevention observers. Using a multi-
level/stakeholder approach, LAIM builds interfaith peace groups of journalists, women, 
religious leaders and students. Driven by religious-based segregation that hit most areas of 
Ambon and Maluku as well as the image of Maluku as the hotspot of Indonesia's interreligious 
conflict, the initiators of the Center wanted to create Christian-Muslim harmony and tolerance in 
the region. 
In coordination with other CSOs, this interfaith institute also held a series of significant 
programs of society empowerment, community development and interreligious cooperation. 
Through the Center, Jacky Manu putty organized movements called "peace provocation," as well 
as conducted peace sermons in both churches and mosques and live ins where Christians and 
Muslims stayed in one place for a few days to share thoughts and experiences, aiming at 
minimizing misunderstanding and maximizing mutual trust. In addition, Rev. Jacky Manu putty 
and his colleagues have developed a peace curriculum, a program of interfaith peace sermon 
and a trauma healing. Last but not least, Jacky Manu putty organized meetings of child soldiers-
both Christian (Agas) and Muslim (Linggis) kid militia groups-to pacify and weaken their 
violent actions.141 Due his tremendous contributions to the peacemaking process, Rev. Jacky 
Manu putty has been awarded as "the 2012 Peacemakers in Action Award" by New York-based 
Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding. 
141 Data used here based on my conversations, online chats1 and email correspondence vvith 
Rev. jacky Manu putty. There are indeed a number of Protestant leaders who played a vital role 
during the conflict. However, due to limitation, I also discuss some of them. 
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Whereas GPM focused on the domestic issues of interreligious reconciliation and 
societal empowerment, the Catholics played a role in bringing international and national 
societies to help find a peaceful solution for Maluku. They also contributed in the Protestant-
Muslim reunification by being involved in various pro-peace CSOs and NGOs. Although there are 
a number of Catholic figures who contributed to the peacemaking process in Maluku, three main 
Catholic leaders deserved special mention for their substantial role in attempts of Christian-
Muslim reintegration. They are P. C. Mandagi (Bishop of Diocese of Amboina), Fr. Agus Ulahay 
(head of Catholic Crisis Center), and Sr. Brigitta Renyaan (Catholic head of Caring Women's 
Movement), all of whom had been the Catholic representatives in the Malina !I peace concord. 
Sr. Brigitta Renyaan was actively involved in the peace movements through an interreligious 
women group she co-founded: Gerakan Perempuan Pedu/i (Concerned Women's Movement). 
While Bishop Mandagi mostly established contacts with the international communities 
and associations, as well as with top leaders of the Ambonese societies and high-ranking 
bureaucrats, Father Agus Ulahay worked closely with Maluku's pro-integration civil society 
agents, including human right activists, conflict resolution practitioners, journalists, and the 
grassroots. As a chief of Catholic Crisis Center, Father Agus, with the help of j.C. Boem, was also 
responsible for media coverage reporting and updating Maluku's current situations, IDPs, peace 
movements, and reconciliation progress. Farther Agus, along with other religious leaders such 
as john Ruhulessin, jacky Manu putty, Thamrin Ely and so forth, also mobilized resources for 
lobbying, pressured concerned groups to establishing sustainable peace in the region, and tried 
to cut off the provocateurs. Father Agus Ulahay states, "The Maluku conflict is like a swing. The 
Moluccan people were put on the swing, and then they were swung. Later these religious leaders 
came in, but soon they were expelled from the pendulum. After the religious leaders were out of 
the swing the provocateurs returned and swung the people again. I thus thought to cut the 
swing, meaning limit and weaken the provocateurs' movements. If we failed to fade them, we 
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sought more powerful leaders to stop these conflict actors. In brief, we strengthened a 
movement to end fighting."HZ 
The role of Bishop Mandagi included sponsoring a series of visits to international 
locations and groupings. Bishop Mandagi, accompanied by a number of Ambonese leaders, 
visited a number of international societies and institutions such as European Unions, the United 
Nations, European parliaments in France, England, and the Netherlands, the American Senates, 
Australian government, and the papacy in Rome. Bishop Mandagi told:"! met the late Pope john 
Paul II three times to discuss the Maluku problems. The Pope, then, mobilized masses at the 
square of Santo Petrus (Saint Peter] to pray for the peace in Maluku. The Pope also instructed 
the Vatican Ambassador in the UN to back up my ideas to end violence and build peace in 
Maluku."143 These international societies and organizations, in turn, pressed the Indonesian 
government to seriously solve the Maluku clash. Having stronghold in the regions of Southeast 
Maluku, particularly Kei and Tanimbar, Catholics remain a minority-but nonetheless 
significant-in Ambon town numbering 10,000 followers. Although Catholics are minority 
religious groups in Ambon, Bishop Mandagi said, "we have international power and networks, 
and I used this power to help create peace in Maluku." 
In addition, the bishop added, "I have spiritual strength and 'heart movement' 
[compassion, spirit, and empathy] so that the people heard my voices." Indeed, Catholics' 
position in Ambon is interesting to discuss since these groups, at first, could play as a mediator 
between the two main conflicting religious groups: the Protestants and Muslims. Bishop 
Mandagi-as well as Father Agus and Sr. Brigitta -could visit both Ambonese Protestant and 
Muslim leaders to talk about the possibility of reconciliation. While Rev. Hendriks, as discussed 
above, built his peaceful missions based on the idea of pro-life theology, Bishop Mandagi's 
142 Interview with Fr. Agus Ulahay, Ambon, june 24, 2010. 
143 Interview with Bishop Mandagi, Ambon, February 18, 2011. 
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nonviolent actions were driven by the notion of the human sacredness. The bishop explains, 
"Humans are sacred; consequently we must respect and love them. Because of this sacredness, 
humans share God's holiness whatever their religions and ethnicities. If we view humans as the 
sacred creature, we therefore forbid to commit violence and killings." 
Bishop Mandagi's view on human purity as the basis of Catholic engagement in the 
Maluku peace and nonviolence movements was particularly interesting because in Catholic 
theology, humans are born sinful and impure. But the Bishop referred to a number of verses in 
the Holy Bible for his theological justification, among others, those dealing with the prohibition 
of killing (Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17) and Christian teachings on love and forgiveness 
(e.g. Matt 5:44; Romans 13:9). It seems also that the dynamics of the Maluku conflict might 
shape his understanding of the purity of humans. Whatever the answer, what is obvious is that, 
for Bishop Mandagi, "keeping the peace is a sacred duty until the death comes.''144 
Muslim Struggle for Peace 
The biggest challenge of establishing peace and reconciliation in Ambon before and after 
the signing the Mali noli peace pact lay with the Muslim community. There are a number of 
reasons why attempts of building interreligious conciliation were harder in the Muslim 
communities than in the Christians. First, the Muslim leadership was more diverse and complex 
than that of the Protestants and Catholics. While the leadership of the latter religious groups are 
hierarchical and centered on the GPM Synod (for the Protestants) and the Diocese of Amboina 
(for the Catholics), the Muslims have no such established institutions. Maluku's Indonesian 
Ulama Council (MUI-Majelis Ulama Indonesia), dubbed it as the highest Muslim authority in 
Maluku, failed in uniting Muslim elements in the province. Moreover, MUl general chairman, R. 
144 Interview with Bishop Mandagi, Ambon, February 18, 2011. 
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Hasanusi, former police officer, surprisingly was inactive in the peace movements and 
reconciliation processes. 
Indeed, Hasanusi refused to issue a "fa twa jihad," a non-binding Islamic edict for jihad 
struggle, after Muslim youth organizations demanded the fa twa; he then pushed the institution 
to issue it so as to sanction Muslim participation in the violence. He also established a Muslim 
organization to take care of Muslim victims of the war. However, he did not join forces with 
other religious leaders to pave the way of reconciliation. His involvement in the peace process 
was almost zero, albeit some MUI members had participated in this movement. Other Muslim 
institutions in Maluku, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Al-Hilal, Al-lrsyad, and 
Mathlaul Anwar, also had no power ability to mobilize members in support of the peace 
movement. The hub of Muslim authority at the time centered on individuals, among others, 
imams of the mosques, Muslim raja or upu lattu (traditional leader), tuang guru (Islamic 
teacher), new emerging jihadist commanders, and some moderate Muslims. As a result of this 
plural authority, the moderate group (the "peacemakers") had limited access to the ordinary 
Muslims, and had difficulty communicating their peace initiatives to wider Muslim audience. In 
addition, as an outcome of this diversity, support for violence was higher in the Muslim 
community than that of the Protestant and the Catholic communities. Opposition to nonviolence 
movement and the Malina II was also stronger among the Muslims than the Christians. 
The second point that made effort of creating peace among the Muslims more difficult 
was the widespread existence ofjihadist groups unwilling to reconcile with the Christians. The 
Protestants had indeed had the militant factions, but soon these groups were pacified and 
weakened, particularly since the sudden death of Agus Wattimena in 2001,''' one of the 
Christian radical commanders, and the signing of the Malina II. The only remaining group that 
145 It is unclear the reason behind his death. Some informants said that he shot himself, while 
others said that he was shot by his wife because of jealousy due to his habits of womanizing. 
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opposed the peace initiative and the Malina II came from the FKM (Front Kedau/atan Maluku or 
Moluccan Sovereignty Front), dubbed by the military as a separatist movement which claimed to 
continue the RMS struggle. However, this group bit by bit had lost its power since the military 
captured its commander, Alex Manu putty, and destroyed its base in Kudamati. Along this line, 
the Protestants realized that this group had political interests and agendas, not for the 
Christians or Moluccan society as a whole but for the founders and elite members of this 
movement. As a result ordinary Protestants no longer joined this group, as well as because they 
feared the military. Christian antagonism to this group was also strong. 
The Muslim case was quite different since the jihadist groups and radical factions were 
more diverse and stronger than the Protestants. Indeed, some of militant leaders had joined the 
Malina II, but the rest remained opposed. Accordingly, after the Muslim delegates of the Malina 
II arrived in Ambon, they became targets of hostility. Houses of some pro-Malin a II Muslim 
leaders were also burnt down and destroyed. "After returning from the Malina meeting, we 
could not go home through a main road since we were blocked and had stones thrown at us by 
the masses who disagreed with the Malina II, which resulted in injuries to some of us. As a result 
we decided to take a speed boat on the way to Ambon town," Idrus Tatuhey says.146 The Muslim 
militants had lost their authority since the Laskar jihad was removed from Ambon back to java 
by its leader, ja'far Umar Thalib, after the Bali bombs in October 2002. The remaining Ambonese 
jihadist leaders such as Mo Attamimy, Abdullah Latuapo, Umar Aly Attamimy, Hasan Umarela, 
and Burhan Tid ore had been pacified and had their activities weakened by Acting Governor of 
Maluku during the political transition in the aftermath of the Malina II: Sin yo Sarundayang, a 
brave and clean bureaucrat (see Chapter 11). 
The third factor was that the Muslim community had no influential and integrating 
leaders such as Bishop Mandagi in the Catholics and Rev. l.j.W. Hendriks and Rev. john 
146 Interview with Idrus Tatuhey, Ambon, November 5, 2010. 
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Ruhulessin in the Protestants. These leaders were able to utilize main Christian institutions 
(Diocese of Ambo ina and GPM Synod) to fully support their peaceful and nonviolent movements. 
In contrast, the MUI and other Islamic organizations had no power to influence people, and 
unable to provide institutional foundation for the peacemaking initiatives. Special credit must be 
given to some daring individual moderate Muslim leaders and activists such as KH Abdul Wahab 
Polpoke, Thamrin Ely, jusuf Ely, Nasir Rahawarin, Hadi Basal amah, Lutfi Sanaky, Hasbullah 
Toisuta, Idrus Tatuhey, Idrus Tukan, Arsyad Rahawarin, jakuba Karapessina, to name but a few, 
in particular, who had played a significant role in the interreligious reconciliation process. Some 
of them were involved in the peace process since the early days of the conflict, while others 
joined the movement later on after having lobbied and been approached by some leading 
figures. 
KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke (Ustad Polpoke), for instance, accepted the "proposal of 
reconciliation" after having approached by some religious and political/military leaders. Ustad 
Pol poke was one of the earlier Ambonese Muslim leaders that supported fighting against the 
Christians which he saw as a part ofjihadfi sabil/iah ("jihad in the path of God"). In a 
conversation with me in his modest house in the suburb of Ambon town, Ustad Pol poke 
provided a rationale for accepting a dialogue with the Christians. He states, "I accepted the 
Christian call for a dialogue in part because they were willing to end fighting and talk about 
negotiation. Based on the Qur'an, the Muslims cannot engage in the warfare when the enemies 
have surrendered and are eager to pursue peace."147 
Since then Ustad Pol poke was involved in the reconciliation process and interreligious 
dialogue, and began to oppose his co-religionists who supported the wars, including )a' far Umar 
Thalib, the supreme leader of the Laskar jihad. "I asked the pro-war Muslim commanders, 
including )a' far Umar Thalib: which verses in the Qur'an or Hadith command the Muslims to 
147 Interview with KH Abdul Wahab Polpoke, Ambon, October 4, 2010. 
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persistently engage in the warfare when the adversaries have given up, asked pardon, and 
agreed to end conflict? I told them that they did not know the Qur'an and Islamic Shari' a if they 
continued to fight against the Christians." At the time, )a' far Umar Thalib and his Ambonese 
Muslim allies kept on fighting with the reasoning that the Muslims had the upper hand in the 
conflict and the Christians had been weakened, and the situation provided a chance for the 
Muslims to triumph over and bulldoze the Christian communities from the land of Ambon and 
Maluku. "When )a'far Umar Thalib and the Laskar jihad militias first arrived in Ambon," Ustad 
Pol poke said, "we together mobilized masses to beat the Christians. Later on I separated myself 
from them when I decided to accept the proposals of interreligious dialogue offered by Rev. 
Hendriks, and of peace negotiation put forward by the government." 
Having trained in Islamic sciences since childhood in numerous madrasah (religious 
school) and pesantren (Islamic boarding school), Ustad Pol poke is one of the Arnbonese 
respected religious scholars (ulama) and educated tuang guru (Ambones term for an Islamic 
teacher). Due to his religious authority, he was frequently asked by the local government as well 
as national political and religious leaders to be actively involved in the peacemaking and 
reconciliation process in the region, as well as to persuade the radical Muslim commanders to 
end hostility. Ustad Pol poke tells, "Many national military and civilian leaders said to me, 'Kiai 
Pol poke, the fate of Muslims in Ambon is in your hands. If you are wrong in the decision making, 
their destiny will end."148 A great imam of An-Nur Mosque in Ambon town, Ustad Pol poke 
realized that the condition in Ambon had been shifted, so that, he thought, it was the time to 
stop bloodshed. 
In a meeting organized by the provincial government of Maluku to discuss about a plan 
of peace agreement at Malina, Ustad Pol poke argued with other Moluccan jihadist commanders 
including Mo Attamimi, Burhan Tidore, Abdul Wahab Lumaela, and Ikram Abu Bakar. In the 
148 Interview with Ustad Pol poke, Ambon, October 4, 2010. 
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meeting, Mo Attamimi (Ambonese of Yemeni descent), argued that, referring to some Qur'anic 
verses he quoted, negotiation with the Christians in the wartime was outlawed. Seeing other 
radical factions in the gathering also refused the truce proposal, Ustad Pol poke stated, "If you 
reject the peace pact plan, I will join the government to come to Malina in the name ofMUI 
(Moluccan Ulama Council)." After this meeting, Ustad Pol poke visited )a' far Umar Thalib. )a' far 
also disagreed with the initiative and suggested Ustad Pol poke to not come to Malina. But, Ustad 
Pol poke replied, "I will be coming to Malina to present my opinions. If the Malina benefits 
Muslims I will continue to support it, but if not, I will resign." 
It is important to underline that, for pro-Malino Muslim leaders, mostly natives of 
Ambon or Maluku who shared some historical, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds with the 
Ambonese Christians, ja'far and Javanese members of Laskar jihad was initially viewed as the 
"heroes" of Moluccan and Ambonese Muslims. But later on they disagreed, and were involved in 
conflict with, ja'far and the Laskar jihad militia members due to a number of reasons. First, the 
Laskar jihad, on behalf of "jihad struggle," forced local ordinary people to engage in the warfare 
and provide "logistics of war," including food, throughout the wars. The Laskar jihad members 
threatened to shoot local Muslim villagers and townspeople if they refused to involve in the war 
or to provide the logistical supports. The second factor that made pro-Malino Muslim leaders 
opposed )a' far and his members is that the Laskar jihad pushed their reformist religious 
understandings and agenda, which were typified by the refusal oflocal practices and traditions 
of Islam, to the Ambonese or Moluccan Muslims. 
Ustad Pol poke, moreover, fulfilled his promise: he left for Malina to sign a peace deal. "I 
was the first man who signed the Malina II peace accord," Ustad Pol poke said. "There was no 
Muslim hardliner, in the beginning, which supported the Malino, except me," Ustad Pol poke 
claimed. He continued to say, "When the Muslim jihadist groups knew my decision to come to 
Malina, they planned to attack me. Mo Attamimi, along with some 100 jihadists, came to my 
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house. They intended to burn my house. Having met resistance from my neighbors, however, 
they finally only destroyed my house."149 ln the Malina, Ustad Polpoke embraced GPM Synod 
chairman, Rev. Hendriks, symbolizing Christian-Muslim reunion. After the signing of the Malina 
11 peace deal, Ustad Pol poke befriended Rev. Hendriks. They worked together to preserve the 
points of the Malina 11 and held intensive meetings of interreligious groups that later resulted in 
the establishment of Lembaga Antar-Iman Maluku (LAlM), an interfaith institution. 
Another Muslim leader, the late jusufEly, worked together with other religious and 
community leaders in the Baku Bae Movement a civil society grouping that had contributed to 
the reconciliation process (see Chapter 10) since its founding in 2000. He, along with other co-
founders of this group, set up a series of intergroup meetings and approached the jihadist 
groups. Moreover, having shared a common background with Ambonese and Moluccan 
Christians, Muslim leaders such as Thamrin Ely, Lutfi Sanaky, Nasir Rahawarin, Hadi Basalamah, 
ldrus Tatuhey, and Abdullah Toisuta, all of whom became the Muslim representatives in the 
Malina, were involved in the reconciliation processes since the first outbreaks of conflict. 
A chairman of Muslim delegates in the Malina 11, Thamrin Ely, and the politician of 
Islamic political party PPP Lutfi Sanaky were both appointed by Governor Saleh Latuconsina to 
be the Muslim representatives in the Tim 6, a team comprising six religious leaders from 
Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic churches, set up by the Maluku government to assess the first 
outbursts of conflict in january, 1999, build communication with people on the ground, and to 
seek the possible ways to end fighting. "Our first-and foremost-task was to look for the ways 
how to stop violence, notto build peace," Lutfi Sanaky makes it clear the main job of the team. 
To achieve this goal, the team, together, visited churches and mosques to calm people in both 
religious groups. "During our visits in mosques, the Muslims insulted and threatened Christian 
members of the team, and when we visited churches, the Christians mocked and terrorized me 
149 Interview with Ustad Pol poke, Ambon, October 4, 2010. 
and Thamrin Ely. But we continued the meetings. Unfortunately, our efforts failed due to the 
wide spread of violence and provocation," Lutfi Sanaky says.1so 
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Since this small team was ineffective in completing its tasks, the team's members later 
on initiated the establishment of a center for interreligious reintegration by involving wider 
moderate groups including academics, as well as religious, community, and political leaders. The 
center was named FRS (Pusat Rujuk Sosia[j where Lutfi Sanaky became its vice chairman (the 
head ofPRS was Professor john Lokolo, now he is an expert staff of Governor Karel Ralahalu). 
The task of FRS was to continue programs previously set up by the Tim 6 by enlarging areas and 
concentration of Christian-Muslim meetings. No doubt the FRS members from both 
communities received various threats and rudeness: from internal groups they were accused of 
having sold their religion to the outside intruders, whereas from the externals they were 
charged for being the provocateurs and initiators of conflict. 
However, Lutfi Sanaky, Thamrin Ely, and the rest continued their missions. A Muslim 
leader from Siri-Sori Salam in Saparua Island, Lutfi Sanaky believed that violence could not be 
resolved through violent means. "1 came from the devout Muslim family," Lutfi said, "but in the 
face of the Maluku conflict I stand for the idea that Islamic teachings pertaining pluralism, 
humanism, and nonviolence should be given priority to those dealing with jihad struggle in the 
sense of warfare. This is the rationale behind my engagement in the peace movement by 
building dialogue with other religious groups." 
Thamrin Ely (b.1947) is another courageous man and moderate Muslim whose 
tremendous contribution in the reconciliation processes should be appreciated. At first, he 
joined Satgas Penanggulangan Idul Fitri Berdarah (the Task Force for Handling the Bloody Idul 
Fitri), a team founded by MUI to take care of the Muslim victims and refugees at the largest 
Muslim mosque in Ambon town, Mosque Al-Fatah, which at the wartime became a refugee camp 
1so Interview with Lutfi Sanaky, Ambon, February 7, 2011. 
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for thousands of Muslims. In this Task Force, founded in january, 1999, Thamrin Ely was 
appointed to be a secretary. Head of this team was Rustam Kastor (a retired military general), 
while its vice chairman was jusuf Ely (now deceased). Ten days after the founding of the Task 
Force, Rustam Kastor disappeared. Before leaving, he talked to some elite members of the Task 
Force to not inform to anybody about his departure to jakarta. Later on he appeared on TV on a 
discussion about the Maluku carnage. The discussion was sponsored by Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiyah Indonesia (the Indonesian Islamic Outreach Council), an Islamist organization founded 
by Muhammad Natsir, co-founders of reformist Muslim party, Masjumi, in 1967. The DDIJ is 
renowned as a national Islamic organization that sends very conservative clerics to mosques 
around the country for Friday sermons. 
Due to his long disappearance, Rustam Kastor was fired by MUJ chairman R. Hasanusi 
from his positions, both in MUJ and the Task Force. Some elite Muslims informed me that the 
departure of Rustam Kastor to jakarta was for fundraising and seeking support from Indonesian 
Muslims and the military in order to help the Muslims in Ambon. After having been fired from 
his positions, some Ambonese informants said, he was angry toward other Ambonese Muslim 
leaders, and accused Thamrin Ely of being the mastermind of this suspension. An Ambonese 
informant said that in an official meeting, Rustam Kastor pulled his gun and threatened to shoot 
Thamrin Ely. It is unclear whether driven by this disappointment or other factors, but the fact is 
that, later on Rustam Kastor mobilized some Ambonese militant Muslim leaders to come to 
jakarta and joined the Laskar jihad where he served as its main advisor. 
Ambonese radical Muslims who stood behind him included Salim Basoan, Ustad Ali 
Fauzy, Jkram Ibrahim, Mo Attamimy, and Umar Attamimy, most of whom having Arab/Yemeni 
background. As a result, over the course of the conflict, Rustam Kastor became one of the main 
stumbling blocks for the moderate Muslim leaders pursuing interreligious reconciliation. 
Throughout the communal conflict, the role of Rustam Kastor was complex, including (1) 
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providing a channel for the Laskar jihad to some elite members of the military, (2) framing the 
Ambon conflict as part of the "American scenario" to control eastern Indonesia's', and (3) giving 
strategy and tactics in the battlefield. A former military commander in Ambon (Korem) and Irian 
jaya (Kodam), Rustam Kastorwas considered to be the "mastermind" and "strategist" of the 
Laskar jihad attacks on Christian areas. )a' far Umar Thalib and the Laskar jihad members were 
heavily relied on Rustam Kastor since they knew nothing about geographical and demographic 
maps of Ambon and Maluku. 
Although Rustam Kastor threatened pro-peace moderate Muslim groups, however, 
Thamrin Ely and his allies did not give up. Due to the leadership vacuum, the Task Force was 
dispersed and was replaced by Sekber (Sekretariat Bersama or joint Secretariat) where Thamrin 
Ely served as its chairman. Thamrin Ely's intensive involvement with Christian moderate 
groupings, however, began when he was selected to be one of the Muslim representatives in the 
Tim 6 and then the FRS described earlier. It was Thamrin Ely who suggested the name of FRS-
Pus at Rujuk Sosial-to give a positive image of interreligious willingness for reintegration. 
Through these institutions, he persistently held peaceful campaigns for the significance of 
Christian-Muslim reconciliation for the future ofMaluku, albeit he was charged by the militant 
Muslims to be a traitor, and was accused by the Christians, of being a provocateur of burning 
churches. Perhaps driven by his long commitment in building Christian-Muslim relations, 
Thamrin Ely was appointed to be a leader for the Muslim delegates in the Malina II peace 
concord. To be sure, other moderate Muslim leaders depicted above such as Hadi Basalamah 
(Ambonese Arab), Nasir Rahawarin (NU), Idrus Tatuhey (Muhammadiyah), Arsyad Rahawarin 
(Mathlaul Anwar), Idrus Tukan (ICMI), and Hasbullah Toisuta (academic) had shared similar 
1s1 In an interview with me (Ambon, December 31, 2010), Rustam Kastor said that the 
Ambon conflict was part of the "American design" to control Maluku and eastern Indonesia. The U.S. 
government, Kastor said, wanted to make Ambon as a buttress and military base to attack China. 
266 
bitter experiences (such as threats of death by the militant groups) during their struggle in the 
pursuit of peace and reconciliation in Maluku. 
In brief, these pro-peace Muslim leaders had tirelessly tried to pave the road toward 
intergroup reunification by utilizing their particular networks, institutional and family ties, and 
social capital to influence other Muslims in order to end hostilities and rebuild relations with 
Christians. In doing so, they were blocked by the radical factions among Muslims who wanted to 
continue the wars and drive the Christians out from the land of Maluku. However, it should be 
noted, the moderate Muslim group was not alone in pursuing this task. Some Muslim traditional 
leaders (raja or upu lattu), among others, Mahfudh Nukulele (Raja Seith, Leihitu Latupatti), 
Abdullah Malawat (Raja Mamala), Abdul Rajak Opir (Raja Liang), to name but a few, had also 
contributed to this effort to jump-start a peace process. They joined the Baku Bae Movement, a 
civil society group responsible for the reconciliation efforts and struggled for the creation of 
stability in Maluku. While the moderate Muslim individuals mostly worked in Ambon city, these 
Muslim traditional leaders struggled to achieve peace in their villages. 
Last but not least, the above religious leaders were not alone in the pursuit of Christian-
Muslim reintegration; there were also civil society groupings that contributed to this process, 
which I will explain in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 10 
Grassroots Agencies and Peace Movement 
No doubt, the contribution of Maluku's grassroots civil society associations in the 
creation of Christian-Muslim peace and reconciliation is obvious. Besides contributing to the 
violence, some civil society organizations (CSOs) in Maluku had played a role in their attempts 
to reconcile Maluku's Christians and Muslims. I will examine in particular three CSOs which 
played a role in the Maluku conflict resolution and peace process. These are Gerakan Bake Bae 
(Bake Bae Movement), Tim 20 Wayame (the Wayame Team of 20), and Gerakan Perempuan 
Peduli (Concerned Women's Movement). It is imperative to note that by presenting these three 
CSOs, it does not mean that I neglect the role of other CSOs and NGOs.''' To be sure, attempts of 
reconciling both conflicting groups had been conducted by numerous civil society agents, both 
local CSOs and international NGOs. 
In 2001, Jakarta-based Go-East Institute, for example, with the cooperation of the Crisis 
Center of the Diocese of Amboina and local government, organized a conference in Kei in 
Southeast Maluku called "National Dialogue on Revitalizing Local Culture for Rehabilitation and 
Development in the Moluccas towards a New Indonesia." Attended by almost 1500 regional 
leaders, this meeting issued a call for traditional village leaders to play an instrumental role and 
advocated the use oflocal traditions as a meeting point for accommodating the interest of the 
different groups in the province of Maluku. Despite having limited impact beyond Southeast 
Maluku due to the relative weakness of tradition elsewhere, it highlighted the potential 
contribution of ad at (customary law) institutions in conflict avoidance and mediation. 
l52 Local organizations working in Maluku and North Maluku have proliferated in response 
to the crises. Mercy Corps estimates some 400 to 500 NGOs were operating in the regions, although 
"civil society in Maluku remains fractured along many fault lines including religious identity" (IDP-
CPRU 2002). 
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International institutions and NGOs (e.g. Mercy Corps, United Nations Development Program, 
European Commission, Save the Children, Medecins Sans Frontieres, International Catholic 
Migration Commission, Mennonite Central Committee, United States Institute of Peace, UNESCO, 
UNICEF, etc.), in collaboration with local counterparts, have also played a vital role in 
reconciliation and reconstruction153 (e.g. Brown 2004; Lowry and Littlejohn 2006; Mawdsley, 
Tanuhandaru, and Holman 2002). 
There were also a number oflocal civil society groups (e.g. Yayasan Hualopu orYayasan 
Bail eo Maluku) that promoted dialogue between people from neighboring villages whose 
Christian or Muslim members had fled during the violence. These dialogues were designed to 
get Muslims and Christians talking frankly about whether they wanted to live together again. 
Mediation skills were also taught, and people from divided groups were encouraged to take the 
first steps at reunification. Reconciliation teams have also been set up at the local level, often at 
the instigation or with the backing of the military and local government. These teams, usually 
comprising equal numbers of adat, religious, community, and youth leaders from both sides of 
the conflict, are aimed at facilitating dialogue and reconciliation processes on the local level, as 
well as promoting IDP returns. Drawing on the legitimacy of their participants and the financial 
support from the local government, these teams were deemed limitedly successful in the first 
phase of facilitating dialogue and reintegration. In North Maluku, particularly in the regions of 
Tobelo and Galela, where the interreligious violence took place, community leaders, 
153 From 2001, UNDP, for instance1 developed a multi-sectoral program in Maluku and North 
Maluku and a framework for response for other UN agencies in accordance with its mandate. UNDP 
supported coordination, information sharing and capacity building to address IDP crises, and 
undertook extensive advocacy in the dissemination and promotion of the UN Guiding Principles for 
Internal Displacement Whereas UNESCO contributed to building media and educational capacities to 
support its theme of "Building a Culture of Peace" in both Maluku and North Maluku provinces, 
UNICEF worked on education, teacher training, youth civic participation, children's rights and 
psychosocial support Broadly speaking, the international organizations working directly in the 
provinces have tended to focus their activities on relatively small-scale, localized projects promoting 
economic sufficiency and the provision of services, particularly to most vulnerable groups such as 
women and children. 
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independent of any assistance from either international NGOs or local government, played a 
central role to reconciliation between Christians and Muslims in the area (cf. Brown 2004). 
However, due to some limitations, I will only focus on three CSOs, namely Gerakan Baku 
Bae, Tim 20 Wayame, and Gerakan Perempuan Peduli, each of which has particular uniqueness in 
both members and the range of activities. While Gerakan Baku Bae involved a large number of 
provincial leaders from various backgrounds and professions, Tim 20 Wayame consisted of the 
villagers and local leaders of the village ofWayame. Whereas Baku Bae Movement conducted 
training workshops outside Maluku, Tim 20 Wayame was limited their activities in Wayame. 
Gerakan Perempuan Peduli is especially interesting to discuss in part because all of its members 
comprised mothers and women activists. Apart from its uniqueness and differences, the three 
CSOs constantly tried to bridge the warring parties in order to end fighting and find ways of 
fruitful solutions. These CSOs brought Maluku's Christian and Muslim communities together by 
adopting bold conflict resolution and reconciliation methods. The initiators see these endeavors 
as a way of rebuilding social capital and restoring trust through dialogue and community focus. 
Gerakan Baku Bae 
Gerakan Baku Bae (Baku Bae Movement, henceforth, Baku Bae154) was established in 
2000. The Baku Bae (lit. "Reconciliation") became one of the most visible civil society responses 
to the communal violence that erupted in Maluku since january 1999. The movement showcased 
an interesting alternative to normal conflict resolution techniques. Their principles and methods 
were based on baku bae, which in central Moluccan culture describes the peaceful spirit used in 
children's games to restore friendships after a quarrel. The Baku Bae, which changed its name in 
2003 to Institut Titian Perdamaian, was started by civil society actors from Maluku supported by 
154 Baku Bae is slang in Ambon Malay which literally means "good to one another" [sa ling 
bersikap baik]. Baku Bae thus refers to restoring friendly relationships and being friends again [after 
fighting] or, simply, "reconciliation." 
270 
a disparate group including activists from jakarta, traditional and religious leaders, women and 
youth groups, intellectuals and educators, lawyers, and journalists. Co-founders of this civil 
society group included Ichsan Malik, jusufEly, jacky Manu putty, Piet G. Manappo, Sr. Brigitta 
Renyaan, and Mahfud Nukulele. The role of Ichsan Malik, University of Indonesia lecturer and a 
former activist for NGOs working to protect natural resources, deserved special mention in his 
crucial role in initiating the founding of the movement. 
In 2000, as fighting between the Christians and Muslims in Maluku spiraled out of 
control (see Chapter 5}, Ichsan Malik began knocking on militants' doors. Neither side showed 
desire for reconciliation. "I was Si Buta Dari Goa Hantu (The Blind Hero of Devil Cave}," he 
admits, referring to a heroic figure from Indonesian fiction movie. "They said I was a lunatic. It 
was, perhaps, mynaivetythatsaved us" (cited in van Tongeren, Brenk, Hellema, and Verhoeven, 
eds. 2005: 667}. To achieve his mission, Ichsan Malik travelled first to Saparua Island, the 
Christian stronghold in Central Maluku regency, to meet a group of priests. He then visited ja'far 
Umar Thalib, the supreme leader of the Laskar jihad, in Yogyakarta. No doubt his initial meeting 
was received by suspicion. Ichsan Malik, along with his colleagues in the Baku Bae such as jacky 
Manuputty, jusuf Ely and Piet Manoppo pressed ahead and even arranged opinion polls among 
people from the two groups to convince their leaders that a sentiment existed in both sides for 
Christians and Muslims to engage in dialogue. The initiators were confident their bottom-up 
approach would work, that the key was to strengthen desire for peace at the grassroots (i.e. 
people actually involved in, and effected by, the violence} before getting the authorities involved. 
In the beginning, the founders of the Bake Bae carried out their work largely in secret. 
Tensions were running high and those within the warring factions interested in talking peace 
feared negative reaction within their communities to any disclosure of contact with opponents. 
The Baku Bae's efforts were divided into five main phases. In the first, the initiators secretly 
approached leaders of parties directly involved in the conflict to meet in a secure place. The 
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outcome was that twelve prominent leaders from both sides attended in Jakarta in mid-2000. 
Owing to the security situation at that time, and disclosure fears, a neutral venue was chosen a 
way from Maluku province. The tensions, nonetheless, were evident inside the meeting. Each 
side blamed the other for the provocation and initiation of the conflict. The Bake Bae 
moderators encouraged more general exchanges about common experiences, and tried to bring 
discussions around to the true nature of the conflict. A follow-up meeting was held in Bali in 
October 2000. Some forty civil society leaders showed up this second meeting. 
In the third meeting in Yogyakarta in December 2000, over one hundred people 
including representatives of Maluku's religious, ad at (customary), youth, nongovernmental, and 
militant organizations turned up. This meeting was held in collaboration with other CSOs and 
NGOs including LBH Jakarta, Yayasan Hualopu, and Inovasi Group. In a joint statement, the 
participants promised to continue using local traditions as a means of accommodating the 
interests of all the different parties. They promised that "all local traditional leaders take the 
lead ... but at the same time support state law and guarantee the acceptance of all migrants living 
in the province." By the end of the conference, thirty representatives of Moluccan people came 
to Jakarta to meet Head of Indonesian Parliament Akbar Tanjung in order to solve the "Maluku 
problems." In this legislative body, the representatives read a plea containing a call for all 
Indonesians to endorse reconciliation processes in Maluku (Riry and Manoppo, eds. 2007: 31-3). 
The desire of establishing peace was tested further at follow-up workshops involving various 
representatives of the Moluccan societies. During the third phase, entire communities-people 
from all walks oflife and different religions-were invited to general assemblies. 
The fourth step involved the setting up of neutral zones on the borders between 
communities where Muslims and Christians felt secure enough to undertake intergroup 
activities, including trade, food exchanges, sharing common health services, and education such 
as the creation of the temporary campus of Universitas Pattimura or Unpatti. Inside these zones, 
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meetings were organized between professionals from both sides, including Christian and 
Muslim lawyers and journalists, who created a media center in one of these neutral zones. 
Neutral zones in Ambon town, moreover, included several integrated produce markets including 
traditional markets, the Ambon Plaza Mall, and pasar kaget ("sudden markets"). These neutral 
centers for economic transactions and food exchanges, which became favorite places for 
Christians and Muslims to buy and sell their products, included a place in front of Hotel Amans, 
Tugu Trikora, PGSD, Air Salobar, jembatan Galala, Lantamal Halong, and Secata B Suli (Lawalata 
2004:17). 
It is imperative to notice that these "sudden markets" served not only for economic 
transactions for buyers and sellers but also as a meeting point of interreligious and interethnic 
groups that later become a cultural medium of reintegration between the two conflicting parties 
(cf. Soegijono 2011). The economic effects of the conflict have meant that Christians who 
previously eschewed jobs in the informal retail trade and transportation services now have both 
the motivation and opportunity to become petty traders, hard workers, shopkeepers, fishermen, 
becak (pedicab) riders, and motorcycle drivers (tukang ojek) for their segregated community.1ss 
The preservation of genuinely interactive neutral zones is vital to foster reunification as they 
allow the peaceful interaction of communities in pursuit of their self-interest and everyday 
needs. 
The last step in this stage-by-stage process saw the outcomes of discussions and 
activities disseminated to people from the Christian and Muslim communities through a series 
1ss As discussed in Chapter 3, before the communal conflict, Ambonese Christians preferred 
to work as civil servants (PNS-Pegawai Negeri Sip iT), teachers, police, or the army. Ambonese terms 
such asgoyang pohon uang jatuh ("shaking a tree, money fall"] or huang batang sujadi ("throwing a 
stick becomes a tree"] all illustrate the fertility of Ambon land that made the Ambonese society 
"spoiled" by this rich nature, added with the colonial policies that favored the Christians. This fact, in 
turn, has made the Ambonese Christians to be the "ambtenaar-minded" and not ready for "hard jobs." 
When the conflict swept the region and made them difficult to get money, they soon shifted and 
accepted the goal to become hard workers. 
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of workshops that encouraged the public at large to translate conflict urges into thoughts of 
peace. This stage was initiated when all the foundational social structures aimed at stopping the 
violence were established, when people no longer wanted to be called "warring factions." In the 
Baku Bae philosophy, this final phase also involves carrying out activities to pave the way for 
legal action to redress grievances suffered by victims, and reinforce the rule oflaw including, 
where necessary, independent investigation into the nature and roots of the conflict. 
Efforts had also been made to recruit students to mixed high schools and vocational 
schools that were later known as reconciliation schools, in addition to the alternate Unpatti 
campus mentioned earlier. Another significant contribution made by the Baku Bae included the 
creation of mixed buses to ply roads from Ambon to neutral transfer points such as Nania near 
Christian Passo on the isthmus between pre-dominantly Christian Leitimor and Muslim Leihitu 
peninsulas. Furthermore, organized by the Baku Bae, Unpatti hosted an important meeting in 
january 2001 of over one hundred raja which resulted in an agreement to better integrate 
educational opportunities in Maluku, a commitment later incorporated into the Malina II peace 
deal. 
The Baku Bae also facilitated meetings of Maluku lawyers in jakarta in january, 2002, as 
well as of some forty Christian and Muslim journalists from Maluku and North Maluku in Bogar 
in March 2001. The meeting resulted in a relatively neutral Media Center, located in the neutral 
zone of Mardika in Ambon town. In September 2001, a mixed Maluku Media Center (MMC) was 
established to bring together journalists from different communities and to mitigate the 
polarization of the local press (cf. Amirrachman, ed. 2007: 155-6). 
MMC is a forum to facilitate and empower journalists from both sides in Maluku in order 
to work professionally and bring balance in reporting issues of conflict on the ground. During 
the conflict, Ambon's mass print media was split into two camps: Christian and Muslim. While 
Ambon Express was linked to Muslims, Suara Maluku became the Christian newspapers. 
Although the Baku Bae lost some of its momentum when the organization split due to a 
leadership conflict, it successfully brokered meetings between the military and local 
communities, resulting in vital improvement in relations and cooperation on security (Goss 
2004: 29-30). 
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In its implementation, the Bake Bae had its own difficulties, especially in removing the 
desire for revenge among people who had lost family or friends, and who were among the many 
forced to abandon their homes. Some of the problems were of a practical nature: with a state of 
emergency in place, movement was difficult and tensions remained high. There were also 
internal differences within the movement over approaches. What made it successful, in the end, 
were the benefits that people actually felt when they tried dialogue instead of fighting. Both the 
Christians and Muslims saw that embracing the simple technique of the Baku Bae-dialogue, 
cooperation, finding common ground in neutral centers-helped to reduce the polarized 
atmosphere. Although limited, old relations were restored and new alliances forged. Many 
partnerships achieved during reconciliation talks were carried over into sustained 
peacebuilding projects. This was evident when the Bake Bae-sponsored dialogue encouraged 
between the regions ofLeihitu (Muslim) and Baguala (Christian) and the Indonesian security 
forces spawned other local initiatives such as the founding of joint community watches at 
neutral points along the road that runs through two areas. 
In addition, individual contacts made during early activities later became partnerships 
between the organizations to which these people belonged. This was evident in collaborations 
forged between Christian and Muslim NGOs in various parts of Maluku. Dialogue helped to 
construct other bridges. Within the Muslim community itself previously fractious groups buried 
differences and united. The creation of neutral spaces in which Christians and Muslims shared 
health, education, and other basic services together without fear of attack was of major 
importance. This enabled the Masohi Hospital, for instance, to resume its function as the main 
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medical care facility in the district (kabupaten) of central Maluku. Before that, patients were too 
afraid to spend the night there. Workers from different NGOs, some former classmates and 
neighbors torn apart by the conflict, discovered that meeting in the neutral centers gave them 
the confidence to travel to each other's offices on either side. Soon, more people saw visits to 
these neutral zones as their right. This was the place in which they felt safe after sunset. 
By 2000, Christians and Muslims were meeting openly at these locations without fear of 
reprisal and crossing into each other's neighborhoods. As more of these spaces were created, 
people began thinking of returning home to their villages. The conduct of economic activity-
both Christians and Muslims set up sidewalk markets and opened stalls where they served 
customers from both groups-gave these spaces added importance. The Baku Bae's activities, 
particularly the innovative thinking behind its methods, showed that people themselves need to 
build an agenda to reconstruct and rearrange their own future.ln the Baku Bae approach, the 
need for credibility is central-establishing that you have a mandate, that people support what 
is being done. 
Establishing trust and solidarity between opposing groups is also crucial, as well as 
ensuring that negotiation is carried out in a way that maintains equilibrium power among the 
parties. In a background paper-written jointly with social psychologist Hamdi Muluk-the 
confounder of the Baku Bae Ichsan Malik notes, "The success of the Baku Bae Movement 
suggests the benefit of bottom-up approach and the role of civil society in strengthening and 
empowering survivors to make their own reconciliation processes. For negotiation to be 
successful, everything must be put on the table, including issues like multiculturalism and 
pluralism. Ordinary folk must be at the center, not the elite. There is no way to resolve the 
conflict in Maluku without building a people's agenda and allowing them to reconstruct and 
rearrange their own future" (cited in van Tongeren, Brenk, Hellema, and Verhoeven, eds. 2005: 
671). 
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Gerakan Perempuan Peduli 
Another significant local civil society group that contributed to interreligious 
reunification is Gerakan Perempuan Peduli (hereafter, GPP-the Concerned Women's 
Movement). GPP founded in August 1999, a year before the establishment of Baku Bae 
Movement described above. In Ambon, GPP was one of the earliest interreligious civil society 
associations that initiated meetings and activities across religious boundaries. Established 
initially by Catholic and Protestant women, this group later recruited Muslim women leaders 
and activists, at first secretly, in order to collaborate on information campaigns, trauma 
counseling, and training workshops for mothers and youth, in the hope of indirectly and directly 
reaching those who are particularly vulnerable to provocation. \fhe idea of the establishment of 
this group came first from the Dutch Catholic nun and a missionary working in Ambon for over 
fifty years, Sr. Francesco Moens PBHK, upon her return from a meeting in Houten, the 
Netherlands, in june 1999. In Holland, Sr. Francesco joined a Christian and Muslim women 
group of Moluccan origins which mobilized masses to stop communal violence in Maluku. 
Influenced by this women movement, Sr. Francesco, accompanied by Sr. Getruda 
Yamlean, visited Vice Governor Paula Renyaan, a Catholic from Kei in Southeast Maluku, to 
discuss her notion of founding an interreligious women group aiming at quelling conflict and 
pursuing peace in Maluku. The vice governor agreed with Sr. Francesco's idea, and was willing 
to convene a meeting to further discuss this initiative. On August 6, 1999, ten Catholic nuns and 
Protestant women priests met for first time in the Catholic Rinamakana building. In this initial 
meeting, they agreed that Muslim women should be involved in this group. 
At the end, the vice governor contacted lea Latuconsina, the wife of Governor Saleh 
Latuconsina, a Muslim from Pelauw, in order to invite Muslim women to join the movement. In 
August, 1999, a gathering was held in the governor's house at Mangga Dua in Ambon city, 
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attended by limited numbers of Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim women, mostly from upper 
middle class professionals such as academicians, religious leaders, bureaucrats, and conflict 
resolution practitioners. They were, among others, Etha Hendriks, Ece Pattinama, Boya 
Rehawarin, Senda Titaley, Beth Gaspers, Ruth Rumthe (Protestant), Sr. Francesco, Sr. Brigitta, 
Olivia Lasol (Catholic), and from the Muslims: lea Latuconsina, juul Pelu, Thurn Tayib, Ena 
Tatuhey, Anisa Latuconsina, Rita Hayat, and Laila. 
Rev. Etha Hendriks, a Protestant priest and lecturer at Universitas Kristen Indonesia 
Maluku, a Protestant-based university in Ambon, illustrated this meeting as follows, "In the 
meeting the participants were, at first, full of tensions, furies, and suspicions. They were 
unwilling to talk much with the opposing groups. They seemed to believe that the opposing 
religious parties were the cause of the conflict that resulted in killings of their families and 
religious brethren, and burnings of their worship places. Indeed, at the time, both Christian and 
Muslim communities accused each other of being and the initiators of the Maluku conflict. 
Although they were suspicious of one another they agreed to continue and follow up the 
meeting for the sake of Christian-Muslim reconciliation."1S6 Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, co-founders of 
this movement, also expressed the same thing describing this historic first meeting of Christian 
and Muslim women as an "emotional, distressed, but nonetheless, meaningful gathering."157 
To follow up the first meeting, this women group held a second gathering of Christian-
Muslim women in a Catholic monastery in Ambon town to further discuss about the ways of 
preventing communal conflict and establishing peace and reconciliation. In addition, they chose 
a coordinator for each religious community to make the movement more effective. Dr. Etha 
Hendriks was selected as a Protestant coordinator for GPP, while Sr. Brigitta for Catholic. Retty 
Assagaf, the wife of Muhammad Assagaf, a Ban danese Arab who later became a vice governor of 
156 Interview with Rev. Etha Hendriks, Ambon, july 30, 2010. 
157 Interview with Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, Ambon, February 19, 2011. 
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Maluku, was chosen as a Muslim coordinator for GPP.'58 In this second meeting, the group began 
to talk about how to build a peaceful campaign and nonviolent movement. "We also discussed 
how to pass on 'voices of mothers' to the government, security forces, parliaments, and those 
who were responsible for safekeeping in Maluku," Etha Hendriks asserts. There were various 
methods of peaceful campaign and nonviolent movement conducted by GPP ranging from street 
marches, mass mobilization, civic education, anti-violence trainings, peace sermons, art 
performances, story telling, interreligious gatherings, and so forth. They also appealed to their 
husbands and sons not to be involved in fighting. 
Throughout the conflict the GPP activists, representing Christians and Muslims from 
various backgrounds and professions, wore green headbands with the writing "Stop Violence." 
They made many headbands from cloths given by the wife of Governor Saleh Latuconsina, and 
distributed these to people they found in public areas (streets, markets, or offices), as well as in 
Christian and Muslim centers in Ambon city such as Mardika and Batumerah. "To distribute 
these green headdresses," Etha Hendriks explains, "we employed a snowballing method. Those 
who wore these were not only women but also men. Although we were mocked by pro-war 
Christians and Muslims, we kept going. There were hundreds of people and volunteers wearing 
this sort of headband." 
Why did the group decide to use the green headbands? Etha Hendriks and Sr. Brigitta 
Renyaan argue as follows. First, the philosophy of green symbolizes "tranquility, coldness, peace 
of mind, and new-born life," and second is to distinguish between GPP (and pro-peace activists) 
and the Christian fighters and Muslim jihadists. As described in Chapter 4, throughout the wars 
the Christian warriors wore red headbands, whereas the Muslim jihadists used the white ones. 
1sa Besides these coordinators, GPP main members included Ny. E. Tahapary, Ny. Dj. Tatuhey, 
Olivia Lasol, Ny. A. Gasperzs, Rita Syukur, Sr. Francesco Moens PBHK, Ny. P. Titaley, Ny. E. Siwabessy, 
Ny. B. Pattiselano, Ny. L. Tapilatu, Ny. B. Rahawarin, Ny. R. Rum the, Ny. S. Pelu, Ny. T. Taib, Ny. M.M. 
Soukotta, and Ny. M. Rahawarin. 
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The green headdress, thus, Sr. Brigitta affirms, is a sort of"cultural resistance" against those 
wearing both the red and white headbands. "Whoever used the green headbands they were a 
symbol of life having responsibility to preserve togetherness and avert death."159 
After quite successful campaigns of wearing the "Stop Violence"-written green 
headbands, GPP initiated a draft of so-called "Conscience of Women" (suara hati perempuan) 
which was also part of a series of nonviolence movements they instigated. The draft was first 
crafted by Dr. Etha Hendriks, and then was edited by Send a Titaley, the wife of Rev. Sammy 
Titaley, the GPM Synod chairman at the time. The draft outlined first a call for the government 
and authorities to stop violence. Second was a call for the Christians and Muslims to reconcile 
and begin to rebuild brotherhood destroyed by the conflict. "In the Moluccan culture," Etha 
Hendriks states, "Christians and Muslims are like brothers, or in our term, sagu salempeng 
dipata dua meaning that we share each other [as a family]". The third point of the draft 
underlined the effects of conflict which resulted in the decrease of foodstuffs that later could 
endanger the lives of inhabitants; and the fourth point was a reminder that the war had 
threatened their children's future due to the damages of school's facilities. 
The petition was then approved and signed by GPP members, representing Muslims, 
Protestants, and Catholics ranging from petty traders to religious leaders and high-ranking 
bureaucrats. After the signing of the appeal, these women peace activists marched to the 
provincial government office to read and submit this "conscience of women" to the governor. A 
Christian representative, Sarah Tapilatu, accompanied by some 250 women, was selected to 
read it in front of the governor (Governor Saleh Latuconsina) and the Pangdam Pattimura (the 
Territorial Military Commander for Maluku province, Mostopo). In the following day, a Muslim 
representative, Laila, a small trader from Batumerah region, accompanied by some 100 hundred 
Muslim women, read this "voices of women" in front of Governor Saleh. The reading of the 
'''Interview with Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, Ambon, February 19, 2011. 
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statement was done separately in part because to avoid tbe possibility of negative effects 
committed by those disliked with Christian-Muslim alliance.''' 
Other nonviolence activities conducted by GPP included story telling in which Christians 
and Muslims shared a story of the difficulties of living in wartime. GPP also set up a meeting for 
members of kid militia groups (Agas for Christian and Linggis for Muslim) in the form of art 
performances (music and dance) in which each group could present their particular songs or 
dance. This performance was finished with a song about peace and brotherhood which they 
sang together. By the end of the show, they embraced with one another and cried, regretting 
their previous violent acts. "During the show, some war commanders visited us and expressed 
their anger," Etha Hendriks says. She continued the story, "Some of them said, "Why did you 
gather my sons here to do the foolish thing like this?" Etha Hendriks then replied, "Excuse me, 
Sir. Perhaps some of them joined you [as a child militia in the battlefield]. Butl have asked 
permission from their parents to gather them here, and they gave the permission. They are 
children who have a future and need to study. We gathered them, not for evil but for good.""' 
After hearing this explanation, they went out. 
A series of meetings of some child militias continued in various places. GPP's activists 
persistently approached them, in secret, to persuade them to stop fighting. For that reason, the 
members of this group faced multiple threats from those who abhorred the idea of Christian-
Muslim reconciliation. The terrorizing varied from threats of killings to burnings of their houses. 
Sr. Brigitta told, "One day a Christian war commander grasped my hands and harshly shouted, 
"Suster, whatforyou talk about peace, we here want to war" (cited in Amrirudin 2004: 105). At 
the time, voices of women in Ambon were regarded insignificant. "The men considered women 
as a weak person so that whatever they have done is viewed meaningless. However, we 
160 Indeed after this event, Christian women were insulted by pro-war Christians, while 
Laila's house was threatened to be burnt by Muslim jihadists [cf. Amiruddin 2004: 101-09). 
161 Interview with Rev. Etha Hendriks, Ambon, july 30, 2010. 
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tirelessly continued our missions to reconcile Christians and Muslims," Sr. Brigitta affirms (ibid: 
102). 
To expand GPP peaceful missions to broader audience, the group recruited women 
volunteers to become what they called "envoy of peace" (duta perdamaian) aiming at spreading 
out messages of peace and tolerance. This method was greeted with enthusiasm by Ambonese 
women, and hundreds of the Christian and Muslim mothers and female youths joined this 
campaign. At first, GPP's core members consisted of mainly the Ambonese j Moluccan women 
from a variety of professions (e.g. nuns, priests, civil servants, government officials, academics, 
and traders) and educational backgrounds. They did not yet involve migrant women, wives of 
imam (a Muslim leader of communal prayer) and hardliners. After GPP held a program named 
"Closing the Gap" they were involved in the process of reintegration, conflict resolution and 
peace building. Closing the Gap was a participatory program aiming at resolving prejudices in 
the hope of recovering broken Christian-Muslim relationships. The program's method was 
participative and voluntarily in nature with the use of games and analyses of the games. In order 
to undergo and feel togetherness in the "real world," this program demanded the participants to 
"live together"-the mix of Christian and Muslim women-for a few days in designated places. 
Upon hearing GPP's activities, the National Assembly of the Uniting Church in Australia 
being experienced in handling conflicts in the Solomon Island and other war-ravaged areas, was 
interested in facilitating the warring parties to meet, and settle the conflict, and began to talk 
about peaceful solutions. Facilitated by Australian Catholic and practitioner Joyce Belaco, GPP 
held a five-day training workshop for members ofhardline groups, both Christian and Muslim, 
each group consisting of ten women. Located in the war-free village Wayame on the seashore of 
Ambon Bay, this initial workshop was designated to "live, work, and play together" between the 
competing parties. "At first, they refused to sleep together because of fear of getting killed. But 
soon they began to talk with one another," Olivia Lasol explains. 
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After this training, GPP held a second meeting with the victims, located in Karang 
Panjang on the uphill of Ambon town. In the third meeting, GPP involved both men and women 
from Christians and Muslim communities. They also asked for moderate religious leaders to 
facilitate the meeting. Having various workshops and activities, alumni of GPP's programs 
reached hundreds of memberships, each of which became an "emissary of peace" in their own 
villages. The graduates of the GPP trainings, moreover, established a social network to help each 
other in creating stability and peace processes, pacifying the militants, as well as in defusing 
local conflicts in order not to escalate to other regions. 
Since the principal members of GPP mostly comprised "senior mothers" they began to 
think about regeneration to continue the group's endeavors in promoting interreligious 
reunification and conflict avoidance. Based on this rationale, GPP established a Genuine 
Ambassadors for Peace (GAP) and Young Ambassadors for Peace (YAP). They are the "offspring 
of GPP that continue to handle peace activities in the aftermath of the war until recently," Etha 
Hendriks affirms. "We believe," Etha Hendriks continued to say, "that our activities were able to 
create public awareness about the significance and beauty of peace and togetherness."162 On 
April10-15, 2010, I attended a training workshop entitled Workshop Peacebuilding Bagi Raja-
Raja Se-Pulau Ambon (Peace building Workshop for Raja all-Ambon Island) in Negeri Rumahtiga 
in Ambon. 
Attended by representatives of Christian and Muslim raja (traditional village heads) and 
lurah (head of kelurahan, a sort of village in a town) throughout the Ambon Island, the 
workshop was supported by the National Assembly of the Uniting Church in Australia in 
collaboration with the GAP and the YAP. Facilitated by Australian conflict resolution practitioner 
joyce Belaco, this workshop was fruitful in both the results and social interactions. The 
participants lived in together-Christians and Muslims-in a dormitory during the five-day 
162 Interview with Rev. Etha Hendriks, Ambon, july 30, 2010. 
intensive peace building training. By the end of the training, they promised to continue 
reconciliation efforts and keep the stability at the village level. 
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Driven by the GPP's success in holding intergroup cooperation, the government used its 
models to sponsor interreligious peace building initiatives. Governor Saleh Latuconsina, 
furthermore, invited the core members of GPP to present their methods and strategies in 
bringing the conflicting parties into a sequence of workshops and gatherings in front of ten 
(male) religious leaders concerned about the conflict resolution. PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid 
also entrusted the GPP activists to take care of "women issues" in Maluku. Perhaps due to the 
GPP's breakthrough efforts in bringing together the warring groups, the government appointed 
two of its key members, Dr. Margaretha Hendriks and Sr. Brigitta Renyaan, to be the delegates in 
the government-sponsored Mali no II Peace Treaty. GPP was indeed one of Maluku's successful 
stories about interreligious collaboration and its legacy can still be witnessed in today's Ambon. 
Tim 20 Wayame 
Tim 20 Wayame (the Wayame Team of 20) was another powerful story and legacy about 
the Christian-Muslim cooperation in Ambon. Tim 20 Wayame (henceforth, Tim 20) was a 
volunteer association that consisted of twenty people-ten Christians and ten Muslims-in the 
village ofWayame on the shoreline of Ambon Bay. Formally established in March, 1999, the Tim 
20's primary goals were preventing the escalation of the Ambon conflict and preserving peace in 
Wayame. Following the first outbreaks of violence in Ambon town on January 19, 1999, and the 
subsequent attacks in Wailete village on January 21-22, 1999, a number of Christian, Muslim, 
and youth leaders in Wayame, organized by Kannes Amanupunyo (Kepala Pemuda or the youth 
leader of the village, now village head ofWayame), convened a meeting to discuss the incidents, 
and how to anticipate the conflict and prevent it from spilling into Wayame. 
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In the meeting, held in january 24, 1999, both Protestant and Muslim leaders tried to 
convince one another that religion does not teach its followers to fight and kill people. Instead, it 
instructs its adherents to love and protect each other. They, then, agreed to protect each other 
and preserve peacefulness in Wayame. This unwritten agreement was strengthened by an oath 
pledged by two respected Christian and Muslim leaders: Rev. john Sahalessy and Abdurrachman 
Marasabessy. The former vowed in a mosque, whereas the latter pledged in a church. "I declare 
and take the oath in this church that there is no need to fight and kill each other. It is much 
better to forgive and love than to hate and clash with each other," Abdurrachman Marasabessy 
said [quoted in Kompas, May 21, 2004). 
Due to the intensification of the sectarian conflict in Ambon town since the initial 
outbursts, the people ofWayame began to worry about the possibility of the spread of violence 
into their village. To anticipate and overcome the implication of the conflict dynamics in Ambon 
town, Muslims and Christians in Wayame, coordinated by the village head, youth and religious 
leaders, met with the military company commander [Komandan Kompi 733 C), which was 
located in the village. They asked for the military commander to join forces in safekeeping 
efforts in the village. The commander agreed with this initiative. They then held a meeting at the 
office ofPerumnas [National Housing) BTN Wayame in March 1999. This gathering aimed at 
talking about the unwritten agreement previously made by the village's religious and youth 
leaders, as well as discussing the creation of teamwork that responsible for maintaining safety 
and peace in Wayame. By the end of the meeting the people agreed to establish a team 
consisting of Christian and Muslim groups which was later called Tim 20 Wayame. The principal 
members of this team included Rev. john Sahalessy, D. Hunihua, ). Haumahu, ). Dorenge, D. 
Pieter, Tony Pariela, Kannes Amanupunyo, Abdurrachman Marasabessy, Imam Sonep, Hambali, 
jopie Wathloli, Hanafi Marhum, and La Taibu. 
285 
The formation of Tim 20 was first initiated by Rev. john Sahalessy, a respected GPM 
Protestant pastor. A former national soccer player during the 1960s, john Sahalessy admitted 
that the founding of the Tim 20 was influenced by Tim 19 (Team of 19)-a team comprising 
nineteen military and police elites of Moluccan origins which was shaped by the central 
government (during President Habibie) to overcome the Maluku conflict. john Sahalessy states, 
"When the civil unrest exploded in Ambon in january, 1999, the central government shaped Tim 
19, whose members were all Ambonese and Moluccan military and police elites, under the 
leadership of Lieutenant General Suadi Marasabessy, aiming at quelling violence and 
establishing peace in Maluku. However, the outcome was zero. The conflict did decrease, but 
tended to escalate and out of control. Although the team failed in preventing conflict, Tim 19 
nevertheless influenced me to form a similar team in Wayame comprised of Christians and 
Muslims."163 
In front of the Wayame people, john Sahalessy openly spoke, "Do you want peace or 
war? If you want war, let us fight each other. But if you want peace let us protect our village 
from outside intruders and provocateurs." Rev. john Sahalessy, moreover, guaranteed the safety 
of Muslims in Wayame. He stated, "You are my Muslim brothers and sisters, there is no need to 
be afraid. Before you are attacked by outside Christians, particularly those from Hative Besar, 
we Christians will face them first. We never allow them to enter this village and disturb my 
Muslim brethren here, whatever the reason is," (quoted in Pariela 2008: 160). One of the 
members of Tim 20, Aholiab Watloly, who is also a lecturer at Universitas Pattimura, stated that 
the security guarantee and protection given by a respected Christian leader like Rev. john 
Sahalessy was necessary partly because Christians were the majority religious group in 
Wayame. john Sahalessy, then, proposed his ideas of shaping Tim 20 consisting often Christians 
and ten Muslims. john Sahalessy and Kannes Amanupunyo were responsible for recruiting 
163 Interview with Rev. john Sahalessy, Ambon, August 14, 2010. 
competent participants from the Christians, while Abdurrachman Marasabessy and Hanafi 
Marhum, added by the great imam ofWayame mosque, were charged with selecting Muslim 
members for the team. 
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Upon the completion of the member selection, they declared the formation of Tim 20 
Wayame under the chairmanship of Rev. john Sahalessy at the office of Perumnas (National 
Housing Authority] BTN Wayame. After the declaration, john Sahalessy requested four 
conditions to be obeyed by the members of the team. These are (1] to be afraid of God, (2] to 
work sincerely, (3] be open, and (4] be neutral. In the following day, the Tim 20 members 
invited people-both Christians and Muslims-through a loudspeaker, to gather in the hall of 
the Wayame Church. In this church, they officially announced the shape of Tim 20, asked for 
people's opinions with regard to the ways of handling conflict, and discussed attempts at 
keeping the peace in the area including how to maintain people in order to not be contaminated 
by outer influences.In the aftermath of this "grand gathering", a series of intensive meetings 
were held regularly in public areas: church, mosque, soccer field, village government hall, office, 
market, and so forth. "The more violence occurred the more intensely we met," john Sahalessy 
asserts. 
In order to make Wayame free from conflict, the Tim 20 composed four normative rules, 
along with its moral sanctions and physical punishments to those who broke it, to be obeyed by 
the Wayame people. These were first Christians and Muslims in Wayame were prohibited to 
disturb each other. If a Christian violated this rule, Christian members of the team were 
responsible to punish him/her. Conversely, if a Muslim broke the rule, the team's Muslim 
members will penalize him/her. Second, both Christians and Muslims in Wayame were not 
allowed to use particular religious symbols, including calling their opposing religious groups 
"Obet' (for Christian] and "Acang" (for Muslim], since it might potentially raise resentment and 
provoke conflict. Transgression against this regulation would be firmly punished. 
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Third, all Wayame inhabitants were forbidden from engaging in the warfare in any 
place. If there were a Wayame villager involved in fighting, hejshe was demanded to leave the 
village.And if there were a Wayame person who died in the battleground, his/her body was 
banned to be buried in Wayame.164 Fourth, the Wayame people were forbidden to fabricate 
weapons, as well as produce and consume so pi (an intoxicating traditional drink made up from 
sugar palm tree)165 (cf. Pariela 2008: 193-4). The sanctions or punishments included resolute 
warning, exclusion, eviction, the ban of entering the village, or beating in front of the public. Tim 
20, with the support of local population, had obeyed these normative rules and punished those 
who transgressed it.166 
With its population reaching more than 4,000 people (Census of2007, its populace was 
4,607), Wayame was one of fifty villages in Ambon town in whose inhabitants were mixed 
between Christians and Muslims, with the former dominating the population167 (cf. 
Pattikayhattu 2008a, 2009).lts residents were a mix of settlers (Ambonese/Moluccan) and 
16' The Wayame Muslims who died in the battlefield were buried at Kotajawa, a Muslim sub-
village near Wayame, while the Christians ofWayame who were killed in the warfare were buried at 
the Christian village of Hative Besar. 
165 In an interview with me (August 14, 2010), john Sahalessy highlights ten obligatory rules 
need to be followed by both the members of the team and the Wayame people. These are, first, the 
ban of using discriminatory languages such as Obet (for Christian] and Acang (for Muslim]. Second, 
the prohibition of using certain religious symbols such as red headbands, white headdresses, Arabic 
scripts, the Cross, etc. Third, the ban of consuming alcohols. Fourth, the ban of producing weapons. 
Fifth, the prohibition of spreading provocative issues. Sixth, meeting with local people, at least once a 
week. Seventh, meeting religious leaders with their folks in mosque and church. Eighth, driving out 
the Wayame people if: they engaged in the warfare, made weapons, or destroyed the people's 
facilities. Ninth, the ban of burying the dead body in Wayame if hejshe died in the battleground. 
Tenth, the Christian members of the team were responsible to prevent, if any, Christian attackers in 
Wayame, and the Muslim members were in-charge stopping, if any, Muslim fighters in the village. 
166 Cases of violation toward these rules can be seen at Pariela (2008: 194-9]. One of the Tim 
20 co-founders, Hanafi, later was involved in the war outside Wayame; consequently he was driven 
out of the team. 
167 According to local history, Wayame was formerly part of traditional village (negeri or 
oman) of Rumahtiga. Historian). Pattikayhattu (2008a, 2009], referring to the old work ofRumphius, 
said that prior to the advent of the Dutch, the inhabitants of Rumahtiga were settled in Mountain 
Hukunalo. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch government sent the Hukunalo people down to the 
seashore to settle in Rumahtiga. At present, Wayame is an independent village, and has become a 
capital for a new established kecamatan (sub-regency) Teluk Ambon. For the profile ofWayame 
village see Pariela (2008: 122-47]. 
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migrants (Butonese, Bugis-Makasarese, and Javanese). Wayame is located in the middle 
between the Christian village ofHative Besar and the Muslim area ofKotajawa. Since 2000, the 
latter had been the basis of the Laskar Jihad militias when they assaulted and destroyed the 
regions ofRumahtiga, Poka, and Tihu. Kotajawa is also the home ofikram Ibrahim, one of the 
Ambonese Laskar jihad leaders. The territory ofWayame is divided into two main areas, the 
lowland where Christians and Muslims mostly mixed and the upland which is inhabited by the 
Muslim Butonese. 
As elsewhere in the Ambonese villages, Wayame was also not spared tension and 
suspicion. As John Sahalessy has remarked, "Many times, Christians from neighboring Hative 
Besar wanted to attack the Wayame Muslims, and the Muslims in neighboring Kotajawa also 
planned to assault the Wayame Christians."168 A number of the Wayame Muslims and Christians 
were also involved in fighting outside the village. As a result, they were driven out ofWayame. "I 
never tolerated those who were engaged in the combat zone," John Sahalessy affirms. He 
continued to say that the Tim 20 persistently worked to build close relationships and establish 
communication with local people. In addition to subsequent formal meetings, the members of 
Tim 20 met every night in Pas Ronda or Pas Siskamling (the village meeting points) to evaluate 
the progress of conflict, and guard the village from unintended outsiders. 
Each religious leader, furthermore, was not hesitant to come to another religious 
community, either in houses or worship places, to talk about the development of conflict and 
guarantee their security. The Muslim leader Abdurrachman Marasabessy, for instance, visited 
his Christian neighbors after the Sunday prayer to convey the Muslim commitment to keep 
social stability, safety, and harmony in Wayame. Taking a similar manner, the Protestant leader 
Rev. John Sahalessy visited the Muslims to assure their security. Ambonese sociologist Tonny 
Pariela, who wrote a doctoral thesis on the Wayame village and its ability to preserve the peace 
'"Interview with Rev. john Sahalessy, Ambon, August 14, 2010. 
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in the time of conflict, stated that the intense interaction between the members of Tim 20 and 
the Wayame people had become the chief foundation upon which to build mutual trust and 
cooperation within the society. Although there had been provocative issues or even certain 
individual actions that bothered Christian-Muslim relations, Pariela added, the high intensity of 
meetings and contacts could help reduce the anxiety and feelings of insecurity of the local 
people (Pariela 2008: 206). Besides building relationships with local people, it is also significant 
to note that Tim 20 also established communications with the military units in-charged in the 
hotspot ofRumahtiga (e.g. Kesatuan 411, Yon Armed 13, Kesatuan 611, and Kesatuan 403) to 
protect Wayame. 
The outcome of the tireless efforts of the Tim 20 and local people was remarkable: 
Wayame was free of communal disturbance, although attempts were made by "irresponsible 
individuals" of Christians and Muslims from neighboringWayame (e.g. Hative Besar and 
Kotajawa) to destabilize the village. A national newspaper Kompas portrayed Wayame as 
follows, "The village ofWayame is a magic in Maluku. Since the first eruption of the Ambon 
conflict in january, 1999, until the social riots driven by the display of the RMS flags on April 25, 
2004, the waves of conflict and violence never touched Wayame. Both Christians and Muslims in 
Wayame continue to Jive in togetherness and harmony, albeit the interreligious sectarian wars 
swept across Ambon and Maluku," (Kompas, May 21, 2004). 
Some commentators erroneously said that the peaceful Wayame was not the product of 
voluntarily grassroots reconciliation but of an order from above-from the government and 
military elites to protect their properties in the region. Indeed, Wayame is the home of the state-
owned oil company (Pertamina) and headquarters of a military unit (Kompi C Batalyon lnfanteri 
733 Masariku) of Regional Military Command (Kodam). But this is not the primary reason of 
why Wayame was freed from violence. In Maluku, government and military properties (military 
1 police posts, barracks, governmental offices, state-owned campuses, hospitals, or companies) 
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and public facilities (markets, worship places, and schools) all had been the target of the angry 
rioters. 
Such analyses tend to neglect the solid local collaboration of the Wayame inhabitants to 
quell conflict and create calmness. As a matter of fact, the peace in Wayame was a product of 
serious commitment of the local people in preserving the harmony, as well as of strong and 
genuine cooperation between religious leaders, village government officials, security forces, and 
the whole society in general. The success of Tim 20 Wayame in maintaining the peace in the 
village drove other villages' leaders to attempt to "clone" the Tim 20 Wayame but unfortunately 
they failed. Due to the success ofWayame, some members of this team (John Sahalessy and 
Tonny Pariela) were selected as representatives of the Moluccan society in the Malina li peace 
accord. 
As a concluding remark, what can be said of the three civil society associations depicted 
above is of what Robert Putnam (2000) has termed "bridging social capital" that creates larger 
identities and reciprocity. The activities of the above three civil society groups had certainly 
helped reduce mass violence, albeit on a small-scale and limited basis. The groups also 
undeniably helped to pave the way for the signing of a peace deal at Malina in 2002, which was 
brokered by the central government (known Malina ll). The Malina !I peace treaty pledged to 
stop violence, support economic growth, and undertake an independent investigation into what 
originally sparked the conflict. It urged unauthorized militia groups to surrender their weapons 
and called on groups from outside the Maluku province to leave the region, a clear reference to 
the main armed Islamic group, the Laskar jihad, which eventually returned its fighters to java. 
Physical divisions remained between the Muslim and Christian communities after this 
peace agreement, but the mass violence largely ceased, deserted army and police were fired, and 
some of the armed groups disbanded. The army also reduced its presence in Maluku; 
consequently the province settled into a period of uneasy calm, even if the traumatic memory of 
291 
bloodletting may never be fully erased. This is to say that civil society groups were not alone in 
pursuing peace. In Ambon, in particular, these groups always collaborated with other agents, 
both state and society, in their efforts of achieving interreligious reintegration. In addition to the 
grassroots agencies, there were religious groups described earlier and the government and state 
institutions which I will explain in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 11 
Government Responses towards Peacebuilding Initiatives 
Contrary to most analyses and studies that tend to discount or dismiss the role of 
government and state institutions in the peace and reconciliation processes, I argue that state-
both central and provincial/ regional governments as well as state institutions such as the 
Latupatti (association of village heads)-contributed to the peacemaking. Indeed government 
efforts paved the way toward Christian-Muslim reintegration. In the context of Maluku, it is 
unfair and biased to neglectthe contribution of government in the reconciliatory process of the 
two warring groups. As john Goss (2004: 28) has rightly pointed out the central government-
sponsored Malina II peace accord reached by representatives of Muslim and Christian groups on 
February 11-12, 2002, in Malina, South Sulawesi, had been the most major and momentous 
stage in attempts of interreligious compromise and cessation of hostilities. 
Finally taking decisive action, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare M. jusuf 
Kalla convened a meeting in Malina which established an-eleven point agreement to end 
conflict, restore the role oflaw, protect the unitary state, establish freedom of movement, 
eliminate armed organization, return displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes, rebuild 
infrastructure, maintain neutrality of security forces, and reconstruct an integrated university. 
The following is the English version of the Malina II peace accord: 
The Maluku Meeting at Malina 
The Maluku conflict which has undergone for more than three years has resulted in 
thousands of people losing their lives and properties, caused sufferings and 
difficulties, endangered the unity of Republic of Indonesia, and darkened the future 
of the Moluccan society. Accordingly, by the Grace of God Almighty, we the Muslims 
and Christians ofMaluku, with the open soul and kind heart, with the intention to 
live under the nation's "unity in diversity," together with the government of Republic 
of Indonesia, agree to bind ourselves into the peace concord as follows: 
o End all forms of conflict and violence. 
o Erect the supremacy of law fairly, explicitly, honestly, and neutrally, with 
the support of the whole society. The law enforcement officers, therefore, 
should be professional in conducting their duty. 
o Reject, oppose, and punish all forms of separatist movement threatening the 
unity and sovereignty of Republic of Indonesia, such as that of the Republic 
of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan or RMS). 
o As part of Republic of Indonesia, all Moluccan people have legal and equal 
rights to live, work, and run business in the whole area of Republic of 
Indonesia; and so as the other Indonesians, they have legal and equal rights 
to live, work, and run business in the area of the province ofMaluku by 
being aware of and follow the local cultural values and keep security and 
peace. 
o All types of illegal armed organizations, units, groups, or militias in Maluku 
are prohibited. They also need to surrender their weapons and/or be 
stripped, and legal actions will be taken over them according to the law. The 
outsiders bothering Maluku need to leave the region. 
o Form a national independent investigation team to investigate the incident 
of january 19, 1999, the FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku- the Moluccan 
Sovereignty Front), the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan- the Republic of 
South Moluccas), the Christian Republic of South Moluccas (Kristen RMS), 
the Laskar jihad, the Laskar Kristus, forced conversion and other forms of 
human rights violation in the name of the supremacy of law. 
o Return the refugees to their former places without any pressure, and return 
their civil rights gradually. 
o The government will help people rehabilitate psychological and social 
conditions, economic infrastructures, and public facilities such as education, 
health, religious facilities, and houses. 
o In order to maintain stability and security of all areas in Maluku, a 
harmonious military and police forces is needed. Along with this need, the 
Indonesian military and police forces facilities should be developed, 
equipped, and functional again. 
o To uphold relationship and harmony among Maluku's religious followers, all 
forms of da'wah or religious preaching should respect the plurality of 
society and pay attention to the local cultures. 
o Support rehabilitation of Universitas Pattimura (Unpatti) under a principle 
of development for all, and hence, recruitment system and other policies are 
run transparently with paying attention on the principle of justice together 
with fulfillment of qualification required. 
This treaty was made with sincerity and the intention to follow up the points 
consistently. Those who break the rules and do not put into practice these eleven 
points will be punished according to the existing law. 
Malino, February 12, 2002 
293 
294 
Follow ups of the Malino II were handled by the Commission of Security and Law 
Enforcement (for security and legal issues) and the Commission of Social and Economy (for 
issues such as rehabilitation, Internally Displaced Persons, reconstruction and so on) . The 
Malino II was signed by seventy delegates representing both Christians and Muslims, each group 
consisting of thirty five members. Muslim representatives at the Malino II were chaired by 
Thamrin Ely, while the Christian delegates were headed by Tony Pariela.t69 The signing of the 
Mali no II peace agreement, moreover, was witnessed by a number of religious and political 
leaders, high-ranking bureaucrats, and military and police elites. They were, among others, M. 
jusuf Kalla (Coordinating Ministe r of People's Welfare), Susilo Bam bang Yudhoyono 
(Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security), Da'i Bachtiar (head of Indonesian Police), M. 
169 The Muslim representatives at the Malino II were as follows: KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke 
(MUI Maluku), Thamrin Ely (BIMM Maluku, the Muslim chair of the delegation), M. Nasir Rahawarin 
(BIMM Maluku), ldrus Tatuhey (Muhammadiyah Maluku), Lutfi Sanaky (KAHMI), Hasan OhoreJla 
(Satgas Amar Ma'rufNahi Munkar), Abdul Azis Fidmatan (FPIM), Husein Toisuta (FPI), Daud Sangadji 
(BIMM Ambon), Yusuf Laisow (BIMM Ambon), Hasbullah Toisuta (lAIN Ambon), Hadi Basalamah 
(Yayasan Al-Hilal), M. Amin Polanunu (Raja ofWakasihu), Effendy Latuconsina (Raja of Hatuhaha), 
Abd. Razaq Opier (Raja of Liang), Abuya Rumakefing (a community leader of East Seram), Abdul 
Karim Rahayaan (community leader of Air Salobar), Yunus Serang (leader of Banda Ely), Yusran 
Salmon (community leader), H.A. Latif Hatala (Batumerah), Djafar Tuanani (Kailolo ), Taib Madura 
(community leader), Husein Tapitapi (Talake), Mahmud Rengifurwarin (Southeast Maluku), 
Abubakar Hehanusa (Airkoning), Lapone Kasman Salamun (Posko Celebes Bersatu), Hanafi (Posko 
Baguala), Usman Slamet (Posko Kebun Cengkeh), Amir Kiat (youth leader in Batumerah), Jalil 
Wasahua (Pemuda Diponegoro ), Daud Sialana (Pemuda Leihitu), Aly Salampessy (Pemuda Air 
Besar), Ahmad Leawara (Pemuda Salahatu), and Hasan Usemahu (Pemuda Jalan Baru). 
The Christian representatives of the Malino II were Rev. I.J.W. Hendriks (chair, GBH Sinode 
GPM), Tonny Pariela (professor at Universitas Pattimura), Rev. S.J. Mailoa (BPH Sinode GPM), Bishop 
P. C. Mandagi (Diocese of Amboina), Rev. Henry Lolain (PGPI Maluku), Rev. Ricky Hitipeuw (BPD GBI 
Maluku), P. Simon Weneben, Pr (Diocese of Amboina), J. Maspaitella (FKYM), Etty Dumutubun 
(PMKRI Ambon), Raja Waraka (Latupati of Amahai), Emus Dias Raja Ema (Raja in Ambon town), Fr. 
Agus Ulahay, Pr (Catholic Crisis Center), Etta Hendriks (GPP), Raja Tuhaha (Latupati of Saparua), J. 
Ajawaila (academic), T. Leatemia (academic), Ipi Litaay (academic), 0. Lawalata (academic), Fileo P. 
Noya (academic), Alo Futunanembun (community leader), Edy Hukunala (community leader), Silas 
Ratuanak (community leader), Sr. Brigitta Renyaan (GPP), John Ruhulessin (AM GPM), Ferry 
Wattimury (youth leader), Emang Nikijuluw (grassroots leader), Femmy Souisa (grassroots leader), 
Yanes Risambessy (grassroots leader), Elvis Talapessy (grassroots leader), Yongkie Siahaya 
(grassroots leader), Kris Timisella (grassroots leader), Rev. Jacky Manuputty (religious leader), Rev. 
john Sahalessy (religious leader), Benedictus Tawuruturun (Latvuan village chief), Hengky Hattu 
(NGO). 
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Saleh Latuconsina (Governor of Maluku), Paula B. Renjaan (Vice Governor of Maluku), M. J. 
Papilaja (Mayor of Ambon), Z. B. Palaguna (Governor of South Maluku), Soenarko (head of 
provincial Indonesian police in Maluku), Mustopo (Territorial Military Commander at Maluku), 
Etty Sahuburua (chair of the Maluku Parliament), Din Syamsuddin (MUI I Muhammadiyah), and 
Fr. lsmartono (KWI Jakarta) . 
Although some elite members of the central and provincial/regional governments had 
undoubtedly contributed by the signing of the Malino II, the role of M. jusuf Kalla (known by his 
nickname "JK"), in particular, ought to have special mention in the reconciliatory process of the 
two conflicting parties. Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim leaders with whom I spoke, expressed a 
similar manner describing JK, who is a Buginese and was a former Vice President of Indonesia, 
as a "courageous man" who directly dealt with the radical factions of Christians and Muslims. In 
contrast, some Ambonese societies depict Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Susilo 
Bam bang Yudhoyono (SBY, now President of Indonesia) as a "coward general" who only landed 
at the Pattimura Airport during his visit in Ambon. Ambonese leaders, moreover, said that JK 
had worked clandestinely approaching the two opposing groups, including the militant factions, 
in order to put their weapons down and began to talk about a peace concord to end the violence 
and rebuild relationship in the spirit of "Ambon basudara" (Ambonese term for "brotherhood"). 
It is central to bear in mind that JK was not only the architect of the Mali no II but also of 
the Malina I, which successfully brought the warring factions of Christians and Muslims in Poso, 
Central Sulawesi, to the negotiating table on December 19-21, 2001, ending that conflict. JK was 
also the architect of the Helsinki Peace Agreement between the Indonesian government and 
Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM). Signed under the supervision of former 
Finnish president, Martti Ahtisaari, the Helsinki peace deal marked the end of a 30-year-old 
brutal violence between GAM and Jakarta, one of Asia's most enduring and bloody armed 
separatist conflicts, as well as gave Aceh a high degree of substantial and genuine autonomy. 
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Anyone studying civic peace in protracted conflict areas will know that a process of 
conflict transformation from violence to conciliation, from disintegration to integration, and 
from denial to cooperation is not an easy journey. The Helsinki, Mali no I, and Malina II were also 
the fruit of a long-term process of negotiation involving various government officials, political 
agents and civil society actors. Ignoring the contribution of one would fail to grasp the whole 
process of negotiation and reconciliation. More specifically, demonizing the government and 
state institutions and networks contradict the facts of their involvement in the peace building 
and reconciliation processes right from the beginning. Apart from some uncivil factions in the 
government that engaged, directly or indirectly, in the communal conflicts, state contributions 
to the peace process, liked or disliked, can not be denied. 
Indeed polls show a considerable minority of the population in Maluku (20%) were 
opposed to the Malina II peace deal (Pinontoan 2002), as were some militant groupings such as 
the FKM (Front Kedaulatan Maluku-the Moluccan Sovereignty Front), the Laskar Jihad, Front 
Pembela Islam Maluku ("Maluku Front of Muslim Defenders"), and Satgas Amar Ma'rufNahi 
Munkar ("Special Task Force of Commanding the Right and Forbidding the Wrong"), which all 
united in opposition in the Forum Silaturahmi Umat Islam se-Maluku ("All-Maluku Islamic 
Friendship Forum") (Kompas 2002). Some militant Muslim groups refused the Malina II in 
particular based on a demand for formal acknowledgement that Christians were to blame for 
initiating the violence in the January 19 incident, while some Christian groups rejected the use of 
the term Laskar Kristen or Laskar Kristus ("Army of Christ"), and the label "separatist." 
Moreover, some militant leaders of Muslim jihadists such as Mo Attamimy, Ja'far Umar 
Thalib, Ali Fauzy, and Rustam Kastor viewed the Malina II as a sign of weakness and surrender 
on the part of Muslims. They also accused that the Christian acceptance of the Malina II was an 
act of deceit and a tactic to survive in part because the Christians had lost control over 
Ambonese territory after the arrival of Java-based holy war militias. It is also true, in some part, 
297 
that Malina II is typical of what Ichsan Malik, University of Indonesia academic and activist who 
was involved from the start in the Maluku peace process, calls the government's "fire engine 
approach," in which distant authorities represent themselves as "saviors in local conflicts" and 
impose top-down, instant solutions that frustrate local initiatives (Malik 2003). Even then, 
progress on some of the goals has been slow, due to lack of political will and funds, and 
representatives of the provincial parliament even threatened to sue the National Government 
for "liable negligence" in its failure to fully implement the agreement (cf. Goss 2004). 
Despite some criticism toward the initiative and implementation of the Malina II peace 
agreement (see Pieris 2004: 272-291), however, most importantly, as john Goss (2004: 29) has 
noted, the accord illustrated obvious concern and political will of the central government at the 
ministerial level, as well as of Maluku's administration to establish the authority and 
responsibility of the civil security forces. As we know, following the end of the Civil Emergency 
status in 2003, the military presence visibly diminished. Weapons amnesty and regular sweeps 
led to the disarmament of militia groups, creating an opportunity for representatives of civil 
society associations as well as community and religious leaders to continue or initiate efforts at 
reconciliation and reconstruction. Without the government initiatives, militia groups were 
unwilling to lay down their arms, and continued to engage in mass violence. As a result, after 
the signing of the Malina II, the collective violence decreased significantly, albeit some minor 
incidents, provoked by disappointed individuals toward the Malina II, occurred in a number of 
Ambon City's fragile areas ( cf. ICG 2002). 
However, by the end of 2002 Ambon slowly reached brittle peace following the decrease 
of armed militias who previously played a major role in the communal strife. After the 
disbanding of the Laskar Jihad on October 14,2002, Kebun Cengkeh, where most java-based 
jihadists stationed, was now free from these radical groups. As well, after the capture of Alex 
Manu putty, the commander of Moluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM, one of the Christian militant 
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groups), as well as the involvement of some main grassroots leaders in the Malina II (e.g. Emang 
Nikijuluw, Femmy Souisa, Yanes Risambessy, Elvis Talapessy, Yongkie Siahaya, and Kris 
Timisella), the radical Christians in Kudamati, where most Christian militia groups were located, 
became weak. Based on these positive facts and Maluku's improvement toward the gradual 
peace process, among other things, Maluku's respected leader John Pieris (2004: 300) elegantly 
states: "The serious and significant endeavors of Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare M. 
)usuf Kalla and the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security Susilo Bam bang Yudhoyono 
when they initiated and designed the Malina II peace deal should be candidly valued because, at 
least through the accord, the Maluku tragedy could be overcome gradually, and efforts of 
revitalizing Maluku's civilizations which were previously weakened by the mass violence can 
now be achieved." 
More importantly, following the Malina II peace agreement, the central government 
issued Presidential Instruction (In pres) No. 6/2003, instructing all coordinating ministries to 
prioritize recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in their work plans and 
dedicated budgets for Maluku and North Maluku over a three-year period beginning in 2004, 
based on input and proposals from the Maluku and North Maluku governments. This was a 
major central government recovery initiative that could be started in 2004 in a context of better 
local social and economic conditions as well as improved security as illustrated by the removal 
of the Civil Emergency status in both provinces. On September 14,2004, the national parliament 
agreed that !DR 1,210 trillion would be allocated in 2005 in order to implement In pres 6/2003 
in both Maluku and North Maluku and an additional !DR 250 billion would be allocated to both 
provinces for IDP-related activities in 2005170 (Brown 2004: 53). 
170 Unfortunately, the budget was not fully received by the IDPs and the victims due to 
corruption of some government officials and those who implemented the government project of 
rehabilitation and economic recovery including the apparatus of the village. Accordingly in some 
villages, this initiative has caused tension and renewed conflict 
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How did Maluku's Christians and Muslims, who had a history of a series of failed 
negotiations, finally come to a peace agreement and promise to end the violence, albeit some 
minority groups refused the peace accord? As noted earlier, the Malina II was a product of a 
long process of meetings between state and society agencies. It was neither magic nor a dream 
that came into fruition overnight. It was indeed the fruit of tireless endeavors of "moderate 
factions" in both religious communities, either in state or society level, in the creation of more 
stable and conducive society in Maluku freed from antagonism, hostility, and sadism. Since the 
beginning of the communal violence in early 1999 the central and local governments ofMaluku 
and Ambon had actually initiated frequent meetings of the representatives of Protestant, 
Catholic, and Muslim communities to end the bloodshed and establish sustainable peace in the 
region. Since the first outbreaks of violence the government had tried to resolve conflict and 
connect social relations of Maluku's anak negeri (a term for Moluccan people) cut off by the 
carnage. 
There were at least three approaches concerning the role of central government in their 
attempt to end fighting. First was security approach by deploying military and police personnel 
to Maluku aiming at avoiding direct communal fighting and maintaining safety of the society. 
Following the deaths of approximately 211 people in the village of Duma in Galela, the central 
government under PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) implemented a Civil Emergency 
status in both Maluku and North Maluku171 by issuing Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 
88/2000 on june 27, 2000. The completion of Civil Emergency increased military (TN!) and 
police (Polri) personnel numbers and also the powers of military commanders. The Civil 
Emergency Law (Undang-Undang Darurat Sipii] gives full authority to the provincial 
government to resolve the conflict. This security approach failed to end the violence in part 
171 The central government maintained a status of civil emergency in North Maluku until May 
2003 and in Maluku until September 2003. 
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because the military forces in Maluku did not go behind the command of the provincial 
government. By the application of the Civil Emergency it meant that the Governor of Maluku 
became the ruler (Penguasa Darurat Sipil-the civil emergency ruler) who had full authority to 
command governmental activities including those of the military. 
At the same time, Provincial Military Commander of Maluku (Pang dam Pattimura) was 
assigned by Panglima TN! (Commander oflndonesian Military Forces) to be Pang lima Komando 
Operasi Pemulihan dan Keamanan or Pangkooplihkam (Commander of Operation for Recovery 
and Security) with two stars rank (Major General) who was responsible for security policy and 
approach. The Pang lima TN! also deployed BKO (Bad an Kendali Operasi-Operation Restraint 
Body) consisting of thousands of soldiers from various units aiming at "securing" Maluku. Thus 
it seems that the military policy differed from that of civil emergency ruler; consequently there 
were dualleaderships in Maluku that made the situation in the region more chaotic and 
uncontrolled. 
Second was called the rehabilitation approach, namely an urgent approach to handle the 
victims of the war including humanitarian assistance for refugees such as providing food 
supplies, medical aids, and camps. Unfortunately, however, in post-Malino II Maluku issues of 
IDPs are not yet fully resolved due to a number of reasons, including corruption on the part of 
some government officials who handled the program as well as the mentality of (some) the 
refugees who cheated the government for funds (see e.g. Hedman, ed. 2005; Adam 2008c). 
The third approach was reconciliation or peacemaking initiative. This approach was 
already implemented since the Habibie presidency in 1999. Concerning this approach, various 
efforts had been done by the central government to end fighting and resolve conflict ranging 
from the formation of the "Eleven Team" consisting of eleven high-ranking military and police 
officers of Moluccan origins (the Team was headed by Major General Suadi Marasabessy from 
Kailolo of Haruku Island) to a team made up ofjakarta-based Moluccan leaders and politicians. 
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When mass violence continued, the minister of religious affairs also organized a meeting of 
Christian and Muslim leaders that produced a document outlining phases to stop the conflict 
and focus on rehabilitation. However, all of these efforts failed to make Maluku more peaceful. 
On the contrary, mass disturbance tended to escalate. 
On May 12, 1999, located on the Merdeka Square in Ambon town, a number of youth, 
religious and ad at leaders from both communities signed a peace pledge in front of General 
Wiranto (Commander of Indonesian Military Forces). They promised to end the tragedy that 
had destroyed Maluku's inter-religious harmony and traditional systems of brotherhood. The 
participants of the meeting expressed their grief toward previous bitter violence, as well as 
assuring to rebuild the damaged human relations with the spirit oflove, mutual respect, and 
human values. However, tragically, the pledge was only three days old. Collective violence 
recurred in various areas. 
As well, early December 1999, General Roesmanhadi (chief oflndonesian Police) met 
with sixty Ambonese leaders who resided in jakarta aiming at shaping a Task Force for 
Ambonese Peace (Satgas Perdamaian Ambon). The formation of the Task Force was driven by 
the conviction that the Ambon conflict could only be resolved by the Ambonese society. On 
December 12,1999, PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid, accompanied by Vice PresidentMegawati 
Soekarnoputri and a number of cabinet ministers visited Ambon to discuss the conflict. When 
President Wahid left for jakarta, however, the communal riots broke out again. 
Attempts of conflict resolution had also been initiated by Maluku and Ambon 
governments. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of violence, the Maluku provincial 
government secured pledges from community leaders to end fighting. Governor of Maluku M. 
Saleh Latuconsina (henceforth, Governor Saleh), a Pelauw Muslim and France-trained 
bureaucrat, endlessly called for the significance of peace and reconciliation for future Maluku. 
Gubernor Saleh had worked hand in hand with civil society forces to minimize violent acts and 
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tried to find acceptable solutions for both conflicting religious groups through various meetings 
and crucial actions, albeit the ending results were hurtful, meaning that every effort of 
reconciliation process he initiated was followed by bloody incidents. Governor Saleh had also 
provided his house for a shelter of hundreds of refugees, both Christians and Muslims. On 
january 23, 1999, just four days after the first incident erupted, Governor Saleh, accompanied by 
Col. Hikayat (Military District Commander at Maluku), Rev. Sammy P. Titaley (chairman ofGPM 
Synod), Bishop Mandagi (Diocese of Amboina), R. Hasanusi (chairman of Maluku's Indonesian 
Ulama Council) and a number of religious and political figures held a parade throughout Ambon 
town aiming at imploring people to stop violence. 
Governor Saleh, moreover, facilitated countless gatherings with community and 
religious leaders and grassroots agencies (civil society associations and nongovernmental 
organizations) to create mutual understanding and trust, and the ways of establishing 
conciliation. Early in 1999, the Governor formed a small teamwork named "Team Six" consisting 
of representatives from Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims (each group provided two persons). 
They were Thamrin Ely, Luthfi Sanaky (Muslim), john Ruhulessin, Thos Lailosa (Protestant), Fr. 
Agus Ulahay and Richard Ufie (Catholic). The Team aimed at finding possible ways to end 
violence and establish peace. After discussing with a number of respected leaders, the Team 
proposed Governor Saleh to shape Tim Rujuk Sosial (FRS), a sort of "reconciliation team," 
involving a larger community representing Muslims, Protestants, and Catholics. Finally, on 
March 8, 1999, the Governor agreed with the establishment of this team whose main tasks were 
to investigate the root causes of conflict, promote reconciliation to the publics, and to seek 
strategies to end the war.'72 
172 Interview with Thamrin Ely on March 28, 2011. A member of Muhammadiyah, Thamrin 
(b. 1947) is among the leading political leader in Ambon who played a crucial role in the Christian-
Muslim reconciliation processes. He also became a head of Muslim delegates in the Malina II. The 
name of Tim Rujuk Sosial was proposed by him (formerly Crisis Center). 
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Governor Saleh, furthermore, convened a mass religious gathering for Muslims atAl-
Fatah Mosque entitled Musyawarah Besar Umat Islam Maluku (a great convention for Muslims in 
Maluku) on june 18-21, 2001. The conference resulted in the founding of a new organization 
named Bad an Imarat Muslim Maluku (BlMM for short, a leadership body for Maluku's Muslims] 
in which dozens of Muslim leaders joined the body including Thamrin Ely, Hadi Basalamah, 
Nasir Rahawarin, Idrus Tatuhey, and Luthfi Sanaky all of whom became among the key players 
of the Malino II peace pact ( cf. Manuputty and Wattimanela 2004: 138-44 ). The governor dealt 
not only with urban-based religious leaders and CSOs but also village-level leadership such as 
latupatti (an association of village heads) as the main force of peace. 
Many times Governor Saleh set up a meeting with the latupatti, either in his house at 
Mangga Dna or in the baileu (village's main meeting place) to discuss recent developments and 
strategies to avoid mass conflict. However, sadly, every effort to end violence failed to stop the 
brutal massacres. Bloody incidents, added with the burnings of worship places, which scattered 
across the Ambon city and countryside along religious lines had provoked masses to commit 
retaliation on the opposing religious group. As a result of this sustained religious violence, 
religious-based segregation continued to occur, not only in the grassroots level but also in the 
governmental bureaucracy, schools, offices, mass media, or even in the security institutions such 
as the police and military (cf. Amirrachman, ed. 2007: 126-7). 
Not only Governor Saleh sought peace, Mayor of Ambon Marcus jopie Papilaja (b. 1952), 
a member of Moluccan Protestant Church, was also active in finding ways to end violence and 
create possible peace. Mayor Papilaja met national political and religious leaders in jakarta to 
discuss the Maluku conflict, held a meeting with international NGOs and representatives of the 
United Nations in order to involve in the peace process, and approached the war commanders 
including the Laskar jihad supreme leader ja'far Umar Thalib to find fruitful solutions for both 
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parties. "Due to my engagement with ja'far, some Christians accused me to be a judas Iscariot 
[i.e. the traitor of Christianity and Christians]," said Papilaja.173 
In Maluku, moreover, while Governor Saleh mostly worked with religious leaders, 
Mayor Papilaja worked with grassroots society. In an interview with me on December 17, 2010, 
Mayor Papilaja told: "I regularly walked around Ambon to discuss with my people. Usually the 
opening sentence I always asked to them was: 'Are you Ambonese?' People commonly replied, 
'Yes, we are all Ambonese.' I then said to them, '"No, you are not Ambonese. You are a Muslim 
and a Christian. Ambonese do not kill each other because Ambon existed due to Christians and 
Muslims. Without them Ambon would not be present." 
In addition to building communication with ordinary folks, Mayor Papilaja, who is also a 
professor of economics at Universitas Pattimura, consolidated the governmental bureaucracy by 
(1) suggesting Christian and Muslim employees mix in the office. Since the "january 19" incident, 
Papilaja said, the government employees, even in the same room, tended to group along 
religious Jines due to fear and suspicion to other opposing religious communities. And (2) 
making a rule of a standard of competency for governmental position (stan dar kompetensi 
jabatan), meaning that a post in the government office is not based on religious affiliations but 
on the basis of skill, experience, capability or competence, a sort of citizenship-based policy (cf. 
Tomagola, at. al. 2007). 
Another significant policy made by Mayor Papilaja, who became the Mayor of Ambon 
since 2001, was the idea of creating "point centers" in a number of safety places in Ambon for 
economic transactions of Christians and Muslims. The Mayor ordered security officers to 
safeguard the places. During the conflict, ordinary Christians and Muslims found it difficult to 
purchase foods or sell their wares since the main traditional markets were on fire and ruined. 
They were also afraid of doing economic activity in those devastated traditional markets. As a 
173 Interview with M. j. Papilaja, Ambon, December 17, 2010. 
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result these centers became an alternative place for economic transactions and activities that 
later developed to becoming pasar kaget ("sudden market") ( cf. Soegijono 2011). "By conducting 
economic transaction in these alternative markets," the Mayor believed, "people from different 
religions would communicate one another, and by the communication, trust, which is the basic 
capital for reconciliation, would be achieved." 
More serious and fruitful attempts of conflict resolution arranged by the government 
through nonviolent means and proactive approaches had been made during the Megawati 
presidency. Two coordinating cabinet ministers M. jusuf Kalla (Coordinating Minister for 
People's Welfare) and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and 
Security, now President of Indonesia) were appointed to handle the Maluku problem. The result 
was both conflicting groups were willing to meet and negotiate to find satisfactory solutions for 
the two parties. Malina II peace agreement, which was signed in February, 2002, was evidence 
of their willingness to end the conflict and begin to rebuild the new Maluku. 
Apart from some critical evaluation and weaknesses of the Malina II, the accord can be 
viewed as the peak and significant consensus achieved by Moluccan societies, in comparison to 
the previous failed reconciliation efforts. More significantly, the peace treaty provides fine 
models of conflict resolution: how to end violence, address the IDPs, recover economy, 
reconstruct damaged infrastructures, erect law enforcement, and form an independent 
investigation team to find out the root causes of the violence. Based on the Malina II, the central 
government also provided funds amounting !DR 1.3 trillion for post-war rehabilitation and 
reconstruction in Maluku and North Maluku provinces. 
The Role ofJusufKalla 
As noted earlier the role ofM. jusuf Kalla (henceforth, JK) was crucial in this uneasy 
peace process. Assisted by Fa rid Husein, deputy in the Coordinating Ministry of People's 
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Welfare, and Hamid Awaludin (alumna of American University at Washington, D.C., and former 
Minister ofLaw and Human Rights), jK paved the way toward Christian-Muslim reconciliation. 
While Fa rid Husein was a field operator )K entrusted to take care off all financial needs of 
Christians and Muslims during the process of negotiation, Hamid Awaludin was a sort of "skilled 
private assistant" assigned by )K to take notes on all conversations and meetings )K held with 
Ambonese Christians and Muslims, and discuss the possible options needed to be done for a 
better Maluku. Hamid Awaludin told, "Wherever and whenever Farid Husein went he always 
brought a bag containing cash." While Farid was the man who allocated )K's money in the field, 
Hamid continued to say, )K's wife, Mrs. Mufidah, functioned as the "treasurer of peace." "jK is a 
generous businessman and bureaucrat who spent a lot of money for conflict resolution, 
rehabilitation, and reconstruction in post-wars Ambon, North Maluku, Paso, and Aceh. He never 
counted how much money he has expended for it. I have no idea whether the central 
government has reimbursed jK's money" (Awaludin 2009: 154-5). 
On january 25-26, 2002, )K, along with SBY and elite members of military and police, left 
for Ambon city. In Ambon )K met a number of religious and political leaders, CSO activists, and 
"grassroots commanders" (armed militia leaders) aiming at gathering information that can be 
used for the planned government-sponsored Mali no II peace treaty. He visited Rev. john 
Sahalessy and the members of the "Team of 20," a Team consisting of twenty members of 
Christians and Muslims that successfully prevented the escalation of conflict in the village of 
Wayame on the seashore of Ambon Bay, albeit its neighboring villages such as Rumahtiga, Poka, 
and Tihu were completely shattered (see e.g. Pariela 2008). )K and the group wanted to learn 
how the "Team of20" was able to prevent the rise of conflict. 
Furthermore, )K met in secret with Muslim leaders and jihadist commanders from 
various organizations, including (among others) KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke (MUI), ldrus Tahutey 
(Muhammadiyah), Abdul Karim Rahayaan (NU), and Muhammad Attamimy (Satgas Amar Ma'ruf 
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Nahi Munkar). JK tried to convince them that killing Christians was not the gate to heaven. "As a 
Muslim I am embarrassed if Islam is identified as a religion that allows its adherents to murder 
Christians for paradise," )K revealed (cited in Awaludin 2009: 18). After meeting with Muslims, 
JK clandestinely visited respected Christian leaders such as Bishop P. C. Mandagi (Diocese of 
Amboina) and Rev.l.j.W. Hendriks (GPM Synod chairman), and some militia commanders 
(Herman Nikijuluw, Femmy Souisa, and Berty Lou patty). )K also tried to convince them that 
murder is not the way to enter the paradise. It is the gate to hell, instead. "jesus taught love not 
hate, peace not violence," he said (ibid: 16-7). 
JK approached them with the use of "religious language" partly because, "Muslims 
believed this war is jihad with Allah's praise, while Christians were convinced that the war is the 
Crusade. Both groups were involved in the fighting with the motive of entering the heaven" 
(ibid). Moreover, JK met separately representatives of the two conflicting parties at Governor 
Saleh's house in Mangga Dua involving a larger number of participants. This was the first 
meeting between the central government under Megawati Soekarnoputri presidency and the 
two groups. About 300 Ambonese political, religious, and community leaders from both 
communities attended the meeting, which was full of emotion, anger, and protest. However, the 
participants were eager to pursue peace. At the end of the meeting they all agreed to meet 
directly outside Ambon to discuss the possible solutions for the Maluku peace. 
jK then set up a preliminary informal meeting (i.e. pre-Malino II meeting) in Makassar 
in South Sulawesi on january 30, 2002. With jK's funds, a group of Ambonese Christians and 
Muslims headed off to Makassar separately. Muslim representatives, led by KH Abdul Wahab 
Pol poke, were housed at the Kenari Hotel, while those of Christians were gathered at the Losari 
Beach Hotel. jK paid all expenses of the delegates during the meeting. In the hotels, JK and his 
team (Farid Husein and Hamid Awaludin) began to discuss, again separately, main points and 
concerns that would be addressed in the planned peace treaty at Malino. Both groups agreed 
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that collective violence must be ended and issues of human rights violations and anything 
related to the legal issues would be processed afterward. They also agreed to continue and 
"formalize" the meeting at Malina in the following month (February, 2002) by involving larger 
communities from both sides to further discuss security, social, economic, and legal issues. 
From this successful preliminary meeting, JK became more enthusiastic to continue this 
process to the peace pact. His black handbag was full of documents on Ambon including DVDs of 
Ambonese pop songs. He suggested his team to listen these songs in order to more fully love 
Ambon before the Malina II peace deal took place. "A song could unite our hearts and minds 
toward particular cultures where the singers came from. Only with a heart and mind that is 
united with Ambonese culture, can we resolve the Ambon problem," )K said. Prior to the Malina 
II, )K prepared a draft of the peace agreement, along with the would-be invited people, place, 
and schedule of the meeting. For the place of meeting, JK chose Malina, a quiet and chilly sub-
district (kecamatan) on the uphill of South Sulawesi, a bout 90 miles from the main city of 
Makassar. 
During the Dutch colonial era and after Indonesia gained its independence, various 
historic conferences took place in this small downtown. Malina was selected as the meeting 
place partly because this region was neutral, outside Maluku, and most importantly, silent and 
comfortable to discuss important issues. At Malina too, formerly, )K had successfully convened 
the meeting between conflicting religious groups of Poso in Central Sulawesi; thereby called 
Malina I peace pact. On February 11-12, 2002, a historic meeting took place at Malina. One 
hundred people, consisting of70 Ambonese Christian and Muslim representatives, 10 
mediators, and 20 overseers, attended the meeting at Malina. As usual, )K covered all expenses 
of the delegates and participants of the gathering. At the end of the meeting they declared the 
Malina II Peace Agreement. 
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The question still remains: why did )K succeed in convening the Malina II meeting? More 
significantly, why and how did Ambonese Christians and Muslims entrust their important 
subjects to JK? Social psychologist Sarlito Wirawan Sarwono commented, "To resolve conflict 
there are at least two prerequisites, namely good intention and negotiation; and to achieve these 
things we need a mediator that has a good intention and does not have hidden agenda. )K has 
played perfectly this role in both Paso and Ambon so that he succeeded in this uneasy peace 
process" (Suara Pembaruan, Maret 10, 2002). Sarlito was right. For )K, reconciling conflicting 
people is part of religious service, so that need to be done with a deep conviction and sincere 
intention. However, good intention and negotiation are also not sufficient to bring the warring 
parties into a peace pact. 
Besides these two things, JK was a brave, serious political leader in the pursuit of this 
agreement. Having the ability to lobby interest groups, including the military and police, )K used 
his own money to finance all costs throughout the peace processes. )K's multiple backgrounds 
(bureaucrat, politician, entrepreneur, activist, and community leader) had also been significant 
in this uneasy reconciliation process. He utilized his extensive networks and ethnic ties to 
approach conflicting parties and concerned people into a negotiation table. )K also succeeded in 
approaching elite members of the military and police so that General TN! Endiartono 
(Commander of Indonesian National Military) and General Da'i Bachtiar (Chief of Police) fully 
backed up the peace deal. They took firm measures against their members who violated the 
peace treaty. Endiartono and Da'i Bachtiar supported )K's policy and plan in part because )K had 
helped them in the composition of governmental cabinet and the increase of military and police 
budget (Awaludin 2009: 159-60). The military and police support had also been the key of the 
success ofthe Malina II. Due to his tremendous contribution in bringing Christians and Muslims 
in Maluku into a negotiation table, the ad at community in the province awarded )K Upu Lattu 
(traditional ad at leader). 
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Apart from jK's vital endeavors and successful breakthroughs, Maluku has formerly 
been conditioned by a series of reconciliation and long process of negotiation, either initiated by 
local government or civil society agencies (cf. Riry and Manoppo, eds. 2007). Malina II thus can 
be called the peak of iceberg of this long peace process. However, it is imperative to note that the 
Malina II was not the end, but the beginning of the peace process. After the signing of this pact, 
Muslims and Christians did not directly stop violence. In the aftermath of the Malina II, a 
number oflocalized sporadic small-scale riots occurred in Ambon town provoked by individuals 
disappointed with the agreement. Further, houses of some participants of the Malina II (e.g. 
those ofThamrin Ely, Ustad Pol poke, and jacky Manuputty) were burnt down and destroyed by 
some radical factions in both communities. Some militant Muslim and Christian leaders who 
refused the Malina II continued to agitate and provoke masses in order to engage in the violence. 
Despite some minor successes, they commonly failed to gain public support, not because of the 
Malina II but of people's exhaustion with the prolonged conflict that caused suffering their lives. 
Ordinary Ambonese Christians and Muslims with whom I spoke expressed their exhaustion with 
the protracted violence, so they therefore were no longer interested with the involvement in the 
conflict. Although they heard about the Malina II peace pact they still did not know yet its points 
and results. 
The Contribution of Local Government 
While JK played a great role in bringing the warring parties to the Malina II, Maluku's 
and Ambon's governments, especially Marcus jopie Papilaja (Mayor of Ambon, 2001-2011], 
Sinyo Sarundajang (Acting Governor ofMaluku from 2002 to 2003), and Karel Albert Ralahalu 
(Governor of Maluku, from 2003 at present) contributed to following up, socializing, and 
implementing its eleven points. Mayor Papilaja, for instance, continued his previous efforts (pre-
Malino II) in reconciling the grassroots and ordinary people. The outcome was, in 2003, both 
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grassroots societies built a peace monument at Kudamati, one of the most severe and terrifying 
places in Ambon town. Papilaja also approached and persuaded war commanders, including 
ja'far Umar Thalib, to accept the Malina II and withdraw their forces from Ambon. 
Facilitated by Minister of Home Affairs Hari Sabarno, Papilaja met )a' far at the Ministry 
of Home Affairs Office to talk about the possibility of Christian-Muslim reconciliation and the 
withdrawal of the Laskar jihad militias from Ambon. In the meeting, )a' far was willing to 
reconcile with Christians and create stability and peace in Ambon with one condition, which was 
that Mayor Papilaja guaranteed that there would be no more Christian attacks on Muslim 
neighborhoods. Mayor Papilaja then promised no more attacks. An hour later, )a' far called 
Papilaja. "He invited me to have lunch together," Papilaja said. During the lunch, )a' far expressed 
his disappointment with the government which could not overcome Christian attacks against 
Muslims. In the next meeting in 2002 with Mayor Papilaja, )a' far was willing to pull out the 
Laskar jihad members from Ambon as the Mayor promised to secure and safeguard Muslim 
communities. In October 2002, )a' far fulfilled his promise: the Laskar jihad was dismissed. 
As Governor Saleh's period in the provincial government ended in 2002, the Minister of 
Home Affairs assigned Sin yo Harry Sarundajang (henceforth, Sin yo), formerly Inspector general 
at the Home Ministry, to be an acting governor of Maluku until the appointment of a new 
governor. Sin yo's main tasks were (1) to implement points of the Malina II peace treaty, (2) to 
achieve stability during the transition, and (3) to prepare the election of a new governor of 
Maluku. Due to a situation in Maluku that was not yet stable, the Maluku Parliament could not 
elect a new governor. Born in Minabasa, North Sulawesi, in 1945, Sinyo was a professional, firm, 
daring, and clean bureaucrat. Along with Riyaas Rasyid, Sinyo composed a reformed Regional 
Autonomy Law (Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah 1999). He was quite successful in creating a 
more stable and conducive society during the Maluku's political transition in the aftermath of 
the Malina II, as well as in arranging the election of a new governor. 
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Commenting on the success ofSinyo (now Governor of North Sulawesi), Protestant 
pastor and leader of AM GPM (the youth wing of GPM Synod) Rev. E.T. Maspaitella said, "Sin yo 
was remarkable. He succeeded in building communication with all levels of society ranging from 
ordinary people to political elites, from common adherents of Christianity and !slam to religious 
leaders. He intensively met with them to talk about Maluku's issues and the peoples' needs. 
More importantly, Sin yo also succeeded in pacifying militant groupings. The turning point of the 
Maluku peace process was during Sinyo's administration." Rev. Maspaitella, furthermore, said 
that under the leadership of Sinyo, Maluku civilian government, which was previously weak and 
stagnant, now was running well and had become more powerful. To resolve local violence, 
Sin yo, who recently received GATRAAward 2011 as Indonesia's Best Governor, "directly visited 
the conflict areas, not only in Ambon town but also in small lonely islands of Maluku, and stayed 
there for a few days until the conflict was resolved."174 
Ambonese religious, political, and community leaders with whom I conversed also 
expressed similar attitudes appreciating Governor Sinyo's effective policy and approach in 
"managing" conflict and crafting stability in this fragile archipelago. With the central 
government funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction in Moluccan conflict as mandated in the 
Malina II peace treaty, Governor Sin yo helped to facilitate "physical rehabilitation" by rebuilding 
damaged houses, worship places (churches and mosques), shops, offices, and public facilities 
(schools, campuses, or hospitals).175 Governor Sin yo also asked for the central government to 
174 Interview with Rev. E.T. Maspaitella, Ambon, March 3, 2011 
175 In the era of Governor Saleh Latucinsina1 the provincial government had also provided 
limited funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction ofMaluku. Headed by Catholic vice governor, 
Paula Renyaan, the Governor formed Badan Koordinasi Penanganan Konflik (the Coordinating Body 
for Conflict Recovery) aiming at reconstructing Maluku which was devastated by the wars. The 
central government had also provided some funds during Governor Saleh, but it was during 
Governor Sin yo that the central government officially gave a large amount of money through a 
presidential instruction (In pres No. 6/2003). 
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issue a Presidential Instruction (Inpres-Instruksi Presiden) on the reconstruction of worship 
facilities in conflict areas. 
Responding to Sinyo's proposal President Megawati Soekarnoputri finally issued Inpres 
No. 6/2003 on the subject. Governor Sinyo, moreover, built refugee camps and returned 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their former villages. Not only helping physical 
reconstruction Sinyo helped to restore broken relationships between Christians and Muslims by 
generating various interreligious gatherings and cultural means of reconciliation. Sin yo, 
moreover, reorganized structures and systems of bureaucracy ineffective during the Saleh 
governorship by placing competent officials in the governmental departments based on their 
skills and experiences. Sinyo's policy of reorganizing the bureaucracy was not only in the 
provincial government (Pemda Maluku) but also in the municipality (pemkot) and districts 
(kabupaten) throughout Maluku province. 
Another significant approach conducted by Governor Sinyo was his courageous efforts 
to weaken and pacify radical Christian and Muslim groups. He visited militant leaders of both 
communities-clandestinely and informally-in their homes, ate with them, and, if needed, slept 
in their houses. Governor Sin yo also offered jobs and positions to them including to Muhammad 
Attamimy, one of the Ambonese radical jihadist commanders. Many Ambonese Muslim 
informants told that during the wars, Attamimy in Friday sermons (khotbah]um'at) and 
religious gatherings prohibited Muslims to greet and shake hand with Christians because they 
were considered to be "kafir harbi'' (belligerent infidels and unbelievers) and Muslim enemies. 
Attamimy, Ambonese informants said, also forbade Governor Sin yo to quote Qur'anic 
verses since he is Christian and not "uli/ amri" (a ruler in the Muslim territory). However, a 
moderate Muslim leader said, "When Governor Sinyo offered to make him rector of a state 
Islamic college in Ambon, Attamimy accepted this position, and since then, Attamimy shakes 
Sinyo's hands and kiss his cheeks." After his time in STAIN Ambon ended, Attamimy was 
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appointed to be chairman of Maluku's provincial branch of Ministry of Religious Affairs and head 
of "Majelis Dzikir SBY," a religious meeting to support President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 
Ambon. Since Ambonese Muslims found out that Attamimy had changed his mind and 
orientation, many of his earlier Muslim friends, colleagues, and followers have become 
unsympathetic toward him. 
After the time of Sin yo Sarundajang was finished in 2003, Maluku's politics were 
smoothly and successfully transferred by the new governor Karel Albert Ralahalu (b. 1946) into 
a more peaceful and democratic society. While Sinyo had laid a cornerstone for Maluku's 
transition, Karel continued and developed Sinyo's strategic policies. Supported by Sin yo and 
PDlP (a nationalist secular democratic political party led by Megawati Soekarnoputri], Karel 
Albert Ralahalu (hereafter, Karel) was elected to be the new governor ofMaluku beating his 
rivals, Zeth Sahubura and Frans de Wana. The main reason for choosing Karel was that he was 
regarded capable of handling conflicts and establishing peace in the region. A member of the 
Protestant Moluccan Church, Karel was a former district military commander (Korem] in 
Ambon who quite successfully prevented the rise of communal conflicts in Ambon town in early 
1999. In May 1999, Colonel Karel also brought the warring groups into a "peace pledge" in the 
Mardika Square in Ambon city. Unfortunately, Karel was assigned as a district military 
commander in Ambon only three months, so he could not maintain a sustainable peace in the 
island. 
Ambonese by ethnicity, Karel was able to rebuild a relatively peaceful and conducive 
Maluku through a series of democratic, balanced, and fair governmental policies and programs. 
In an interview with me, Governor Karel explained his plans of peace building initiatives as 
follows, "In attempts of resolving conflict and establishing peace in Maluku, I worked together 
with other government officials and provincial parliament to make Rencana Pembangunan 
jangka Menengah Daerah (RP)MK-a regional development plan]. The RPJMK was divided into 
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two stages. The first phase was the recovery of security and social order (pemulihan keamanan 
dan ketertiban sosiaTJ and the second step was the social rehabilitation and economic 
recovery."176 
The Governor, moreover, said that the plans of regional development (pembangunan 
daerah) and security recovery (pemulihan keamanan) were part of an attemptto implement the 
Malina II peace deal. In 2003, the RP)MK was specified and formalized in a new five-year 
Strategic Plan (Rencana Strategis, abbreviated Renstra) released by the Maluku provincial 
government. The plan divided the following five years into two phases, namely (1) the Security 
and Stabilization Phase (from 2003/04- 2005) and (2) the Creating a Competitive Environment 
Phase (2006- 2008). The first stage, moreover, focuses on three areas: social stability and peace, 
community empowerment, and infrastructural development. The second phase emphasizes 
economic development and equality, community empowerment, social stability and conciliation. 
With the central government funds for rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Maluku 
conflict, Governor Karel continued Sinyo's programs carrying out not only the "material 
reconstruction" (such as rebuilding infrastructures, devastated houses, churches, mosques, 
medical clinics, offices, markets, and schools, or building new settlements for the IDPs) but also 
the "social/ immaterial rehabilitation" through "cultural approaches" such as revitalizing the 
pel a gandong (indigenous institutions of brotherhood and reconciliation) and other traditional 
socio-cultural institutions and local wisdoms. It is clear, however, that in financial terms, at least, 
the provincial government's immediate priority was infrastructural development, which took up 
more than a half of its development budget for 2005, receiving !DR 1,102.6 billion (51.3 o/o of the 
total budget). Due to budgetary constraints, the provincial government had placed little direct 
emphasis on restoring social cohesion between ethnic and religious groups. Programs to 
176 Interview with Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu, March 3, 2011. The interview was 
conducted at the Governor Karel's office. I thank Rev. E.T. Maspaitella and Sammy Huwae for 
arranging this official interview. 
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improve religious relations (under the division of Social Stability and Peace) received only !DR 
21,926 million over the five years of the plan, just 1 percent of the total budget (Brown 2 0 04: 
52). 
To revitalize local traditions and cultures, the Governor made regional laws and rules 
(Peraturan Daerah or Perda) that accommodated traditional systems and native institutions of 
the Moluccan society. In the regional government law (Undang-Undang Pemerintah Daerah No. 
32/2004), the central government admitted all civil rights. Based on this law, the Maluku 
government, along with the parliament and society, composed a regional law (Peraturan Daerah 
or Perda for short), namely Perda Negeri, a regional rule on the Moluccan traditional village 
government, to return ad at rights of Moluccan society previously abolished by the New Order 
government. By this reformed Perda Negeri (Perda No. 3/2008), the structures of village 
government were returned to their earlier form. As previously described, before the New Order, 
Central Maluku's villages (i.e. Ambon, Lease, and Seram) were governed by raja (or Upu Lattu in 
some villages) assisted by Saniri Negeri (a type of village legislature). The raja was a hereditary 
position from the village's certain clans, and the saniri was representatives from the main clans 
in the village. 
During the New Order, however, President Suharto issued the Village Government Law 
of 1979 that removed of all Indonesia's local ad at regulations, including those in Maluku. As a 
result, in Central Maluku the institution of raja was replaced by kepala desa, and saniri was 
substituted by the LMD (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa, a village deliberation institution). While 
raja was a hereditary position, kepa/a desa was elected by a district head (bupatl) via sub-
district head (cam at). The members of LMD, unlike those of saniri, were elected from any clan 
and family. Thus, Governor Karel, by way of the Perda Negeri, had restored cultural and 
traditional rights of the Moluccan society. This ?erda Negeri was undoubtedly welcomed by 
Central Maluku's society. 
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To preserve local cultures, customs, and traditions, Governor Karel, furthermore, 
established a semi-state institution called Forum Latupatti, an association of raja negeri and sub-
village head (kadus], which became the government partner in the ad at issues. Throughout the 
Karel governorship, the Forum Latupatti has become the backbone of the Maluku government in 
the reconstruction processes of social rehabilitation in the village level. In addition, the Forum 
had the duty to gather aspirations and concerns of the society which would be brought in the 
Maluku provincial government-supported Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan or 
Musrinbang (the deliberation of development plan] to discuss the government's regional 
development programs. The contribution of the Forum Latupatti is rather significant. The birth 
of the Perda Negeri No. 3/2008 depicted above and other ad at-based political policies could not 
be separated from the role of the Forum Latupatti. This description suggests that the 
government has provided free space for the society to organize their needs and rights. 
Governor Karel also built a close relationship with religious leaders, organizations, and 
civil society agencies to further advance the post-Malino peace process and community 
development. The Governor, for instance, set up an interreligious communication forum (the 
FKUB] and facilitates its programs by using the provincial government funds (APED]. Governor 
Karel also supported the founding of an interfaith institution (LAIM] consisting of moderate 
religious groups to boost the reconciliation process and the creation of religious pluralism. 
Ambonese informants shared that Karel is the only governor who is not reluctant to request 
opinions of the religious leaders-both Christians and Muslims- and invite them to pray and 
discuss the Maluku issues. Moreover, Governor Karel works together with community and 
religious leaders in the all processes of peace building and development. 
Observing Governor Karel's policy and approach, Elias Maspaitella comments, 
"In the first period of his governorship1 Governor Karel succeeded in building a 
peaceful Maluku. He is the only governor in Maluku that has seriously and candidly 
expanded intensive communication with the grassroots level of society. He has truly 
grown awareness, brotherhood, and conciliation. He is also the only governor in 
Maluku who is knowledgeable about local cultures and traditions so that he knows 
how to employ Maluku's traditional institutions and symbols to rebuild "cultural 
awareness" of Moluccan societies as a means of building peace in the region. He, 
moreover, does not differentiate between the "native" and the "migrant'', or between 
the Christians and the Muslims. Having visited all areas of the province, including 
isolated islands, Governor Karel has truly been the '~Governor of Moluccan societies/' 
not only for the Christians and the Ambonese."17 7 
Maspaitella, moreover, said, "ln the context of Ambon and Maluku, there is a sort of 
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state-society synergy, the collaboration between secular government and religious institutions 
in the process of establishing the just and peaceful Maluku." Maspaitella's comments seem to be 
true. Right from the start, Governor Karel has worked closely with the potential elements of the 
society (i.e. religious figures, community and political leaders, CSOs, NGOs, adat communities, 
etc.). He has also treated the Maluku societies fairly, not based on religious and ethnic 
affiliations. Perhaps due to his success in the first period of his governorship, he was reelected 
for the second round to be Governor of Maluku with more than 60 percent votes in the 2008 
election. 
111 Interview with Rev. Elifas Maspaitella, Ambon, March 3, 2011. 
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Concluding Remarks 
Two conclusions emerged from the preceding chapters' discussions. First, religious 
discourses and actors did contribute in the peace building and reconciliation processes. Religious 
teachings, discourses, and historical narratives pertaining to the spirit of togetherness, 
pluralism, compassion, love, forgiveness, and the prohibition of killing people, in particular, have 
shaped and influenced religious actors in the ground in their attempts of establishing peace and 
reconciling the two conflicting parties. In addition, the actors' religious understandings have 
also been shaped and reshaped by the local knowledge, especially indigenous practices of inter-
village alliances and brotherhood. However, in doing so, in order to be accepted by the wider 
communities in Maluku, the actors have changed and transformed the static a datto become the 
dynamic customs, from the local wisdom to the universal value, by the means of religious 
explanations and theological justifications. 
By providing new meanings (the pel a as a public ethic), giving religious clothing (the 
idea of the pel a as part of God's works), and offering religious metaphors (the notion of the 
crucified Christ for the application of pel a within Christian communities) toward these customs, 
the local traditional institutions such as the pel a, hopefully, would become common value of 
Christians and Muslims in the province, not limited to the pel a pact members or Central 
Moluccan people. 
This process of transformation indicates that social actors in Maluku have strategized 
and manipulated religious discourses as well as local norms, systems, and structures in order to 
achieve their goals, namely the creation of Christian-Muslim relationship destroyed by the 
previous conflict. In brief, the pro-peace moderate Christian and Muslim actors in Maluku have 
produced and reproduced the idea of pacification and nonviolence actions by utilizing 
normative discourses, not only those in the religious texts (scripture) and accounts but also in 
the traditional texts practiced by the local society (adat). 
320 
Although both groups employed religious texts and discourses to support their 
nonviolent movements, the Christians, moreover, seemed stronger than the Muslims in utilizing 
their religious teachings and scripture. Whereas Christian leaders were strongly influenced by, 
and did utilize, Biblical texts as a theological justification, the Muslims, with notable exception 
KH Abdul Wahab Pol poke, traced the root, legitimacy, and rationale of their commitment in 
building Christian-Muslim reintegration by pointing traditional practices and local institutions 
such as the pel a in Central Maluku or ain ni ain ("we are all one") in the Kei tradition. 
This is to say that, for some Moluccan Muslims, the Qur'an or Hadith are not the only 
source of authority. Ad at (customary law) is also considered to be part of Islamic practices, and 
therefore, is an authoritative source that could be used and should be preserved. Some 
traditional and pro-ad at Muslim leaders even said that religion is divisive, while ad at is uniting 
or religion divides humans, whereas custom unites them. This does not mean, however, that 
they had abandoned or did not practice Islamic teachings. They did believe Islamic fundamental 
principles and practice Islamic basic doctrines such as fasting, prayer, and pilgrimage. 
In short, this group has treated both Islamic and traditional texts in an equal manner as 
a sort of "sacred duality." This kind of Muslim group differs from the reformists who refuse the 
implementation of any local culture and tradition that they consider to be bid'ah. This group also 
differs from the Muslim adat, namely, a Muslim group that practices and puts priority of local 
traditional customs over lslamic common tenets. A prime example of this group is the Pelauw 
Muslims who had particular ritual practices and beliefs (e.g. the pilgrimage at Mount Alaka, not 
in Mecca, Friday prayer is only for elite members of the village, or fasting is only three days, 
instead of the all days of Ramadhan). While for the Muslims in Pelauw (Central Maluku), 
numbering some 15,000 people, believe that these ad at practices are Islamic or religious since 
these traditions had been passed on by their forefathers, for non-Pelauw Muslims, however, 
these ritual practices and traditions are considered not Islamic. 
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The_second point of this chapter is that the peace and reconciliation processes in Ambon 
have been supported by both state and society agents. In other words, cooperation between 
actors in society and state has been the key of the Ambonese efforts of establishing uneasy peace 
and integration. The involvement of the government officials and state institutions in this 
process was based on the view that the achievement of intergroup reunion required the 
participation of both religious leaders and civil society associations. Since the first outbreak of 
violence, the Maluku government provided a space for the religious, community, traditional, and 
civil society leaders to meet and discuss about the Ambon problem, and initiated meetings of 
interreligious groups. The signing of the Malina II peace deal was also the product, and proof of, 
state-society collaboration. 
There were indeed various small-scale violent conflicts that happened after the Mali no 
II such as the attack on Soya village around the end of April, 2002, and incidents such as anti-
FKM campaigns and various bombings that occurred even years thereafter (e.g. Bohm 2005). 
But what made these more recent incidents different from those ofpre-Malino II is that most 
ordinary masses were no longer engaged in the fighting, admitting that they were depressed and 
tired with mass violence and did not want to get involved anymore, albeit the provocateurs and 
the culprits (i.e. individuals being paid by people who still have an interest in perpetuating 
unrest in Maluku] had tried to provoke them again. The tendency oflocalized violence is obvious 
in the post-Malino II Ambon. It is understandable in part because due to violence, these lay 
people had suffered in all aspects of life-socially, culturally, economically, and in education; 
consequently they want to live in a better life now. It is thus unexaggerated to conclude that 
Ambon's peace building and reconciliation project depended upon a collaborative effort between 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies.l78 
178 It is significant to underline that reconciliation always takes place different ways in 
different places at different times. Reconciliation also m'eans different things to different people in 
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The Maluku case thus teaches us how underestimated views of the role of state in 
creating public cultures of citizenship are no longer the case. It is, however, not unique to 
Maluku. Even in China, as Robert Weller (1999: 19) points out, "the ability of Chinese society to 
self-organize will depend on the state allowing enough free space." After examining the 
development of civil society in the Middle East, anthropologist Augustus Richard Norton also 
concludes "it is meaningless to speak of civil society in the absence of the state" (Norton 1995: 
11). In the Maluku context, moreover, analyses and studies of the Maluku wars that put the state 
as part of the problem and not the solution and blame the state as the provocateurs and 
masterminds of the violence, ignore the fact ofMaluku's and Ambon's governments' 
involvements in the peace process right from the start by making alliances with pro-peace civil 
society agencies, and community and religious leaders. 
These also neglect various efforts had been done by the central government. Birgit 
Brauchler's claim (2009: 98) that the end of conflict in Ambon and Maluku was due to Ambonese 
or Moluccan people themselves, and not "the government, not the big politicized peace events 
such as Malino II, and definitely not military and the police" is therefore only half true. The roles 
of Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare M. jusuf Kalla, Acting Governor of Maluku during 
the conflict, Sinyo Hari Sarundajang (b. 1945), and Governor Karel Albert Ralahalu, for instance, 
cannot be undervalued in their tireless efforts in pacifying the militant religious leaders, 
approaching the grassroots radicals, and bringing conflicting parties into peace settlement. The 
fact that in post-Malino Ambon, mass conflicts have reduced significantly proves that the Malina 
did work and affect local societies. 
different circumstances. This was also the case in Maluku. While reconciliation efforts in Haruku 
island, with special reference to Kariu and Uli Hatuhaha, in the Central Moluccas was mostly initiated 
by grassroots agencies (i.e. the agency of civil society groups) (e.g. Brauchler, ed. 2009: 97-118), and 
in Saparua region where the peace process began with the subsequent meetings of mothers, 
fishermen, and farmers, Ambon's reconciliation was an outcome of active collaboration betvveen civil 
society agencies1 religious leaders, and government officials. 
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The Maluku case also allows us to think that, contrary to some of its sloganeering 
characterizations, there is no zero-sum opposition between civil society and the state; 
accordingly this thesis will make another strong case for rethinking assumptions about the 
antagonism between state and society. Many models imply that state and society are the players 
in a zero-sum-game: society can grow only if the state shrinks, and states grow only by 
diminishing society. However, as a recent study on civil society, government, and political 
change in Asia indicates (cf. Weller, ed. 2005), there is no clear split between state and society. 
This is true, Robert Weller (2005: 77) has remarked, even for Taiwan, which "has historically 
been open to the strongest state-society antagonism." 
An old model of rivalry of civil society versus the state thus does not really helpful for 
describing any of the Asian cases of state-society cooperation, including those ofMaluku. In this 
regard, Robert Hefner's (1998, 2001) and Peter Evans' (1997) remarks deserve special mention. 
Both scholars have argued that state-society synergy becomes the key of establishing 
democratic civilities, social stability, and civic pluralism, which is, in Hefner's term (2005: 28), "a 
public culture and social organization premised on equal rights, tolerance-in-pluralism, and 
legally recognized differentiation of state and religious authority." It is precisely this state-
society synergy that caused most militant factions of Ambon's Muslims and Christians to be 
willing to compromise, find the middle ground, and brought them into a ceasefire in Malina after 
three years of brutal confrontation. 
To conclude, the end of a large-scale communal violence in Ambon was not merely the 
outcome of Ambonese war fatigue. !twas also the result oftbe government's willingness to 
bring an end to the fighting. This is to say that in addition to uncivil state that promotes violence, 
terrorism, and discrimination, there is a civil state that backs up the production of peaceful 
societies, democratic ideals, interreligious tolerance, and civic pluralism. 
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Although the massive warfare has ended in Maluku, however, the question still remains: 
does Moluccan society today enjoy a sustainable peace? Is it capable ofdevelopi'\g a multifaith 
citizenship culture? This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Part Five 
Contemporary Maluku: Concluding Notes 
Introduction 
This last section aims at providing a picture of modern Ambon and Maluku, 
approximately ten years after the signing of the Malina II peace treaty that officially marked the 
end of the Maluku mayhem. While writing this dissertation I was stunned by a series of incidents 
of communal violence in Ambon and the surrounding islands that took place between 2011 and 
2012. I notice there were at least three communal riots within this period, which I will analyze 
in this chapter to illustrate the current situations in Ambon and Maluku. Examining Ambon and 
Maluku nowadays aims at understanding whether the peace and reconciliation process set forth 
in the Malina II in 2002 is running well or not. 
The second aim is to comprehend whether religious issues still play a central role in the 
social life oftoday's Ambonese and Malukan Christians and Muslims, or if there are other factors 
that also contribute to the social-political dynamics of modern Maluku. This section, in 
particular, examines the root causes of the new collective conflicts in order to understand 
whether these most recent occurrences share anything in common with the previous mass 
violence in 1999-2004, or if there is a change with regard to the nature ofthe conflict. It also 
discusses efforts that have been made by actors in state and society to prevent further conflict 
and further the process of pacification. Finally, it examines the challenges the Maluku societies 
face in their efforts to attain social stability and civic pluralism. This section ends with the 
dissertation's conclusion (Chapter 13). 
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Chapter 12 
Religion, Regionalism, and Citizenship in Modern Maluku 
I will begin this chapter with an overview of three cases of recent collective conflicts in 
Ambon and Central Maluku. These are (1) the "Universitas Pattimura" incident in mid-2011, (2) 
the so-called "September 11" tragedy in that year in Ambon city, and (3) the unrest in the 
Muslim village of Pelauw in Haruku Island in the regency of Central Maluku on February 11, 
2012. When I undertook fieldwork in early 2010, there had been no serious collective violence 
so far, especially in Ambon city. However, inter-village and intergroup conflicts and small-scale 
violence continued to persist in both rural and urban areas in Maluku, including Ambon. Abidin 
Wakano, Director of Ambon Reconciliation and Mediation Center, noted that there were at least 
73 incidents of inter-village/ community conflict throughout 2010, while in 2011 the number of 
riots diminished to only 35 cases.179 Most of the incidents were in the Central Maluku regency 
and Ambon. 
The incident in Universitas Pattimura (Unpatti), Maluku's largest state university, in 
mid-2011, which resulted in the destruction of the campus' facilities, was sparked by imbalances 
and tensions surrounding the election of the university's top leadership.180 This was new 
violence with an old root: Christian-Muslim rivalry. The Muslim groups in the campus asserted 
that, referring to the points of the Malina II peace treaty, the process of selection of Unpatti's 
179 Conversation with Abidin Wakano, Ambon, September 14, 2011. Patrick Barron, using 
data from the World Bank's Violent Conflict in Indonesian Study (Vi CIS] data set, notes that from 
March 2002, a month after the signing of the Malina II, to December 2008, there were 489 incidents 
of popular justice violence in Ambon leading to 50 deaths, 534 injuries and 68 damaged buildings 
(ICG 2011]. 
lSO In early March 2010, there had also been mass violence at Universitas Pattimura. Muslim 
students claimed that the violence was driven by a talk of Dean of Economics Faculty who said that 
the Muslims were incapable of directing Universitas Pattimura. This happened during the succession 
of a new dean in the Faculty of Economics. The violence also caused damages of a number of the 
university's properties. 
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leadership should be balanced between Christian and Muslim candidates. They further argued 
that all selection and recruitment processes in the campus, including the acceptance processes 
of new students, staff, and employees, must be based on the Malina II. Indeed one of the Malina 
II points (the eleventh) is to "support rehabilitation of Universitas Pattimura under a principle of 
development for all, and hence, recruitment system and other policies are run transparently 
with attention paid to the principle of justice together with fulfillment of qualification required" 
(see the Malina II peace pact in Chapter 11). For the Muslims, this point, known in Ambon as 
"pain perimbangan" ("equilibrium point"), is interpreted and understood as "equal numbers" 
between Christian and Muslim groups in all positions in the university. 
For the Christians, moreover, the pain perimbangan cannot be interpreted literally as 
Christian-Muslim balance in the sense of an equal number. But rather, as the Malina II peace 
pact indicates, it should require qualification or simply put "equilibrium with preconditions." 
Within this frame, for instance, if in fact, there is no Christian candidate qualified for a certain 
position, while there is a Muslim who is suitable for that post, he/she can fill it. Conversely, if 
there is no Muslim eligible for a particular job, then, the Christian-if he/she is qualified-can 
be placed in it. My Ambonese Christian informants told me that it is unreasonable if the 
recruitment process oflecturers or administration staff, or the enrolment procedure of students 
in the university, should follow the strict rule of the Christian-Muslim equilibrium. For the 
Christians, the balance point means a "mass deception" (pembodohan masalj of Ambonese 
society. They even said that this sort of the "balance point" has been the new source of conflict 
and social instability in contemporary Ambon. For the Muslims, on the contrary, this "point of 
equilibrium" should be kept to avoid hostility and disunity, and uphold Christian-Muslim unity. 
In brief, whereas for the Christians balance means injustice and source of conflict, for the 
Muslims balance means justice and resource for peace. 
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The distinction in responding to this "balance issue," it should be noted, is strongly 
rooted in the imbalanced conditions in the university between the Muslims and Christians. lt is 
essential to point out that Unpatti has long been an arena of competition between Christians and 
Muslims. Since its founding, the Christians, the GPM Protestants more precisely, have dominated 
the university since their human resources are already better developed than those of the 
Muslims. It is understandable partly because, as I discuss in Chapter 3, the Christians had long 
enjoyed education since the Dutch colonial period due to some privileges given by the Dutch to 
this religious group. Not only education actually; the Ambonese Protestants had also benefited 
from the Dutch policies in terms of careers opened special to them such as teachers, colonial 
officials, church ministries, or the army (cf. Aritonang and Steen brink, eds. 2008; Chauvel1990). 
In contrast, Ambonese Muslims, except those from a few raja families, mostly 
considered entering the Dutch schools as taboo or haram (prohibited acts according to Islamic 
shari' a) due to their belief that the Dutch were kafir (infidels) or unbelievers, or because of their 
fear of being "Christianized" by the Protestantteachers ( cf. Chauvel1980, 1990a). Due to the 
privileges the Dutch offered to the Ambonese Protestants, they have been called "Dutch golden 
boys" (anak em as Beland a) or "Black Dutchmen" (Beland a !tang), a label that is still proudly 
expressed by present-day Ambonese Protestants. It is interesting to consider the fact that during 
the Soccer World Cup in 2010, when the "Orange" (Netherlands) matched against the "Tango" 
(Argentina), most Ambonese Christians supported the Dutch while the Muslims went behind the 
"Tango" team. 
As a result of these imbalanced policies, the Ambonese Christians gained more educated 
people than the Muslims; consequently it is understandable that they had controlled key 
positions in Unpatti since the establishment of the university, while the Muslims still struggled 
to overcome their lack of education. The fate of Ambonese Muslims, except the Hatuhaha 
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Muslims who pursued education since late Dutch colonial time (1920s),!8l began to change only 
since the mid-1990s as an outcome of Governor Akib Latuconsina's policies in sending the 
Muslims, particularly those from Haruku, to pursue higher education (in master and doctorate 
levels) in Sulawesi and java in order to catch up the Christians and fill positions in bureaucracy 
and campuses, especially Unpatti. 
Indeed Unpatti and Poltek (Politeknik), both located in Negeri Rumahtiga, a semi-urban 
village where I conducted fieldwork, are overwhelmingly controlled by the GPM Protestants. 
Students, lecturers, and staffs of the university were dominated by the GPM Christians. While 
the Christians argued that their domination is "normal" as a "logical consequence" of their 
capability and lengthy process of education and dedication in the campus, the Muslims, in 
contrast, view this dominance as the "Christian greed" and discrimination.182 Perhaps driven by 
these factors, local Muslims joined forces with the Laskar jihad to destroy the university in mid-
2000, resulting in the near devastation of all the campus' properties and facilities, including 
books, computers, and labs. The Mali no II peace pact was then viewed as an opportunity for the 
Muslims to impose their agendas in order to become equal with, or even dominate over, the 
Christians. 
Based on the historical and social background sketched above I argue that the Christian 
statement that regard the Malina II, particularly the "equilibrium point," as a ruse that can be 
understood as a statement of the "dominant group" who wanted to keep their privileges and 
status of domination. Conversely, the Muslim statement that said the "balance point" is a way to 
maintain social balance and circumvent renewed violence can be interpreted as an expression of 
181 Interview with Ali Latuconsina, the Hatuhaha Muslim from Pelauw, February 12, 2011. 
182 Ambonese Muslim students from Universitas Pattimura and Poltek (Politeknik] with 
whom I spoke illustrated the discriminatory treatments of the Christians at least in four issues. First 
is in terms of scholarship in which, according to them, the Christian students are put in priority. 
Second is in the grading system. Third are in academic/administrative services; and fourth deals with 
the recruitment of lecturers, students, and staffs. 
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the minority or "subordinate group" who do not have the control of the campus. For the 
Christians, the "balance point" is seen as a threat of their dominance, while for the Muslims this 
point is an opportunity to control the university. It is imperative to notice that the debate over 
the "equilibrium point" takes place not only on the campus but also outside campus in terms of 
power sharing in bureaucracy, military /police, or civil servants. 
In contrast to the "Unpatti incident," the mass violence that took place months later in 
Ambon town on September 11, 2011, had a different nature and impact. Unlike the incident in 
Unpatti that broke out between Christian and Muslim students and occurred only in the campus 
area, the mass clashes on the 11th of September and sporadic incidents thereafter in Ambon city 
involved larger communities of Christians and Muslims, and resulted in damages, deaths and 
injuries. Accordingly the uprising raised fears of a return to the collective unrest that wracked 
the region from 1999 to 2002. The discord was sparked by the death ofDarfin Saimin, a Muslim 
motorcycle driver (tukang ojek), on September 10. Local police reported that Darfin's death was 
an accident, while the family was convinced that he had been killed based on evidence (i.e. 
wounds) they found on the back of the body. 
Text messages that he had been tortured and murdered by Christians began circulating, 
and by the time Darfin was buried, hundreds of mourners had gathered. Mass violence soon 
exploded as the Muslim mourners (pelayat) left the cemetery and continued on to target 
Christian areas. Having been attacked by the Muslim rioters, the Christians retaliated, and mass 
fighting could not be avoided. As a result some eight died and dozens injured, and hundreds of 
houses from both sides were again burned to the ground (ICG 2011). By September 13 of that 
year, markets, schools and offices returned to normal, but Ambon had some 4,000 newly 
displaced persons, some of whom had lost their homes for the fourth time in twelve years. "I just 
rebuilt my house for the third time, but now it was burned again," a Christian from Talakke 
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region told me. Polarization was greater than ever, with mostly Christians believing the 
"accident theory," while most Muslims believed the "murder theory." 
After three days of conflict that attracted national media, I returned to Ambon to meet 
with my old friends and informants and collect data regarding this most recent mass violence. 
My aim in returning to Ambon was to examine and compare the new unrest with the 1999-2004 
bloodshed. Did both have similar patterns, roots, and objectives or completely different ones? I 
stayed in a modest hotel in the center of the city for a few days, and had conversations with, as 
usual, lay Muslims and Christians, religious/civil society leaders, activists, and government 
officials, including with the family of the deceased Darfin Saimin in a small alley of the crowded 
Muslim village (kelurahan) ofWaihoung in Ambon town. 183 Darfin's mother and family did not 
understand-and did not intend for sure-why his death generated mass violence. They said 
that it was a spontaneous outburst of the Muslim peiayat (mourners) who were angry at the 
police investigation. The question remains: why then were the Christians the target of their 
anger? Indeed rumors that the deceased had been killed by the Christians already spread by 
means ofponsel text messages before the body was buried. But, there was no evidence that the 
Darfin had been killed by the Christians. The suspicion or accusation of the Christians as the 
killers was only based on an assumption that the incident occurred in the Christian area of 
Gunung Nona, on a hillside portion of Ambon city. 
After days of riots, when the city was calm once again, people began to ask whether the 
violence was spontaneous or "by design." No matter how many theories of provocation are in 
play or how valid or invalid they may be, however, Ambon is vulnerable to conflict. Since the 
1999-2004 wars, the city has been almost entirely divided into Christian and Muslim zones, and 
183 Before the outbreaks of conflict in 1999, Waihoung was a plural semi-urban village 
(keiurahan) in Ambon city in which multi ethnic and religious groups, including the Chinese, had 
lived. But1 after the communal violence this place became a Muslim area from various ethnic 
backgrounds, settlers and migrants, Ambonese and non-Ambonese. 
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everyone knew the borders (perbatasan) were between residential neighborhoods. Accordingly 
it is easy for the Muslim or Christian rioters to attack their opposing religious groups.lt is 
essential to notice that in the modern day Ambon and Maluku, as an outcome of the previous 
wars that resulted in religious segregation, people understood one's religion by asking his/her 
village. As usual, theories and speculations concerning the root causes of the violence circulated 
among Ambonese societies ranging from the policejmilitary conspiracy to Muslim terrorism. 
Some sources also said that the violence was provoked by some dispossessed elites of 
the Hatuhaha Muslims who wanted to use the uprising to return to the power they enjoyed since 
early 1990s in particular when the Hatuhaha Muslim Akib Latuconsina was appointed to be the 
first Ambonese Muslim Governor of Maluku. Since that period until the advent of direct elections 
for local officials in 2005, the Muslim political elite who dominated bureaucracy in Ambon and 
Central Maluku had come from clans of the Hatuhaha federation, on Haruku Island. This 
confederacy consists of mainly five Muslim villages, namely Pelauw, Kailolo, Ory, Rohomoni, and 
Kabauw. In Ambon or Maluku in general, Muslim clans from the Hatuhaha-such as 
Latuconsina, Marasabessy, Tuasikal, Sangaji, Salampessy, to name but a few-are famous since 
many Muslims from these clans have become political/military elites in Ambon, Central Maluku, 
or jakarta. 184 
The Hatuhaha group, not to be confused with Tuhaha federation on Saparua Island 
which consists of the Christian villages, traditionally had better access to education and 
influence than other Muslim groups and thus was in a position to rise to power when President 
184 The Hatuhaha, for instance, produced a number of political elites, including Governors of 
Maluku (Akib Latuconsina from 1992-1997, and M. Saleh Latuconsina, from 1997-2002), Regent of 
Central Maluku (Abdullah Tuasikal), former vice mayor of Ambon (Olivia Salampessy), former 
military elite in jakarta (Let Gen. Suadi Marasabessy), the head of provincial development board 
(Zidik Sangaji), former vice governor ofMaluku (Mehmet Latuconsina), and recent vice mayor of 
Ambon (Sam Latuconsina). Ironically, this group also produced a gang leader, Sulaiman Latupono 
and Maman Latuconsina1 a former mosque youth leader who controls vendor association in Ambon 
city's largest market Pasar Mardika (cf. ICG 2011]. 
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Suharto started reaching out to political Islam in the late 1980s or early 1990s through ICMI 
networks (cf. Hefner 2000). As the Hatuhaha Muslims consolidated power in Ambon and Central 
Maluku, antipathy towards them rose among the Christians and Muslims outside the Hatuhaha 
since these two groups were "marginalized" from bureaucracy (especially at the provincial 
level). education, and economy. 
As a result, when direct elections of governor or regent (bupatz) took place, Christians 
and Muslims outside of the Hatuhaha such as those from Seram, Leihitu, Kei, Buru, Banda, and 
Buton joined forces to form a strong anti-Hatuhaha movement. The movement is particularly 
strong in the regencies (kabupaten) ofBuru, Buru Selatan (South Burn), Seram Bagian Barat 
(West Seram), and Seram Bagian Timur (East Seram). The decline of the Hatuhaha elite, 
moreover, was brought into sharp focus with the 2008 gubernatorial election that Karel 
Ralahalu and his running mate Muhammad Assagaf, a Bandanese-Arab Muslim, won with more 
than 60% of the vote beating two Hatuhaha rivals: Abdullah Tuasikal (26%), former Regent of 
Central Maluku, and Mehmet Latuconsina (6%), former vice governor ofMaluku. 
While West Seram regency has become the stronghold of the Butonese Muslims185, 
Ambon and Central Maluku are the last bastions of the Hatuhaha Muslims in the province. As a 
result of their loss of power since the period of Governor Karel Ralahalu, some elites in the 
group, some sources said, wanted to regain lost status by playing the Islamic card, trying to 
generate sympathies among fellow Muslims by focusing on Christians as the common enemy. A 
Muslim source (cf. ICG 2011) said that in his neighborhood close to Ambon's Islamic State 
Institute (JAIN), all the rumors about Governor Karel Ralahalu fomenting the riots to divert 
attention from corruption came from the Hatuhaha elite. Rumors about Christians killing Darfin 
and provoking riots would fit into this framework. A Muslim lecturer at lAIN Ambon from 
1as In the regency of West Seram, Butonese Muslims composed a significant minority. As a 
result elites from this ethnic group twice become a vice regent [wakil bupatz). They are La Kadir and 
M. Husni. 
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jazirah (Peninsula) Leihitu also expressed a similar opinion. In a conversation with me, he 
pointed out that the resentment felt by Hatuhaha Muslims towards Governor Karel Ralahalu 
since 2004 was in part because the Governor, who is a GPM Protestant, had built a "political 
coalition" in his government with Muslims from outside Hatuhaha such as those from Leihitu, 
Seram, Tenggara, Tual, Banda, and Buton. 
As a result Muslim clans from those areas such as Soulisa, Soumena, Uluputy, Far Far, 
Rahawarin, and Assagaf, to name but a few, held significant positions in the government and 
other political positions186 These Muslim clans have long opposition with the Hatuhaha partly 
because when the "Latuconsina regime" (i.e. Akib Latuconsina and Saleh Latuconsina) became 
Governors of Maluku (from 1992 to 2002) they did not use these groups in the bureaucracy.187 
Because the Hatuhaha group does not enjoy positions in the governorship of Karel Ralahalu, he 
continued to say, they inflamed anti-Karel sentiments proclaiming that Karel Ralahalu was an 
anti-Islam and pro-Christian governor. "This is an expression of the 'losers,' the defeated ones 
who were not accommodated in the bureaucracy," a Leihitu Muslim said. 
No matter how valid or invalid this "evicted Hatuhaha elites' theory," the fact is that the 
Hatuhaha group is also not solid. They are also prone to conflict and competition over political 
and economic resources. In many cases clans or sub-clans (Ambonese: marga or soaJ from the 
Hatuhaha federation were involved in harsh rivalry, not only in political domain but also in 
ad at-related matters. In politics, for example, they compete to win the vote such as the rivalry 
between Abdullah Tuasikal and Mehmet Latuconsina in the gubernatorial election in 2008. 
Olivia Latucinsina-Salampessy and MAS (Sam] Latuconsina also struggled to win the votes of the 
same clans in the 2011 election of Mayor of Ambon. At present, political elites from major clans 
IB6 Muslims from these clans holding top positions during the period of Karel Ralahalu 
include Reni Soulisa (former provincial head of Education Ministry in Maluku], Rahman Soumena 
(assistant to the governor], Said Assagaf (vice governor], Nasir Rahawarin, ldrus Tatuhey (Maluku's 
Commission of General Election or KPU), and Abdul Rahman Uluput:y (Kisbang Lin mas). 
IB7[nterview with SS, Ambon, November 26, 2010. 
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of the Hatuhaha group also tried to seize control over the same clans to win the 2012 election of 
Bupati (head of regency) of Central Maluku. They are jusufLatuconsina, Hamzah Sangadji, and 
Abua 'ruasikal. In addition to struggling in political j economic sphere, clans from the Hatuhaha 
were also involved in conflict with one another in terms ofland, religious matters, and ad at-
related issues. 
In February 2012, this group, again, was involved in bitter communal violence. Unlike 
the two previous cases of mass violence depicted above, the disturbance that took place in 
Pe!auw was rooted in an inter-clan conflict in the village. My Ambonese informants reported 
that the civil unrest happened between kelompok depan ("front group") and kelompok belakang 
("back group"), both of which consisted of a number of clans and sub-clans such as Sa!ampessy, 
Tualepe, and Latuconsina. The groups in the "back group" joined forces to face and fight against 
those in the "front group." Initially driven by a disagreement over the renovation of a rumah 
ad at (a traditional ad at house), with some groups wanting the ad at house's roof to be replaced 
by a roof-tile (genteng) or iron sheets [seng) while others rejected the changes, preferring the 
use of previous roof with rumbia (palm leaves), and the tensions escalated into communal riots, 
resulting in six deaths, dozens of injuries, damages to hundreds of houses, and the creation of 
thousands of refugees.188 My informant in the village of Karin, bordering Pelauw, said that 
although they came from the same clans, their economic condition and education differed. While 
clans and sub-clans that clustered in the "front group" mostly had good incomes and educational 
backgrounds, those living in the "back group" were mostly from the low class economy. 
It is also important to notice that Pelauw, located on Haruku Island in Central Maluku, 
was the largest Muslim village in this island. Unlike its neighboring villages such as Kailolo and 
Ory, Pelauw is the stronghold of adat-based Muslims who practice and believe various local 
188 My informant in Kariu, neighboring Pelauw, reported that 6 people died, 262 houses were 
burnt down, 193 houses damaged, 20 injured, 1.365 people displaced in Kailolo (mostly from the 
"front group"), and 678 people (all the "back group") displaced in Kabauw. 
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traditions that they consider to be part of Islam. These beliefs and practices have resulted in a 
series of incidents between the Peiauw Muslims and OryjKailolo Muslims who practice shari' a-
based Islam (reformist Islam), a conflict that caused the division of the village in 1939 ( cf. 
Chauvel1980; see also Chapters 3-4). I assumed, at first, that the recent riots in Pelauw 
illustrated above were somehow a clash between the reformist and ad at-based Muslims, an 
assumption that is evidently wrong since both parties involved in the conflict came from the 
same ad at groups. When I visited Pelauw and neighboring villages in late-2010, local people 
tended to express their disagreement with other groups with regard to ritual and religious 
practices or the debate over the land access, or the preservation and authenticity of ad at or 
customs traditionally practiced by their forefathers. 
Religion, "Clan-ism," and Regionalism 
Whatever the root causes of, and reasons for, the three cases of the communal conflicts 
described above, this recent violence indicates that the nature and dynamics of conflict vary and 
change from place to place and from time to time. Although religion still plays a role in some 
cases of violence, it is, however, not the only source of violence. Rivalries over land, either in 
terms of"traditional ad at lands" (Ambonese: tanah pertuanan) or non-adatlands, as well as 
market places, customs, political assets, and new settlements are still on the scene. 
Religion, no doubt, does still matter in modern Maluku, especially in Ambon city. The 
fact that the communal clashes in September 11 and its aftermath in Ambon town sketched 
above fell along religious lines confirms this impression. Some Muslims and Christians in the 
town with whom I spoke still express their grief of the violent past, and some of them have 
passed on their previous bitter experiences to their offspring. It is starling to find that most 
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recent Muslim and Christian undergraduate students whom I surveyed 189 and with whom 
conversed still expressed suspicion and disbelief with their "opposing" religious groups. Some 
students even openly expressed their dislike of the other religion's teachings, traditions, and 
scriptures. 
I wondered whether this disrespect for and poor understanding of other religious 
cultures maybe due to the fact that students I surveyed were from Christian/Muslim-based 
campuses (UKIM and lAIN). I then visited a state university and a college (Unpatti and Poltek) 
where Christian and Muslim students commonly mixed. I was surprised, however, to find the 
fact that students in both campuses also tended to group along religious lines. Students said that 
there is no student body that mixes both religious communities. Surprisingly, some Muslim 
students also expressed their satisfaction with living in a state of religious separation. A Muslim 
student said, "Christian-Muslim segregation is better than mixing. By living in a community or 
area that resides only Muslims, we are able to practice religious worships purely and calmly. If 
we live combining with Christians, we are bothered by the church bell (lonceng) and dogs. Many 
times dogs enter a mosque, whereas this animal is najis ("dirty or impure") and prohibited in 
Islam. For that reason, I prefer to live with a Muslim community."190 These divisions among the 
younger generations may be an impediment to future peace building and the implementation of 
citizenship culture in the region. 
A common phrase these college undergrads, just like their parents, frequently used was 
as follows, "katong zeng percaya /ai deng dong" ("we do not trust them anymore"). The 
Ambonese terms katong (we jus} and dong (they/them} which formerly refer to a particular 
IB9 During the fieldwork1 I administered a questionnaire survey on perceptions of Christian 
and Muslim students with their "opposing" religious groups. The survey I distributed to 200 
hundreds Christian and Muslim students at Universitas Kristen Indonesia Maluku1 Ambon's GPM 
Protestant-based main university, and Ambon's Islamic State Institute (JAIN}. I thank Steve Gaspersz 
and M. Safin Soulisa for allowing me distributing the quiz at both campuses. 
19° Conversation with Muslim students from Unpatti and Poltek in December 2010. 
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group beyond religious and ethnic boundaries, now points to a religiously based in-group 
identity. Accordingly when the Ambonese Christians, for instance, say "katong" that means the 
Christians, whatever their ethnic and regional backgrounds, and when they say "dong" they 
mean the Muslims, including the Ambonese Muslims. Conversely, when the Muslims say 
"katong," it refers to the Muslims, and when they utter "dong" they mean the Christian 
communities. Thus, in today's Ambon, the words katong and dong have become a religious 
marker. This change thus provides a critical challenge for traditional systems of inter-village 
alliances and interreligious brotherhoods traditionally practiced by both religious groups in 
some villages in Ambon and central Maluku. The shifting idea also indicates, in some parts, the 
winning of world religion over Moluccan culture. 
However it is oversimplification to say that everything in Ambon and Maluku concern 
religion or that all conflicts in Ambon and Maluku happened merely between Christians and 
Muslims. Religion and Christian-Muslim antagonism are only part of the region's social and 
political life. As illustrated in the previous paragraphs, clashes also broke out among Muslims 
between different or same clans or ethnic groups. Conflict and competition among Muslims from 
different ethnic backgrounds, regions, and clans-both settlers and migrants-over cultural, 
economic, and political resources were common in pre-conflict Maluku (see Chapters 3 and 4) 
and are still common today. 
lt is imperative to highlight that a number of Muslim groups in the province such as 
those of Hatuhaha (e.g. Pelauw, Kailolo, and Ory on Haruku Island), Leihitu (e.g. Hitu, Hila, 
Wakal, Mamala, Morela, etc. in the northern part of Ambon Island), Seramese (from Seram 
Island), Ambonese Arabs, Buru Muslims (from Buru Island), Bandanese (Banda Island), 
Tenggara or Southeasterners (from Kei, Tual), Butonese and Kendarians (Southeast Sulawesi), 
Bugis-Makasarese (South Sulawesi), Ternatans (North Maluku), to name but a few, have always 
been in conflict and rivalry for control of scarce local resources. Due to this competition, some 
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Muslim groups sometimes are more willing to forge alliances with Christians than with Muslims, 
in an effort to exclude or eliminate their Muslim rivals. Most existing literatures always depict 
the rivalry between Christians and Muslims in the marketplaces and political arenas causing 
tensions and conflicts among them. In fact, the rivalry is not only between Christians and 
Muslims but also among Muslims such as that of the Pelauw and Butonese (and Makasarese] to 
get access to the traditional market of Ambon City. Anti-BBM (Butonese, Buginese, and 
Makasarese] campaigns in the early stage of the Maluku conflict were also supported by the 
Pelauw and the Hatuhaha Muslims. 
The disputes between factions of Butonese migrant groups are also common, 
particularly between Buton lama (the old Butonese] and Buton baru (the new Butonese]. The 
Buton lama is a group of Butonese whose forefathers migrated from their homeland in 
Southeast Sulawesi to Ambon or Maluku in colonial times, and settled in rural areas and 
mountains of Ambon Island or Central Maluku, while the Buton baru refers to the new Butonese 
migrants, especially since the New Order, who mostly settled in Ambon city. Whereas the 
profession of the Buton lama is mostly farming, the Buton baru work as petty traders. The Buton 
lama, moreover, is organized in an organization named BKM Sutra (Bad an Koordinasi 
Kerukunan Masyarakat Maluku asal Sulawesi Tenggara], while the Buton baru join PKST 
(Persatuan Keluarga Sulawesi Tenggara, whose main base is in jakarta]. Ambonese society 
characterizes the Buton lama as a cultural Butonese (Buton kulturaf) and the Buton baru as a 
trading Butonese (Buton dagang]. Throughout the communal conflicts of 1999-2002, the Buton 
baru mostly became the target of the rioters. The Buton lama even accused the Buton baru as 
trouble makers since they migrated to Ambon town only to find jobs and competed with other 
migrants or local Ambonese. 
Furthermore, the conflicts and tensions in to day's Ambon also took place between the 
main Moluccan Protestant Churches (the GPM) and the Christian members of Pentecostal and 
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Evangelical churches such as Bethel, Bethany, GBI Rock (Representative of Christ Kingdom), 
Sidang jemaat Allah, Kemah Injil, Tiberias, and Advent. The GPM pastors told me that the conflict 
began when GPdi (Gereja Pentakosta di Indonesia or the Indonesian Pentecostal Church), 
expanded its mission in Ambon and competed to get new converts, especially from the GPM. 
Some elites of the GPM, particularly church ministries (majelisjemaat), also joined ("converted") 
with this new religious movement for a number of reasons ranging from the disappointment 
with the policy and leadership of the GPM which they considered as too compromising with the 
Muslims, conflict with other members of church officials, to "economic interests" since this new 
church offered a better salary for a pastor and ministries and good facilities. 
The Pentecostals also offered scholarships, spiritual tours to holy lands (wisata rohanz), 
music courses, or musical groups designed to recruit young people from the GPM. The church 
also provided money for new converts. It is common to know that this sort of church has good 
financial resources, either from its members or international donors of Pentecostal networks, 
including in the US. A GPM pastor said, "Many corruptors also give donation to this church since 
it never reckons corruption as a sinful and immoral deed. By donating the money to this church, 
the Pentecostal pastors have claimed that the corruptors' sins will be forgiven by God." 
Although the Pentecostals came to Ambon before the eruption of the 1999 conflict, their 
members grew during and after the violence. The church's religious activities and teachings 
have attracted considerable GPM members, particularly among youth and the urban poor. To 
appeal to Ambonese people, the Pentecostal church has regular mass religious gatherings in 
Ambon city's main squares and buildings attended by public figures, pastors, artists, or singers 
from jakarta to lead sermons, give witness of Christian faith, and perform music. The church's 
religious elites have claimed that the bloodshed that took place in Ambon from 1999 to 2002 
was due to the sins of Ambonese Christians, mainly GPM, who did not practice properly pure 
Christian teachings. 
341 
The church's pastors strongly criticize GPM for having practiced and amalgamated two 
contrasting traditions: the pure Christian faith and the impure ad at belief. While GPM believed 
that local customs are part of God's gift through which He works and transforms His knowledge, 
and therefore need to be respected (see Chapter 9), the Pentecostals blame these as evil 
practices. In order to circumvent renewed violence and keep away from God's anger, they then 
came up with the idea of a new repentance by submitting to a new church with a new spirit and 
faith, namely the Pentecostal. Due to some criticism of the church toward GPM and the move of 
GPM members to this church it is understandable why the two churches have been involved in 
conflict and tension. 
Notwithstanding their strong religious influences, communal disputes in modern 
Maluku have been sparked by ethnic-ism, tribalism, clan-ism and regionalism. Instead of 
religious identities, most politicians in contemporary Maluku and Ambon emphasize their ethnic 
or tribal identities (such as Ambonese, Seramese, Butonese, or Bandanese), their clans or jam in 
Ambonese Malay (such as Latuconsina, Tuasikal, Marasabessy, Rahawarin, or Papilaja), or their 
native regions (Haruku, Saparua, Seram, Pulau Ambon, Tenggara, Buru, or Banda) to win the 
hearts of voters. The implicit message is that each ethnic group or clan-whatever their 
religion-has to vote for its own leaders to guarantee access to vital economic resources and 
political power. Indigenous people of Ambon, for instance, expressed their dissatisfaction and 
distress that Ambon city had long been governed by political elites from the islands of Lease (i.e. 
Saparua, Haruku, and Nusalaut), neighboring Ambon. In Ambon and Maluku, it should be noted, 
people know one's regional origins by pointing his/her last name, indicating their jam or marga 
(clans and sub-clans). At present, as a result of the 2011 election, Ambon town is again being 
headed by political elites from the Lease (Richard Louhanapessy, Mayor of Ambon from 
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Saparua, and Sam Latuconsina, Vice Mayor of Ambon from Haruku]. Interestingly, native 
candidates from Ambon failed to gain major votes in the region's elections191 
Commenting on the shifting phenomena in modern Maluku, Lutfi Sanaky, a politician of 
Islamic political party PBR (Partai Bin tang Reformasl) from Siri-Sori Islam in Saparua, states, "In 
the political domain, the threat for future Maluku's democracy is tribal sentiment At this time, 
issues in regional elections for electing a region's heads or members of parliament, recruitment 
of civil servants and military /police, or access to economic resources in Ambon and Central 
Maluku, all these things use this tribal sentiment." Lutfi Sanaky, who is running for head (bupatl) 
of Central Maluku, refers to this sort of sentiment as "sukuisme" (ethnicism], noting that it 
becomes a new hazard for Ambon's future social, cultural, and political life. He pointed out that 
people from the northern, southern, or southeastern regions of Maluku-no matter their 
religion-usually experience difficulties in getting access to bureaucracy and other political and 
economic spheres in contemporary Ambon and Central Maluku. 
Although, the boundary between religion and clan-ism or regionalism in present-day 
Ambon is quite blurred, all these factors, however, still matter in the political and social life of 
Ambonese society. It is difficult to point out, for instance, whether people voted for their 
candidates because of religious or regional/tribal issues since the candidates for heads of 
municipality, regency, or province chose their running mates from different religions. Thus if the 
candidates running for mayor, regent, or governor are Muslims, they select Christians as their 
running mates, and vice versa, to win the hearts of the voters. Political parties and their elites 
tend to build coalitions with those possessing different religions from their own. One of the most 
191 Clans of the native Ambon include, for the Christians, Maspaitella, Tita, Hatulesila, 
Talahatu, Telapary, Peta, Hetharion, Hunihua, Risakotta, Kastanya, Nunumete, Wattimanela, to name 
but a few, while for the Muslims, Saulatu, Mahu, Wael, Pelu, Tuahuns, Tuasalamony, Lestaluhu, 
Salatalohy, among others. Native clans in Ambon that were influenced by the Portugese or the Dutch 
include, among others, Gaspersz1 da Costa, de Fretes, de Keiser, de Lima, de Jonge, van Deilsen, van 
Kapele, and Schroeder. 
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outstanding election results to indicate the shift was the gubernatorial elections in 2008 in 
which people elected Karel Albert Ralahalu, a Protestant and member of GPM, as Governor of 
Maluku with more than 60 percent, defeating two Muslim rivals, Abdullah Tuasikal and Mehmet 
Latuconsina, even though the province's population is dominated by Muslims. This is to say that 
change regarding religious orientation has indeed taken place in modern-day Maluku. 
In addition to issues dealing with clan-ism and regionalism, the hindrance for the 
establishment of citizenship culture and religious pluralism in modern AmbonjMaluku comes 
from some political elites and parties who still use and manipulate religious sentiments and 
identities for their purposes. Some conservative elites from religious-based political parties 
even support the preservation of the existing religious-based segregation and reject the 
government's and moderate leaders' project proposals of Christian-Muslim integration. For 
these particular political opportunists, the separation is regarded as a political precondition for 
winning voters. With the division in place, they can easily mobilize masses by using religious 
jargons to attract the voters. On the contrary, if the people integrated, convincing and mobilizing 
them by utilizing or manipulating religious identities, would be more difficult. 
Furthermore, the remnants of extremist Muslim groupings linked to both the former 
Laskar jihad and trans-local terrorist networks of jama'ah Islamiah, Laskar Mujahidin, and 
KOMPAK have been the next obstacle for building interreligious harmony in the province. Some 
extremist members of these groups still see Maluku [and Paso) as an area where "enemies of 
Islam," including local Christians, continue to pose a threat to the Muslim community. These 
radical Muslim groups believe that parts of Maluku and Po so have the potential to develop into 
what they called qaidah aminah, a secure place where residents can live by Islamic principles 
and apply Islamic law. In their view such a base could then serve as the building bloc of an 
Islamic state. Maluku and Paso thus remain a focus for religious outreach and recruitment 
efforts [cf. ICG 2005). 
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In Maluku, these militant groups built their bases at, among others, Dusun (sub-village) 
Hanunu in the village ofWaesalah in West Seram and the village of Haya at Tehoru in the Central 
Maluku regency. Local people of Peru in West Seram told me that, at first, the "jihad" 192 
("jihadist") built its base in Hanunu after having permission from Waesalah's Muslim raja who 
was involved in rivalry over the forest resources, particularly maleleuca trees (pohon kayu 
putih) which can be produced to become a medical oil (minyak kayu putih), with the neighboring 
Christian village of Alang Asaude. The raja, Umar Kasturian, invited the jihadists to this area in 
an attempt to terrorize villagers of Alang Asaude into not chopping down the trees and 
producing the valuable medical oil. The raja even joined Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah wal 
jamaah, the organizational mother of the Laskar jihad, and recruited local villagers to be the 
jihadists. No doubt, the remnants of ex-Laskar jihad members are present in modern Maluku, 
and some of them have built their base in Ambon city, particularly in Gunung Malin tang and 
some places in the town's main crowded Muslim negeri, Batumerah. They built madrasah, 
foundations, religious meeting groups, and a mosque near Mardika market, known Masjid 
Laskar referring to Laskar jihad. 
These ex-jihadist groups, in addition to Muslim and Christian conservatives, anti-
pluralist religious leaders, corrupt government officials, pro-segregation political elites, 
unemployed trans-migrants, military /police personnel who have deserted, ex-Christian/Muslim 
fighters, street thugs (preman), local bosses, competing businessmen, and some clan or region-
oriented groupings may-and do-represent a challenge to Maluku's struggle for peace, 
1
" The term "jihad" in Ambon refers to all Muslim [ex) militias, mostly Javanese by ethnicity, 
linked to the ex-Laskar jihad. In fact, Laskar jihad was not the only producer of radical groupings. 
Other groups such as jama'ah Jslamiah, KOMPAK, Laskar Mujahidin, Hizbullah, Laskar jundullah, 
among others, also have produced the militant groups, including terrorist networks. However, for the 
AmbonesejMoluccan societies in general the words "jihad" or "ke/ompokjihad" mainly refer to [ex) 
members of the Laskar jihad. 
reconciliation, and citizenship culture. These particular groups also have the potential to 
provoke recurrences of communal riots in years to come. 
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However, the story of Maluku is not all about these uncivil groupings. Maluku's account 
is also not merely about violence, intolerance, and hostility. It will be an enormous error to 
conclude that Maluku's social history and culture is all about enmity and antagonism. This 
picture will neglect another picture of Ambonese and Moluccan societies, a portrait about 
tireless continuing endeavors of interreligious groups, community and political leaders, as well 
as activists and practitioners in pursuing pacification and struggling for democratic civilities and 
tolerance-in-pluralism. 
Civic Peace and Citizenship 
In the midst of the first days of chaos on September 11, 2011, depicted in the previous 
paragraphs, dozens of brave activists and religious leaders of both faiths who called themselves 
"peace provocateurs" rushed around dispelling rumors and urging calm. This interreligious 
cooperation was coordinated by Rev. jacky Manuputty, a Hartford Seminary-trained GPM pastor 
and conflict resolution practitioner, and Dr. Abidin Wakano, head of the Moluccan Interfaith 
Institute (LAIM), director of Ambon Mediation and Reconciliation Center, and a lecturer at the 
Islamic state college in Ambon. Some human right activists, journalists, and academicians joined 
this group, including (among others), Zairin Salampessy and Rev. Agus Lopuhaa. 
These activists with a group of young people called "Ambon Bergerak" (the "moved 
Ambon") and members of LAIM. Their core group was about ten individuals, each of whom had 
some ten or fifteen contacts around the town's major flash points. They were on the phone with 
each other constantly, checking out stories and sending information over Twitter, Face book, 
emails, and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town, for instance, 
heard the rumors about the destruction of a church or a mosque, he called a member of the 
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network stationed at the churchjmosque to take a photo with his phone and then circulate it, to 
prove it was standing undamaged. This tactic was to cut off the increase of the false rumors that 
could be potential for being used by the provocateurs to mobilize masses in the riots. 
I was involved in the discussions held by this group that occasionally took place until 
mid-night. They discussed a number of issues including the possibilities of actors and roots of 
the disarray and strategies to blockade unintended outsiders. They, moreover, identified 
influential strategic partners in border neighborhoods and put them in touch with one another 
to help coordinate the dissemination of information. They were keenly aware of the impact of 
national media on the unrest; they designated one person to monitor the reporting and send 
clarifications as necessary to the relevant journalists. Their activities focused on collecting and 
verifying reports of attacks, threats, street blockades, injuries, crowds massing and then trying 
to defuse the threats ( cf. lCG 2011]. 
Separately, top religious leaders in Ambon joined forces to prevent the escalation of the 
riots. GPM Synod chairman, Rev. Dr. john Ruhulessin, for instance, went to the hotspots to 
defuse conflict and gather GPM pastors and church elites to calm their followers. MUI chairman, 
Idrus Tukan, intervened in mosques and instructed their ta'mir (mosques' officials) and imam in 
order to convey peace sermons in the Friday prayer. Taking a similar approach, P.C. Mandagi, 
Bishop of Diocese of Ambo ina, tried to calm his Catholic followers so that they would not be 
influenced by strangers and provocateurs. Interreligious meetings were frequently held to 
monitor the development of conflict and peace. 
Moreover, impressively, Governor Karel Ralahalu went down to the streets. Using a 
motorcycle helmet as protection from stones thrown by the rioters, the governor tried to calm 
the masses and rioters. Other city officials also worked frantically on the phones to religious 
leaders, gang leaders and anyone else with influence, trying to lower tensions. Vice Mayor of 
Ambon Sam Latuconsina, a Muslim, also worked hard to soothe tensions of Muslim 
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communities, and prevent the escalation of the clashes. He attended meetings held by the above 
"peace provocateurs" to share information regarding the riots. As well, he invited Ambonese 
religious leaders and activists to discuss the recent riots and how to manage conflicts, worries, 
and tensions in order to prevent further escalation in the violence. At the local and village levels, 
religious, youth, and community leaders of both sides also worked together to avert the rise of 
violence. 
In brief, local government, religious and civil society leaders, at provincial, municipal, 
and village levels, collaborated to minimize the impact of the communal clashes. The result was 
impressive: the riots failed to escalate to broader areas and communities. Although rumors of 
burning or destroying worship places and provocations of killings of Muslims and Christians 
scattered across and beyond the city, these rumors and provocations failed to influence the 
larger religious communities. Unlike the carnage in january 1999 that soon escalated to other 
areas, including rural islands, beyond the initial incident in the Batumerah-Mardika 
neighborhoods in Ambon city, the riots that broke out in September 11-13, 2011, only blew up 
in a few areas in Ambon town. 
It is unfair, however, to say that the inability of the riots to escalate was just the product 
of elite efforts. The success was the result of both the elites and ordinary people. The elites, both 
political and religious, need to be praised for their marvelous attempts to prevent the escalation 
of riots and to calm the communities. The ordinary people, furthermore, must be appreciated for 
their refusal to join the rioters and attackers. Some Ambonese informants illustrated this 
noteworthy phenomenon as a "blessing" of the 1999-2004 wars. The death and destruction from 
1999 to 2004 had certainly left dreadful pains but it also teaches positive things for the 
Ambonese society, including, among others, that the local people had become immune to 
provocations and false rumors. They crosschecked one another concerning unclear issues 
distributed through text messages. Although the government officials or top religious leaders 
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had definitely contributed to the pacification processes, the last bastion lied in the hands of 
village-based communities and elites. 
Another significant development in the modern Maluku is that both Christians and 
Muslims are not interested in pursuing sectarian religious laws. While in some regions in 
Indonesia, some conservative religious groups eagerly promote the application oflslamic Law 
(Islamic Syari'a) such as in Aceh193 (e.g. Hefner 2011) and of"Christian Law" such as in West 
Papua, the questions of religious law did not figure prominently in both Maluku (dominated by 
Muslims) and Ambon city (dominated by Christians). It is imperative to note that since the 
downfall of dictatorial President Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia, with about 87% ofits more 
than 240 millions citizens professing Islam, has been struggling for its future politics, 
democracy, citizenship, and religious pluralism. 
Indonesia's recent political and religious developments, in particular, have been 
marked by the emergence of two opposing Muslim groups. First are moderate and progressive 
groups and organizations that have played pivotal roles in developing democratic cultures and 
politics to an extent that some observers have claimed Indonesia as the representation of the 
Islamic world in democratic politics. The second group is the conservative, anti-pluralist Muslim 
groupings that have contributed to the radicalization and intolerance which in turn could hinder 
the process of democratization as well as jeopardize political and social stability in the country. 
For that reason, Robert Pringle (2010) suggests that the future of Indonesian Islam will be 
determined by the competition of"conservatism" and "pluralism." 
193 The implementation of Islamic Law (syari'a) in the province of Aceh was the consequence 
of a national policy oflegal pluralism, effected in 2001, when the national government decided to give 
a special status and wide autonomy in the region. Since then some provinces, regencies, and 
municipalities in Indonesia were eager to implement the Islamic Law or Perda Syariah. Until 
September 2006 no less than 16 districts have ratified the ?erda Syariah. Hefner (2011) notes that 
legal codes based on syari'a were passed in 53 of 470 districts and municipalities. 
349 
To achieve its goals, the conservative group, among other things,. has struggled to 
implement elements of Islamic Law, popularly known Perda Syariah, which raised deep 
concerns among domestic and international communities. The Perda Syariah raised pros and 
cons among Muslims in the country. The pros argue that these laws are legitimate for at least 
two reasons; first, it gives the people social/communal securities that the state is unable to 
provide; and second, due to the fact that Muslims are Indonesia's majority religious group it is 
thus very justifiable to take Islam as a common moral umbrella. Meanwhile the cons contend 
that although Islam is the religion of the majority there are also non-Muslims among 
Indonesians, and institutionally, the nation is not an Islamic state, and therefore the ratification 
of Perda Syariah betrays the national consensus agreed upon by the founding fathers of the 
Republic. Not all Muslim agreed with the laws, however, because they only represent one 
Islamic stream among many interpretations and schools of thought (mazhab) in Islam. They 
argue that the laws are political projects, rather than religious, in that they deal more with 
intangible issues such as morality and preserving culture instead of solving real social problems 
such as poverty, unemployment, and corruption (cf. Hefner 2011). 
While some Muslim- or Christian-dominated regions in Indonesia have struggled to 
apply Islamic or Christian laws, fascinatingly, Christians and Muslims alike in Maluku and 
Ambon have shown little interest in the issue. This illustrates that what is most important for 
the Ambonese and Malukan societies is justice, peace, and welfare. Activists and sympathizers of 
Islamic political parties also expressed their lack of interests in pursuing the implementation of 
the Islamic Law. The provincial and regional branches of Islam-based political parties such as 
PKS (Partai Keadilan dan Sejahtera), PBB (Partai Bin tang Bulan), PER (Partai Bin tang 
Reformasl), and PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) are also not interested in discussing the 
application of Islamic Shari'a in Ambon and other regions in the Maluku province. 
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Party leaders point out that discussion of the implementation of Islamic Law in the 
Maluku context is useless and results in lost votes in elections. They even rejected the idea of the 
application oflslamic Law. In both Ambon city and Maluku province, religious-based political 
parties have indeed lost significant votes in the elections. The region's long dominant Islamic 
political party, the PPP, only had two seats ( 4.4%) in the 2009 elections, decreasing from 12 
seats (26.6%) in 1997,8 seats (17.7%) in 1999, and 4 seats (8.8%) in the 2004legislative 
elections. Other Islamic parties such as PER and PBB only shared 1 seat (2%) of each in the 
provincial parliament. The Protestant-affiliated political party, the PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera), 
had zero seats in the 2009 elections. Both Christians and Muslims in Maluku tended to vote for 
secular nationalist-based political parties such as Partai Golkar (8 seats or 17.7%), PDIP (8 seats 
or 17.7%), Partai Demokrat (7 seats 15.5%), and Partai Hanura (3 seats 6.6%).194 
Commenting on the decline of the religious-based political parties, a Muslim politician 
from PER, Lutfi Sanaky said, 
"The decline of the religious-based political parties could be driven by the society's 
mistrust toward the parties because they thought that religion had been misused 
and manipulated for political and individual interests of the parties' politicians. 
Before and during the communal wars, religious issues were 'marketable' but now 
not anymore. Maluku's modern societies are no longer interested in the religious 
issues. They are now more concerned about issues dealing with wellbeing, justice, 
and peace, and how to solve poverty1 unemployment, and underdevelopment." 195 
Despite the lack of interests toward the Islamic or Christian-based political parties or 
the societies' oppositions toward the idea of the application of Christian or Islamic Law, 
however, it is misleading to conclude that religion has disappeared from the Moluccan and 
Ambonese political and social scene. Religion does still matter in both cultural and political 
"
4 Interview with Idrus Tatuhey, head of the Maluku branch of the National Election 
Commission, in Ambon, November 5, 2010. 
195 Interview with Lutfi Sanaky, Ambon, February 7, 2011 
spheres. In the political processes, religion still plays a role and determines the process (e.g. 
issues of power sharing), albeit not in terms of ideological manners. 
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The shift also happens among ex-Laskar jihad members. Based on my conversations 
with some former members of this group, they are nowadays more interested in the moral 
issues than political ones. The group's recent orientation focuses on the piety of Ambonese 
society, and not ideology. They even refused to vote for the Islamic political parties for the 
reason that the parties have contributed to ongoing corruption, poverty, stupidity, and immoral 
practices. This is to say that this group has undergone the process of "de-politicization" and 
begun to take a new direction, including the possibility of building dialogue with the Christians. 
Uri Kaimudin, head (ketua ta'mir) of Mosque Al-Ma'ruf, the main mosque of the ex-Laskar jihad 
group in Batumerah, had shared with me about the group's willingness to engage and open 
dialogue with the Christians. He said, "We want Christians greet us and talk about anything 
related to everyday life. But, unfortunately they are unwilling to talk and looking at us with 
suspicion. Maybe, they think us to be terrorists." A graduate from a college in Yogyakarta and a 
member of the Laskar jihad since the beginning of their arrival in Ambon, Uri Kaimudin clarified 
that his group is not based in terrorism, different from jamaah Jslamiah members. "Although we 
wear the same robe and have grown the same beard, we differ. Let's remember the bitter past to 
build a sweet future," he asserts196 
Now the job lies in the hands of both the government and the society in the region. 
Building sustainable peace and reconciliation in the post-war societies requires the 
collaboration of both, as well as the "political will" of the conflicting parties to engage and 
interact with one another, and to establish a fruitful dialogue not only with the moderate 
factions but, more importantly, with the radical ones. "One cannot build a bridge starting from 
the middle," the peace activist and sociologist john Paul Lederach (1996) said, to criticize most 
196 Interview with Uri Kaimudin1 Ambon1 December 311 2010. 
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interreligious dialogue initiatives that only involved the moderate parties, neglecting the 
militant groups (cf. Mahmood 1996). The Maluku government, civil society and religious leaders 
have done a great job so far in approaching some militant factions of both Christians and 
Muslims. But their efforts are still limited to those of Ambonese and Moluccan ethnic 
backgrounds, and not ex-Laskar jihad members of non-Ambonese origins. 
Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the civil society movements and pro-democracy 
elements in both state and society have succeeded in bringing modern Maluku into post-war 
reconciliation and reformation typified by the decline of large-scale communal violence, the 
empowerment oflocal society, and the growing awareness ofthe significance of interreligious 
cooperation. The AmbonesefMoluccan Christian and Muslim avoidance of the idiologization of 
religion in the forms oflslamic Law or Perda Shari' at (for Muslims) or Christian Law or Perda 
Injil (for Christians) described above indicates that the two religious groups have acknowledged 
the importance of public needs and rights over primordial, sectarian needs/rights. The Maluku 
and Ambon governments have also implemented regulations concerning the recruitment 
mechanisms of civil servants, military /police and other positions in bureaucracy based on the 
capacity and skills of the applicants and not religious affiliations197 ( cf. Tomagola, at. a!. 2007). 
This competence-based policy is part of the government efforts to decrease sectarian politics 
and to increase citizenship culture. 
The Maluku case challenges some previous analyses and studies that (1) portray post-
Suharto Indonesia as a "failed state" due to the widespread of communal clashes, and (2) neglect 
the contribution of government in the reconciliation process of conflicting parties. Indeed, post-
New Order Indonesia had been marked by the outbreaks of ethno-religious violence scattered 
from Sam pit, Poso, to Ambon and North Maluku. Such brutal ethno-religious violent conflicts 
197 This information is based on my interviews with Mayor of Ambon J a pie Papilaja 
(December 17, 2010) and Governor ofMaluku Karel Albert Ralahalu (March 3, 2011). 
353 
changed the myth of the "smiling" Indonesia and civil Islam characterized by democratic civility 
and tolerance-in-pluralism in a question mark. However, looking solely at the violent elements 
oflndonesia will also fail to capture the Indonesian picture as a whole. 
Viewing post-Suharto Indonesia as a failed state due to the failure of civil society and 
political society agents in bringing the spirit of the reformasi (political reformation) agenda into 
the scene of Indonesian politics is also unfair and tend to neglect the country's achievements in 
attempts of implementing democratization (free election or press freedom), regionalism 
(regional autonomy), or conflict resolution (such as Aceh, Poso, and Maluku). Unlike Malaysia 
focusing on coalitional capital, Indonesia's concern has been political or cultural capital, namely 
democracy. judging post-reformation Indonesia as an intolerant society due to the rapid growth 
of Islamist groups is also a sort of unjust judgment partly because such views tend to ignore the 
flow of moderate elements and pluralist Muslims in the country who are concerned about civil 
democratic ideals. Even in the fragile regions like Ambon and Maluku, which social observers 
and political commentators dubbed as Indonesia's most dangerous hotspots due to the 
intensification of inter-group conflicts, the pluralist religious groupings are present throughout 
the islands. Portraying Ambon and Maluku as solely as a conflict area is only halftrue and unfair 
since the islands have also practiced a culture of inter-group harmony. 
Concluding Remarks 
Looking at the development of modern Ambonese and Moluccan politics, especially the 
dynamics of religious leaders, civil society and state-level politics, a few reflections and lessons 
can be drawn as follows. First, civil society alone is no longer enough to establish a sustainable 
peace and a citizenship culture. Those who had placed great hopes in civil society as the chief 
elements of democracy and civility need to hold their desires since civil society associations 
cannot guarantee the accomplishment of civil democratic ideals. In other words, civic 
354 
associations or associationallife is necessary but never sufficient to secure the practices of a 
civil-democratic politics. Civil society is not sufficient because CSOs, as indicated in Ambon and 
Maluku, can be sectarian groups, either based on ethnicity, religion, or class, aiming at achieving 
sectarian interests that far away from civil democratic ideals and citizenship culture. ln other 
words, civil associations can be a force of the creation of a "segmentary civility." 
Second, equally important is that this self-organizing civil society must be part of a 
larger pattern of what Robert Hefner has called "political pluricentrism," in which social class, 
group, or organization no longer affirms domination or monopoly control over the social, 
cultural, political, and moral resources of society. Third, in order to keep the balance of state and 
society, its norms must be scaled up into a "constitutional charter that enshrines equality, 
participation, and tolerance as principles oflaw, in a manner that protects them from political 
vicissitudes and socializes them among the public at large" (Hefner 1998: 39). 
This mutually reinforcing equilibrium is necessary to keep both state and society on the 
righttracks. If state is too strong while society is too weak it will create tyranny (e.g. Indonesia 
during the reign of Suharto or the Philippines under Marcos). On the other hand, if society is too 
strong while state is too weak, it will produce chaos and anarchy. Ethno-religious violence in 
post-Suharto Indonesia, including in Ambon and Maluku, was one of the best examples of the 
latter. The job of civil society thus, among others, is to maintain equilibrium and stability 
between state and society in order that both state and society do not fall into these extremist 
poles. 
This is to say that the implementation of civic democratic ideals needs the collaboration 
and synergy between state and society. The Maluku's future will also depend on this state-
society synergy to weaken sectarian, anti-pluralist and contra democratic movements and to 
maximize pro-democracy and pluralist groupings. The result of the state-society cooperation 
will determine the future of interreligious and inter-group relations in both Ambon and Maluku. 
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This is certainly a difficult task for the governments, religious leaders, and civil society 
associations in part because today's post~war Maluku is still facing a lot of social, political, 
economic, demographic, and religious problems such as militancy, identification with clan 
("clan~ism") or ethnic group and tribe (sukuisme), conservatism, poverty, unemployment, and 
over population, particularly in Ambon city. If not resolved properly, these issues will serve the 
sources of collective conflicts in the years to come. 
Chapter 13 
Conclusion 
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Based on the description sketched in the preceding chapters, several conclusions can be 
drawn as follows, first, unlike most existing scholarships that (1) portray pre-conflict Maluku as 
a stable area and (2) depict peaceful relations between Christian and Muslim groups before the 
communal conflict broke out in 1999, the dissertation shows that Maluku's social history and 
relations between the two religious groups in the region were marked by conflict, competition, 
and violence since European colonial times. Spurred by political-economic rivalry over local 
resources, the process of proselytization (Christianization and Islamization), and the 
discriminatory policies of the colonial regimes, both religious groups were pitted in a number of 
violent conflicts. This social history of interreligious conflicts, thus, provides a rationale for the 
later Christian-Muslim communal wars that took some tens of thousands of casualties. The 
legacy of inter-village alliance, the traditional system of Christian-Muslim unity, and the local 
mechanism of conflict resolution in pre-conflict Maluku appeared as an indigenous means of 
settling disputes which were widespread and commonplace in the region. In other words, these 
traditional ways of intergroup reconciliation and union indicate that the violence had been part 
of everyday life of Moluccan and Ambonese societies before, during, and after the colonial 
period. 
The second conclusion is that the Maluku conflict from 1999-2004 was not uniform in 
its development, but varied in terms of root causes, actors, motives, and interests. The acts of 
violence, furthermore, occurred in various episodes or stages ranging from religiously 
motivated riots to the violent conflicts driven by issues of separatism and terrorism. Due to the 
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local dynamics of the Maluku conflict, it is misleading to conclude that the conflict was the result 
of a single actor, motive, and cause. 
The third point is that locally-based actors in society played a significant role during the 
communal strife. They were not "passive victims" but truly "active agents" during the 
interreligious violence. This finding contrasts with most analyses on the Maluku conflict that 
tend to emphasize the central role of jakarta-based military and civilian elites as the 
perpetrators and portray Maluku's people as the victims. 
Fourth, the dissertation shows that conflict and competition among Muslims from 
different ethnic backgrounds, regions, and clans-both settlers and migrants-over cultural, 
economic, and political resources are very high in pre-conflict Maluku and its aftermath. As a 
result of these rivalries, some Muslim groups today are more willing to forge alliances with 
Christians than with Muslims, in effort to exclude or eliminate their Muslim rivals. This finding 
challenges previous studies that attribute all conflicts to Christian-Muslim rivalries. 
Fifth, in the first phases of the Maluku conflict, before turning to issues of separatism 
and terrorism, religious identities and discourses figured prominently in the framing and 
exacerbation of the violence. Based on my survey to one hundred ex-militias, both Christians 
and Muslims, and my conversation with ordinary people joined the wars, religious discourses, 
networks, institutions, and actors greatly contributed to the stimulation and escalation of the 
mayhem. This finding also contrasts with most previous analyses and studies that place singular 
emphasis on the political economy of the conflict. The dissertation also demonstrates that 
religious identities, discourses, and actors contributed in supporting and improving peace and 
reconciliation. 
Sixth, synergy between state and society actors has been the key to preventing 
additional outbreaks of violence. While some factions in government might-and did-play 
some role in exacerbating violence, others significantly contributed to the peace building and 
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reconciliation process between the conflicting parties. It is important to emphasize this point 
because many political analysts underestimate the positive role of the government officials and 
state institutions. Furthermore, while some actors in society played a vital role in increasing the 
violence, there are substantial groups of religious, grassroots, and community leaders that 
contributed to the peacemaking process in Maluku. 
Seventh, although the current situation of Maluku is relatively peaceful in the sense that 
there is no Christian-Muslim large scale violence, the region is still vulnerable to renewed 
outbreaks of violence. Issues of ethnic chauvinism, religious radicalism, imbalanced public 
policies, poverty and unemployment, institutionalized religious discrimination, as well as the 
continuing activities of anti-pluralist sub-groupings within each major religious and ethnic 
group, all could provoke further tension and hinder interreligious integration. 
Eighth, the question of religious law did not figure prominently in pre- and post-conflict 
Maluku (dominated by Muslims) and Ambon (dominated by Christians). This fact is in contrast 
with some parts of Indonesia in which some religious groups eagerly promote the application of 
Islamic Law or Shariat Islam (in some Muslim regions) and of "Christian Law" (in some 
predominantly Christian areas). 
Ninth, there is a tendency that in the aftermath of religious violence, ethnic difference, 
identification with clan ("clan-ism") or ethnicity (sukuisme), and "regionalism" are becoming 
more pronounced in contemporary Ambon and Maluku. Instead of religious identities, most 
politicians in contemporary Maluku and Ambon emphasize their clan, regional, or ethnic 
identity to win the hearts of voters. The implicit message is that each ethnic group or clan-
whatever their religion-has to vote for its own leaders to guarantee access to vital economic 
resources and political power. In some regions in the Maluku province, this clan or region-based 
chauvinism may contribute to future social tensions or even violence. 
Maps of Ambon and Maluku 
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